Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Lingnan Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

7-10-2020

Blurring boundaries : life and work of young middle-class women
in post-2000s urban China
Lili LIN

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd
Part of the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, and the Gender and Sexuality Commons

Recommended Citation
Lin, L. (2020). Blurring boundaries: Life and work of young middle-class women in post-2000s urban
China (Doctor's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/
88/

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Digital Commons @
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Lingnan Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Terms of Use
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its
author. Any reproduction, adaptation,
distribution or dissemination of this thesis
without express authorization is strictly
prohibited.

All rights reserved.

BLURRING BOUNDARIES:
LIFE AND WORK OF YOUNG MIDDLE-CLASS WOMEN IN
POST-2000S URBAN CHINA

LIN LILI

PHD

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2020

BLURRING BOUNDARIES:
LIFE AND WORK OF YOUNG MIDDLE-CLASS WOMEN IN
POST-2000S URBAN CHINA

by
LIN Lili
林莉莉

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Cultural Studies

Lingnan University

2020

ABSTRACT
Blurring Boundaries:
Life and Work of Young Middle-Class Women in
Post-2000s Urban China
by
LIN Lili
Doctor of Philosophy

The research concerns young middle-class women’s labor practices and experience
in cultural and creative industries (CCI) and the formation of labouring subjectivity
in the post-2000s urban China, based on text analysis and eight months of
ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai. Tracing women’s work histories throughout the
twentieth century in urban China, it is apparent that women’s work has historically
been prominently shaped by reproduction. Women have been positioned as flexible
labour and are embodied in the contradiction between production and reproduction.
Since the 2000s, a new round of reform has begun calling for ‘upgrading and
transforming’ production that is ‘made in China’ to ‘created in China’. The Chinese
government promulgates the discourse of creativity, inciting the young, educated
middle class to embrace ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’. Such socioeconomic conjuncture reconfigures women’s position in society. Young middleclass women, who are historically positioned in the field of flexible work, are now
represented as the paradigmatic workers in current modes of production. Through a
policy review and an examination of the key features of work in CCI, this research
argues that the discourse of creativity underlined by the spirit of entrepreneurship
legitimates and normalises a labour regime that directs young middle class,
particularly young middle-class women, to adopt a flexible and precarious pattern of
working life with limited social welfare protection. Young women’s work practices
in CCI are characterised by precariousness, flexibility, and entrepreneurship. They
are required to build their social relations and lived experience into work, which
blurs boundaries between production and reproduction.
The ethnographic fieldwork shows that young, urban middle-class women are both
the subject of and subjected to the demands of life focused on work. On the one hand,
they conform to the subject-position, produced in the hegemonic representation,
which prioritizes their role as workers over their maternal roles. Young women
consider work crucial to obtaining independence and self-actualization, and
constantly manage their human capital and fashion themselves in order to increase
employability. On the other hand, the expansion of productive logic intensifies the
contradiction women embodied and causes unspeakable pains such as anxiety and
depression, which are invisible in the representation but prominent in lived
experience. Young educated women are not entirely subsumed to the discourse of
‘putting life to work’, but try to negotiate and resist an excessive attachment to work
through various means, including recourse to the market and family. Yet, their means
of negotiation and resistance tend to be highly individualised and de-politicised.
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Introduction

Theorizing Gender, Work and Subjectivity
Gender and Labour in the ‘New Times’
There is a rich tradition of academic literature on gender and work (see e.g. Jarrett,
2014, McRobbie 2011, and Weeks, 2007, for recent reviews). One important strand
within this literature takes up the debate on the gendered division of labour in
sustaining the capitalist system (Alessandrini, 2012; Dalla Costa and James, 1972;
Federici, 2004; Fortunati, 1995; Fraser, 2016). The capitalist system separates the
domestic field from productive labour, and associates domesticity with women and
productivity with men. The two imperatives – the imperative of production, which is
to make profits to maintain the system, and the reproductive imperative, which is to
reproduce and replenish the ‘labour power’ needed for production – are ‘inextricably
braided but mutually opposed’ (Fraser, 2016). Yet, the systems of domination
associated with capitalism valorise men’s work in the field of production through
monetization via wage, and devalue ‘women’s work’ in the reproductive field as
unpaid, free, affective and immaterial. The capitalist accumulation relies on the
exploitation of ‘women’s work’ – the unwaged and free reproductive work to
sustain its order (Federici, 2012). Thus, Weeks (2011) maintains that the gendering
of labour creates a series of dichotomies, including production/reproduction,
family/work, and public/private. Gregg (2009: 211) also argues that such
‘problematic division in economic theory [has segregated] the private (unpaid) and
public (paid) spheres, implying that work in the home is less “material” than that in
the formal workplace’. In a word, the gendering of labour casts women in a
subordinated position in the domestic field and stresses their prime responsibility for
reproduction. The historical organization of labour has been based on the exclusion
of women from paid employment.
Yet, a shift to the ‘New Times’ since the 1980s has witnessed the rearrangement and
reconfiguration of women’s labour. The ‘New Times’, as Stuart Hall (2006: 222; see
also Hall and Jacques, 1989) defined it, brought about ‘social, economic, political
and cultural changes of a deeper kind now taking place in western capitalist
1

societies.’ Signifying a new cultural, political, social and economic conjuncture, the
‘New Times’ gave rise to different, though not necessarily connected, trends of
social change, of which ‘post-Fordism’ was one key phenomenon in the New Times.
At least in the first world, post-Fordism emphasises the shift from mass production
to a more flexible specialised production. The consequential rise of creativity and
innovation emerges from a broader discussion of ‘cultural turn’, as culture is
inflected into the logic of economy (Lash and Urry, 1994; McRobbie, 2002; Pratt
and Jeffcutt, 2009). This is the shift from industrial labour to what the Italian
autonomist writers called ‘immaterial labour’.
What kind of role do women play in the ‘New Times’ of post-Fordist production,
especially in the emergent cultural industries? It is necessary here to provide a brief
review of ‘immaterial labour’ and ‘affective labour’, which had been at the centre of
the debate in the post-Fordist regime of production.

Immaterial Labour and Its Gendered Limits
The blurring boundaries between life and work have been theorised by the
autonomist Marxists1 through the concept of ‘immaterial labour’ and ‘affective
labour’. Seeing the production of immaterial commodities (such as culture, creativity
and information) as a new hegemonic form of production, the Italian autonomist
Marxist writers Lazzarato (1996), Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004), and Virno (2004)
have used immaterial labour or affective labour to conceptualise the new mode of
labouring in a post-Fordist society. The concept provides a theoretical lens to
understand both the changes in the working practice and worker’s subjectivity that
such labour produces.
‘Immaterial labour’ refers to a post-Fordist phenomenon ‘where labour produces
immaterial goods such as service, a cultural product, knowledge or communication’
(Hardt & Negri, 2000). According to Lazzarato (1996: 133), immaterial labour

1

Negri draws from phenomenology (particularly the concept of form of life) and Foucault’s concept
of biopolitics to analyse the new configuration of global capitalism. See Negri, Marx beyond Marx:
Lessons on the Grundrisse (MA: Bergin & Garvey Publisher, 1984).
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includes two different aspects of labour: firstly, he recognises ‘the informational
content’ of the commodity, and uses the concept to explain the workers’ changing
labour process in the industrial and tertiary sectors, which heavily relies on computer
control skills and communicative cybernetics; secondly, he refers to the ‘cultural
content’ of the commodity, and applies the notion of immaterial labour to explain the
labour activities that would not previously have been considered work – in his own
words, ‘the kinds of activities involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic
standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and more strategically, public opinion’.
Hardt and Negri (2004) develop Lazzarato’s premise and outline a similar distinction
between linguistic immaterial labour (involving problem-solving and problemidentifying activities) and ‘affective labour’. They argue that affective labour, as a
form of immaterial labour, ‘produces or manipulates affect such as a feeling of ease,
well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion’ (ibid: 108). They define affects as
follows:
[U]nlike emotions, which are mental phenomena, affects refer
equally to body and mind. In fact, affects, such as joy and
sadness, reveal the present state of life in the entire organism,
expressing a certain state of the body along with a certain mode
of thinking. (2004:108)
For Hardt and Negri, legal assistants, flight attendants, and fast-food workers are
examples of affective labour,2 since these jobs, involving both bodies and brains, are
required to not just serve but also ‘serve with a smile’. They maintain that immaterial
labour has become the ‘hegemonic’ form of labour and ‘has imposed a tendency on
other forms of labour and society itself’ (ibid: 109).
The autonomist Marxist writers use the concept to theorise the changes of
production, labour relations and working conditions since the 1970s while also
raising concerns over the changing labour subjectivity. They maintain that
immaterial labour is always producing and reproducing post-Fordist subjectivity.
Lazzarato (1996) argues that it is subjectivity that is hired and managed at work. He

2

Such a form of labour is also defined as ‘emotional labour’ by Hochschild. See Hochschild’s work
The Managed Heart: Commercialisation of Human Feeling (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1983).

3

(1996: 134) claims that ‘the capitalist needs to find an unmediated way of
establishing command over subjectivity itself; the prescription and definition of tasks
transforms into a prescription of subjectivities.’ In a similar tone, Franco ‘Bifo’
Berardi (2009) maintains that it is the soul at work. Taking this cue, Virno (2004)
formulates the notion of ‘virtuosity’ grounded on the Marxist notion of intellectual
labour to examine immaterial labour, which is non-productive wage labour.
According to Virno (ibid), virtuoso workers do not produce material things in the
classical sense, but work based on communicative and cognitive abilities, involving
speaking and affective performing. He believes that the culture industry is the
exemplar of immaterial labour, claiming that the cultural and creative production
‘determines the operative instruments and procedures which will then be largely
applied to each corner of the social labouring process’ (Virno, 2001: 2). Thus, it
demands the entire person, with their knowledge and their affects, to become part of
the capitalist production process.
Similarly, Hardt and Negri (2004; 2009) use the concept of ‘biopolitical production’
to describe this form of immaterial labour. They recognise ‘a biopolitical turn of the
economy’, in which ‘the object of production is really a subject, defined, for
example, by a social relationship or a form of life’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009:132). That
is, work not only involves skills that could have been obtained on the job, but also all
aspects of social life, such as the cognitive activities, social relationships and affects,
that are accumulated outside of work. Echoing Hardt and Negri, Gorz (2010) also
identify immaterial labour as dependent on two forms of knowledge: one is ‘formal
knowledge’ (connaisance) that ‘bears on formalised objectivised contents which
cannot belong to persons’; the other is ‘experimental knowledge’ (savoir) made up of
‘expressive and cooperative capacities that cannot be taught, on a vivacity in the
deployment of knowledge that is part of the culture of everyday life’ (ibid: 11). Gorz
argues that it is experimental knowledge –which workers have obtained ‘through the
game, team sports, campaigns, arguments, musical and theatrical activities, etc’
outside of work – that ‘the post-Fordist enterprises seek to work and exploit’ (ibid.).
Hence, Gorz (2010: 13) maintains that ‘in becoming the foundation of a valueproduction based on continual innovation, communication and improvisation’,
immaterial labour is likely to ‘become indistinguishable from a labour of self4

production’. To work now is to produce self. In other words, the process of
subjectivation is at the centre of contemporary capitalism.
A number of critiques have been raised of the notion of immaterial labour or
affective labour in the post-Fordist field for its gendered limits (e.g. Dowling, 2007;
Fantone, 2007; Fortunati, 2007; Hearn, 2011; McRobbie, 2010; 2016; Weeks, 2011;
Federici, 2008). Federici (2008) criticizes Negri and Hardt’s understanding of
capitalism as ‘moving towards higher forms of production and labour’ as faulty as
their argument fails to recognise the underdevelopment part. That is, the ‘intelligent’
computer work is one side of the restructuring of production. Federici criticises them
for being ‘blind to the capitalist destruction of lives and the ecological
environment’(ibid.). Both Schultz (2006) and Federici (2008) point out that the
concepts of immaterial labour and affective labour stress the perspective of capitalist
accumulation, and erase and misrecognize reproductive labour, such as care work
and psychological support, as productive labour. McRobbie (2010; 2016) also uses
the term ‘gender blindness’ to criticise the subsuming of the issues of gender under
class relations and hierarchies in the Italian autonomist Marxist writings. She further
criticises the excessive optimism on the influence of ‘spontaneous and elementary
communism’ in their work.3 Borrowing from Skeggs’s analysis on gender and class
(1997), McRobbie argues that classed femininity, which associates working-class
femininity with failure, discourages working-class young women from identifying
themselves with a working-class position. Thus, instead of forming a possibility of
‘trade unionisation’, as McRobbie (2010: 69) puts it, ‘there are possibilities for
further education and “lifelong learning”’.
Despite the excessive optimism and gendered limits in their writings, the autonomist
Marxist writers do point out the important observation that the boundaries between
work and life are dissolving, as the production process requires not merely
commodities but also social relationships and forms of life. Besides, they recognise
the significance of difference as a constitutive part of our society in their formulation
3

Negri and Hardt argue that immaterial labour enhances person to person interaction and
communication, and thus it also provides potential for a kind of spontaneous and elementary
communism. For detailed accounts of this argument, see Negri and Hart. Empire (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2000).

5

of the concept of ‘multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Difference is a gendered
concept and practice.
As all aspects of social life are involved in the field of production, work becomes an
extension of social life, and the subjective state is inflected into work. How do young
women experience dissolving boundaries between life and work? The following
section will examine this through the concept of ‘feminization of work’.
Blurring Boundaries between Life and Work: ‘Feminization of Labour’
Feminist theorists demonstrate that women are at the centre of the field of postFordist production. For McRobbie (2010), the view that women’s prime
responsibility is maintaining reproduction has been challenged under the post-Fordist
regime. In industrial times, the labour regime framed by gendered division of labour
often placed men in higher-paid and skilled industrial jobs, whereas the labour
market of the post-industrial economy increases the prosperity of employment for
women. McRobbie (ibid.) observes the correlation between the rising number of
women in paid employment and the move to post-Fordist production. For example,
in the context of the UK, she points out that there has been an increasing number of
women flowing into the workplace since the mid-1980s, especially young educated
women who have benefited from the expansion of higher education. Thus,
McRobbie (2010: 67; see also McRobbie, 2016) concludes, ‘the nature of work in
the post-Fordist economy favoured the large skill pool and flexibility of the female
workforce.’

In strong agreement with McRobbie, Morini (2007: 46) also notes that women
represent ‘a strategic and particularly attractive pool of workers’. Morini (ibid.) uses
the concept of ‘feminization of labour’ to highlight the qualitative characteristics of
the current production process. The feminization of labour consists of two parts. The
first refers to the general trend of the rising number of women entering paid
employment, especially in the service industries. Such expansion of women’s
employment, as Haraway (1997) points out, is ‘multidimensional’. Indeed, the
implementation of the low-paid workforce and the progressive insertion of educated
professional women into high-end service industries are on a continuum of global
6

production (Sassen, 1998; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2002; Federici, 2008). The
second aspect of the feminization of labour is the inclusion of flexibility and
adaptability, which have been historically considered as ‘feminine skills’, within
current precarious employment systems (Morini, 2007).
Morini’s work concerns the qualitative and constituent character of the feminization
of labour. In another article, Morini and Fugamilli (2010) further analyse the
qualitative change of current capitalist accumulation through redefining the labour
theory of value. They recognise that the transition from industrial-Fordist to what
they called ‘bio-capitalism’ has transformed the process of valorization, which no
longer relies exclusively on material production but increasingly on immaterial
elements such as ‘the relational, emotional and cognitive faculties of human beings’
(ibid: 235). Bio-capitalism accordingly refers to ‘the production of wealth by means
of knowledge and human experience, through the use of those activities, both
intellectual and corporeal, that are implicit in existence itself ’ (Morini and
Fugamilli, 2010: 238). In other words, they argue that the value of labour is first and
foremost generated from the ‘intellectual and relational resources of the subject’. It is
the ‘subjectivity itself, in its experiential, relational, creative dimensions’ that is
exchanged in the labour market (ibid: 236). Thus, they conclude that the value of
labour is based on ‘the potentiality of the subject’.
Morini and Fugamilli (2010: 238) suggest that ‘women’s work’ – the unpaid labour
of reproduction and care – is configured as an ‘archetype’ of contemporary
production. Morini (2007) elaborates that women’s experience, which derives from
their historic position in conducting reproductive and domestic work, becomes a
domain that the current capitalist accumulation seeks to extract value from and
exploit. In Morini’s words:
in cognitive capitalism precariousness, mobility and fragmentation
become constituent elements of the work of all persons,
irrespective of gender. The model advanced is pliable, hyperflexible and in this sense it draws on the baggage of female
experience (2007: 43).

7

In such a way, Morini (2007: 48) concludes that the prioritization of extracting value
from emotional and cognitive elements such as relational capacities, linguistic
abilities and propensity for care, which are often part of ‘the baggage of female
experience’, reframes women’s position in the field of flexible work from the
margins to an ‘extraordinary paradigm’ for capitalist exploitation.

Echoing McRobbie and Morini, Lisa Adkins (2012; 2014; 2016; 2018) also notes
that the post-Fordist condition coordinates a particular gender order which centralises
women’s role in contemporary production. Particularly, she cogently demonstrates
that the expansion and extension of women’s employment are related to restructuring
in the organisation of value and labour of post-Fordist economies. New modes of
value creation and accumulation, according to Adkins (2014: 625), are ‘increasingly
organized and harnessed not via retroactive accumulation processes but via a
prospecting for potential’. As such, worker value also shifts from his/her
accumulated embodied skills and experience to his/her ‘potential capacities’. In this
regard, Adkins (ibid) further posits that women are positioned as ‘the future of
capitalism’, instead of the reproducers of labour power or as a reserve army of labour
to the mainstream. Specifically, women are included as the heartland of value
creation and are considered a focus of potential and possibility in new times, rather
than experiencing exclusion and segregation in terms of paid employment in the
Fordist era in which the value of labour lay in retroactive accumulation of capacities,
abilities, and skills (ibid.). In a word, Adkins (2018: 479) highlights that the
enrolment of women’s labour into new modes of value creation and accumulation is
characterised by ‘inclusion, expansion and limitlessness’, rather than ‘exclusion,
constraint and limit’.

From this brief review, it is apparent that the post-Fordist mode of production
reconfigures women’s role in the labour market, and places women’s experience as
the ‘archetype’ and paradigm of value generation. In this way, productive and valuecreating activities are not merely bound within the workplace, but expand across the
whole social body – that is ‘the whole society is placed at the disposal of profit’
(Negri, 1989:79; see also Gill and Pratt, 2008). As such, the understanding of
reproduction and production as separate must be questioned. One significant
8

consequence of the centralisation of women’s experience at work, as many feminist
theorists point out (e.g. Adkins, 2014; 2018; McRobbie, 2016; Morini and Fumagalli,
2010; Weeks, 2007), is that it dissolves the boundaries between life and work.
Different branches of feminist theorists have analysed the contradiction between
capitalist orientation to unlimited accumulation and its tendency to destabilize the
process of social reproduction that sustains it. Social reproduction refers to ‘the
activities that sustain human beings as embodied social beings who must not only eat
and sleep but also raise their children, care for their families, and maintain their
communities, all while pursuing their hopes for the future’ (Arruzza, Bhattacharya,
and Fraser, 2018:68, emphasis in original). The unlimited needs of capitalist
accumulation have a tendency to undercut and hollow out the conditions for renewal,
sustenance and reproduction of material life, which is called ‘the permanent crisis of
social reproduction’(Federici, 2013; see also Bakker, 2007) or ‘crisis of care’ (Fraser,
2016). Adkins (2012) argues that the unfolding of the economy into society renders
the commercialization or marketisation of social reproduction. In her words (ibid:
633), ‘both the home and the work of social reproduction have been rewritten as sites
of productive possibility’.
In summary, the above body of scholarship reveals how and why women are ‘located
as subjects of capacity in regard to the economization of the social’. The following
section will focus on the question of subject formation. If the boundaries between
productive and reproductive labour are blurred, how do women experience this new
form of work? And what kinds of labour subjectivity is produced?

To Work is to Produce Self: Work and Subjectivity

The positioning of women as subjects of potentiality and capacity in contemporary
capitalist accumulation has radically reworked subject formation. Feminists have
mapped the emergence of entrepreneurial and competitive forms of subjectivity for
women, namely ‘the economisation of femininity’ (Adkins, 2018). The following
review of the scholarship is situated in a broader context, in which the market
operates as the mode of rationality, and reforms not only the state but also the social
sphere (Adkins, 2018; Brown, 2015; Foucault, 2008). The expansion of the economy
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to the social redefines all forms of conduct and renders the conversion and
assessment of social relations through market criteria and standards. The technique
of such governance produces economically calculative subjects ‘who are responsible
for the success and failures of their own calculative actions’ (Adkins, 2018: 472).
That is to say, such subjects, who are construed as both entrepreneur and investor in
oneself, are bound by rules underlined by ambition, calculation, accountability and
personal responsibility (du Gay, 1996; Rose, 1992 and 1998; Scharff, 2016a, 2016b;
Brown 2003, 2015; Adkins, 2016).

Feminists have noted the characteristics and features of economized femininity.
McRobbie (2016) argues that young women prioritise work and achievement at work
and give their life commitment to work rather than marriage. Besides, McRobbie
(2015) also recognises that young women are constantly striving to pursue
perfection. Ringrose and Walkerdine (2008) maintain that the emphasis on selftransformation is associated with femininity. Several researchers also argue that it is
women who are called on to transform themselves, particularly through constant
investment in their appearance and body (Gill and Scharff, 2011; McRobbie, 2009).

Young women, in particular, have become positioned as the ideal subjects of
entrepreneurial reinvention par excellence (Gill and Scharff, 2011; Scharff, 2016a,
2016b; Adkins, 2018; McRobbie, 2007; Ringrose and Walkerdine, 2008; Luckman,
2015a, 2015b). Tyler (2013) argues that the neoliberal subject is produced through a
process of abjection. That is, the positioning of women as subjects of capacity
privileges certain females while excluding ‘other’ women (Scharff, 2016a).
Economized femininity reproduces classed and racialized exclusions regarding
subject formation, which locates middle-classed femininity as aspirational.

Adkins (2018) notes that the body of scholarship on the characteristics of
economized femininity focuses on the harmful and injurious effects of
economization for women, including their exclusion and suffering. Rather than
focusing on the injurious effects of economization for women's subject formation,
she highlights the centrality of women’s position to capitalist growth and argues that
young women as subjects of capacity are incorporated in the wage labour imperative.
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She suggests shifting focus to the transformation of women’s lives resulting from the
economisation of the social. Work is not an option, but a must for young women.
Moreover, it is the subject, especially the female experience, that is positioned at the
heart of value generation. The necessity of becoming a viable economic subject leads
young women to invest their lives in their work to craft their own employability and
work-readiness (Adkins, 2016). McRobbie (2016) also points out that young
women’s attachment to work and working often involves affect, such as love and
passion. In the name of love and passion, young women excessively attach
themselves to work through ‘self-exploitation’ (ibid.). Such affects condemn women
to ‘precarious, insecure, fatiguing and impossible forms of working and living’
(Adkins, 2016: 4).

In the face of such demands, how and why have young women attached themselves
to work? How do young women negotiate and resist their central position in a system
of capitalist accumulation? These are the questions of this research. Both McRobbie
(2016) and Scharff (2016a, 2016b) note that young women who work in cultural and
creative industries (CCI) are twice positioned and hailed as ‘model’ workers in
contemporary capitalism. Young women in the field of flexible work, as discussed
above, are the heart of current modes of value creation; individuals in CCI are also
‘paradigms of entrepreneurial selfhood’ (Ross, 2008) as work in CCI features
flexibility, precariousness and informality. Thus, the next section will look at young
women’s working experience and subject formation in CCI.

Gender and Work in Cultural and Creative Industries (CCI)
Understanding Creativity from a Labour Perspective
There are two main bodies of literature in relation to creativity. One strand of
scholarship often hails creativity within policy discourse. This body of literature
considers cultural and creative industries as a more advanced form of economic
development and a new engine for capital accumulation in support of policymakers
and the official discourse. The origin of the concept of creative industries 4 can be
4

This research adopts the terms ‘cultural and creative industries’ (CCI), ‘cultural industries’, and
‘creative industries’ interchangeably. For the debates on the differences on the above three concepts,
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traced back to the 1990s. The Labour Party of the UK adopted the term creative
industries as a cultural policy that is a central plank of its ‘post-industrial economy’,
and issued various related reports from 1997 onward (Hesmondhalgh et al 2015;
Flew and Cunningham, 2010). The UK Department of Culture, Media and Sport
(DCMS) (1998) recognised various creative sectors, including advertising,
architecture, arts and antiques, crafts design, designer fashion, film, leisure, software,
music, performing arts, publishing, software, television and radio. The British New
Labour Party reformulated the role that arts and culture played within the national
economy, and embraced culture as a source of economic regeneration. It used the
creative industries as a policy label to brand itself as ‘Cool Britannia’ (McRobbie,
2016). The creative industries, as defined by DCMS, are those ‘based on individual
creativity, skill and talent with the potential to create wealth and jobs through the
development of intellectual property’ (DCMS, 2001: 4).
The policy discourse of creative industries has since ‘travelled’ and been taken up by
many countries around the world (Wang, 2004; Flew, 2014; Flew and Cunningham
2010). The Australian government championed ‘Creative Nation’ policy, targeted to
reformulate culture to create wealth (Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 1994). Creative industries have also been picked up by governments in
Asia since the 2000s. After the Asian Financial crisis of 1997, policies of cultural
and creative industries provided new paradigms of economic growth, and translated
differently across different specific economic and political contexts in Asia (Kong et
al, 2006; Gibson and Kong, 2005), including Singapore (see e.g. Leo and Lee, 2004;
Yue, 2006), Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and China (see e.g Keane, 2004, 2007,
2013, 2016; Zhang Xiaoming, 2013, 2016).

In the creative industry policy discourse, cultural sectors are celebrated as
contributors to wealth creation, economic growth, and employment, rather than
claimants on public revenues (e.g. Cunningham, 2009a and 2009b; Keane, 2009;
Power, 2009). Creative industries, which integrate arts, culture and economics,
see, for instance, Cunningham, S. (2002) ‘From cultural to creative industries: Theory, industry and
policy implications’, Media International Australia, vol. 102, pp. 54–65; Flew and Cunningham,
‘Creative Industries after the First Decade of Debate’. In The Information Society, volume 26: 113123 (2010).
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become significant new ways to increase a nation’s competitiveness in the global
economy (Yue, 2006; Pang, 2012; Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009). Richard Florida (2002),
who remains one of the best-known exponents of creative industries, highly
celebrates the ideas and policies that privilege the exploitation of collective creativity
as intellectual property for promoting economic growth. He argues that cities in the
global world must compete to attract a ‘creative class’ to stimulate economic growth
in the post-industrial society, promoting the kinds of hipster middle-class norms,
which almost exclusively focus on a consumer lifestyle absent any focus on social
responsibility. Florida (2002) and Howkins (2002) hail the autonomous, selfexpressive and fulfilling nature of work in CCI in the globalised society.

However, this body of literature often fails to make work and labour conditions
visible in cultural and social policy (Rossiter, 2006; Hesmondhalgh 2007; Banks and
Hesmondhalgh 2009; Oakley 2013; Comunian and Conor, 2017). Critics have argued
that the relentless celebration of creativity and promotion of CCI within policy
discourse conceals the underlying inequality. For instance, David Hesmondhalgh
(2008: 567) criticises this policy discourse for its ideological mystification and its
endorsement of ‘inequality and exploitation associated with contemporary
neoliberalism’.

The second, more critical, strand of literature, condemns the exploitative working
conditions within the creative economy. Cultural and creative industries exemplify
immaterial labour. While the autonomist Marxist concept of immaterial labour is
often criticised for its ‘lack of empirical engagement with the specifics of those
forms of labour that supposedly comprise its wide-ranging categories’
(Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2008: 100; see also McRobbie, 2010), looking at specific
practices of working life in CCI breaks down the generalisation of the category of
immaterial labour as well as cultural and creative industries policy. It is the second
approach with which the current research aligns.

Pang Laikwan (2012) makes a crucial contribution to understanding the creative
economy through reconnecting the relationship between creativity and labour, and
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considers creativity as a product of labour.5 She argues that it is crucial to stress the
public and social dimension of creativity in order to demystify the glamorisation of
creativity in the creative economy which heavily stresses the private and
individuated dimension of creativity. She criticises the fantasizing of creativity as an
abstract concept and argues that human talent prevents us from understanding the
actual labour that makes up the creative economy. Pang (2012: 56) pointedly
demonstrates that creativity requires ‘labour input to introduce it to the capitalist
system’. In other words, it is labour, rather than an abstract concept of creativity, that
drives the capitalist system. In analysing the labour factor in the creative economy,
Pang argues that the creative economy harbours a propensity for more severe forms
of exploitation. She believes that creative labour embodies the intensified
contradiction of late capitalism, namely, the contradiction between the logic of
manual and intellectual labour, because creativity itself is contradictorily placed in
the creative economy. Creativity is privileged for its unexhausted and unlimited
potentialities to propel the continuous capitalistic economy, whereas it is also an
‘enemy’ of capitalism and needs to be constrained because capitalist principles are
based on ‘efficiency, productivity, and management’. In this vein, creative workers
are expected to produce both creatively and industrially. In Pang’s words (2012: 7),
‘we find the seemingly easy but indeed contested coexistence between the
postmodern proliferation of styles and the instrumental exercises of discipline’. At
the same time, Pang points out that it is the very existence of this internal
contradictory logic that makes a resistance to the creative economy possible.

McRobbie (2016) offers important theoretical insights into the relationship of gender
to the politics of creativity. She formulates the concept of the ‘creative dispositif’ to
accentuate that creativity is operated as a form of governmental policy that manages
the youth to live and work on ‘thin air’ in the cultural and creative economies. In her
own words,
Creativity is designated by current modes of biopolitical power, as
the site of implementing job creation and, more significantly,
5

Drawing from Marxist analysises of raw material, Pang argues that the production of creative
commodity, be tangible or intangible, needs two connected labour factors—labour that initiates ideas
and labour that transforms creative input. See her work Creativity and Its Discontents (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2012), p. 55.
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labour reform; it is a matter of managing a key sector of the
youthful population by turning culture into an instrument of both
competition and labour discipline, which manages a key sector of
young people by turning culture into an instrument of both
competition and labour discipline (McRobbie, 2016: 38).
She argues that young people are trained for a new labour regime of enterprise
culture, in which passion is romanticised as compensation for the absence of
measures of protection and security that were provided by regular work under a
Fordist regime. In other words, such labour reform incites the young population to
‘test out the water of working life without welfare or with substantially reduced
welfare’ through the promise of creativity and passion in work (McRobbie, 2016:
58). McRobbie recognises the central role that ‘entrepreneurial’ education plays in
promoting the new economy. Higher education is a key instrument to ensure an
entrepreneurial mentality and a creative dispositif to indoctrinate young middle-class
subjects and society. The entrepreneurial mentality is not only a crucial part of being
creative, but also a force to remake the middle class. As McRobbie (2016: 59) puts
it, ‘the new urban middle class is being de-socialized’, and is convinced to ‘think and
act only on its own behalf’.

McRobbie then examines the role of working women in this new labour regime. She
argues that any understanding of changes in work is accompanied by questions
relating to gender. She maintains that the gender of post-Fordism is female because
of the increasing number of young women entering higher education and paid
employment in the new service economy. She argues that for young women the
notion of romance has come to be more closely associated with work than intimate
relationships. The ideological effect of the creative dispositif underlined by a spirit of
self-entrepreneurship gives young women ‘the feeling of being middle class and
aspirational’ (McRobbie, 2016:11). Drawing from Adkins (2002), she suggests that
the idea of passion for work requires a feminist critique because it relates to a
distinctive mode of gender re-traditionalization and is part of a de-politicizing
strategy.

In the end, McRobbie criticises the absence of an organized struggle or collective
action for better working conditions in the CCI, in which many young women work,
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and suggests an alternative vision for creative work that differentiates from the
individualised ethos of the creative economy. She calls for the young population to
use creativity not merely for improving individual life, but for creating new forms of
social protection and solidarity.

The work of Pang and McRobbie offers an important framework for understanding
the governmental discourse on creativity in China, and more significantly, it offers
insight into the relationships between creativity and labour, which is directly relevant
to the fieldwork in my research. Building upon Pang’s emphasis on the relationships
between creativity and labour and McRobbie’s focus on the current centrality of
young women in creative work, this research further explores the articulation of
creativity and labour from a gender perspective in China.

Empirical Investigations: Gender and Work in CCI

There has been a substantial body of empirical investigations focusing specifically
on the working life and practices in cultural and creative industries. The extensive
range of scholarship unveils the distinctive nature of work in various sectors of
creative industries, including in the media (see e.g. Gill 2002, 2010; Rossiter, 2006;
Deuze, 2007; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011; Adkins 2013; Jarrett, 2014; Duffy,
2016), the TV and film industry (see e.g. Ursell 2000; Blair 2001 and 2003;
Wreyford, 2015), the music industry (see e.g. Scharff, 2015), fashion and design (see
e.g. McRobbie 2002, 2016; Arvidsson et al. 2010; Larner and Molloy, 2009;
Wissinger, 2007), and so forth. Scholars highlight similar characteristics and features
of creative work, which are absent from cultural policy, such as widespread
precarity, job insecurity, informality, flexibility, a bulimic working pattern, low
wages and a lack of social protections, the entanglement of affects at work (e.g.
passion and love), project-based work, multi-tasking, and second-jobbing (e.g. see
McRobbie 2002 and 2016; Nixon and Crewe 2004; Ross, 2008; Comunian, et al,
2010; Comunian, et al., 2011; Comunian and Conor 2017; Adkins, 2013; Conor,
Gill, and Taylor, 2015). As McRobbie (2008: 517) summarizes, work in CCI has
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become increasingly characterised by the values of ‘entrepreneurialism,
individualism and reliance on commercial sponsorship’.

Despite extensive literature on work practices in cultural and creative sectors, there
are relatively few studies focusing on the gender aspect of creative work. McRobbie
(2010) has characterised several themes shared by recent investigations in young
women’s participation in CCI. She argues that female workers in creative industries
are likely to be highly educated young women, who often prioritize work over
marriage and childrearing, and show a passionate commitment to often precarious
and uncertain freelancing and micro-entrepreneurial activities. Indeed, Larner and
Molloy (2009) believe that the cultural entrepreneurial activities of young educated
women are fundamental to the growth of an urban creative economy.

In recent years, there have been a number of articles that address gender-based
exclusion and segregation in the creative economy. This body of empirical studies
explores the gendered pattern of disadvantages and exclusions in the CCI, and how
work in CCI, which is often hailed as ‘cool, creative and egalitarian’, systematically
produces gender inequalities based on stereotypes. For instance, Oakley and O’Brien
(2015) have noted the under-representation of women in the film industry,
manifesting in a low percentage of women nominated for Academy Awards lists in
the UK and US (Oakley and O’Brien 2015). The under-representation of women in
key creative and decision-making roles is also found in media and the music industry
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2015; Scharff, 2015; 2016b; Wreyford, 2015). Empirical
studies also show that compared with men women are more likely to lose their jobs
during periods of economic recession (Leung, et al, 2015). Women are not only
under-represented in key creative roles, but are also typically concentrated in lowstatus and low-paid positions – sustaining gender stereotypes (Hesmondhalgh and
Baker, 2015; Jones and Pringle, 2015). Hesmondhlgh and Baker (2015) examine
segregation based on sexism in the media sector in the UK, where women are often
assigned to glamour jobs rather than ‘creative direction’. Gendered stereotypes,
which are based on an essentialist understanding of gender attributes, assume that
women are more caring and better listeners with strong communication skills,
legitimating the exclusion of women from more prestigious creative work.
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Another theme in the existing literature on women’s working conditions in CCI
concerns how the distinctive nature of work – informality, precariousness and the
bulimic career – exacerbates the exclusion and inequalities of women. Gill (2002)
explores gender inequalities in new media sectors in the European context, including
the flexibility of work hours and location as well as the informality of the job search
and hiring process in new media sectors and argues that it is precisely such features
that exclude women from making networks with others and thus disadvantage
women in workplace. Leung, Gill and Randle (2015) study freelancing in the film
and television industries in the UK and explore how the nature of the work excludes
women. They demonstrate that the automatic association of women with childcare
excludes women from the workplace, and individualises childbearing as ‘women’s
private problem’. As such, women are pushed to be ‘responsible entrepreneurial
subjects who are solely responsible for all the costs, risks and challenges of working
parents’ (ibid: 61). They also find that female professionals in the field are less likely
than men to have children and more likely to defer family life in order to sustain a
career. Such gender-specific aspects of freelancing are termed ‘career scramblers’ by
Leung, Gill and Randle (2015). Wreyford (2015) highlights similar issues. She
maintains that given that crucial positions in the film industry are dominated by elite
white men who often conduct an informal recruitment process relying on trusted
social networks, workers of alternate gender, class and ethnicity are systematically
marginalised and disadvantaged.

In addition to the study on gendered patterns of inequality in the CCI, scholars are
also contributing to understanding the formation of new gendered subjectivities
associated with cultural work. Working in the CCI requires certain types of skills as
well as a new subjectivity, which leads to the need to negotiate a new tension in
constructing creative female selves. To conduct work in CCI, workers have to learn
to adopt flexible, networked, adaptable and entrepreneurial traits, which
disadvantage workers from a working-class background (Morgan and Nelligan,
2015). Many scholars (Scharff, 2015; Conor, 2015; Luckman, 2015a, 2015b; Taylor,
2015) have demonstrated that the prevalence of self-entrepreneurship and
individualisation are two prominent characteristics in the neoliberal cultural
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economy. The spirit of entrepreneurship is classed, because only some women,
mostly from the middle class, can succeed as entrepreneurs in the creative economy.
Taylor (2016) points out that ‘the labour of creativity is a marker of middle-class
femininity’. Scharff (2015; 2016a: 223) studies the production of entrepreneurial
subjectivity characterised by ‘responsibilization, an incitement to self-care, and the
individualization of failure’ through examining the gendered dynamics of selfpromotion in the classic musical industry. She argues that female musicians have to
see themselves and their work as products to be sold. The construction of self as
business creates a new tension between the need to self-promote and the threatening
to artistic identity that female musicians have to negotiate. The prevailing selfentrepreneurship in CCI dissolves boundaries, including home and work, production
and reproduction, paid work and unpaid work. Research has noted the erosion of
boundaries between worker identity and subjectivity (Taylor and Luckman, 2018).

Young Middle-Class Women and CCI in Contemporary Urban China

There are extensive studies on women and employment in contemporary China. One
rich strand of studies on gender and labour has examined the work and life of the
social group of migrant working-class women in urban China (see e.g. Lee, 1998;
Pun, 2005; Jacka, 2006; Gaetano, 2015; Yan, Hairong, 2008; Hanser, 2008; Zhang,
2001; Liu, 2007). This strand of research recognises increased social differences and
inequalities based on class, age and generation that have been exacerbated by the
initiation of the ‘reform and opening’ policy since the late 1970s. Such
transformations in the labour market have valorised the work conducted by young
and educated women, and significantly devalued that of rural and elder women who
often lack access to education. Chapter 1 of the present study provides a more
detailed account of the changing definition of work for women from a historical
perspective.

Young educated women who have been placed in an aspirational position in
contemporary urban China with the emergence of the urban middle class have been
the subject of many studies (See section 2.1 and 2.2 of chapter 2 for a detailed
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discussion). There has been an increasing number of young women enrolling in
universities because of the expansion of higher education in China since the late
1990s. Women who have benefited from the higher education expansion have
entered the relatively high-end service economy, and are known as ‘white-collar
beauties’ (see e.g. Ong, 2008; Liu, 2016). In recent years, research on young
educated women in the labour force has noted an increasing difficulty for young
educated women in securing full-time and lifelong employment in large cities (see
section 2.1.3 of chapter 2). Young educated women are more likely to take up
flexible employment in large cities in China. For instance, Zhang Xia (2015) uses the
concept of affective labour to study a young urban female fashion graduate who
rejected a regular job and started up her own online store as an alternative to the
dominant mode of work. Zhang argues that the urban youth’s embrace of a flexible
and individualized lifestyle makes them vulnerable to the labour market because they
have to bear all the risks by themselves and learn to live with reduced welfare
protection provided from the state. Echoing studies in the western context, Zhang
(2015:538) also argues that in China ‘through celebrating the youth’s novelty as the
new resource for capitalist accumulation, the cultural logic of post-Fordism
essentially has made these have-nots shadowy beings whose need for care has also
been ruthlessly denied’. Section 2.1 of chapter 2 examines the emerging statesponsored middle-class discourse in China, and section 2.3 of chapter 2 details
difficulties that young educated women have encountered in the labour market.

Since the 2000s the discourse of creativity has travelled to China, and has been
strongly sponsored by the government through policy. China’s policymakers
enthusiastically embrace the transition from having goods ‘made in China’ to having
them ‘created in China’ (Keane, 2006). The creativity policy discourse in China
conflates political, economic and cultural forces (Pang, 2012). From a political
perspective, many scholars have argued that the creativity discourse is a mode of
governance that is operated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to ‘maintain
cultural security and national identity, and a source of soft power to maneuver’ (Su,
2014; see also Pang, 2012; Keane, 2010). In terms of the economy, the state-led
development of CCI in China suggests that the party-state tries to upgrade its
economy by supporting the inflection of culture into economic growth, which is
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closely associated with global socio-economic change. The role of culture, which
was initially considered to be ‘ideology and related institutions and organisations’,
has shifted to become an important driver for economic transformation (Keane,
2007). In 1998 the Cultural Industries Division of the Ministry of Culture was
established with the aim of turning culture into capital (Keane, 2016). Since then,
cultural industries have been prioritised to serve the national economy. In 2000, the
term ‘cultural industries’ was added to the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), and was
ratified by the State Council in 2001, the same year that China was admitted to the
WTO. Responding to the call from the government, a school of cultural industries
has gradually emerged since the 2000s and has strongly advocated for legalizing the
CCI within policy discourse in China. As in the western context, this body of
scholarship in China often fetishizes and romanticises creativity as a magic solution
to all problems, with promises for economic growth and employment opportunities,
while concealing the work practices and conditions in CCI. Section 2.2 of chapter 2
will review the subject of creativity within policy discourse in detail.

Despite the growing body of research supporting the governmental discourse, there
are a few empirical studies that explore the working conditions in the creative
economy in China’s context. For instance, the work of Yao Jianhua (2014) examined
a group of editors in publishing houses in Shanghai and recognised the deteriorative
working conditions they experienced. He (ibid., 3) categorised editors as ‘knowledge
workers’ who are ‘well-educated, equipped with up-to-date technological skills, and
are often situated in high positions in the social hierarchy’. His key argument is that
knowledge workers, who constitute a crucial part of the working class in China,6
now face the same problems as industrial workers in the labour market. He argues
that although editors have gained increased personal choices, financial autonomy and
intellectual freedom from marketisation, they have to live in increasingly precarious
conditions where jobs, welfare benefits, and pensions are no longer secured. Thus,
Yao maintains that knowledge workers, just like industrial workers, are losing their
6

Yao argues that the Chinese working class has expanded after the initiation of reform and open
policies. According to him, the Chinese working class includes, ‘workers in state-owned, collective,
and private enterprises, the peasantry, intellectuals, cadres, cadres and intellectuals in the countryside,
private entrepreneurs working on their own, private entrepreneurs with enterprises of their own,
soldiers, college students, and an underclass composed of migrant laborers, beggars, and prostitutes’.
p.29.

21

standing and slipping into a lower stratum in the social structure in China. He
identifies several characteristics of working conditions in publishing industries,
including the demands of constant skill-updating, the intensified workload and the
decline of job security and welfare benefits, the blurring of boundaries between work
and life, and the disparities between junior and senior workers. In responding to the
pressures and challenges brought by media reform and social transformation, Yao
suggests that the roles of worker organisations and trade unions are significant in
improving knowledge workers’ conditions in terms of employment opportunities, job
training, and social welfare, as they defend the rights and interests of knowledge
workers.
Chumley’s work (2016) examines the formation of subjectivity through the
ideologies and pedagogy of creativity and the practices of self-styling in postsocialist China from 2006 to 2008. Creativity in Chumley’s formulation is
understood ‘as a constellation of practices, learned through practice (2016:8)’.
Creativity is practised as ‘a social role and model of being”, involving all aspects of
self-presentation (ibid: 9). Hence, self-styling, which is pedagogically conveyed as
the pursuit of self, is significant in practising creativity. She argues that in order to be
viewed as creative, art students need to create a style that indexes their personality,
which Chumley defines as ‘self-styling’. Individual style and personality, and
distinct ways of dressing and speaking, all become inseparable parts of their creative
outcome. That is to say, as Chumley maintains, the regime of self becomes a means
of production for culture workers, who produce value through the production of
aesthetic subjectivity to some extent. The self-styling that art students cultivate is
inevitably commercialised and marketed as a commodity to be experienced by
customers as an expression of selfhood (Chumley, 2016:125). In Chumley’s words,
the creative personality is a ‘commodity-producing structure’ (ibid). The production
of creative subjects, Chumley argues, plays a central role in China’s transition from
an industrial producer to a creative designer. The ideology of creativity highlights
individualism, which has the potentiality of liberating. However, the version of
freedom that institutionalised pedagogy provides is directed toward the personal,
rather than the political. The art schools, on the one hand, demand students freely
discover their own personal personality and style while on the other hand, they are
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tightly controlled by the state. Therefore, the subject formed through the multimodal
creative practice is a neoliberal individualistic subject, which is characterised as
‘bourgeois, liberal, individualistic, decadent, and pessimistic’ (ibid: 200)’.

In summary, using empirical studies, Yao contributes to understanding the features
of work in CCI, which strongly resonates with studies in the western context as
examined above, and Chumley offers an insight into investigating the formation of
subjectivity – characterised as bourgeois, individualistic, decadent, and pessimistic –
through the practice of creativity. In light of these two investigations, the present
research asks, from a gender perspective: how do young educated women integrate
the new modes of production in CCI? What are the features of their working
practices and work experience in CCI? And what kind of gendered subjectivity(-ies)
is shaped by this form of labour? By asking these questions, this research examines
the work practices and modes of subjectivation produced in post-2000 urban China.
The research questions will be elaborated further in the following section.

Research Question and Method
Building upon existing studies of gender, work and subjectivity, this research
examines the subjective formation of young, urban middle-class women in post-2000
urban China. The review above shows that the shift to the ‘New Times’ has reframed
women’s position in the field of flexible work from the margins to the centre of new
forms of work. Such new forms of work situate the female experience at the heart of
value creation and generation. In the western context, many have argued that CCI
exemplifies these new forms of immaterial work. From a gender perspective,
McRobbie (2016) argued that the creativity dispositif would sustain a new labour
regime that incites young educated women to work and live on thin air.
In China’s context, since the 2000s a new round of reform has begun calling for
‘upgrading and transforming’ from products that are ‘made in China’ to products
‘created in China’. In order to upgrade to a more knowledge-based economy, the
Chinese government promulgates the discourse of creativity and innovation, inciting
individuals, particularly educated middle-class youth, to embrace ‘mass
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entrepreneurship and innovation’. Meanwhile, the government introduced the twochild policy in 2015, and induces especially young educated women to reproduce a
new generation of ‘high quality’ (gao suzhi) labour power for economic
transformation. Such socio-economic conjuncture reconfigures women’s position in
society. By examining the interaction between gender (young educated middle-class
women) and labour (work in CCI), this research examines the positions of young
educated women in the current round of ‘upgrading’ and ‘transforming’ in urban
China in post-2000s. Specifically, the research asks: what role do young educated
women play and how do they integrate into CCI? What are the features of young
educated women’s working life in CCI? How do they understand their own work and
life in urban China? If they have to dedicate their life to work, how do they negotiate
and resist colonization?
The present research mainly adopts textual and discourse analysis, as well as the
ethnographic method. Chapter 1 traces a historical review of the evolution of
women’s work in twentieth-century urban China. To explore the construction of
creativity discourse in China, various texts are analysed, including official policies,
reports and speeches made by governmental officials (see section 2.2 of chapter 2).
Particularly, this research uses representation as an analytical tool to examine the
production of the subject. Representation occupies a central place in cultural studies,
and is crucial to relating culture to subjectivity and the embodied experience of
selfhood (Gill, 2008). Three texts – a movie Fashionable Red Dress on the Street
(1984), a fashion magazine Elle (1988-1999), and a web drama Women in Shanghai
(2018) – were chosen to understand the subject-position and the changing
subjectivity(-ies) of young urban middle-class women in the hegemonic cultural
representations of contemporary urban China (see section 3.1 of chapter 3).
Yet, representation only tells a partial story, as Stuart Hall (1997) points out. It
makes the subject-position in hegemonic culture visible, and at the same time ignores
the way that the subject identifies and perceives herself within the hegemonic
culture. Thus, the ethnographic method is equally significant in regard to
understanding how young women view their own work and life in urban China, how
they position themselves, and how they negotiate and resist within their lived
experience. The ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai lasted for around 8 months in
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total (August 2017, December 2018, February to April 2018, and June to August
2018). This research is a qualitative study based on the narratives of young educated
women in their late twenties and early thirties, drawing from in-depth interviews
with 21 young people working in different sectors of CCI in Shanghai. Each
interview lasted for two hours on average. In addition to interviewing 19 young
women, I also interviewed 2 males in order to examine how young women and men
may experience work in CCI differently. The 21 participants were approached
through personal contacts. The participants of this research consist of female workers
in different occupations, which suggests that the creative economy has absorbed a
wide range of newcomers. The in-depth interviews allowed me to summarise the
features of work in CCI in Shanghai, which are examined in section 2.3 of chapter 2.
Furthermore, I incorporate participant observations as a method. As many
interviewees were working in co-working spaces, I conducted a one-month study in a
co-working space called Naked hub near Nanjing Road in central Shanghai in order
to obtain a deeper understanding of young middle-class women’s workplaces and
practices. I invited my interviewees to the co-working space I rented, and also got in
touch with one interviewee there.
In addition, I arranged a salon in Shanghai in August 2018. The salon, which
attracted 15 young women and 2 young men, aimed to invite young women to share
their own accounts of their work and life in Shanghai through a collective viewing of
the web drama Women in Shanghai. In order to build upon the interviews, I followed
two interviewees – Koki and Savina – to observe young middle-class women’s
negotiations and resistance in their lived experience. I followed Savina from August
2017 to late August 2018, during which time she changed jobs three times. I
conducted repeated interviews with her when she changed jobs, and was invited to
participate in her daily life. I spent two days with her and her girlfriend at her home
for New Year’s Eve in 2018 in Shanghai; I also met Savina and her girlfriend twice
on October 3rd and October 5th, 2018 when they travelled to Hong Kong. In the case
of Koki, I first interviewed her in August 2017 when she had just moved to
Shanghai. In addition to repeated interviews, I spent time with her on multiple
occasions, including shopping trips, attending a language exchange event, meeting
her colleagues and so forth. From these activities and informal conversations with
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Koki and Savina, I not only increased my understanding of young educated women’s
everyday life in Shanghai, but also established friendships with them. We continue to
maintain relationships through WeChat even after the completion of my fieldwork.
The cases of Koki and Savina and the salon are detailed in section 3.2 of chapter 3.

Chapter Outline
Chapter 1 examines the changing definition of women’s work and the shifting
formation of subjectivity in the course of China’s process of modernisation since the
late nineteenth centuries. Beginning with the encounter with the west since the midnineteenth centuries, China has tried to modernise itself in socioeconomic, cultural
and political spheres, and tried to reposition itself in the global world. The ‘women’s
question’ was designated as one of the many projects of modernisation, but, much
like modernisation itself, women’s positions remained ambiguous and contradictory
over the course of China’s modernization. An examination of China’s history of
modernisation shows that there are some continuities in the formation of women’s
subjectivity, even though the specific contexts change over time. Firstly, the
formation of women’s subjectivity is inseparable from labor history. The gendered
division of labour is the fundamental framing device in defining the nature and
meaning of women’s work over time, and it is connected to the broader definition of
gender characteristics throughout the twentieth century. Secondly, the history of
women’s work is prominently defined by reproductive work, including marriage and
childrearing. That is, women continuously embody the contradiction between
production and reproduction. Women’s dual role as worker and mother/wife
necessitates movement back and forth from the home to the workplace in accordance
with the interests of the nation-state. Thirdly, women’s dual identity makes the role
of the state crucially important in subject-positioning. Women’s reproduction is
consistently viewed as an instrument that can be subsumed to the state’s regulations.
Chapter 2 focuses on the legitimation of CCI within the cultural policy discourse in
China, and summarizes key characteristics of work that young educated women
experience in CCI in China. Drawing from McRobbie’s (2016) concept of the
creativity dispositif, chapter 2 argues that, as in the UK, the creativity dispositif in
China sustains a labour regime that directs young, educated middle class women to
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embrace a new pattern of work with limited or even no protection from the state.
Young, educated women, who have been historically positioned to adopt a flexible
pattern of work as detailed in chapter one, now make up the emblematic labour force
of the creative economy. The first section of chapter 2 examines the emergence of
state-sponsored middle-class discourse and its key characteristics in urban China,
and argues that the middle classes have maintained a hegemonic position during the
past two decades, since young college graduates are considered to be the ideal labour
force for driving economic development and transformation, utilizing strategies of
creativity and innovation. Section 2 of chapter two explores how creativity
embedded with the ethos of entrepreneurship has been legitimized by China’s
cultural policy since the 2000s, and how such policy discourse conceals the
contradictions that young, educated women experience in the labour market, and
pushes them to learn to live on thin air. Based on the ethnographic fieldwork, section
3 of chapter 2 summarises several key characteristics of work in the cultural and
creative economy, and argues that flexible, informal and precarious patterns of work,
which used to be relatively marginalized in the labour market and have been
historically dominant among female workers, are becoming normative and
paradigmatic for young, educated middle-class women in contemporary urban China.
Chapter 2 also argues that work in the creative economy attempts to economize
every aspect of human life, and to convert young women’s experience and affect,
which historically have been viewed as unproductive, defined as women’s natural
femininity, into value creation and accumulation. To be viewed as a valuable
economic subject, young female workers must invest their whole lives in their work.
Chapter 3 explores the formation of the gendered subjectivity of young educated
middle-class women in contemporary urban China. In regard to the increasingly
blurring boundaries between life and work that young women experience, chapter 3
further asks: if young educated middle-class women must put their whole lives into
their work, what kinds of labouring subjectivity are produced under the present
conditions? Chapter 3 is divided into two sections. The first section uses the
analytical tool of representation to explore the changing position of young, educated
middle-class women between home and work in the dominant culture. Three texts
are chosen to explore the interrelations between changing representational practice in
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visual culture and changing subjectivity(-ies) of young middle-class women. Section
2 of chapter 3 focuses on listening to young women’s own voices to explore: how
and why are young educated middle-class women attached to the excessive logic of
work? how do they endure if their lives are dedicated to their work? and how do they
negotiate or resist in their daily lives? Specifically, section 2 of chapter 3
summarizes key findings from a salon organized by the researcher, in which young
middle-class women shared their perceptions of the popular representations of them,
and their own accounts of the understandings on their working experience and life;
secondly, it zooms in on two cases to detail young middle-class women’s love, pain,
negotiations and resistance to an excessive attachment to work in their lived
experience.

28

1. Women’s Work and Subjectivity in Urban China: A Historical
Perspective
This chapter examines the changing definition of women’s work and gender roles
over the course of China’s modernisation since the late nineteenth century. A
historical review of women’s work is necessary to understand women’s positions in
the field of flexible work and their dual roles in production and reproduction. In so
doing, this chapter provides a historical overview for understanding the
normalisation of flexible and precarious patterns of work for young women in post2000 urban China, which will be detailed in chapters 2 and 3. Beginning with the
encounter with the west in the mid-nineteenth centuries, China has taken steps to
modernise socioeconomically, culturally and politically, and reposition itself in the
global world. The ‘women’s question’ was one of the many projects of
modernisation, but ‘women’s position’ remained ambiguous and contradictory.
Tracing the history of women’s work and shifting gender roles, this chapter explores
how women integrate into the field of production historically, and the resulting forms
of hegemonic gendered subjectivity.
This chapter argues that women’s labour force participation is consistently viewed as
‘flexible labour’ (or, in Marxist terms, as a reserve army of labour), even though the
nature of women’s work has changed over time. Though women’s participation in
the labour force played an indispensable role in nation-building from the late Qing
era to post-socialist China, women were always the first to be unemployed and asked
to return to home when confronting an economic crisis. This was evident in three
debates on ‘women returning home’ that took place in the 1930s, 1940s and 1980s.
Firstly, the gendered division of labour is the fundamental framing device in defining
the nature and meaning of women’s work over time, and is connected to the broader
definition of gender characteristics throughout the twentieth century. In the late Qing
era, women’s work was associated with female virtues of diligence and obedience;
during the Republican period, women’s engagement in the modern economic sector
was a crucial part of women’s ‘independent personhood’; in socialist China,
women’s engagement in social production for the state was viewed as progress.
Secondly, the history of women’s work is prominently defined by her reproductive
29

life, including marriage and childrearing. That is, women continuously embody the
contradiction between production and reproduction. Women’s dual roles as worker
and mother/wife lead to consistent movement between the home and workplace in
line with the interests of the nation-state. Thirdly, women’s dual identity makes the
role of the state crucially important in subject-positioning. Women’s reproduction is
consistently viewed as an instrument that can be subsumed to the state’s regulations.

1.1.

From the Late Qing to Republican Era

1.1.1. Women’s Work and Womanhood Prior to the Republican Era

The canonical notion of work in China was based on a gendered division of labour,
summarized as ‘men till and women weave’ (nangeng nüzhi) (Mann, 2000). The
expression also separated proper and improper spheres of activities for men and
women. Men were prescribed to manage affairs in the ‘outer’(wai) sphere; whereas
women worked in the ‘inner’ (nei) sphere within the household. Such construction
suggested a complementary relationship between men and women rather than a
hierarchical one, as women’s work in weaving was a crucial part of the tax for the
household (Bray, 1997).
However, women’s contribution to production was gradually undermined and placed
in a subordinate position to men’s with the process of commercialisation that began
during the Song dynasty (960-1279).7 Francesca Bray (1997:237) argues that
changes in textile productions between the Song and Qing dynasties, the pillar of the
economic sector in late imperial China, devalued women’s work. Studying the
representations of labour, Bray (1997) found that men were replaced by women as
the protagonists of the skilled worker. Women were de-skilled and marginalized in
the productive area, even though they continued to work in and make contributions
to the household. Accompanied by the process of marginalisation of female labour,
the social value of women’s work was increasingly defined by women's moral

7

For the studies on how economic transformations changed women’s social status in late imperial
China, see, e.g., Hill Gates, ‘The Commoditization of Chinese Women’. in Signs, Vol. 14, No. 4,
Common Grounds and Crossroads: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in Women's Lives (Summer, 1989), pp.
799-832.
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virtues rather than their economic contribution. Although women participated in
different kinds of work other than weaving, it was Ban Zhao’s definition of women’s
work ‘inside’ the household that was promoted by the late Qing officials as the only
proper work for women that could be recognised as an ‘occupation’ (ibid: 244).8 The
notion of women’s work was promoted by the Han female historian Ban Zhao in her
instructional text Nü Jie (Precepts for Women). The book defined viewed women’s
work as spinning, weaving, and needlework, and connected the conduct of women’s
work with the virtues of womanhood. The Qing government used nü jie to instruct
women in the proper female behaviours. Women from genteel families and lowerclass families were expected to perform women’s work not merely for its economic
contribution but also for gaining female virtues of ‘thrift, frugality and diligence’
(Bray, 1997: 243). The dexterity involved women’s work was ‘transmuted into worth
and virtue’ (ibid: 242). For example, the women’s skills became one crucial criterion
of whether a woman could be arranged to marry a better family.
Changes in women’s productive roles within the household laid the foundation for
emphasizing women’s roles in the reproductive domain (Bray, 1997). The joint
family system consists of three or more generations structured on the basis of
hierarchical kin relationships between father and son, husband and wife, and elders
and youth. Neo-Confucianism,9 which became the dominant school in official
ideology from the Song dynasty, positioned women as subject to ‘three obedience’
within the joint family, namely obedience ‘to her father and elder brothers when
young, to her husband when married and her sons when widowed’ (Croll, 1995:13).
Because the joint family was reproduced according to the patrilineal descent system,

8
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female chastity was considered important to guarantee the purity of the male line
(Ono, 1989). The devaluation of women’s participation in production made their
reproductive work more prominent, and fostered the wide acceptance of NeoConfucian doctrines on women’s subordination and male domination.

Reproductive duties were not limited to child-rearing, and were distributed unequally
among women occupying different positions within a polygynous family. The wife
of an elite family was honoured in terms of ‘her moral worth’, ‘the moral education
she gave her children before sending them out into the world’, and the management
of work inside the household, rather than ‘primarily in terms of her work at the loom’
(Bray, 1997: 272). The elite wife was also the role model for the daughters of the
family, who supervised the daughters’ foot binding process and their learning of
women’s work, namely weaving (ibid). For a concubine or a maid, who were usually
from poor families, work would focus on the physical duties of child care, and the
manual work of the household. In such a hierarchical system, elite wives were only
subordinate to men, occupying a higher position than the other women in the family.
Women were not all the same powerless objects of ‘tradition’, as was claimed by the
May fourth intellectuals (Ko, 1994; Bray, 1997).10 Some more elite women had more
bargaining power over their fertility.

The Qing government enforced the concepts of obedience and chastity at the core of
female virtue, in accordance with the Neo-Confucian values, in a context where
commercialisation and social mobility were expanded and increased (Theiss, 2002;
Du and Mann, 2003).11 As Theiss (2002:48) notes, women’s virtues ‘became a
touchstone of social quality, moral refinement, and cultural identity’. That is, chastity
not only constituted an important component of female identity but also was seen to
be important to the reputations of men and families and the maintenance of a
harmonious social order. In the Qing period, bound feet and chastity came to be
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significant aspects of female identities (Mann, 2011).12 The government relied more
on voluntary measures than coercion to instil chastity-centred female virtues. It
facilitated the publication and circulation of the biographies of exemplary women
who were chaste and obedient to normalise such womanly virtues (ibid). In addition,
it also rewarded women for their chaste behaviour, and even established shrines and
memorial arches for virtuous women (ibid).

However, increasing pressure from the West beginning in the mid-nineteenth
centuries has dramatically altered the whole society, including women’s roles.
China’s confrontation with the West began with its defeat in the Opium War in 1842,
resulting in the signing of a series of unequal treaties on foreign investments in
China. Since then, Great Britain, France, the United States, Russia and Japan ‘all
established concessions in treaty ports across the country’. The impact of the West
compelled Chinese reformists to find a way to save the nation. Modernisation was
perceived as the way to get rid of the backwardness and to build a strong nation
(Bergère, 1976). Concern about women’s issues was raised as one of the many
projects of modernisation.

Reformers in the late Qing dynasty put women on the agenda of national salvation,
embedded in the nationalist framework. They believed that women were the weakest
link in the chain that hindered the development of the nation. In order to strengthen
the nation, they first needed to strengthen its women. That is, shifting gender roles
were ensnared in the projects of modernisation and nation-building from the very
beginning. Although there were talented women who had received informal
educations within the genteel families13 and women participating in the workforce,
the reformers and their followers from the May Fourth Movement totalised and
essentialized women as illiterate and feet-bound, with an absolute dependence on
12
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Shoes for Bound Feet (2001), and Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding (2005).
13
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men in the household. Women’s lack of education and bound feet were strongly
criticised and regarded as a symbol of China’s backwardness. As such, the reformers
Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao (1873-1929) advocated for an antifootbinding movement and the promotion of women’s education. Kang co-founded
bu guozu hui (Do Not Bind Feet Society) to challenge the practice of footbinding.
Liang keenly advocated for female education. In his famous essay ‘On Women’s
Education’ (published in 1897), Liang stated that,
‘…the nation’s two hundred million women, among whom all are
consumers and none are producers. Owing to women’s inability to
support themselves and their dependence on other people, men
raise women as livestock or slaves…Since women are wholly
dependent and men have no choice but to support them, even those
men who work for the entire year cannot afford to care for their
wives and children’ (cited from Liu, Karl and Ko, 2013:191).
Liang’s argument implied that an uneducated woman on a pair of bound feet was a
parasite, and her economic dependence on men was the root of China’s poverty,
which overshadowed her traditional learning and her domestic work (Ko, 2005).
Liang further argued that, in order to improve the nation’s economy, women should
be part of the labour force; and to take part in a labour force that can meet the
demands of the modern world; women first needed to be educated and unbind their
feet. Moreover, Liang believed that the improvement of women’s education was vital
for national survival, because women reproduced the future generations of the
nation. Liang maintained that ‘Children’s education begins with the mother, which is
itself rooted in women’s education. Therefore, women’s education fundamentally
determines whether a nation will survive or be destroyed and whether it will prosper
or languish in weakness’ (cited from Liu, Karl and Ko, 2013: 194). A mother became
‘guomin zhi mu’(mothers of citizens).
The reformers’ vision for women did not subvert gender norms. The emancipation of
the female labour force from the household did not alleviate women’s reproductive
role as a mother. Instead, it was reinforced. There was not a sharp rupture between
the reformers and the earlier Qing government in terms of their emphasis on the
maternal aspects of women’s reproductive role. The difference was that the late Qing
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reformers blended women’s social roles into the category of nation. The integration
of nation and woman in terms of motherhood naturalised and politicised women’s
maternal role (Judge, 2000). A model woman from the preceding Qing period would
demonstrate her virtue by undertaking woman’s work such as weaving, the
management of household affairs, and the provision of moral education to their
children; the reformers’ version of a model woman was one who was patriotic,
educated with modern knowledge, economically independent and physically healthy
so that she could produce profits and reproduce educated and healthy citizens for the
nation.
Entering the twentieth century, the ‘women’s question’ was positioned as a central
concern within the framework of nationalism and modernisation. Women were
required to emancipate from household production, but were subordinated to the
project of nation-building. Although the nature of women’s work changed
dramatically with the introduction of industrialisation in the late nineteenth centuries,
their social position came to be increasingly controversial over the course of the
Republican period (Mann, 1994). As Susan Mann (ibid.) clearly points out, ‘On the
one hand, women were the workers who would transform China into a modern
industrial power: “Women workers can double productivity and with it government
tax revenue”; on the other hand, women were the mothers who kept the homes where
modern citizens of the realm could be nurtured: “Women in the home manage the
family, and the family is the basic unit of local self-government”.’ Different
ideologies co-existed without a consensus on women’s roles.

1.1.2. Republican Period

The collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the democratic
republic in 1912 failed to transform China into a strong, modern nation-state,14
propelling intellectuals (mostly male) to search for a cultural solution to revitalize
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China (Wang, 1999; Gilmartin, 1999). The intellectuals that emerged from the New
Cultural Movement (1915-1923) – also known as the May Fourth Movement –
vociferously criticized Confucian culture as the reason for China’s backwardness.
The new cultural radicals believed that in order to construct a civil and modern
nation on par with its Western counterparts, a thorough cultural transformation was
required. The project of anti-Confucianism served the ultimate purpose of ‘national
salvation” (jiu guo) (Bergère: 1977). As Bergère (1977:69) noted, ‘The May Fourth
Movement united the struggle for the nation’s rights and the struggle against
traditional Chinese political society’. Another characteristic of the movement was
that, like the reformers of the late Qing, the New Cultural intellectuals relied on the
west for new models. They proposed several western-inspired reforms (Glosser,
2003). The movement not only catalysed various political alternatives:
libertarianism, anarchism, and the socialism of Marx – to name a few, but also
incubated two major political parties – the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang KMT) and
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Bergère, 1977; Mitter, 2004).

Underpinned by nationalism and anti-Confucianism, the iconoclastic movement
attacked the old traditions – including the family, gender roles, elite literature, and
authoritarianism, and promoted political alternatives rooted in science and
democracy (Glosser, 2003). One profound change of the May Fourth era was an
emphasis on youth. Chen Duxiu – a leading thinker in the New Cultural Movement
and a founder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – published a famous article
entitled ‘jinggao qingnian’ (Call to Youth) in the magazine Xin Qingnian (New
Youth). The overturning of Confucian norms provided the youth with new
opportunities to explore the modern world as well as their individual selves (Mitter,
2004). The individual self, which was downplayed in Confucian culture, was
celebrated by the New Cultural radicals under the influence of western ideas. The
movement worked to remould a new modern self.
In this light, discussions of women’s issues grew and expanded to occupy a central
place in the modernising discourse during the May Fourth Movement. The
modernization of women became a precondition of a modern China. The ‘traditional
women’ that had been essentialised as obedient, submissive, and virtuous became the
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victims of Confucian culture, and thus tokens of the backwardness of Confucianism
(Wang, 1999).15 In addition to the call for women’s economic independence that the
reformers advocated, the movement incited women to emancipate from the shackles
of the traditional family and to develop an independent personality (duli renge).
Women’s suffrage, defined as their equal participation in all walks of social life,
became ‘a sign of modernity and the key to a strong and independent nation’ (Wang,
1999:131). The movement broadened the concerns of women in both the public and
private spheres, including freedom in love, marriage, and sexual behaviours. In his
essay ‘My views on Chastity’, Lu Xun, the foremost figure of the May Fourth era,
vigorously attacked the virtue of Chastity, which was considered the highest moral
behaviour of women by the Qing government. Another example is Ding Ling’s
fiction entitled Sophie’s Diary written in 1928, which touched upon the issue of
women’s love.
The new cultural radicals’ vision of women was evident in the reform of the family,
which was one of the most important reformist policies of the time. The concept of
family, which played a central role in Confucianism, was attacked for oppressing the
individual. Although the reformers of the early twentieth century were critical of the
traditional joint family (da jiating) system,16 it was not until the New
Cultural Movement that the critique of the family crystallised into more concrete
personal dissatisfaction. The new cultural intellectuals attacked the joint family
where different generations lived under one roof; they embraced the conjugal model
(xiao jiating) that comprised a husband and wife with their children introduced from
the West as an ideal form (Glosser, 2003). Susan Glosser (2013) identifies three
elements – the self, the nation and production – that feature in the family-reform
discourse in the New Cultural Movement. She argues that the family-reform
discourse was the outgrowth of young educated urban male’s competing desires of
redefining their positions in the industrial economy and a modernising nation (ibid).
The New Cultural intellectuals believed that a conjugal family promised freedom for
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individuals to develop their own talents, which would, in turn, strengthen the nation
(ibid). That is, the family became the foundational unit of a strong nation. The xiao
jiating model formulated the idea that a husband and wife live independently from
their families and make their own incomes to support themselves (ibid). Thus, it was
believed that individual fulfilment could be achieved and serve as the foundational
unit of the nation’s economic productivity and social progress.

The family-reform discourse envisioned a new role for women. According to a
survey conducted by two Chinese sociologists, Chen Heqin (1892-1982) and Pan
Guangdan (1899-1967), in 1920 on men’s definitions of the ideal wife, the ideal
wife, in many men’s eyes, was one who attained some level of education, and could
take on most childcare responsibilities (Glosser, 2013). That is, the new woman was,
on the one hand, envisioned to be a wife that received a certain level of education
and participated in social activities ‘outside’ the household to meet the new demand
of modern productivity; while,on the other hand, she still was deeply rooted in her
traditional roles, which primarily consisted of reproductive labour. As Glosser
(2013:73) notes, ‘It seems that the New Cultural Movement convinced men and
women that women should play a greater role in society, but most were not sure of
how the new public role was to be combined with the traditional private one.’
This contradiction in women’s roles continued in the New Life Movement in the
1930s. If in the heyday of the New Cultural Movement in the 1920s women’s new
role as independent, educated modern worker was much celebrated, women’s
domestic role was reasserted over the course of the New Life Movement (19341936). The Nationalist government was established under the leadership of Chiang
Kai-shek in Nanjing in 1928. It centralised its authority through the revitalisation of
Neo-Confucian values of proprieties, loyalty, and honour, aiming to build a new,
strong modern nation (Bergère, 1977; Croll, 1980). As French historian Bergère
(1977: 190) argues, the government’s ideology, ‘Just as its power was founded on
the coalition of the conservative managerial classes (the military and the landowners)
and the pro-Western business classes’, ‘combined elements of Chinese tradition and
modernist borrowings from abroad, without undue concern about coherence’.
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Like its incoherent ideology, the Nationalists placed women in a contradictory and
incoherent position. On the one hand, despite the actual effects and changes, the
government passed new laws to legitimize and equalise women’s rights to divorce,
property and equal pay, and continued to encourage women to participate in modern
social life; on the other hand, rejecting the new cultural radical’s envision of a free,
independent woman as a foundation of a sound family and ultimately of a strong
nation, it reframed women’s domestic role as an indispensable part of the new family
unit and for the new modern nation.
In this manner, the New Life Movement refashioned ‘traditional’ Confucian virtues
to revolutionize Chinese life (Dirlik, 1975),17 with the goal of reviving the habit of
behaving in accordance with fixed and unquestioned rules which traditionally
defined correct relationships between the rulers and ruled, the generations, and the
sexes (Croll, 1980:159). The movement sanctioned the traditional division of labour,
and highlighted a modern version of women’s traditional roles (ibid). It was a
modern version and not a restoration of traditional Confucian notions of ‘virtuous
wife and good mother’, because it was catered to the nationalist agenda in the
context of the modern economy. Girls’ educations were reoriented to develop
curriculums to foster women’s domestic role within a family unit. Women were
asked to improve their housekeeping skills and to go back to the kitchen. Educated
elite women with housekeeping skills were heralded as role models to their female
counterparts for their skills in the art of household management and child-rearing.
Furthermore, the family became a link between the nation and the individual,
charged with supervising individuals to dedicate their loyalty and economic
productivity to the nation (Glosser, 2013). In this way, women’s reproduction also
transformed into a highly supervised arena, constituting ‘the source of China’s
optimistically healthier population’ (Johnson, 2011:157).18 In terms of women’s
socio-economic role, it was encouraged with reservations. According to Elisabeth
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Croll (1980:163), ‘They were encouraged, at least while they were young and single,
to obtain professional qualifications and enter employment, while social work was
advocated for the leisured.’
The contradiction between women’s social positions of production and reproduction
remained in the new ideological framework emerging in the course of China’s
modernisation, and evident in its practices. Before moving on to discuss the
increasing female population’s participation in the labour force, it is necessary to
review the changing landscape of urban areas during the Republican era, where
various kinds of jobs were offered for women from different classes. The large cities,
especially the treaty-ports, were the insignificant locales where the modern industries
developed. Modern sectors were introduced in large cities under the influence of
foreign capital. Despite the fact that the majority of China remained rural, the growth
rate of modern industries in big cities reached 13.8 percent from 1912 to 1920.
Notable areas of growth included cotton yarn, food industries, and the tobacco and
cigarette industry (Bergère, 1983:748). An economic boom accompanied the
increasing urbanisation. The urban population accounted for 5 to 6 percent of the
then 500 million Chinese in the 1930s, compared to 3 to 4 percent of the total 350
million at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Feuerwerker, 1983:33). In large
cities such as Shanghai, the annual growth rate was 2 to 7 percent in the 1930s (ibid).
It was also in these large cities that, as Bergere described, ‘almost all elements of
modern life were to be found: industrial centres, universities and newspapers, foreign
concessions, the concentration of the modern bourgeoisie.’ As such, new occupations
such as journalism and publishing, and modern educational and cultural institutions,
gradually appeared in port-cities (ibid).
The expansion of girl’s education also played a crucial role in the emergence of a
new class of women in the cities. The new modern economy emerging in the cities
required women’s skill improvements and women’s participation in the labour force.
Compared with previous generations, the number of women from certain classes
receiving an education increased during the Republican period. The abolishment of
civil service examinations in 1905 and the rise of modern educational establishments
opened up new possibilities for women to receive a public education. The girl’s
40

school was first introduced by Western missionaries in the mid-nineteenth-century,
and institutionalised by the Qing government in the early twentieth-centuries
(Croll,1995; Bailey, 2007). Different levels of education for women, including
vocational schools, primary and secondary schools, and higher-level educational
opportunities were gradually established in the first two decades of the twentiethcentury (Bailey, 2007).19 There was a steady growth of female students, although
still few when compared with the number of male students. The total number of
female students at all levels in Chinese schools increased from 40 in 1903 to 141,130
(4.81 per cent of the school population) in 1912-13, and reached 417,820 (6.32 per
cent of the school population) by 1922-1923 (ibid). By 1922, there were 665 women
enrolled in colleges, not counting colleges and universities run by missionaries
(Zurndorfer, 2005:460).
The formalization and expansion of girl’s schooling played a significant role in the
creation of ‘a class of women conscious of both the advantages of education and its
consequent opportunities for economic and individual independence’ (Croll, 1980:
165). The small group of women who received an education became career women
working in modern sectors in cities. It was recorded that there were around 300,000
to 400,000 career women in 1949: the majority of them worked in relatively lowlevel positions in their respective sectors, such as teachers in primary and high
schools, civil service workers and nurses; a few women worked at a more
professional level as lawyers, journalists, doctors, dentists, and even as managers and
executives in enterprises (Croll, 1980; Mann, 1994; Wang, 1999). In Shanghai,
women also found jobs as shop clerks, dancers, singers, bar hostesses, telephone
operators, prostitutes, vendors, and custodians (Mann, 1994).

The development of modern industries was accompanied by the emergence of a
growing industrial proletariat. Women and children made up a large part of the
unskilled proletariat, especially in the Yangzi river area (Bergère, 1977: 124).20
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Women, who migrated from the countryside to join urban job markets under labour
contracts, held the majority of factory jobs, especially in Shanghai. It was recorded
that female factory workers accounted for 61 per cent of the industrial workforce in
1929 (Honig, 1986), and occupied around 25 per cent of the total one million female
workers in Shanghai in 1935 (Mann, 1994). According to a survey conducted in
1937 of 102 Shanghai factories, it was reported that female factory workers were
predominantly ‘unmarried, nineteen, illiterate and earning $4.83 US dollars per
month’ (Croll, 1980). For this group of women, working hours were extremely long
and wages only permitted the poorest living conditions (Bergère, 1977: 124; Honig,
1986; Ono, 1989) Wages were usually sent back to family in the countryside,
becoming an important contribution to the family income (Honig, 1986). They
frequently moved in and out of different factories and moved back and forth between
the countryside and the city. This form of mobility increased even more after
marriage or childbirth (ibid).

However, although women from different classes got opportunities to participate in
the modern economy, they experienced different forms of discrimination in the
workplace as a consequence of the friction between production and reproduction.
The overall society was still segregated by gender hierarchies. Educated women in
the medical field were often low-level technicians, only rarely working as surgeons;
in the educational field, the majority of women were teachers in primary and highschools, almost never professors in universities; in the government, most women
occupied the lowest ranking positions and found it difficult to be promoted (Chen,
2008: 356-358). For working-class women, the factories favoured single and young
female workers. Although married women continued working in factories, they were
less likely to have a stable job, and more likely to move from factory to factory and
from the city to the countryside (Honig, 1986).

female workers in southern China, see Emily Honig. Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai
Cotton Mills, 1919-1949. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); for the situation in Northern
China, see Gail Hershatter. The Workers of Tianjin:1900-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1986).

42

During periods of war and the economic crisis, female workers were the first to be
forcibly laid off from their jobs. In the mid-1930s, a large number of female workers,
especially in the industries of silk, matches, flour and cigarettes, were laid off, as
China’s national industries suffered the results of the great world depression which
began in 1929 (Zang, 2005). The social issues of mass urban unemployment and
rural agricultural crisis were getting increasingly severe with the beginning of the
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. It was reported that some governmental sectors
and business enterprises bluntly rejected employing women in 1938 (Lü, 1995). It
was during these two periods that the debate on ‘women returning home’ reached its
first climax in the press (Zang, 2005).21 A well-known writer Lin Yutang in a speech
given in 1930 at a girl’s school initially acknowledged that there were fewer jobs
available for women compared with men, and thus he remarked that ‘…the only
occupation without any male competition is marriage. Marriage is the best, most
suitable and most satisfying occupation for women’ (1933:4, cited in Zang, 2005:
377).

1.1.3. New Subjectivity: Modern Women

During the Republican period, the coexistence of various social forces, NeoConfucianist, New Cultural reformist, Nationalist, and Communist, co-shaped the
hybrid and contradictory subjectivities of women.22 These ideologies were
formulated within the framework of nationalism. The inseparable projects of
modernisation and nation building placed women in a rather ambiguous position:
nation building demanded the emancipation of women from the household to
participate in a labour force that was indispensable to modern productivity;
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meanwhile, women were also required to be a ‘virtuous wife and good mother’, to
shoulder the responsibility of reproducing strong and healthy future citizens for
nation building. One example was the reform of the family system. The model of
xiao jiating, consisting of a husband, a wife and their children, replaced the joint
family system and functioned as an independent economic unit. Xiao jiating, which
was supposed to free individuals from hierarchical relations of the big family system,
turned into a locale where the nation (both KMT and CCP) could extend its power
over and constantly supervise the private life of individuals (Glosser, 2003). A
modern woman did not free herself from the domestic; instead, the virtues of
domesticity reasserted themselves within the middle-class conjugal family.
A variety of political proposals for ‘national salvation’ coming from Kang-Liang
reformists, New Cultural intellectuals, the commercial sector, Nationalists and
communists, put forward different versions of the ideal modern woman, but none of
them was really capable of addressing the problem of women’s contradictory
positions. Women found themselves stuck in the dilemma of compromising between
production and reproduction. That is, coping with the conflict between the modern
role of female worker and the ‘traditional’ role of mother and wife. Such
controversies were experienced differently among women from the middle and
working-classes: for the former, it was possible to compromise between the two
positions and still have choices; for the latter, who rarely had a choice, they were
subjected to a more transient way of life. It also needs to be pointed out that, as some
scholars clearly demonstrate (e.g. Wang, 1999; Chan, 1988), the invention of new
female subjectivities was closely associated with elite male intellectuals’ own
anxiety of identity in the modern world. At the same time, women themselves were
not merely the object of modernisation – they actively fought for their own rights of
suffrage, labour, and marriage.
As argued in section 1.1.2, the New Cultural intellectuals envisioned a ‘new woman’
characterised by individualism and anti-Confucianism within the nationalist
framework. They prioritised emancipated and fulfilled individuals as the foundation
of national salvation (Glosser, 2003). The traditional women, who weaved and sewed
with bound feet, were condemned as victims of Confucianism who hindered the
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project of China’s modernisation. Therefore, women were asked to throw off the
shackles of their traditional social roles, and to participate in the social, economic
and political arenas. Attacking the Confucian formulation of women as backward
and traditional, New Cultural radicals envisioned a ‘new woman’ who was educated,
had an independent personality and was politically active. She also had a career to
support herself without being dependent on her family, and bravely pursued love
while rejecting the arranged marriage. The prescriptions of new women widely
circulated in the press, and became the aspirational model of womanhood.

Inspired by the emancipated atmosphere of this period, women themselves actively
sought new identities (Croll, 1995; Wang, 1999). Feminist movements thrived on the
fight for women’s rights in the fields of education, suffrage, employment and
automatic marriage in the early twentieth centuries23 (although they were suppressed
both by the KMT in the latter decades of the Republic and by the CCP after 1949).
Moreover, as Elisabeth Croll (1995) argues, the notion of rebellion and the rejection
of Confucian female norms were common themes in female autobiographies.
Women in the early twentieth centuries did not find their mothers and grandmothers
as appropriate practical role models for the new womanhood. Nora, the protagonist
of Ibsen's play A Doll’s House, who leaves her husband and family after realizing
that it was impossible to change her status in the home, received much attention
during the New Culture Movement. Nora became an influential symbol to women of
the May Fourth generation.

What happened to the new woman after the rebellion? Lu Xun asked in his famous
essay ‘Nala chuzou zengyang’ (What Happens after Nora Leaves Home?). Women
experienced modernisation differently after stepping outside of women’s traditional
fates, but, as the historian Rana Mitter (2004:72) notes, ‘Still, the spirit of the age
gave women, like men, a chance to dream.’ A cohort of women, whose voices were
overshadowed after 1949, did make their own way and became the professional
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women in the Republican period.24 For example, Liang Yen, who grew up in a
traditional large family, left her home to escape an arranged marriage, and made her
own living by teaching and writing articles. She recalled in her autobiography that, ‘I
knew I could teach; I was sure I could learn other jobs. I would make my own way to
my dreams’ (Cited in Croll, 1995: 54). For a larger number of factory workers, who
were by no means seen as exemplars of the new woman, they worked and lived in
harsh conditions in cities but were not merely the victims of modernisation. They had
the opportunity to visit friends and enjoy street theatre and operas on their days off
(Honig, 1986).

Urban consumer power supplanted the New Cultural radicals in the 1920s to 1930s,
and influenced the definition of the modern woman. The New Cultural radicals’
concept of the ‘new woman’, who was educated, patriotic and politically aware, was
appropriated as consumer in modern commodities, increasingly losing its radical
political significance. Edwards (2000: 116) argues that ‘two decades after her first
appearance in 1918, the modern woman became a symbol of national modernity that
was commercially rather than politically centered’. This was evident in the
prevalence of the images of modern girls in calendars, magazines, and
advertisements (Barlow, 2008). The modern woman was associated with her clothing
and bob hairstyle,25 and was juxtaposed with commodities. The modern woman was
illustrated as a joyful and emotional participant in consumerism and a lifestyle of
leisure (Barlow, 2008; Edwards, 2000). The commercial framework positioned the
modern woman as a glamourous consumer at the centre of national salvation, which
replaced the New Cultural radical’s formulation of the new woman, and became the
new role model. Meanwhile, the entrepreneurial ideal of the conjugal family
considered family as a ‘marketable product’, which was the foundation of economic
success. Emphasis on the economic function of the family reconfigured the roles of
family members, where men fulfilled their duties to the nation through productive
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labour and women contributed to the nation through consumption (Glosser, 2003:
135, 165). However, the shifting ideal of the modern woman from laying stress on a
political to a commercial connotation did not emancipate women from reproductive
labour. As Glosser maintains, ‘women would continue to meet family and state
demands of reproductive labour while adding a new role as educated consumer’
(ibid: 135).

Confucianism, which was criticised by the New Cultural intellectuals, did not
disappear and still had a powerful impact on everyday life (Mitter, 2004). The
nationalists highly centralised power, supervising citizens through the family to build
a strong nation. The nationalist government understated women’s contribution to the
nation in terms of production, and reclaimed women’s reproductive labour for the
project of nation-building. Although the expansion of education and new economic
opportunities provided new possibilities, the nationalists envisioned a modern
woman subjected to the middle-class nuclear family, with recourse to the Confucian
notion of ‘virtuous wife and good mother’. She was educated not for the sake of
gaining economic independence, but for the purpose of raising educated children for
the nation. As was demonstrated in section 1.2, there were some educated women
who chose to pursue professional careers, whereas some chose to return home to be
‘taitai’ (wives). According to Susan Mann’s (1994) study of a group of middle-class
women from Ningpo in Shanghai, the virtues of domesticity operated powerfully in
everyday life, and was viewed as a symbol of social status. Women embraced the
virtue of domesticity to identify themselves with the old Confucian elites in their
management of domestic affairs, and to distinguish themselves from women working
in factories. For women from rural areas, Confucianism was the most powerful and
dominant ideology saturating their daily lives (Mitter, 2004). In terms of work, rural
women who were mobilised away from the rural economy to work in cities, were
stigmatised under the cultural influence of Confucian values. Women working
outside their hometown were still seen as violating their chastity;26 in terms of
marriage, arranged marriage was very common in rural China, even though it was
26
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attacked by the new cultural radicals. Emily Honig’s (1986) seminal study on factory
girls from rural places shows that female workers rarely had the freedom to choose
their own mates, and some found the idea of self-selected marriage disgraceful.

However, the concept of the modern woman jointly shaped by the new cultural
intellectuals, nationalists, commercial sectors and Confucianists in the Republican
period was problematic in two ways. Firstly, it was an elite formulation. The image
of the modern woman, which became the aspirational subject predominating in the
press, films, magazines, and advertisements, posed ‘the question of class conflict’
(Mann,1994: 187). Examples of modern women, such as the figure of the
professional woman and ‘taitai’, were almost exclusively educated women from
urban middle-class families. They might be lawyers, doctors, teachers or journalists,
but not factory workers. Thus, working-class women were excluded from the
imagination, and their visibility was obscured. Secondly, the project of
modernisation for ‘national salvation’ framed the conflict between production and
reproduction. That is, the project both required women to become workers, joining
the modern economy, and to reproduce the labour force, resulting in contradictory
women’s roles. But, as Croll (1980) and Mann (1994) both argue, it was the educated
middle-class women who encountered the conflict between returning home to be
taitai and pursuing a professional career. Factory girls and peasant women rarely
struggled with this friction. Because their incomes were significant for sustaining the
whole family, they were often forced to relocate for work in factory after factory and
some even postponed marriage in order to work (Honig, 1986). After marriage, such
mobility prominently increased. They were forced to constantly move back and forth
from workplace to home to cope with the conflict between work and reproductive
duties.

With the end of the second Sino-Japanese war and the beginning of the civil war, the
Chinese Communist Party gradually abrogated all of the political provisions brought
forward during the May Fourth Movement, and became the one and only dominant
party. The CCP diminished educated modern women – including taitai and
professional women – as bourgeois, and cast working-class women as the new

48

champions of nation-building. The next section will discuss women’s role and
women’s work in the socialist era in China.

1.2.

Women of Socialist China

China’s socialist era features the pursuit of socialism in accordance with the
development of industrialism via the centralised direction of the socialist state. The
final legacy that KMT left the Chinese Communists in 1949 was ‘the utter destitution
of cities’ (Meisner, 1999: 77). Hence, in order to reinforce its authority, the primary
task of the CCP was to revive social and economic life in the cities. A significant
characteristic of the new system was the highly centralised form of socio-economic,
political and ideological control.

The dominant discourse on gender in the socialist period was framed by the concept
of women’s liberation (funü jiefang). Women’s liberation, which was first introduced
in the early twentieth century under the impact of Western feminism (Davin, 1976),
was incorporated as an indispensable part of the agenda of the socialist revolution
(Evans, 2008). The CCP’s version of women’s liberation was based on the Maoist
understanding of the May Fourth Movement and the Marxist legacy,27 and was
justified as the sole narrative on gender through the rejection of other visions of
women as marks of the counter-revolutionary and bourgeois mentality (ibid.).
According to the Maoist-Marxist formula, women’s participation in the sphere of
production and labour was essential in achieving equality between men and women,
and finally to achieve the complete liberation of women. Hershater (2007) precisely
argued that the modernity of socialism ‘was to be measured in the realm of
production rather than reproduction’.

Therefore, women were principally positioned as workers. In the realm of
production, women were mobilized to participate in the sectors that used to be
known as man’s work, and to work like men. This was termed as the ‘androgyny’ of
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gender, which will be further discussed in the following pages. However, women
were mobilised as a flexible labour force that was always the first to be unemployed
during the difficult times. The CCP prioritized women’s position in the productive
sector, but it failed to question women’s reproductive burden at home. In sharp
contrast to the gender sameness in the productive realm, social reproduction was
organised primarily on the principle of gender difference (Evans, 2008). Women’s
role as wife and mother was naturalised as their social obligations. Another distinct
characteristic of women’s position in the socialist period was that it was consistently
manipulated by the hand of the state. The power and influence of the state exerted
itself into women’s daily life. The family reform of the early 1950s is one apparent
example. Taking a step further than the KMT, the CCP inserted itself into the
personal affairs of the family through the legislation of familial relations among
husband and wife, parents and children, and daughter and mother-in-law. Therefore,
the fluctuation of state policies constantly forced women to move forth and back
from the home to the workplace, and intensified women’s dual burden.

1.2.1. ‘Men and Women are All the Same’: Women’s Work in Socialist Urban
China

The CCP shifted its focus from rural to urban restoration after the institution of its
power in 1949 (Meisner, 1999; Davin, 1976). Industrialism and socialism went hand
in hand under Mao’s theory of ‘permanent revolution’ during the initial two decades
of the socialist era. The rapid process of urban industrialisation was regarded as ‘the
means to achieve socialist ends’ (Meisner, 1999: 126). Despite dramatic fluctuations
after the Great Leap Forward campaign in the early years of the 1960s, all in all,
from 1952 to 1977, Chinese industry grew at around 11.3 percent yearly and created
a sharp rise in industry’s share of China’s national income to encompass nearly 30
percent of the total. Meisner (1999: 415) concludes that the development of Chinese
industry is ‘as rapid a pace of industrialisation as has ever been achieved by any
country during a comparable period in modern world history’. To put it briefly,
Maoist socialism was based on the development of heavy industry.
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The new regime was characterised by an unprecedented penetration of state power
into social life. It not only established the centralised labour allocation system
(tongfen tongpei) wherein labour was organised and allocated by the state, but also
organised the urban population and urban reproductive life in favour of socialist
production. One prominent example of the combination of work and life in the cities
was the emergence of the ‘work unit’ system (danwei zhi), which was set up to
organise and manage workers in state and collectively owned enterprises (two main
types of ownership) under centralised control to facilitate rapid industrial
development in cities in the 1950s. Pun Ngai (2016: 64) precisely summarizes that
‘not only were jobs allocated to urban workers who held urban hukou, state-owned
and collective enterprises were formulated as “units”, which served as encompassing
social institutions to guarantee the new working-class employment, housing,
education, and medical care.’ Danwei guaranteed a lifetime job for urban workers
and provided benefits such as education and medical care. It functioned as an agent
between the state and urban workers (Bian and Huang, 2009). But it also deserves
notice that danwei was not a system without hierarchy. When a work unit had a close
relationship with the state administrative sectors, it usually could gain more benefits
and offer more to its workers (Xie, Lai and Wu, 2009). The establishment of the
household (hukou) system in 1955 strictly prohibited population flow from rural to
urban areas, which advantaged urban industrialisation but also widened the
rural/urban gap.

Furthermore, urban populations, including women, students, businessman, and
professionals, were organised into separate mass organisations, including the AllChina Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Federation of Women (ACFW),
the Students’ Association, and a variety of professional associations (Davin, 1976;
Meisner, 1999). Women in urban society were mainly grouped into two
organisations: the ACFW, whose members were mainly female craft workers,
housewives, families of urban workers, women from rural areas and so on; female
cadres of different levels of trade unions, whose members were female workers and
employees (Tan, 1993). The ACFW, the official agency that represented all women
in socialist China, pursued two goals: they channelled the needs and requirements of
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citizens from different groups to the government, and also facilitated the state’s
centralised control over urban social life to serve national priorities (Davin, 1976).

The mobilisation of the female labour force was a crucial part of the statist project of
socialist industrialisation (Davin, 1976; Hershatter, 2007). Women’s participation in
social production was both an ideological and productive necessity. At the
ideological level, women’s liberation was part of China’s national liberation
movement against feudalism and imperialism (Davin, 1978; Andors, 1976; Andors,
1983; Hooper, 1984; Young, 1989; Evans, 2003; Hershatter, 2007; Evans, 2008).
Adopting Engels's theory, women’s participation in social production was regarded
as the crucial condition for women’s liberation (ibid). As Deng Yingchao (19031992), a veteran CCP-member and chairperson of the Women’s Federation, stated in
1951, ‘ten years of practise has proven that mobilising the masses of women to
participate in production is the basic key to improving equality between men and
women and to achieving the thorough liberation of women’ (cited in Evans, 2003).
That is, only when women participate in social production can women emancipate
from the constraints of the feudal family and become equal to men. On material
grounds, the rapid growth of industrial production demands a large number of
workers in the industrial arena, and female labour force, as Mao Zedong once
remarked in 1955, ‘forms a great reserve of labour power in China. This reserve
should be tapped into the struggle to build a great socialist country’ (Mao, 1977: 269,
cited in Hooper, 1984). Women’s contribution to the workforce was viewed as an
integral part of the state development strategy, especially during times of labour
shortage.

Women’s work outside of the home was legislated through the enforcement of laws
to uphold women’s equality with men, and was organised mainly through the official
Women’s Federation. The provisional constitution, The Common Program of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, drafted in 1949 when the CCP
had just come into power, ratified the abolishment of the feudal system, and
recognised women’s equal rights in the socio-economic sphere, as well as in the
political, cultural and domestic spheres. The labour code of the PRC in the early
1950s further advantaged women by decreeing equal pay for equal work, 56 days of
52

maternity leave with full pay, sick leave and access to canteens and nurseries (in the
state sector) (Davin, 1976; Lin, 2006). The ACFW became the major means to
mobilise and organise women to go out to work, since the notion that women work
outside the home was still not widely accepted and was regarded as shameful to
female virtues in the early years of the socialist era. The ACFW in urban and rural
areas functioned at once to liberate women from the bondage of the ‘feudal family’
and channel their energies into production, and to make women qualified subjects of
the new socialist state (Davin, 1976; Wang, 2005). In attacking the old ‘feudal’
system, the establishment of laws and the ACFW were the major means to liberate
women’s productivity and channel it for socialist nation-building. As such, a woman
in socialist China was a product of production, free from the oppression of ‘feudal
bondage’ and standing against imperialism (Rofel, 1999). Thus, women’s role as
workers became a standard feature of urban women during the socialist era.28

The cultural meaning of women's work was rearticulated in socialist rhetoric.
According to Lisa Rofel (1999: 76), the cultural category of ‘work’ was equivalent to
‘productive’ activity, which ‘produced surplus value for the state, acknowledged
with an age’. It valued activities outside the family that serve the interests of the
state, while devaluing the activities confined within the family as either ‘signs of the
feudal constraints that held women back from liberation or petty-bourgeois (i.e., nonproductive) labour, privatized and opposed to the interests of the state’ (ibid.).
Accordingly, a woman’s work for socialism would only be valued as ‘productive’
work in the dominant discourse when it was undertaken outside the family’s
domestic sphere for the interests of the state. Prior to the socialist revolution, a
woman who remained inside the household within her kinship world was valued as
respectable, and those who went outside the family were disdained (Rofel, 1999;
Wolf, 1985). However, the specificities of women’s work collapsed the boundaries
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of inside (unproductive home) and outside (production), which set a different cultural
parameter for defining femininity (Rofel, 1999; Hershatter, 2007). One distinct
characteristic was that more and more women worked outside the home as wage
earners (Andors, 1983). Another characteristic of women’s work in socialist China
was that women began working in traditionally male-dominated heavy industries, in
addition to the industries which were considered women's work prior to 1949,
notably in textile industries and service industries (primarily education and health)
(Andors, 1983).

In general, there were three patterns of employment for women in urban areas:
regular industrial positions, street industries (minbangong), and neighbourhood
service centres (Davin, 1976; Andors, 1983). In regular industrial positions, some
women who benefited from educational opportunities became the technocratic elites
in factories (such as technicians, engineers and designers), while the great majority
were allocated to less demanding and unskilled, and hence lower compensated, jobs.
Women working in state-owned or collective enterprises could enjoy the benefits
offered by work units, such as housing, health, and education. Depending on the
levels of the work units and the profits that each work unit produced, the forms of
welfare provided were also different (Bian, 1994). Women, who could not find a job
in regular factories due to a lack of education or skills, were considered to ‘naturally’
possess the skills of homemaking, and thus were mobilised to work in street
factories. The street factories (minbangong) emerged in the late 1960s to produce
mostly daily consumer items, such as cloth, cooking implements and processed
simple foodstuffs (Davin, 1976; Andors, 1983). Compared with those full-time
regular workers with tenure, women working in the street industries were poorly
remunerated, with no welfare benefits, since the street factories were vulnerable to
the overall economic situation, and could barely provide secure employment or longterm welfare benefits (ibid). Women had to rely on their relatives or neighbourhood
child-care facilities (Andors, 1976). Neighbourhood service centres located in
residential areas provided unpaid jobs for old women and young housewives with
several children or with heavy household burdens working in kindergartens,
nurseries, laundries, tailoring, food processing, and repair shops (Andors, 1983).
Women also outnumbered men providing neighbourhood work in residents’
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committees (Wang, 2005). Although work in street industries and neighbourhoods
was poorly paid or unpaid, it mobilized women out of domesticity, and gave them a
sense of participation in socialism (Andors, 1983; Wang, 2005).
However, women’s position as workers were quite ambiguous and conflicted in the
socialist era. Firstly, the female productive role was largely subjected to the state’s
policies, which had undergone unsettled fluctuations from time to time (Davin, 1976;
Hooper, 1984; Andors, 1989; Croll, 1985). In the early 1950s, women were largely
unemployed, even though their participation in production was legislated and
included as the foundation of their liberation in the dominant discourse (Andors,
1983). Coupled with the large unemployment of the female labour force in cities, the
role of housewife was glorified at this stage. Both the state council and the
newspapers and magazines in this period suggested that women could contribute to
socialism by doing housework, even if they were not able to work outside the home
(Davin, 1976; Andors, 1983). This trend continued in the ‘Five Good’ movement
that began in early 1956, which attempted to revalue housework by associating it
with revolutionary aims (ibid). The movement reasserted and glorified housewives’
role in educating children, and supporting and assisting the work of their husbands
for the goal of national development (Davin, 1976; Song, 2007). It was not until the
Great Leap Forward (GLF) period (1958-1960) that both the intensity and the
number of the female labour force increased greatly. Millions of women were
unprecedentedly brought outside their home, participating in economic production as
well as political activities. The female labour force was viewed as a substitution for
men, which freed up men to undertake more advanced projects (Andors, 1983). The
movement ‘substitute women for men’ promoted women’s work in light industry,
commerce and service trades (ibid). By 1962, the number of female workers in urban
industrial sectors reached over 8 million (Andors, 1976). Meanwhile, the official
attitudes toward housework also changed, becoming perceived as trivial and
burdensome (ibid). However, the flood of women into the workforce did not last for
very long. Shortly after the GLF, the number of female workers in state-owned and
collectively-owned enterprises decreased from 10.08 million in 1960 to 6.56 million
in 1963, which meant that more than three and a half million female workers were
unemployed over three years (Jiang, 2001; Song, 2011).
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Secondly, the gendered division of labour continued to exist, and placed women in a
subordinated position (Andors, 1983; Croll, 1983; Wang, 2003; Hershatter, 2007;
Davin, 2010). In the urban areas, while men occupied more technically advanced
positions, women were disproportionately allocated to lower-skilled, lower-paying
positions, playing an auxiliary role in the workplace (Wang, 2003; Jin, 2006).
Therefore, female workers constituted a large portion of temporary workers in the
industrial system that ‘was characterized by lack of job security and fringe benefits
and significantly lower wages than those of permanent workers’ (Andors, 1976:104),
and were the first to be unemployed during times of economic adjustment (Davin
2010; Andors, 1983). This phenomenon was even prominent during the restructuring
of the state-owned enterprises in 1992, which will be further explained in section 1.3
of this chapter. Moreover, domestic chores and childcare remained the purview of
women within the household. Women had to conduct a ‘second shift’ after work. As
Elisabeth Croll (1983: 9) argues, ‘the government had to a certain extent come to
rely upon female unpaid labour to subsidize economic development programmes’.
All in all, the dominant gendered discourse, that women’s participation in social
production was the foundation to liberate women and ultimately to achieve equality
between men and women, increased and naturalised the social acceptance of women
working outside the home, but it also produced an inherently contradictory subject
position (Andors, 1983). Work had previously been dictated by the status in the
hierarchy of female roles and positions that mediated women’s experience. Working
outside the home extended women’s social networks from their kinship relations
within the families to the outside world (Davin, 1976), which appeared to collapse
the longstanding inside/outside distinction (Rofel, 1999; Hershatter, 2007). Worker
became the most desirable identity for women; with the exception of the early years
of the glamorization of housewives through state propaganda, the housewife was
seen as a residual category and a less acceptable identity for women (Wang, 2003;
Hershatter, 2007). However, while women working outside the home were highly
valued and visible to the state, domestic work inside the family remained the purview
of women and the lowest and most invisible position (Wang, 2005). Without the
socialisation of housework, women actually had to bear the ‘double burden’ of
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productive work in the public sphere (for the state) and reproductive work in the
domestic sphere in the socialist modernisation. Furthermore, although women began
working in male-dominated fields with the support of the state, the gendered
division of labour remained unchallenged in the socialist era (Croll, 1985; Davin,
2010). The contradictory positioning of women was even more prominent in the
family reform in Chinese socialism.

1.2.2. Women and Family Reform in The Socialist Era
Although the CCP’s initial goal was to incite women to participate in production, it
shifted its political attention and efforts to reforming the family structure in the early
1950s (Johnson, 1983). The Marriage Law, established in 1950 and promulgated
intensively from 1951-1953, was one of the earliest policies legislated by the state
(Diamant, 2000). It was listed in the CCP’s project of ‘women’s liberation’, and
constituted ‘the second transformation’ for women after land reform (Ono, 1989).
The Marriage Law of 1950 was one of the largest experiments in China’s history of
social reform, and had a considerable impact on women’s position both at work and
in the home (Davin, 1976; Stacey, 1983; Diamant, 2000).
The CCP’s vision for family and marriage had roots that preceded 1949. The
iconoclastic New Cultural Movement initiated the first family reform project that
disparaged the traditional family system. The new culture intellectuals fiercely
criticized arranged marriage and the Confucian model of the hierarchical extended
family. They looked to the Western model and advocated a modern conjugal family
system, where individuals could freely choose their spouse. The radicals prioritised
freedom of the individual from the family as necessary to boost productivity.
Derived from the legacy of May Fourth, the two important parties, KMT and CCP,
developed their own versions of family reforms. The Nationalist Party (KMT)
launched the family code and sequentially the New Life Movement in 1931, which
attempted to abolish concubinage and polygamy, codify freedom of marriage partner
selection, paved the way for women’s equal rights to property and easier access to
divorce (Glosser, 2003; Diamant, 2000; Stacey, 1983). Although the Nationalists’
regulations on the family were limited in urban areas and rarely had a significant
57

impact in rural areas, it reconfigured the relationships between individuals, the
family and the state. The New Life Movement used the family as a mediator to
encourage individuals to transfer their loyalty to the state. In doing so, it extended the
power of the state into private affairs.

Following the New Culture Movement and the Nationalist family code, the CCP
initiated two codes of family policies in rural areas in the Jiangxi Soviet – the
marriage regulations of 1931 and the marriage law of 1934 (Davin, 1976; Stacey,
1983).29 Family reform, together with land reform, was an effort by the CCP to
overturn the traditional rural authorities (Stacey, 1983: 160). Both laws called for the
establishment of a ‘new democratic’ family system to end the ‘feudal’ and
traditional family forms (ibid). The ‘feudal’ family was defined in a broad sense,
including the arranged marriage, the purchase and sale of contracts in marriage,
bigamy, polygamy, and the foster daughter-in-law (Davin, 1976; Stacey, 1983;
Diamant, 2000). To replace the ‘feudal’ family, the CCP envisioned a family based
on the principles of monogamy, freedom of partner selection, the absolute freedom to
divorce and extensive courtship between individuals (ibid). In analysing two codes of
family law, Stacey (1983) noted that, although family reform was considered a
necessary means to mobilise peasant women to participate in the CCP’s rural
revolution, the goal of women’s liberation was constantly subjected to the class
struggle. Take the regulations on divorce as an example. The 1931 marriage
regulations codified absolute freedom in marriage and divorce, which was a basic
measure to guarantee special protections for women (Stacey, 1983: 160). However,
the CCP retreated from this divorce principle by placing restrictions on divorce for
the wives of soldiers, who needed to request the consent of their husbands to obtain a
divorce, even from a ‘feudal’ marriage (Stacey, 1983: 164).
The CCP’s family reform in early 1950 was similar in tone and content to the two
family laws in Jiangxi Soviet. The Marriage Law of 1950 continued the call for the
29
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abolishment of ‘feudal’ marriage and marriage by purchase, and the codification of a
new democratic marriage based on the fundamental principle of freedom of partner
selection (Meijer 1972; Davin 1976; Croll 1981; Johnson 1983; Stacey 1983; Ono
1989; Diamant, 2000; Hershatter, 2007). The Marriage Law of 1950 prohibited
bigamy and polygamy, set the minimum marriageable ages (eighteen for women and
twenty for men), and claimed the right to remarry for widows (ibid). It reasserted the
rights of free divorce, but it moved further away from absolute freedom in divorce,
which introduced governmental mediation in contested divorce cases. Moreover, it
not only legislated monogamy as the norm, but further defined the relationships
between husbands and wives, and parents and children. According to the law,
‘Husband and wife are duty bound to love, respect, assist, and look after each other,
to live in harmony, to engage in production, to care for the children, and to strive
jointly for the welfare of the family and for building the new society.’30 Regarding
parent-child relationships, the 1950 Marriage Law not only dictated parents’ duties in
child-rearing, but also children’s responsibility to support and assist their parents.

The Marriage Law of 1950 was one of large-scale promulgation and education,
which reached a large part of the population (Davin, 1976; Stacey, 1983). Family
reform became one of the major themes of propaganda for social reform. The CCP
advocated the new system using all forms of cultural representation, including
newspapers, magazines, posters, pamphlets, and comic strips (Davin, 1976; Ono,
1989). To better facilitate the promulgation of the law to the illiterate and the rural
areas, newspaper reading groups, cultural work teams, and mass mobilisation
meetings were organised (ibid).

The law, which was drafted with the efforts of a cohort of feminists descending from
the May Fourth generation (Wang, 1999), reasserted the principle that men and
women should enjoy ‘equal rights’, ‘equal status in the home’, and equal rights to
family property. Women who were restrained in the traditional family system or
from poor families could now try to obtain a divorce with recourse to the law.31 But
30

Quotations from the article 7 of the Marriage Law of 1950, translated in English The Marriage Law
of the People’s Republic of China. (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1950).
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The Marriage Law of 1950 was practiced differently among different groups. According to Neil
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the actual effectiveness of the Marriage Law was limited and not long-lasting,
especially for women (Davin, 1976; Johnson, 1983). In terms of divorce, because the
law was intended to dissolve ‘feudal’ marriage, it was known as a divorce law
(Davin, 1976; Stacey, 1983; Ono 1989). The enactment of the law resulted in a
dramatic increase in the number of divorces from 1950 to 1952.32 75 percent of total
divorces were applied for by women, which was the reason why the law was also
called ‘women’s law’ (Ono, 1989: 179; Stacey, 1983: 178). But in response to
requests for governmental mediation in non-consensual divorce, it became more
difficult for women to obtain a divorce (Stacey, 1983). It was recorded that there
were more than 10,000 women killed or suicided in South-Central China in 1951
because of marriage-divorce related issues; this number reached around 70,00080,000 in 1955 (Davin, 1976: 87; Ono, 1989: 179). Even worse, women, who opted
for divorce, had to prepare for a very difficult future (Ono, 1989). There was a
considerable number of women who were killed or committed suicide over marriagerelated issues, the majority of which were young women (Davin, 1976; Ono, 1989).33
In terms of the right to property, women had little control over land, even though
they theoretically had equal rights to land ownership (Davin, 1972; Stacey, 1983;
Ono, 1989 ).

Family reform in the early 1950s is noteworthy in several aspects. Firstly, the family
reform was considered as the essence of the CCP’s attempt to liberate women, but
the feminist goal of women’s liberation was constantly compromised for the
priorities of class struggle (Johnson, 1983; Stacey, 1983). Family reform made no
attempt to destroy the family itself; instead, it sought to maintain it. Women’s
attempts to divorce to end ‘feudal’ marriages encountered huge difficulties, as the
party actively emphasized the importance of maintaining a harmonious, stable
Law. Among the urbanities, the elite-class women were unwilling to expose their family affairs and to
seek the state institutions to divorce, while the working-class who lived in periphery of the cities were
more often recourse to the court to solve marriage issues. See Diamant. Revolutionizing the Family:
Politics, Love, and Divorce in Urban and Rural China 1949-1968 (Berkeley: University of California,
2000).
32
According to Davin (1976), Stacey (1983), and Ono (1989), the number of divorces surged from
1950 to 1952. There were 186,167 divorce cases in 1950, 409,500 in 1951, and 398,243 in the first half
year of 1952.
33
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marriage and family life. The party consistently criticised the feminists, who
encouraged a view of the Marriage Law as a women’s law, and stressed the law’s
relationship to women’s rights, for their impediment to domestic harmony between
husbands and wives (Stacey, 1983). Stacey (1983; 1984) notes that the aim of the
family reform was not to wage a feminist revolution, but to institute a more
democratic form of the patriarchal family system that could carefully combine
traditional peasant virtues and socialist ideals.34

Secondly, the promulgation of family reform, in connection with the enhancement of
productivity, was an instrument to mobilise young women and men to participate in
social production outside the household (Davin, 1976; Stacey, 1983; Ono, 1989;
Hershatter, 2007). Family reform turned the family into a unit of production, and reconfigured gender relationships within the household (ibid). The divorce law became
a means to stimulate female productivity for the construction of socialism, and draw
women to work outside the home. The party envisioned the basic and ideal
relationship between husband and wife as one where they would work together
outside the home to contribute for the socialist project, and work together at home to
raise their children to be loyal members in socialist nation-building (Davin, 1976).
The party disseminated a Marriage Law for ‘the Five Goods’ – ‘good for men, good
for women, good for the old, good for the young, and good for production.’
Lastly, family reform was the CCP’s attempt to further centralise the power of the
state, and directly exercise its huge influence on individuals’ ordinary lives more
than any other regime (Davin, 1976; Stacey, 1983; Ono, 1989; Glosser, 2003;
Hershatter, 2007). Following the May Fourth idea, the CCP believed that a reformed
family would lead to a strong socialist nation (Glosser, 2003); and similar to the
KMT’s formulation, the CCP used marriage freedom to reduce the authority of
junior family members, and prioritised the power of the state over the family and
individuals. Although the CCP’s family reform in the early 1950s was built from its
Republican predecessors, the CCP denounced the Republican vision of marriage and
family as westernised, petit-bourgeois and capitalist. In so doing, the CCP justified
34
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itself as the only legitimate ideology (Glosser, 2003). The CCP took further steps
toward bringing the domestic realm into a closer relationship with the state, through
the legislation of divorce principle that required governmental mediations and the
legislation of familiar relationships between husband and wife, bride and mother-inlaw, and parents and children (Glosser, 2003; Hershatter, 2007).

1.2.3. ‘Funü’ of Socialist China

A hegemonic female subject position, funü, was available to women under the
dominant gender discourse of funü jiefang in Chinese socialism (Barlow, 1994;
Evans, 2003). The hegemonic funü erased the alternative possibilities of nüxing or
nüren, and was legitimized as the only language of the socialist period. The category
nüxing, as has already been argued in the previous section, was introduced and
widely disseminated by the May Fourth intellectuals from the West in the larger
discourse of anti-Confucianism, and it was widely represented as the new modern
subject in literature and media in the 1920s. ‘xin nüxing’ provided a subject position
characterised by individualism and independence. However, the state discourse of
funü jiefang associated nüxing with negative significations, and denounced it as a
sign of individualism, counter-revolutionary, westernised and bourgeois (Barlow,
1994; Wang, 1999; Evans, 2003; Evans, 2008). Through the marginalisation of
subject positions that were unsound to the dominant discourse funü jiefang, funü
became the only term ‘within the legitimate language of the revolution that women
could use to identify the process of their own transformation’ (Evans, 2003: 210).

Thus, as Harriet Evans (2003) points out, the emergence of the new category funü in
the socialist time deconstructed the past and created a new socialist future. In
contrast to nüxing in the individualist discourse of May Fourth or nüren in the
discourse of humanist principles, the gendered subject funü in Chinese socialism was
the collective woman of Maoist ideology (Evans, 2008). Funü was a compound word
referring to all women in late imperial China ––fü refers to married women, and nü
the unmarried daughters in the family. The category funü was defined within the
framework of kinship, and positioned women ‘normatively on the primary sites of
the jia [family]’ (Barlow, 1994: 257). As Barlow (1994) argues in her seminal essay
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‘Theorizing Woman’, the Communist Party’s usage of funü detached its connection
with kinship, and re-articulated a state category within which to position women.
Funü, the subject position that was a product of revolutionary practices, was situated
within the state and family grounding in Maoist-Marxist principles (ibid). That is,
women were transformed into the mediator between the state and family.

Funü, as a discursive sign and a subject position, was primarily constructed around
production and class, and was legitimised through the practices in both symbolic
representations and public policies (Barlow, 1994; Manning, 2006; Evans, 2008).
The funü of China’s socialism was a wife and nurturing mother; but more
importantly, she was a tireless model worker. Underpinned by the Marxist theory
that women’s participation in production was essential to women’s liberation, the
role of women as workers was stressed over her role as mothers and wife (Andors,
1983; Young, 1989; Davin, 1976; Jin, 2006). Moreover, funü, unlike the nüxing
evoked by the May Fourth discussants, was a figure from working-class or peasant
families rather than the middle-class. The Women’s Federation was established to
play a crucial role in representing the new women of socialist China; more
importantly, it was only through the mediation of the Women’s Federation that
women could be represented as the gendered subject funü (Barlow, 1994: 274). The
public celebration of International Women’s Day as funü jie in 1949 institutionalised
the dissemination of the new category funü (Huang, 2018). Women’s Day also
became the occasion for the Women's Federation to honour women who had made
contributions to the socialist nation. The dominant cultural representations of women
in the 1960s and 1970s in films, magazines, operas and posters, depicted women as
active heroines from working-class and peasant backgrounds, replacing the images
of nüxing that portrayed a sexualised and consumerist narrative of femininity.
Women in socialist modernity were expected to fulfil similar collective
responsibilities and political commitments as men (Evans, 2008a). For example, the
movie Li Shuangshuang (1961) featured the female protagonist Li as a determined
and ‘progressive’ leading force in her village during the Great Leap Forward
movement, and had to constantly overcome her ‘backwards’ minded husband (Meng,
1993). The enforcement of public policies, such as the Marriage Law of 1950 and the
land reform, also enabled the practice of a gendered and cultural category of funü.
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These policies were the crucial institutional changes that gave women equal rights
with men at the level of the law, and had a direct impact on the everyday life of
women.

Women were not passively constructed as state subjects, but had their own agency.
The funü of Chinese socialism was not a closed subject position; other forms of
subjectivities that were formed in the local narratives of gender also existed, even
though they were erased from the dominant and official narratives (Evans, 2008a).
Many feminist scholars’ studies on China have demonstrated that the dominant
discourse of women’s liberation also offered a point of resistance, and enabled some
women to exercise their situational agency. For instance, Kimberley Manning’s
(2006) study from an institutional perspective on the leaders of the local Women’s
Federation has suggested that the official inscription of funü by the Women’s
Federation was constituted through the organisational experiences at the grass-roots
level, where new understandings of and possibilities for liberation might be
produced. Tina Mei Chen’s (2003) research on female model workers has shown that
multiple subjectivities were involved in shaping the interactions between women’s
lived experience and the state representation of them in the 1950s, even though their
agency was situated within the state-sanctioned discourse. Phyllis Andors (1976) has
argued that the stress on the role of women as workers was significant with respect to
the legitimate female experience of working outside the home. Although the number
of women in leading positions was still small, increases in the female labour force in
industrial, educational and governmental institutions, especially during the Great
Leap Forward, led to a growing social acceptance of female work outside the home,
and became a part of a legitimate female experience in Chinese socialism. The
official gender discourse of Mao provided some rural and urban women with a
certain level of freedom to challenge gender constraints and oppression (Jin, 2006;
Lin, 2006).

However, the funü of Chinese socialism was an inherently contradictory position,
where women had to bear the double burden of production and reproduction (Croll,
1978; Andors, 1983; Robinson, 1983; Young, 1989; Dai, 1995; Evans, 2003;
Hershatter, 2007; Davin, 2010; Dai, 1995; Song, 2007). Women embodied the social
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contradictions: on the one hand, she was required to participate in social production,
both as a sign of her liberation and to meet the expectations of collective
responsibilities for socialist building; whereas, on the other hand, she was also a
‘natural’ mother, and thus an inferior worker, which was grounded on the artificial
construction of gender difference based on the discourse of reproductive science
(Barlow, 1994; Evans, 2008b). The inherent contradiction of women’s double
identity was concealed within the legitimate language of women’s liberation that
centred almost exclusively on women’s involvement in social production. As such,
the role of the state was of vital importance in women’s everyday life.

With respect to the productive role of women, the stress on proletarian production of
the dominant gender discourse that was expressed through slogans like ‘men and
women are all the same’ and women ‘hold up half the sky’ constantly mobilised
women to break into male-dominated fields of work, but also unmarked men as the
standard and norm for orienting individual women (Dai, 1995; Honig and Hershatter,
1998; Evans, 2003). The reworking of the female gender resulted in the term
‘socialist androgyne’ by Marilyn Young (1989: 236). That is, in the public realm, the
new woman of Chinese socialism was expected to work and behave like men, and to
be sexually invisible and genderless; while in private, she was expected to be a
chaste wife and selfless mother. The gender androgyny or gender sameness in the
productive domain was prominent in the representation of women in the socialist era.
The pervasive images of women as iron girls, militant fighters, or political activists,
featuring the de-feminisation of the female appearance, approximated to male
standards of dress (Evans, 1995; Finnane, 2008). She was physically strong and
robust, with monotonous uniformity of dress and hairstyle and engaged in
traditionally male occupations.
While women’s achievement in work and politics was set according to the unmarked
norm of male, the biological construction of gender difference was still the
unchallenged assumption in the domain of reproduction. The female maternal role
was ‘naturalised’ through the binary construction of gender difference between male
and female on the material ground of biology (Barlow, 1994; Evans, 1995; Evans,
1997). The scientific construction of gender difference, which has its roots in the
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May Fourth Movement, was consolidated in socialist China and further essentialised
the complete differences between men and women (Barlow, 1994: 276). Harriet
Evans’s research (1995; 1997) on the discourse of gender and sexuality from the
socialist to the reform eras has persuasively demonstrated that the conceptualisation
of sexual difference in modern socialist China fixed women’s position to the
domestic realm, based on a biological and reproductive definition of femininity. This
discourse of the 1950s established continuities in the discourse of sexuality in the
reform era.

Evans argues that the conflation of female sexuality with procreation was
fundamental ‘to the official construction of gender distinctions’ (1995: 370). The
texts on sex-related issues produced by experts under the sanction of the official
agencies constructed sexuality and sexual difference as a set of biologically
determined binary opposites between male and female (ibid). The biological
construction of sexual difference characterised male desire as spontaneous and
powerful excitement, while it linked female desire to reproductive concerns and a
response to male desire (ibid). The harmonious sexual relationship between husband
and wife was seen as crucial in supporting a harmonious marital relationship, and
ultimately contributing to social stability and economic and social development
(Evans, 1997). The naturalised link between sexuality, marriage and reproduction
suggested that women should undertake more domestic chores and be ready to
sacrifice themselves for the needs of their husbands in order to achieve sexual and
marital harmony. The natural positioning of women as mothers in the socialist era
has also emerged in discussions on the sexual behaviour and sexual hygiene that
mostly targeted women (Evans, 1995; 1997). These discussions stressed the
protection of women’s fertility and reproductive capacities, and advised against
sexual intercourse during menstruation, pregnancy and after childbirth; they also
warned that women’s reproductive function resulted in their particular vulnerability
to disease (Evans, 1995; 1997). All in all, the warnings and advice on sex-related
issues strengthened the view that women’s sexuality wasdefined first and foremost
by their reproductive function.
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The articulation of gender difference on the basis of the biologically determined
binary in socialist China not only naturalised and normalised women’s reproductive
role, but also reasserted the assumption that women’s subordination to men was
biologically determined. To be a mother was naturalized as a universal aspect of
women’s experience, and women who did not want to have children would be
considered as failing to fulfill their natural duties. However, the biological and
scientific construction of gender difference also reasserted the assumption that
women’s physical characteristics made them a less ideal labour force compared with
men.
The contradiction of women’s double identity situated between the domains of
production and reproduction rendered their relationship to the state of crucial
importance (Young, 1989). The centralisation of power in ideological and socioeconomic realms at the hand of the state made it possible to position women to work
for the collective aim of nation-building (Evans, 1995). As section 1.2.1 on
production and section 1.2.2 on family reform in the socialist era demonstrated, state
policies have undergone considerable fluctuations, which consistently mobilised
women back and forth between the workplace and the home in conformity with the
overall national priorities. In the First Five Year Plan, although women’s equal
participation in production was legalised as the foundation of women’s liberation, the
state stressed women’s role as housewife in contributing to socialism at this stage.
During the Great Leap Forward, women were mobilised to work outside the home,
and the identity of female worker, female student, and female scientist became
superior to housewife. During the economic crisis after the GLP, women were the
first to be unemployed, and the value of housewife was reasserted. As Evans (1991:
269) points out, ‘Socialist mobilisation politics targeted funü as a tactical object and
eventually made her a triangulating category that mediated between the modern state
and the modern Chinese family’. Women had to balance the unsettling tension
between supporting the state by participating in collective industrial production and
providing for their own families.

To briefly conclude this section, the funü of Chinese socialism was an ambiguous
subject-position wedged between the nation and the family. The contradictions
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inherent in women manifested in their dual burden. As in the Republican era, the
contradictions of women’s role in production and reproduction remained
unreconciled in Chinese socialism. While the dominant discourse on gender and
sexuality in the socialist era emphasized the significance of women’s socio-economic
role through positions not formerly available to women prior to 1949, the
naturalisation of women’s maternal role remained unchallenged, which was based on
the biological and reproductive construction of gender difference. The state’s
unprecedented involvement in the everyday life of individuals made it possible to
channel women’s interests to work toward national priorities. The socialist
modernity expected that a woman be both a tireless and temporary worker devoted to
the state and a perpetual mother.

Furthermore, the socialist modernity also constructed several sets of gender
dichotomies which established continuities in the post-socialist era. Firstly, the
essentialist differentiation between male and female justified the gendered division
of labour, which subordinated women to men. While ‘men and women are the same’
supported women to undertake male-dominated work, most areas of work remained
highly gendered. The low-skilled and less-demanding jobs were disproportionately
occupied by the female labour force, which also meant that women were more
vulnerable to unemployment. Secondly, the urban female labour force was also
differentiated. Though some educated and skilled women became technocratic elites,
such as technicians, engineers and designers, the majority took part in the mass
labour force. Technocratic elite women and permanent female workers could turn to
the public welfare service provided by work units to reconcile the double burden. But
housewives, temporary workers and workers in street factories had to rely on their
families and neighbourhoods for assistance with childcare and domestic chores.

When reform began in 1978, there was an explicit repudiation of the past. Out of the
need to search for a new subjectivity, women’s participation in production was
criticised as the erasure of femininity, and urban elites cried for ‘restoration’ of true
femininity through an emphasis on gender difference. Meanwhile, gender differences
based on scientific and biological constructions, interpreted as ‘women return home’,
re-emerged in the early 1990s after having first emerged in the 1930s.
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1.3.

Women of the reform Era (from 1978 to the 1990s)

Post-socialist China began with the death of Mao in 1976. The official end of the
Cultural Revolution was marked by rejection of the socialist past (Young, 1989;
Rofel, 1999). Gender is a critical locus for the ideological rejection of the past and
the legitimization of neoliberal practices. The recuperation of gender difference
based on sexual difference in the post-socialist era constitutes part of the farewell
movement to socialism. In a rejection of the androgynous subject-position produced
in the socialist era, women are defined as having a set of specific characteristics
determined by their biological function in the reform era, which naturalizes as
women’s attributes (Evans, 1997). While discussions on gender difference often
focus on the reform era, they are influenced by the legacy of socialist discourse
(Hershatter, 2007).
The Third Plenum of the Party’s Eleventh Central Committee that convened in 1978
was a decisive point that marked the CCP’s embrace of the market economy and the
end of Mao’s era. That is to say, the nationalist pursuit of economic development
became the principle ideological orthodoxy in Deng Xiaoping’s time, replacing
Mao’s nationalisation of industry, collectivisation of agriculture, and class struggle
(Meisner, 1991). The initiation of the ‘reform and opening’ (gaige kaifang) policy
since the late 1970s, which witnessed a shift from the earlier development strategy of
state socialism to a socialist market economy. In order to create a socialist market
economy, Dirlik and Zhang (2000: 4) write that ‘the whole cornucopia of neoliberal
economic doctrines were engaged ideologically and theoretically.’ The CCP’s
enthusiasm to introduce market forces into the economic system, and to participate in
the global world greatly transformed the socio-political system in China, resulting in
decentralisation, increasing transnational mobility, economic and cultural diversity,
and the emergence of consumerism.
The processes of ‘reform and opening’ can be generally categorised into three
different but continuous periods. The implementation of the household responsibility
system marked the beginning of market reform in 1978, which resulted in the
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emancipation of peasants from collectivised agricultural work and the emergence of
town enterprises. In the 1980s, economic development became the major target of
reform, featuring the promotion of ‘let a few get rich first’. It included two policies:
one was permission for small-scale individual-owned businesses (getihu) in the
market and the other was the opening of special economic zones in Shenzhen and
other coastal cities. Along with these changes, there was an emergence of new urban
and urban landscapes during this period. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the south
launched ‘the nearly total release of market forces’ (Dirlik and Zhang, 2000:10). In
the 1990s, the market-oriented reform went further by restructuring the state sector
of the whole economy, which ended the life-long employment system, namely the
smashing of the ‘iron rice bowl’. The unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
were downsized and privatized in order to be competitive in the open market to
attract investments, resulting in millions of urban laid-off workers. From 2000 on,
Jiang Zemin, the former president of the People’s Republic of China and GeneralSecretary of the Chinese Communist party, justified the re-entry of entrepreneurs and
business people to the Chinese Communist Party in the ideological terms of the
Three Represents Theory (Goodman, 2014). This ideology defined the CCP as the
representative of China’s ‘advanced social and productive forces, advanced culture,
and the interests of the overwhelming majority’ (ibid). Therefore, as Guo Yingjie
(2009) argued, socialism was redefined by economic development rather than public
ownership. That is to say, economic growth became the primary objective. The
market process was not limited to the economy but extended to the realm of social
reproduction. Employment, housing, education, and medical care that had been
guaranteed to the new working class in socialist urban China were gradually
dismantled. They gradually became commodities that had to be purchased in the
market. As Nancy Fraser (2016) pointed out, ‘the result is a new, dualized
organization of social reproduction, commodified for those who can pay for it and
privatized for those who cannot, as some in the second category provide care-work in
return for (low) wages for those in the first.’
Gender is reconfigured in China’s transition from socialism to the socialist market
economy. In the productive domain, the gender difference, which naturalises the
attributes of soft, gentle, caring and supportive to women, justifies the gendered
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division of labour in the post-socialist era, and devalues women’s work.
Corresponding with China’s economic shift from heavy to light and service
industries, the cultural and social reconfiguration of gender that feminises certain
attributes legitimises the orientation of the female labour force into the light and
service industries. In the reproductive domain, women continue to take primary
responsibility for domestic work, as it is viewed that women’s specific biological
attributes render them to be natural mothers and wives.

The decentralisation of the state, the prevalence of marketisation and privatisation,
and the emergence of consumer culture together produce the new gender-subject
position nüxing. In contrast to the masculinised working-class women and peasant
women, consumer-oriented nüxing is the emblem of an eternally young, educated,
fashionable urban subject. Encouraging consumption to stimulate national economic
growth, the new consumer culture also emerged. A key feature of consumerism in
China is that it stands as a form of culture, making the distinction between culture
and economy increasingly ambiguous.
However, nüxing is a contradictory subject position caught between women’s
productive and reproductive roles. Moreover, the introduction of market forces
centering on consumption has increasingly widened the hierarchical differences
within the categories of gender, class, and generation grounded in the socialist past.
Women’s position remained caught in the struggle between the forces of the state,
market and family, which is the background of the fieldwork of the current research.

1.3.1. ‘Women Returning Home’: the Valorization of Gender Difference in the
Post-socialist Era
In order to undermine Mao’s popularity and justify the market-reform policies
established in the Third Plenum, increasing criticism of Mao emerged in official
publications in 1979 and 1980. The Cultural Revolution led by Mao was depicted as
an especially brutal distortion of ‘human nature’ (Young, 1989; Hershatter, 2007;
Huang, 2016). Replacing the socialist definition of women, which was criticised for
viewing women by male standards and ignoring particular female characteristics and
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attributes, there were surging discussions of what a woman should be in this new era
both in academia and popular culture (Young, 1989; Hershatter, 2007). However,
similar to the discourse on gender and sexuality in the 1950s, the hegemonic
assumption of gender difference in the post-socialist era continued to define women
by a series of characteristics and attributes that corresponded with their biological
function (Evans, 1997).
In the 1980s, urban intellectuals 35 publicly criticised gender policies in the socialist
era and advocated for a restoration of gender differentiation, in responding to the
CCP’s calling for ‘ideological emancipation’ (sixiang jiefang, which was led by
then-president Hu Yaobang). Mao’s allegation that ‘men and women are all the
same’ was criticised as ultra-leftism, and was thought to masculinise women,
distorting their human nature (Wang, 2016). Women were discouraged from
working, and their roles as mother, wife and daughter were re-emphasised as
expressions of women’s ‘natural femininity’. Zheng Yefu (1994), one of China’s
leading male sociologists argues in the article ‘On Equality between Men and
Women: from Sociological Perspective (Nannü pingdeng de shehuixue sikao)’
published in the journal Sociological Studies (shehuixue yanjiu), that the
differentiation between men and women should be restored because women are
biologically less efficient than men. Thus, he concluded, women ‘naturally’ belong
to the domestic sphere and should return home to serve as ‘virtuous wife and good
mother’. This formula defined women as the subjects of characteristics and attributes
defined by their biological condition (Evans, 1997; Evans, 2002).
Except for urban male elites’ condemnation of ‘gender sameness’, urban educated
women also appealed to recuperate gender differences and to express their femininity
in reaction to the gender androgyny in the socialist era. For instance, Wang Anyi, a
well-known novelist based in Shanghai, encouraged women to go back to the kitchen
and learn to be docile in order to cultivate their ‘inner’ femininity (Zhong, 1998). In
rejecting the ‘de-gendered’ and de-sexed Maoist era, feminist scholar Li Xiaojiang
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(Post-women’s liberation and self-reflections), Dushu (Reading) 11 (2005): 13–20.
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asserted women’s ‘true femininity’ to (re)define women with needs and goals
different from those of men based on binary biological differences. Li Xiaojiang
argued that the hegemonic discourse in socialist times neglected the biological
difference between male and female. It denied women’s specific bodily differences
to drive women into conducting strenuous physical work, which damaged women’s
health and led to women’s contradicted position between home and work (Yang,
1999; Barlow, 2004). Li also strongly criticised Moist practices of class struggle
because she thought that ‘women’s interests were either subordinated or neglected in
the name of class struggle’ (cited in Wang 1998: 20). It is worth noting that it was
exactly during these periods when the language of class was gradually diminished
from the dominant discourse, such as during the 1980s and 1990s, that the class
hierarchy was reproduced.

The appeal of the essentialist construction of gender and sexual difference based on
biological differences was also prominent in popular culture. Replacing the socialist
representations of selfless and androgynous women with sexually undifferentiated
styles of dress, the popular press and magazines depicted the ideal woman through
characteristics of obedience, gentle and softness (Evans, 2002). A survey on men’s
views of the ideal wife conducted by a magazine showed that the attributes of
support, care, and service were considered to be the foregrounding images of the
ideal wife (ibid.). Women of China (Zhongguo Funü), the official journal published
by the Women’s Federation (restored in 1978), began to use images of beautiful
slender young women with fashionable dresses and glamour make-up on its covers,
substituting the images of robust working-class and peasant women of the socialist
era. Articles on female characteristics as contrary to males’ also sprang up.
According to these articles, females were characterised as passive, sensitive,
emotional and subjected to their nervous system (Young, 1989). In short, as Evans
(1997; 2002) clearly points out, the considerable appeal of gender difference in
academia and popular culture defined gender as a set of inner and essential
characteristics determined by natural biological function.

The valorisation of gender difference was a reaction to the androgyny of the socialist
period, and was influenced by the market economy. The yearning to recuperate
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women’s ‘inner’ femininity seized on by consumer industries, lead to a strong
emergence of the makeup, clothing, and fashion industries. That is, if a woman was
not feminine enough, she could feminise herself through consumption. For example,
Yang Mayfair noted (1999) that there was a growing number of commercial training
classes for urban women to teach them how to cultivate femininity in the 1990s.
These training classes offered detailed instructions on broad issues, including how to
speak softly, how to smile sweetly, how to apply make-up and dress fashionably,
how to properly put on a dinner and so forth (ibid).

Nevertheless, the biological explanation of gender difference championed in postsocialist China reproduced the gender hierarchy, placing women in a subordinated
position and leading to increasing discriminations against them. The initiation of the
one-child family policy began in 1979 (eliminated in 2015), which aimed to reduce
population growth to less than 1 per cent per year by the 1980s, exerted a massive
impact on women’s life (Greenhalgh, 2008). The policy was officially supported by
the state in the 1978 Constitution, and was popularized through mass media coverage
as well as the launch of a massive educational campaign (Andors, 1983; Croll, 1985).
Systems of incentives and punishments were established to institutionalise the onechild family policy (Andors, 1983; Croll, 1985; Kane, 1985).36 The initiation of the onechild family policy resulted in highly skewed sex selection before birth, and a large
increase of female infanticide (Andors, 1983; White, 1994; Greenhalgh, 2008; Mann,
2011). The policy led to the preference of sons, the abandonment of baby girls, as
well as the trafficking of women (ibid). Compared to boys, girls were discriminated
against in the domains of culture, social investment and economy (Hershatter, 2007).
Moreover, debates on the issues of birth control in the reform era continued to
assume that women should bear the principal responsibility for control of fertility,
which was determined by their biology (Evans, 1997; Evans, 2002; Greenhalgh,
2008). The texts about the use of contraceptive methods primarily targeted women
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and shared many similarities with discussions on family planning in the socialist era
(Croll, 1985; Evans, 1997). For example, according to the State Statistics Bureau in
1991, married women’s usage of contraceptive means increased from 13.47 percent
in 1970 to 73.24 percent in 1988 (Evans, 2002: 349). Consequently, women
continued to be the target of the state’s policies relating to reproduction (Evans,
2002; Johnson, 2011). As the anthropologist Susan Greenhalgh (2010: 42) argues,
the biological constructs of women permitted the state’s intervention in women’s
reproduction ‘in the interests of the nation as a whole.’ That is, the state continued to
exert direct authoritative regulations over fertility decisions and family size (Croll,
1985).

The emerging notion of femininity highlighted the biology of sex differences and
reinforced the view that women naturally have an affinity for the domestic
(Hershatter, 2007). While women were supposed to take on dual roles as workers
outside home and mothers and housewives at home in the socialist period, the postsocialist discourse placed the domestic role as mother and housewife at the centre of
women’s subject-position (ibid.). The debates on women returning home, which had
already taken place in the 1930s and 1950s, resurged in the 1980s and 1990s (Song,
2011). The call for women returning home assumed that women were less efficient,
‘economically dependent, domestically competent, and concerned more about
appearance, and thus by nature belonged to the domestic sphere’ (Greenhalgh, 2010:
43). Building on the socialist legacy of birth control and family planning, the onechild family policy increased the centrality of women’s mother-wife roles on the
basis of biologically determined gender difference. With only one precious child,
women were enticed to return home to conduct domestic chores and to take on the
responsibility of educating that child (Evans, 2008). This echoes Robinson’s analysis
(1985: 51) that the government and the media in the reform era suggested that
women were by nature the educators of the home. Furthermore, with the advent of
resurging Confucianism, the terms ‘virtuous wife and good mother’, which were
introduced and widely circulated in the early twentieth century, resurged in the
reform era ( Honig and Hershatter 1988; Mann, 2011). For example, Mann notes that
Women’s Classic, the old Confucian-style advice book, was reinvented and
circulated in the 1990s to instruct women to be virtuous wives and good mothers.
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The domestic space was no longer represented as ‘backward’, but rather it was
guarded by a female consumer (Hershatter, 2007). The privatisation and
commercialisation of the domestic sphere intensified rather than relieved women’s
household labour (Robinson, 1985). The die off of the state’s role as welfare
provider and the increased availability of domestic consumer goods, like washing
machines and refrigerators, confined household labour to individual efforts (ibid.).
As Robinson points out, without the socialisation of housework, domestic chores
remained women’s main responsibility within the individual family unit. As such, it
reinforced women’s central roles as mother and housewife.

In short, the essentialist understanding of gender difference in relation to femininity
in the reform era did not represent an abrupt rupture with the socialist era
(Hershatter, 2007). Quite the contrary, notwithstanding the official statements of
state and urban intellectuals, the assumption that gender difference was a product of
reproductive physiology actually had its roots in the socialist era, and continued to
remain unchallenged in the reform era (ibid.). Ironically, this public backlash against
women’s liberation (which many feminists had strived for since the late nineteen
centuries), was viewed as avant-garde ‘ideological emancipation’ from the gender
regime of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ (Wang 2016: 231). Ironically, as the feminist
historian Wang Zheng (1998: 19) pointed out, ‘feminisation of Chinese women,
therefore, became a progressive stance, suggesting a negotiation of Maoist politics as
well as a recovery of human nature’.

The marking and marketing of gender differences in the reform era were the result of
many factors, including the process of marketisation, the shift of labour markets,
reaction to the socialist past, and decreased control of the state in work and family
life (Hershatter, 2007). The essentialist notion of gender, which understood gender as
a set of characteristics corresponding with physiological and reproductive structures,
became powerfully connected with the new market-based China. The feminisation of
certain qualities, such as gentleness and softness as women’s natural attributes and
characteristics also sloped into the gendered division of labour (Evans, 2008).
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1.3.2. ‘Rice Bowl of Youth’ (qingchun fan): Urban Women’s Work in the
Reform Era
The valorisation of gender difference reconfigured women’s role in production in the
reform era. The gendered division of labour, linked to essential notions of gender
characteristics, produced ‘normative forms of work for women and men’ and
consistently devalued women’s work in the reform era (Hershatter, 2007: 51).
Women’s work was redefined, and was increasingly stressed for its differentiation
from the experience of male workers (Croll, 1995). Work in heavy industries and
physically demanding sectors was not considered to be proper for women. Beyond
the increased stratification between the sexes, the female labour force was also
further differentiated by categories of class and cohort.
Women’s inferior status in employment was grounded in the view that women and
men had essential biological differences. Such an assumption was openly presented
in the public press. Take a report entitled ‘Men and Women are Different: Cultivate
the Strengths and Avoid the Weaknesses’ in Tianjin Daily in 1980 as an example. It
deserves a long quote here:
Everyone knows that men and women are different. From ancient
times a division of labor has existed: men plant, women weave.
During the last few years, under the influence of the ultra-leftism
of the Gang of Four, there has been a one-sided emphasis on the
idea that men and women are exactly alike….. Women represent
half the population. How to mobilize them to “hold up half the
sky” in the Four Modernizations is an important question. People
often say it is necessary to cultivate the strengths and avoid the
weaknesses in order to fully use women’s abilities. Thus, we must
cultivate women’s strengths of industriousness and thriftiness, their
cleverness and deftness, patience and meticulousness. The female
weaknesses that we must avoid are the “three periods”: the
menstrual period, pregnancy period, and nursing period. We
should, as much as possible, allow women to engage in textiles,
handicrafts, crafts, service, finance, culture, and education (cited in
Honig and Hershatter, 1988).
Whereas women working in heavy industries and strenuous physical sectors were no
longer represented as glorified figures and were considered masculinised, they were
encouraged to work in service sectors that were suited to women’s special
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characteristics. It listed proper women’s work to be in ‘textiles, handicrafts, crafts,
service, finance, culture, and education’, capitalizing on female attributes of
industriousness, dexterity, patience and carefulness. It is on this basis that the
feminisation of labour, especially in the service sector, is justified. This sexual
division of labour, as Federici (2004:113) addresses, ‘differentiated not only the
tasks that women and men should perform, but their experiences, their lives, their
relation to capital and to other sectors of the working class.’ The biologization of
women workers was also inscribed in law. The labour laws and labour regulations in
the reform era were written with the stated intention to protect women’s labour
according to their special needs during menstruation, pregnancy, lactation, and
menopause (Croll, 1995; Woo, 1994; Johnson, 2011). However, Woo (1994)
demonstrates that the laws, which focused on protecting women’s biology, actually
further marginalised women and reinforced discrimination against women in the
workplace. The laws and regulations legitimised the growing unwillingness to hire
female workers (ibid.). As Woo (1994: 279) argues, the laws actually increasingly
defined women’s struggles as ‘a matter of biology rather than social problems.’

With a series of changes in the labour market, urban working-class women were
gradually excluded from the workforce during the first two decades of reform and
opening. The restructuring of state-own sectors (SOEs) and serious unemployment
problems in cities resulted in a large number of laid-off workers in urban areas, and
women employees were the first to be terminated from their jobs. An official statistic
in 2000 reported that 60 percent of the workers in SEOs who were laid off since
1992, were women (Jiang, 2003). For example, in Tianjin, among 260,000 laid-off
workers in SEOs in the first half of 1996, 70 per cent were middle-aged women
(Evans, 2002). According to the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (Zhang, et al,
2001), between 1996 and 2000, the total number of female workers in state or
collective owned enterprises decreased by nearly 15 million. One of the main reasons
for such a large proportion of female unemployment was that the majority of women
had been placed in auxiliary positions at the workplace in the socialist era. Although
such institutional inequality in employment has its roots in the socialist era when
women were primarily allocated to unskilled positions, it stigmatised those laid-off
female workers as ‘being old’ and ‘uneducated’ (Wang, 2003). In addition to the
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institutionalised inequalities, another reason for the high discrimination against
women was the high cost of providing reproductive-related benefits to women
(Croll,1995). The work units refused to hire or maintain female workers because they
had to absorb the costs by themselves according to the labour regulations.

Individuals had to rely on themselves to find jobs due to the smashing of the iron rice
bowl. The shift in priority from heavy to light and service industries absorbed a high
proportion of female workers in cities and towns (Croll, 1995). In 1978, only 12
percent of employment was in the service industry, while in 2009 this number
increased to more than 34.1 per cent. Moreover, the service industry accounted for
42.6 percent of GDP in 2009 (gross domestic product), a sharp rise compared with
1978 (23.9 per cent) (Tong, 2013). In 2014, the service industry reached 48.2 percent
of GDP (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). In
accordance with the booming of the service economy, there is also an increasing
proportion of female employment in the service industry. In 1990, the proportion of
female employment in the service industry was only 10.43 per cent, lower than
men’s, but in 2014 this proportion rose to nearly one third, 9 per cent higher than
men (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Urban female workers who were laid off
were forced to become part of the cheap labour force working in low-end serviceindustries after SEO restructure (Wang, 2003). For rural women,37 the loosening of
the control of the hukou system (established in the 1950s, prohibiting rural/urban
mobility) and the implementation of a household responsibility system and the
emergence of town enterprises, allowed them to move back and forth from the
countryside to the city with relative ease. While a small portion of rural women
remained in the countryside to work in agriculture,38 many moved to the cities to
search for jobs. They formed a large group of dadongmei, young rural women who
moved to primarily coastal cities to work in factories. Pun Ngai’s work (2005) is a
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rich ethnographic study that looks at the lives of dagongmei at the time when China
tried to link tracks with global capitalism. Many older women became maids serving
urban middle-class families (Yan, 2008).39

The female labour force was differentiated across the hierarchies of age, class,
education and rural/urban residence (Wang, 2003). While urban laid-off women and
rural women were downwardly mobile, young and educated women were valorised
in the labour market (Rofel, 1999). Education, networking and family background
played an increasingly important role in determining the possibility of social
mobility. Although attempts had been made to develop the educational system in
rural China,40 overall, educational resources were preferentially committed to urban
areas. The imbalanced development of educational opportunities between rural and
urban China, which has been further deepened after the reform, makes it more
difficult for rural and poor workers to attain a higher social status. For instance, in
Wuhan, Solinger (2009) pointed out that all jobs in Wuhan City’s central labour
market in 1999 demanded workers with an educational certificate who were under 30
years old. Laid-off urban workers were increasingly marginalised, a condition that
was reproduced across generations. Those who had capital could buy an education in
the market, and those did not were excluded and marginalised in the whole society.
Moreover, as the marketization of labour increases job mobility, networking plays a
crucial part in access to job information. Bian and Huang’s (2009: 277) fieldwork in
five cities in China in 1999 reveals that ‘by the end of the last century, network
allocation of labour had reached a point of dominance in China’s urban labour
market.’

In contrast to the stigmatisation of laid-off workers and rural migrant workers as
‘old’ and ‘uneducated’ or without suzhi (low quality), ‘rice bowl of youth’ (qingchun
fan) became the most desirable type of work for women beginning in the 1990s in
urban China. Education, youth and beauty are converted into employment
opportunities with the rapid development of the service industry. Rice bowl of youth,
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See Yan Hairong, New Masters, New Servants: Migration, Development, and Women Workers in
China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).
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The attempts on developing the education system in rural China were apparent especially during
the era of the Cultural Revolution, see Meisner, Mao’s China and After (1999).
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as Zhen (2000) defines it, ‘refers to the urban trend in which a range of new, highly
paid positions have opened almost exclusively to young women, as bilingual
secretaries, public relations girls and fashion models.’ Young and educated women
in the service industry replace women in heavy industry to become the new standard
image of a female worker at the transitional point from socialism to a market
economy, which indicates a shift from production to consumption. Zhen’s argument
deserves a long quote here,
Young female eaters of the rice bowl of youth symbolizes a fresh
labour force, a model of social mobility and the rise of a consumer
culture model of social mobility, and the rise of a consumer culture
endorsed by current official ideology—the “democracy of
consumption” was promoted to prevent social unrest since the
suppression of student movements in 1989 (Zhen, 2000: 111).

In sum, firstly, the gendered division of labour remains the fundamental apparatus
framing the work of men and women. The definition of proper work for women is
associated with what are considered to be women’s natural attributes. China’s
embrace of the market and the shift from heavy to light and service industries
reconfigures the content of women’s work, directing an increasing number of female
labourers to enter the service industries; yet, it continuously maintains the gendered
division of labour, in which women are subordinated to men in the workplace.
Secondly, as the state no longer provided lifelong jobs and welfare benefits, a
woman had to rely on her own resources in the labour market, which marks the
valorisation of age, education, and family background. Therefore, labour
stratification is increased not only among men but also among different groups of
women. ‘The play of difference is highly political’, as Pun Ngai (2005) stated. In
urban China, ‘ “the play of difference” is reflected in a cultural conversation about
the relationship between the past and the future that rejects the socialist “past” and
embraces the market “present”’ (Hanser, 2008: 14). Differences based on gender,
class and cohorts is naturalised, legitimised, and reproduced in the name of progress
and modernity (Rofel, 1999; Wang, 2016).

1.3.3. Nüxing/nüren of Post-socialist Urban China
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The post-socialist gender discourse sought to produce gender-subject positions that
marked a departure from the statist construction of funü of the socialist era. While
the Cultural Revolution was represented as a distortion of human nature in academic
and popular culture, the socialist figure funü was also viewed as a distorted woman
that embodied the distorted past (Huang, 2017). The national funü, which featured
the characteristics of collective-spirit, selfless and androgynous, was condemned for
the masculinisation of women and the erasure of women’s inner femininity.
Although the Women’s Federation (restored in 1978) under the leadership of the
CCP tried to re-establish its authority in representing all women of China, its
authority was largely challenged. In rejecting the Women’s Federation’s production
and representation of women, urban feminists sought to define what it meant to be a
woman41. That is to say, the state withdrew from direct involvement in family
relations and work, lessened its exclusive ability to define women’s positions, and
anticipated a new female subject not represented in the residual category funü.

A new gendered position nüxing occurred within the contradictions created by the
state’s efforts to combine socialism with a free-market economy in the first two
decades of reforms, substituting funü, the hegemonic subject position of the socialist
era. The subject position nüxing or nüren (literally, female human) is associated with
a more individual, feminine, sexualised and consumer-oriented image, in
juxtaposition with the masculinized, sexless and politicised image of the socialist
funü. The recuperation of nüxing, emphasising the binary heterosexist male/female
difference grounded in the May Fourth legacy, opened up the potential for feminist
resistance (Barlow, 2004). The withdrawal of the state’s role in defining women
allowed women to raise their own individualised voices. One example was the
emerging public discussion of love and sexuality during the first decade of reforms.
The 1980 marriage, revised based on the Marriage Law of 1950, contained a new
decree on divorce. It granted a divorce if there was no ‘mutual affection’ between a
husband and wife, in contrast to the 1950 Marriage law that only allowed divorce
with governmental mediation. As the state retreated from direct control over familiar
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For example, Li Xiaojiang publicly criticised the Women’s Federation, and questioned its role in
post-socialist era in the 1980s. see Li Xiaojiang. ‘renlei jinbu yu funü jiefang’, in makesizhuyi yanjiu,
1983(02).
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relationships, women writers began expressing female perspectives free from
ideological constraints (Evans, 2010). For instance, the short story ‘Love Must Not
Be Forgotten’(ai shi buneng wangji de) written by Zhang Jie in 1980 depicts a
profound romantic love, inspiring wide-ranging discussions nationwide. Similarly,
Yu Luojin’s autobiographical novel ‘A Winter’s Fairy Tale’ (yige dongtian de
tonghua), which recorded Yu’s experiences with love, marriage, sex and divorce,
caused intensely heated arguments (Honig, 1984).42 The individual expressions of
intimate relationships were also found in literature, arts, and women’s magazines,
which, as Evans states, recuperate ‘the individual voices from its obscurity in the
collective realm (Evans, 2008)’. Through the expression of intimate emotions rather
than production, the new subject nüxing, which stressed femininity to mark
differences from men as a part of de-Maoicization in the 1980s, resisted the statist
category of funü, and opened up the potential to imagine a new place for women
(Barlow, 2004; Huang, 2018).

However, the valorisation of gender difference based on femininity has since been
incorporated by the state with its neoliberal transition beginning in the 1990s. The
force of the market is increasingly significant in producing the subject position funü.
Marketisation and privatisation entered almost all aspects of life (both in the
economic and reproductive domains, including housing, education, and medical
care). Increased globalisation contributed to the constitution of new neoliberal
subjectivities. Ong and Zhang (2008) demonstrated the emergence of ‘the
enterprising self’ in China’s process of privatisation, characterised by selfenterprising, self-governing and calculating subjects. Individuals are encouraged or
even forced to be self-reliant to make a living in areas that used to be controlled by
the state. This is a direct shift from ‘rely on the state’ (kao guojia) to ‘rely on self’
(kao zij) in China since the 1990s. This echoes Yan Yunxiang’s (2009) argument that
the collectivist ethics of personal responsibilities have gradually given way to the
ethics of individualism and self-development in China’s transition to a market
economy.
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For an analysis on Yu Luojin’s work, see Emily Honig. 1984. ‘private issues and public discourse:
the life and times of Yu Luojin’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 2.
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In addition, Anagnost’s work on the social totality from the perspective of social
stratification sheds light on the formation of a new self-consciousness among
Chinese subjectivity. Anagnost (2008: 498) argues that the term ‘social
stratification’, which deliberately avoids the term ‘class’ that often refers to Marxism
and Mao’s ideology of class antagonism and aims at developing the market
economy, ‘has become part of a government project to expand the middle class by
inciting aspiring individuals to adhere to new social norms of middle-class identity
often defined around consumer practices’. In other words, the middle class is set up
as a ‘normative figure’ that embodies high cultural capital and has the power to
consume. Individuals are encouraged to pursue middle-class status. It should be
noted here that the significance of consumption is twofold: it is not only a part of the
subject construction, but also creates demand in a domestic market plagued by both
overproduction and deflationary tendencies (see also Guo, 2008). This echoes Stuart
Hall’s argument that ‘consumption, in some ways the privileged terrain of
reproduction, is no less symbolic for being material.’ In this sense, the middle-class
identity was formulated through transforming the self-consciousness and
constructing a new subject – namely the entrepreneurial subject. To do so, the new
subject was responsible for ‘profits and losses’ and eager to manage their embodied
capital; moreover, their success was ‘measured in commodified expressions of social
distinction’, and their identity ‘as a rights-baring subject was defined in terms of
consumption’ (Anagnost, 2008: 515). Anagnost clearly concludes that ‘this new kind
of subject has been called into being – one whose consumer behaviour not only
drives the momentum of the reform-era economy but also underlies the architecture
of a new mode of government’ (ibid.).

The subject position nüxing, produced in the social and cultural space within this
shift, has a range of appearances (Evans, 2002). In contrast to the androgynous image
of working-class or peasant funü engaging in production, nüxing is associated with
young, fashionable, sexually desirable, and consumer-oriented urban women from
the emerging middle class. Fashionably dressed slender women supplanted robust
steelworkers or cotton-pickers in the cultural representation (ibid.). nüxing embodies
‘wealth, social mobility and success, and urban location’ linking with “the
individualised opportunities and practices of the reform strategy” (Evans, 2008: 370).
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An urban nüxing can be a ‘modern’ virtuous wife and good mother, a white-collar
worker, a model, an athlete, or a ‘strong woman’, but these diverse representations
‘appears as an appropriation of individual desires, experiences, and aspirations in
support of the institutions underpinning the market’ (Evans, 2008: 379).

However, the representation of nüxing raises the issue of those who are not
represented. While young, educated, middle-class urban women become the
normative figures in cultural representations, old, working-class and peasant women
are excluded and marginalised. Women from working-class and peasant families,
previously presented as socialist heroines, gradually lost out in China’s transition to a
market economy. The shift from stressing class to gender differences overshadows
the changing social tensions and the acute problem of increasing social
stratifications.

The blurring boundaries between the official, the market, and the popular in
contemporary cultural representations spawn the formation of a segregated and
hybrid plurality. In the socialist era, one’s subjectivity was defined around his/her
work, Urban women were workers recognized in terms of social production as well
as mother or wife within a family. And because work was allocated for a lifetime,
social mobility was almost impossible. Her identity was quite fixed and stable.
Nevertheless, after the reform, class and work alone were not enough to grasp one’s
identity. Diverse occupations and social groups emerged, such as business people,
entrepreneurs, white-collar professionals, lawyers and so forth. The individuals’
disembodiment from the collective sector and access to new career choices
encouraged individuals to make their own lifestyle choices. It highlights the
increasing importance of a cultural and more symbolic dimension in defining one’s
subjectivity. Hall (2006: 233) argues that, ‘the ‘pluralisation’ of social life expands
the positionalities and identities available to ordinary people (at least in the
industrialised world) in their everyday working, social, familial and sexual lives.’
The realm of daily life in China now is exposed and flooded with global
commodities and international fashion and ideologies (Dirlik and Zhang, 2000).
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To briefly conclude, the departure from the socialist era should not be overstated.
Despite the new configurations in social, cultural and economic domains in postsocialist times, nüxing, as a hybrid and plural subject position, shares many
continuities with the subject position funü. First of all, like funü under Mao, nüxing
continues to embody the contradiction of production and reproduction. The different
forms of nüxing in the dominant discourse focusing on sexual difference consistently
reaffirmed softness, gentleness, supportiveness and care as women’s natural
emotional attributes (Evans, 2010). The foregrounding image of the young,
fashionable, urban woman confirms the binary opposition between active and
productive men and gentle and supportive women (Evans, 2008b). Such essentialist
views naturalised women’s domestic role, marking women as natural mothers and
wives suited to domestic work and the education of children. Harriet Evans’s (2008)
study of mothers’ and daughter’s changing expectations in urban China demonstrated
that the practices and representations of emotional qualities associated with crossgenerational communication between parents and children are viewed as a female
domain in post-socialist China, which she defines as ‘feminisation of intimacy’.
Evans (2010) argues that the feminisation of intimacy naturalises women’s domestic
roles. The market-supported naturalisation of women’s roles is, to quote from Evans
(2010: 1000), ‘managed by the state through a plethora of educational, psychological
and media materials, and corresponding with the new forms of gender hierarchy in
employment and incomes that the market economy has engendered.’ While socialist
funü’s inherent contradiction of production and reproduction is configured between
the state and the family, the naturalisation of women’s domestic roles in postsocialist China is at the same time market and state-sponsored.

Secondly, the state remains a significant force in constituting the subject position of
nüxing. The state’s withdrawal from direct control over social life and subjectmaking in the post-socialist era does not mean that it completely dissolves from
social life. In contrast, the whole project of opening and reforming is directed by
state planning. Ong and Zhang (2008) examine how the ‘enterprising self’ as an
effect of the privatisation process provides form and meaning for the governing. The
governing discourse gave individuals the feeling that they were freed from old social
constraints and offered more choices to pursue their self-interest. However, practices
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of enterprising oneself actually aligned with the state's interests, and enhanced state
control. Ong and Zhang define this mechanism as ‘socialism from afar’. The state
strengthened its governing by encouraging the expression of self-interest. A similar
argument can be seen in Yan’s study, where he argues that by drawing boundaries
and regulations, the state manages the process of individualisation. Women in
particular could experience a degree of liberation through consumption while
continuing to endure state regulation of their reproduction. This is evident in the
initiation of the one-child family policy. Similar to the family planning project of the
socialist era, the one-child policy turned women’s reproduction into an instrument
that could be managed for the interests of the state (Greenhalgh, 2010).

To sum up, building upon the existing studies of gender, work and subjectivity in
China, this chapter examines the historical background of the subjective formation of
young urban middle-class women after 2000 when a new round of reform begins
calling for ‘upgrading and transforming’ from ‘made in China’ to ‘created in China’.
Adopting methods of representation and ethnographic fieldwork (see chapter 3), the
research examines how young, educated middle-class women are positioned and
position themselves in the new transitional moment. Rather than being passé, the
multiple gender discourses of May Fourth, the Socialist era, and the early reform era
sediment and interact with the current process of subject formation. Through a
historical review of Chinese modernization from the late Qing to the 1990s, it is
apparent that the gendered division of labour remains the fundamental apparatus in
defining the work of women and men, even though the nature of women’s work
changes over time. Moreover, although a century-long process of modernization
produced different gender-subject positions – xin nüxing of May Fourth, funü of the
socialist era, and nüxing in the postsocialist era, women were inevitably placed
within an inherent contradiction between production and reproduction. The inherent
contradiction remains unchallenged to this day. Therefore, examining the gender
legacy from the late nineteenth century to the early years of reform is necessary for
understanding the present social and cultural transformations.
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2. Articulating Gender, Work, and Creativity in Post-2000
Urban China
Chapter 1 traced the shifting formation of women’s subjectivity through an
examination of women's work histories in twentieth century China. Women’s
contradictory subject position is articulated differently depending on historical
context. As discussed, since the initiation of opening and reform policies, young
educated middle-class women have been positioned as normative figures, replacing
the socialist subject-position of funü who were of working-class and peasant origins.
Since the initiation of opening and reform policies, the peasantry and working-class
who were previously the masters of the state have gradually lost out; meanwhile,
new social stratifications have shaped the emergence of the middle-class since the
1990s.

Focusing on the changes from the 2000s, this chapter will explore the articulation of
creativity, gender and work. Moving into the 2000s, the call to ‘upgrade and
transform’ through strategies of creativity and innovation has marked a new
transitional moment in China. To become a creative and innovative state requires
economic as well as cultural and social transformation. Upgrading and transforming
the economy requires a corresponding upgrade of human capital. Hence, the middle
class is placed in an increasingly hegemonic position in transforming China from a
labour-intensive economy to a knowledge-based economy. Against this broader
background, the discourse of creativity and innovation converges with the discourse
of the middle class.
This chapter adopts McRobbie’s (2016) concept of the ‘creativity dispositif’ to
explore how the creativity discourse incites young middle-class women to work
without guarantee, and to embrace risk and uncertainty as middle-class values. In
other words, how the governmental discourse of creativity encourages young,
educated middle class women to embrace creative work marked by risk, insecurity
and flexibility. The chapter is divided into three sections: section 2.1 traces the
formation of the discourse on the middle class since the 1990s and its major
characteristics, which lays a crucial foundation for upgrading to creativity and
innovation; section 2.2 examines the discourse of creativity operating within and
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outside the government through a cultural policy review, and investigates how the
discursive practices of creativity articulate with employment policy to encourage
middle class youth to craft their own jobs and embrace new middle-class values;
section 2.3 presents key features of creative work – including individualism,
flexibility, and entrepreneurship – based on fieldwork centered on a group of young,
middle-class women in Shanghai, to reveal the paradoxical nature of creative work
for educated urban women in particular, which is often invisible and neglected in the
official discourse on creativity.

2.1.

The Making of China’s Middle Classes

2.1.1. The Making of Middle-Class Discourse in China: an ideological shift
The making of China’s middle class has been considered by officials, researchers
and journalists as a crucial means to cope with the challenges brought by the
intensified reforms since the 1990s (Rocca, 2017a; Guo, Yinjie, 2008; Goodman,
2014). China’s economic miracle, which produced an average of 8 percent annual
growth of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1978 to 2014 (Bian et al. 2018),43
heavily relied on the export-oriented industry based on the comparative advantage
from a large amount of cheap labour. To further integrate into the global economic
system, China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Yet, the rapid
growth model has led to mounting contradictions, causing a disequilibrium between
excessive dependency on exports and investment and low levels of domestic
consumption (Naughton, 2007; Butollo, 2014).44
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For a detailed analysis on the economic development in different phrases of reforming in China, see
Naughton, B. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (London: The MIT Press, 2007).
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China’s saving rate is one of the highest in the world. A study shows that China’s urban household
saving rate increased from 19 percent of disposable income in 1996 to 30 percent in 2009. In 2008
Chinese households saved around 40 percent of their disposable income, while at the same year the
American households saved 3 percent of their disposable income.The high rate of saving indicates the
low rate of spending. In 2008, for instance, China’s private consumption made up only 35 percent of
GDP, compared with 50 per cent to 60 per cent in most Asian countries and 70 per cent in America.
See Li, Cheng. ‘Introduction: The Rise of the Middle Class in the Middle Kingdom’, in Li, C. (ed.)
China’s Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation (Washington DC: The Brookings
Institution, 2010) pp. 3–31; Nabar, M., 2011. 'Targets, Interest Rates, and Household Saving in Urban
China'. IMF Working Papers 11/223, International Monetary Fund.
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Additionally, the high rate of economic growth and intensified marketization,
especially since the second phase of opening and reform in the 1990s introduced in
section 1.3.1 of chapter 1, has resulted in increasing social inequalities. In the late
1970s, Deng Xiaoping first used the term ‘zongti xiaokang shehui’(an overall welloff society) as a key ideological tool to set a goal for China’s modernization, which
aims to achieve a per-capita GDP of US$800 by the end of the twentieth century
(Anagnost, 2008). The concept ‘xiaokang’ signifies the embrace of ‘economic
reform by conveying a promise of widely shared prosperity’ (Anagnost, 2008: 502).
In Lu Hanlong’s words (2010: 112), ‘That xiaokang became a development model
during China’s modernisation is a breakthrough for CCP ideology and marks a new
period of Chinese history’. Whereas the general target of GDP of $800 was achieved
by 2000, the problem of increasing socioeconomic disparity worsened. A vast
amount of workers and peasants were proletarianised and semi-proletarianised (Pun
and Lu, 2010), while few were getting increasingly rich, particularly a small group of
elites who took advantage of the integration of power and wealth (Dickson, 2008).
Income disparities widened considerably in the 1990s, after having improved in the
1980s (Huang, 2008). This change is evident in the Gini index, a measure of social
inequality. The Gini index surged from 0.22 in 1978 to 0.458 in 1997 (Anagnost,
2008). 0.4 is generally recognized as a dangerous level (ibid.). The figure continued
to increase, reaching around 0.5 in 2007 and 2012 (Guo, 2009; Bian et al, 2018). It
was noted that 70 percent of the wealth of the whole nation was owned by 0.4 per
cent households in 2006 (Guo, 2009). The high polarization and unbalanced social
structure raised concerns about social stability in China.
Against such a background, the government ‘engineered’ the project of middle-class
expansion aimed at developing the middle class and enlarging the middle-income
population to alleviate the complex issues of low domestic consumption, social
polarisation and potential social conflicts since the 1990s (Anagnost, 2008;
Goodman, 2014; Lu, 2010). That is, to expand the middle class to develop an oliveshaped society, which would be ‘xiaokang’ (well-off) and harmonious (Guo, 2008;
Lu, 2010). ‘xiaokang shehui’ (moderately well-off society), first used by Deng
Xiaoping, is considered as the eventual goal of Chinese modernisation since 1979.
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The new term ‘comprehensive’ development of xiaokang (quanmian de xiaokang)45
was proposed in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), replacing ‘zongti xiaokang’
and emphasising extending material well-being to social and cultural well-being.

In 2000 the formulation of the Three Represents by then-president Jiang Zemin
marked a significant ideological change. The Three Represents allowed the reentrance of entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and technocrats to the CCP, who constituted
the middle-income group, suggesting ‘the official euphemism for the middle class’
(Li Cheng, 2010: 10). Hence, the vanguard of the CCP shifted from a revolutionary
working class to the capitalist and middle classes (Guo, 2016; Goodman, 2014), who
were viewed as ‘efficient creators of wealth and consumers with ample purchasing
power’ (Guo, 2016: 10). In 2001, the state information centre claimed that 200
million Chinese would become ‘middle stratum’ from 2001 to 2006 (Guo 2008: 38).
Following Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao developed a concept of scientific
development a harmonious society in 2003-2004, focusing on narrowing inequality
and poverty and expanding the middle class to harmonise the society. In 2012,
president Xi Jinping put forward the concept of the ‘Chinese Dream’ for the ‘great
rejuvenation of the Chinese people’. Xi’s Chinese Dream had two goals: one was to
make China into a ‘moderately well-off society’ by the 100th anniversary of the CCP
in 2021, and the other was to modernise China into a completely developed country
by the 100th anniversary of the PRC in 2049. The concept of the Chinese Dream is in
line with the governmental project of expanding the middle class beginning in early
2000s (Xinhua, November 16, 2013). In a word, the fetishization of the middle class
is prominent in public policies (Guo, 2009; Goodman, 2014). As Anagnost (2008)
and Lu (2010) point out, increasing social inequality has been addressed through
public policies rather than a social revolution. The initiation of all of these policies
suggest that ‘there has been an emerging state-sponsored discourse encouraging the
development of the middle class’ (Goodman, 2014: 4).
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The objectives of an quanmian xiaokang shehui are: 1) doubling the GDP between 2000 and 2020;
2) enhancing national power and international competitiveness; 3) improving democracy, reforming the
law, and governing by law; 4) improving citizens’ moral, educational, and health levels; 5) building
capacity and leveraging resources to promote harmonious development of both the people and nature.
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In addition to the CCP’s official statements, intellectuals have also contributed to the
obsession with the middle class, particularly since 2002 (Anagnost, 2008; Rocca,
2017a).46 With the full support of the central government, sociologists at the Chinese
Academy of Social Science (CASS) began conducting a nationwide sociological
study of China’s social stratification beginning in the 1980s (Ren, 2013). According
to the surveys on the number of articles that included the term ‘middle class’
conducted by Li Chunling in 2009 and Rocca (2017) in 2014 respectively, there were
surging scholarly works mentioning the middle class from 1980 to 2007, especially
from the end of 1990s to the end of the 2010s (Rocca, 2017a). In 2002, the first
comprehensive study of the social strata of reform-era China entitled Research
Report on Social Strata in Contemporary China was published by CASS, which
identified ten strata of China’s society (Lu Xueyi, 2002). By 2010 there were over
100 works on China’s middle class that had been published by Chinese scholars (Li
Cheng, 2010; Li Chunling, 2009).

Although an increasing number of intellectual statements claim that the middle class
has existed in China, there is no consensus on the definition, scope and size of
China’s middle class among Chinese sociologists (Lu Hanlong, 2010; Li Cheng,
2010; Goodman, 2014; Rocca, 2017a; Bian, et al., 2018). Sociologists in China have
tried to use income, occupation, education, consumption and lifestyle as the criteria
for defining the middle class (ibid.). The application of different criteria leads the
evaluation of China’s middle class to range widely. For example, Li Peilin, a Chinese
sociologist and vice-president of CASS, adopts three kinds of capital (income,
education, and occupation) to identify middle-class membership, and divides the
middle class into three groups: the core middle class (possessing three kinds of
capital), the semi-core middle class (two kinds), and the marginal middle class (one
kind). Based on a national survey of households in China in 2006, Li Peilin and his
colleagues identified that the core, semi-core, and marginal groups of the middle
class constituted respectively 3.2 per cent, 8.9 percent and 13.7 percent of the
population (Li and Zhang, 2009). Li Chunling, another distinguished sociologist at
46

The discussions on social stratification in the academia in China can be roughly divided into two
stages. During the first decade of the reform era, scholars focused on the question of social
stratification; since the late 1990s, the question of the middle-class has replaced the discussion on
social stratification. See Guo Yingjie, (2009) ‘Farewell to Class, except the Middle Class: The Politics
of Class Analysis in Contemporary China’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 7(26), pp. 1–26
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CASS, identifies four criteria of the middle class – occupation, income,
consumption, and self-identification. According to the national survey she conducted
in 2003, only 4.1 percent of the workforce and 2.8 percent of the total population
could meet all four criteria for middle class membership (Li Chunling, 2005). While
the measurements of the middle class in China by Lu Hanlong and Li Chunling have
been criticised as conservative (Li Cheng, 2010), Lu Xueyi (2004; 2010) used access
to capital and occupation as the criteria for defining the middle class, including
entrepreneurs, office workers, and professionals/technicians. Based on his large-scale
national survey, he estimated that the middle class constituted 22-23 percent of the
whole population in 2009. Although the definition and actual size of ‘middle class’
are still open to debate, it is apparent that the concept of the middle class is
acknowledged by intellectuals as a necessary segment of Chinese society in the
reform-era.

While sociologists in China focus on describing the actual size of the middle class,
some scholars argue that the middle class is more discursive than descriptive in
China (Anagnost, 2008; Guo, 2008; Goodman, 2014; Rocca, 2013, 2017a). Through
reviewing existing academic publications classifying the middle classes from
objective and subjective dimensions, Guo Yingjie (2008: 51) argues that the
discourse of the middle class is more prescriptive than descriptive, because ‘it either
has no objective identity or there is no established link between the putative
subjectivity of the so-called ‘middle class’ and any constructed schemes’. That is,
despite lacking convincing evidence, social scientists project the subjective attributes
of the middle class onto imaginary groupings. Therefore, Guo (ibid.) concludes that
‘its purpose is not to provide information about the size, composition or intrinsic
characteristics of the middle class but to promote this class, together with its
presumably attractive qualities, or advocate these values by riding on the wave of the
fetishized middle class’. Guo’s arguments echo with Rocca’s. Rocca (2017b: 232)
argues that the definitions of the middle class are ‘never neutral and objective’, and
each definition carries a hidden agenda. From a constructive approach, he states that
the discourse of the middle class is operated as ‘an imaginary phenomenon’.
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In a word, from a brief review of the CCP’s ideological shift and the intellectual
statements, it is apparent that there has been a state-sponsored discourse of the
middle class, aided by social analysis. The state-sponsored middle-class discourse is
‘designed to encourage economic growth, consumption and a rising standard of
living’, and ‘designed to mediate the increasing social inequality’ (Goodman, 2014:
109). Ideas concerning the definition of the middle class are various, but they inject
the same burden on the middle class – to stimulate domestic consumption, to raise
the quality of life of the whole population, to introduce modern lifestyles, and to
alleviate social conflicts between the rich and poor. In so doing, the discourse of the
middle class highlights social harmony and deliberately discourages social
antagonism. As Guo Yingjie (2008: 52) puts it, in this way, ‘promoting the middle
classes… supports the CCP’s legitimacy’. Without constituting a dominant position
in the whole population, the middle classes have been placed in a crucial role in the
new economic development.

2.1.2. The Aspirational Middle-Class Status: key characteristics
The middle class discourse is more than official or intellectual statements; it creates
aspirations (Anagnost, 2008; Goodman, 2014). In Anagnost’s words (2008: 498),
‘this discourse [of middle class] has become formative to government efforts to
expand the middle class by inciting aspiring individuals to adhere to new social
norms of middle-class identity, often defined around consumer practices’. The
middle class, differentiated from the new rich, who got rich overnight and are often
viewed as lacking cultural capital, and the urban underclass,47 who gradually lost
their privileged position in the reform era, became the new model citizenry, featuring
high cultural capital and the capacity to consume (Goodman, 2014). That is, the
discourse of the middle class models a new middle-class subjectivity, characterized
by educated, middle-income knowledge workers who have the economic capacity to
consume and to invest in ‘new forms of self-cultivation and self-identification’
(Rocca, 2017b: 235). Individuals are being encouraged to pursue middle class status,
47

According to Solinger, the underclass that was newly created over the course of reforming is a
group composing of ‘recently laid-off workers, underpaid and underprivileged migrant labourers from
the countryside, and any others who have fallen into penury with the withdrawal of job and welfare
security and the elimination of free health care in the cities’. See Solinger, 2006. ‘The creation of a
new underclass in China and its implications’, Environment and Urbanization, 18(1), pp. 177–193.
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even though their sociological characteristics are more prescriptive than descriptive.
For instance, the young post-1990s migrant workers that Pun and Koo (2015) studied
aspired to purchase cutting-edge commodities, such as iPhones and iPads, in the
anxiety of pursuing a cosmopolitan, individualist and consumption-oriented lifestyle.

Cultural representations played a significant role in normalising the aspirational
middle class status. The practice of engineering the middle class moved beyond
policy and intellectual statements, extending to popular culture. In other words,
China’s middle class discourse is not only significant in the economic, social and
political domains but also in the cultural realm. In Anagnost’s words (2008: 499),
‘the middle class is…a political and cultural category as much as an economic one’.
The representation of the middle class in popular culture was ‘staged in anticipation
of its realization as widespread social reality’ (ibid.). The middle class dominated in
media representation, while the urban working class was marginalized both
economically and symbolically. Consequently, the aspirational representation of
middle-class values and lifestyles provides reasonable grounds for the existence and
behaviour of the rich, and at the same time incites other social groups, including the
new underclasses, to imitate such economic behaviour. For example, Gaetano
Arianne’s work (2015) on young migrant women demonstrates that young rural
women, who are often seen as cultural inferiors and social outsiders in the cities,
actively participate in urban consumer practices in an attempt to redefine themselves
as urban sophisticates. The representation of young middle-class women in popular
culture will be analysed in section 3.1 of chapter 3.

The discourse of middle class identity is tightly associated with the development of a
consumer society as well as the marketing of lifestyle in the reform-era (Li Chunling,
2005; Anagnost, 2008; Goodman, 2014; Cartier, 2013; Rocca, 2017a; Zhou, 2010).
Consumption is driven by the CPP to enable the transition to a consumption-led
domestic economy, but also becomes a principal means of defining and identifying
China’s middle class. China has undergone a ‘consumer revolution’ since the 1990s
(Davis, 2000; Davis, 2005). The centres of domestic consumption have shifted from
food in the 1980s, electronic goods in the early 1990s, to a broad range of
commodities in the mid to late 1990s, especially after the Asian financial crisis in
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1997, including houses and cars, telecommunications, tourism, leisure and
entertainment activities (Davis, 2000; Zhang Li, 2010; Tang, 2013; Yu, 2014; Rocca,
2017a).

Since the 2000s, consumption has become even more crucial in stimulating
economic growth. In 2000 Zhu Rongji, then-Premier of the State Council, in the
Report on the Work of the Government declared that all barriers to consumption
should be eliminated, and ‘new consumption highlights such as housing should be
created; residence construction should be made a key industry; and consumption of
telecommunication, tourism, culture, entertainment, health care and other tertiary
industries should be encouraged’. In 2011, China’s 12th Five-Year plan (2011-2015)
considered consumption as one key strategy to rebalance its economy after the
financial crisis in 2008. The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) highlights the
fundamental role of consumption in stimulating industrial progress and
transformation. ‘Ten Initiatives for Boosting Consumer Spending’ (2016) was
implemented by the State Council to encourage the further expansion of
consumption. It advocated boosting and upgrading consumption spending not only in
social reproductive domains (such as elderly care, domestic services, health services,
education and sports), but also in new domains, including green consumption,
information consumption, high-tech electronic consumption, and fashion
consumption. As such, the middle class, a potentially heavy consumer and future
market creator, is central to stimulating consumption.

Middle class social status is particularly expressed through homeownership and the
pursuit of a comfortable lifestyle (Anagnost, 2008; Zhang Li, 2010; Tomba and
Tang, 2008; Goodman 2014; Rocca, 2017). Housing, which was allocated to urban
employees as public welfare, was gradually commercialised since the late 1980s. In
the mid to late 1990s the project of expanding the middle class was also primarily
accomplished through encouraging private housing (Anagnost, 2008). To encourage
housing consumption, employees in the state sectors were offered different levels of
mark downs or housing subsidies according to their positions in work-units and the
sectors and ranks of their work-units (Tang, 2013; Anagnost, 2008). In 2004,
National statistics recorded that the urban homeownership rate was 80 per cent
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(Tang, 2013: 54). Moreover, housing is a form of consumption as well as investment.
It was reported that annual investment in commercial housing reached 1365 billion
RMB in 2006, increasing more than three times from 422 billion in 2001 (China Real
Estate Statistics Yearbook, 2007, 2009; Tang, 2013). The acceleration of housing
privatisation was also represented in commercial advertisements. Housing is
advertised as a lifestyle as well as a symbol of social position. In particular, the gated
community with security and the various services provided, which spatially keeps
out other social groups such as the urban working class, represents a higher
socioeconomic status, and is a symbol of middle-class living (Zhang Li, 2010;
Goodman, 2014; Tang, 2013).

It needs pointing out that the development of the middle class is prominently an
urban phenomenon. The highly uneven economic development in China greatly
favours the urban areas and eastern coastal regions at the expense of rural areas and
western regions (Bian et al, 2018). Consequently, eastern coastal cities, such as the
metropoles of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, congregate near 80
percent of middle-class families and individuals (Barton et al. 2013). The emergence
of consumer culture and cultural representation take place mostly in the urban areas.

Education reform is another necessary part of the project of middle class expansion
and the definition of middle class identity. Higher education reform initiated in
1999 led to a surge in growth of higher education graduates from around one million
in 2001 to around 7 million in 2016, and over 8 million in 2018, an increase of more
than 7 million in the past 17 years (Goodman, 2013; Ministry of Education, 2018;
Zhang Ni, 2019). The total number of regular higher education institutions also rose
dramatically, from around 1,100 in 2000 to 2,409 in 2011, and 2,631 in 2017 (Tsang,
2013; Ministry of Education, 2018). Furthermore, education reform also witnessed a
surging number of Chinese students studying overseas, which has increased from
about 1,200 in 1978 to 662,100 in 2018 (Zou, 2019; Ministry of Education, 2019).
The growth rate in the number of Chinese studying abroad surged dramatically
between 2000 and 2015, with an average growth rate of 19 percent (Maslen, 2017).
Since 2015, although the growth rate slowed down slightly, reaching 8.83 percent in
2018, the number of Chinese studying overseas has continuously increased. From
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2001 onward, about 90 percent of the overseas study was self-funded (ibid.). The
U.S, UK, Australia, Canada, and Hong Kong are the top destinations for overseas
study (Xue, 2019).

All in all, education reform is a crucial strategy for expanding the middle class.
Researchers at the CASS Institute of Sociology state that expansion of college
enrollment was designated to enable opportunities for social mobility, and ‘created a
reserve force for the expansion of the middle class characterized by high academic
qualifications’ (Hu, Li and Li 2012: 419–20, cited in Goodman, 2014: 39). That is,
the expansion of higher education aimed to improve the ‘quality’ of the labour force
for the needs of economic development (Rocca, 2017a). However, obtaining a higher
education degree is only an entrance ticket to middle class status, and does not
necessarily guarantee a better job or a middle class identity (Anagnost, 2008;
Goodman, 2014), which will be detailed in section 2.1.3 of this chapter.

In addition to consumption and education, suzhi (quality) is also critically important
in relation to the state-sponsored discourse of the middle class and the achievement
of middle class membership (Goodman, 2014; Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis, 2006, 2011).
The term ‘suzhi’, which resonates with thoughts and discourses in early modern
history in China,48 has become a keyword since the early 1990s, primarily linked
with the prevailing forces of neoliberalism (Yan, 2003; Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis,
2006, 2011; Jacka, 2009; Tomba, 2009).49 In the 1980s suzhi was mainly discussed
in relation to eugenics, 50 referring to ‘superior birth and nurture’ (yousheng youyu),
48

Tracing the linguistic genealogy of the term suzhi, the studies of Andrew Kipnis and Borge Bakken
suggest that suzhi discourse in contemporary China echoes with the national anxiety about modernity
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a concern that China is weak and backward and
thus needs to be strengthened. See Kipnis, ‘Suzhi, a Keyword’. Sara Friedman has demonstrated the
similarities between the efforts made in different historical moments in order to civilise citizens – the
Republican New Life Movement in the 1930s, the cultivation of new socialist citizens in socialist era,
and the promotion of suzhi in the reform era. See Friedman, ‘Embodying Civility: Civilizing
Processes and Symbolic Citizenship in Southeastern China’, The Journal of Asian Studies 63, no.3
(August 2004): 687-718.
49
The discussion of neoliberalism is not the focus here. For Anagnost and Yan Hairong’s investigations
on neoliberalism in China, see Anagnost, ‘The Corporeal Politics of Quality (suzhi)’; and Yan, 2003,
‘Neoliberal Governmentality and Neohumanism’. For the critiques of Anagnost and Yan’s arguments
on neoliberalism in China, see Andrew Kipnis, ‘Neoliberalism Reified: Suzhi Discourse and Tropes of
Neoliberalism in the People’s Republic of China’; and Tamara Jacka, ‘Population Governance in the
PRC: Political, Historical, and Anthropological Perspectives,’ China Journal 58(2007): 111-26.
50
The discourse of eugenics in China’s context can be traced back to the early 20th century. See Frank
Dikötter, ‘Eugenics in Republican China’, Republican China, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1989).
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which aimed to control the quantity and improve the quality of the population
(renkou zhiliang) as a whole (Yan, 2003; Kipnis, 2006). The massive population of
low quality individuals, particularly in rural areas, was viewed as a hindrance to
China’s modernisation. By the 1990s, with the intensification of marketisation and
the anxiety of competing in the global economy, suzhi became critically important
and has been widespread in official and academic statements as well as in popular
culture(ibid.).51 Meanwhile, the uses of suzhi have also been extended from
identifying the quality of whole populations to an individual’s embodied qualities ‘in
practices of consumption and the incitement of a middle-class desire for social
mobility’ (Anagnost, 2004: 190; Kipnis, 2006).

The initiation of the one-child policy, as well as the expansion of higher education,
are crucial policies that are centred in the discourse of suzhi. Suzhi has played an
important role in education reform (Kipnis, 2001, 2006, 2011; Rocca, 2017). Since
1995, schools and universities have added the curriculum of ‘education for quality’
(suzhi jiaoyu), aiming to improve the quality of the whole population (Kipnis, 2006;
2011).52 The one-child policy (ended in 2015) detailed in 1.3.1 of chapter 1 was
considered a key means to raise the quality of the population. The middle-class
single child nurturing manifested the central role of suzhi in relation to the middle
class discourse (Anagnost, 2004). It intensified the anxiety of middle-class families
to invest in the single child’s education, as the single child was ‘the only hope’ of the
family (Fong, 2004). At the same time, it reinforced the domestic role of middleclass women. As discussed in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1, the educated, middle-class
women, who are seen as less efficient and competitive in the workplace than men,
are enticed to return home to take on the responsibility of building quality into ‘the
only hope’ of the family (Evans, 2008; Anagnost, 2004; Fong, 2004).

51

For example, Tamara Jacka notes that the number of times suzhi was used in People's Daily, increased
from ‘7 in 1970 to 102 in 1980, 1,066 in 1990, and 2,486 in 2000’. See Tamara, Jacka, 2009, in
‘Cultivating Citizens: Suzhi (quality) Discourse in the PRC, Position 17:3 (winter 2009).
52
For more discussions on education and the discourse of suzhi, see Rachel Murphy. ‘turning peasants
into modern Chinese citizens: population quality discourse, demographic transition and primary
education.’ The China Quarterly, volume 177, March 2004, pp. 1-20; Kipnis, 2011, ‘Subjectification
and Education for Quality in China,’ Economy and Society, 40(2), pp. 289-306.
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Suzhi is a value code used to mark social distinctions, staging the middle-class as the
exemplar of modernity (Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis, 2006, 2011; Tomba, 2009). The
code, according to Anagnost (2004), functions in the ideological realm by
constructing the antithesis between two figures: the middle-class only child in urban
areas, which are considered a site of accumulation of high-quality (gao suzhi), and
the rural migrants, massive in number, viewed as backward and lacking quality. In
this way, Anagnost (2004: 193) maintains that the discourse of suzhi works as ‘a
regime of representation’, ‘through which subjects recognise their position within the
larger social order, thereby setting up the conditions for socio-economic striving’.
The state has promoted the symbol of high quality, which is generally ‘associated
with a university education, good manners, a white-collar job and an urban
residence’ (Tomba, 2009). The middle class is positioned to differentiate itself from
other groups viewed as lacking quality, by establishing themselves in urban gated
communities residentially segregated from the underclasses (ibid.). Meanwhile, rural
migrant women are the most common target for suzhi discourse, often stigmatised as
unskilled and having ‘low suzhi’(Judd, 2002; Jacka, 2006; Gaetano, 2015). They are
incited to move to the cities, as their labour mobility from the countryside to the
cities is coded as suzhi mobility (Yan, 2003). However, it is exactly through the
unlimited exploitation of the massive mobility of a low-paid female labour force that
China established its position as a ‘world factory’ that fueled its economic miracle
throughout the 1990s (Lee, 1998; Pun, 2005). In this sense, the discourse of suzhi not
only marks social distinctions as those who have quality and those who do not but
also justifies the exploitation of so-called ‘low quality’ labour.

Furthermore, the discourse of suzhi also produces subject positions, defining the
middle class as a site of neoliberal subject production (Yan, 2003; Anagnost, 2004).
As Yan Hairong (2003: 511) argues, suzhi ‘forces the ethics of the market on the
individual subject and codes its value for Development’.53 Suzhi ‘inscribes,
measures, and mobilises’ human subjectivity as the new frontier for productivity and
development, which is central to China’s neoliberal reform. In other words, human
life itself becomes a form of value for capital accumulation. By coding the value of
53

Yan Hairong (2003: 496) in this article uses Development with capital D, referring to “the ideology
and practice of a developmentalism advocated and promulgated by organizations of North-dominated
international capital, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.”
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human beings for development, suzhi ‘abstracts and reduces the heterogeneity of
human beings’ (ibid.). By this means, suzhi renders subjectivity inherently lacking
and compels subjectivity to constant self-development. Both for the middle class and
the rural migrant, suzhi has become a struggle to be recognised as an individual of
value. In this way, the neoliberal subject has to open the body as a site of investment
to acquire more value through single child nurturing, education, and training
(Anagnost, 2004). Under the anxiety of having a single child fail, middle class
parents intensively build quality into the single child to assure her/his success,
differentiating from the ‘derogated’ rural migrants. In a word, suzhi, as a corporeal
politic, reorganises the domain of the biopolitical as a new site of exploitation. The
discourse of suzhi serves to justify the exploitation of migrant labour, and privileges
the middle class as the most desirable type of subject coding with more value for
development.

2.1.3. Young Middle-Class Women at Work: The Paradox of Urban Labour
Market Reform
Thus far, I have demonstrated that the party-state engineered the expansion of the
middle class in China, and positioned the middle class – marked by the
characteristics of a high level of education, economic power of consumption, and
high sushi – as a dominant and normative figure in society. The middle class is
supposed to be a driving force to enable China’s socio-economic, political and
cultural transition: economically, they are the major driver of domestic consumption;
politically, they are supposed to stabilise and harmonise the social conflicts caused
by decades of reforms; and culturally, they are represented as the normative subject
in popular culture, even though they are still small in number. Representation of the
middle class in the hegemonic popular culture will be detailed in section 3.1 of
chapter 3.

However, in contrast to the inflation of middle-class status in governmental discourse
and cultural representation, this section argues that there is a tendency toward the
deflation of middle-class earning power, which is particularly prominent among
young middle-class women. This section, from a gender perspective, will review the
key policies relating to urban labour reforms and its key characteristics to explore the
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following two questions: firstly, how the labour market reform characterized by
individualism, precariousness, and flexibility has gradually come into shape since the
initiation of ‘reform and opening’ policy; secondly, how educated, young middleclass women have become particularly vulnerable under such labour reforms in the
past two decades.

In the transition from a state-planned economy to a market-driven economy, the
labour system has accordingly shifted from a socialist centralized allocation system
to a market labour system (Tomba, 2002; Solinger, 2003 and 2006), which deserves
a brief review here. The Chinese urban labour market reforms focused mainly on two
dimensions – the introduction of the labour contract system in 1986, and changes in
the wage system (Meng, 2004). The labour contract system54 allowed enterprises
relative freedom in the hiring and dismissal processes, according to their financial
profitability, differentiating from the socialist era when jobs were assigned by
governmental bureaus and layoffs required approval from bureaucratic superiors
(Davis, 1999). In other words, the labour contract system replaced job assignment
with recruitment. In the late 1990s, all SOEs were allowed to dismiss employees
freely, resulting in the significant number of laid-off workers mentioned in section
1.3 of chapter 1. The wage system has also been increasingly decentralized. In the
socialist period, wages were allocated by the central government and were generally
the same. There were only two ranks – the production workers, and the managerial
and professional workers (Meng, 2004; 2012). Wages and bonuses, which were
associated with moral criteria, were connected to employee’ productivity after the
reform. The transformation of wage systems led to increased variation in wages
based on gender, age, education level and so forth.

In addition, the reforms also increased variation in employment practices and shifted
the employment structure, particularly after China formally entered the WTO
(Tomba, 2002; Solinger, 2003; Gallagher, 2005). The introduction of direct foreign
investment and the restructuring of SOEs diversify ownership types, with the
54

The labour contract system was processing at a slow pace in China. According to Mary Gallagher,
about half of China’s workforce were working without labour contracts in 1996. See Gallagher, M.,
2005, Contagious Capitalism: Globalisation and the Politics of Labor in China. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
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emergence of private and foreign ownership as well as joint ventures (known as
recombinant ownership) (ibid.). The labour contract system lessens employment ties
between workers and enterprises, and thus enabled labour mobility, while the
expansion of ownership types increased non-state employment opportunities.
Workers could choose between jobs from the state sector and the rapidly growing
collective, foreign, and private sectors, including state-owned units (guoyou danwei),
joint ownership units (lianying danwei), foreign-funded units (waishang touzi
danwei) (Tomba, 2002). Moreover, employment in the state sector reduced from
78.3 per cent in 1978 to 21.9 per cent of total urban employment in 2008. Over the
same period, employment in the foreign-investment sector increased significantly,
from zero to 15.8 million (Gallagher, Lee and Kuruvilla, 2011:1). While agriculture
employment decreased from 69.9 in 1978 to 27 percent of the total in 2017, service
sector employment kept rising, particularly after 2008, from 12.2 in 1978 to 32.4
percent in 2008, and to 44.9 percent in 2017 (National Bureau of Statistic China,
2018).

It deserves notice that women dominate the growing service sector. A survey on
Chinese Women’s Social Status in 2010, conducted by the All-China Women’s
Federation and National Statistics Bureau every 10 years beginning in 1990, showed
that the proportion of the female labour force in the primary industrial sectors,
secondary industrial sectors and tertiary industrial sectors was 45.3 per cent, 14.5 per
cent, and 40.2 percent, respectively. According to the survey, compared with the year
2000, the number of female workers in the industrial and service sectors increased by
25 per cent in 2010. As Zhou (2009) categorizes, during the first phase of
development between 1978 and 1991 the new jobs available in the service sector
were mostly in low-value areas such as commerce, catering and the hospitality
industry. Between 1992 and 2006, young professionals began emerging in the highvalued sectors including finance, insurance, telecommunications and technology with
the diversification of the structure of the tertiary sector. During this second phase,
young female urban professionals – who are often called ‘white-collar beauties’ –
have gradually emerged in response to market reform, the expansion of higher
education, and global capitalism (Goodman and Zang, 2008; Liu, 2017). Young
women are favoured for service-sector jobs because they are sexualised and
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considered glamourous (Hanser 2008; Otis, 2011 and 2016). It is prominent that
women workers experience the conversion of their youth and femininity into capital
and the possibility of upward mobility, referred to as ‘rice bowl of youth’ (chi
qingchunfan) (ibid.). Young women can convert their youth and beauty into
potentially lucrative employment opportunities, especially in a range of new and
highly paid positions in the service sector, including bilingual secretaries, public
relations girls and fashion models.

The urban labour reforms have several crucial characteristics. Firstly, the urban
labour reforms directed the individuals to detach from the state, and to rely on
her/himself for employment. Increasing competition and influence from the global
market stresses the importance of efficiency and productivity (Tomba, 2002). Along
with the labour reforms, the nature of labour has also been transformed from a social
right provided by the state, to a form of commodity that propels individuals to
constantly increase her/his own value (Tomba, 2002). Labour in the socialist era was
viewed as a general right that all individuals should have access to, such as food and
housing, and hence was a part of the redistribution system. In contrast, labour in the
reform period became a commodity, consisting of a component of the production
system. Moreover, the labour reforms also changed the relationship between workers
and enterprises: workers were no longer the masters of the state enterprises as in the
socialist era, but were employees that could be hired and dismissed freely. As a
result, pressures were placed on employees themselves to be productive and effective
in order to attain employability.
College graduates, who had been ‘the child of good fortune’ (tianzhi jiaozi), had to
face severe unemployment. They shouldered increasing pressures to find
employment, especially with the initiation of the higher education expansion. The
policy of job assignments was abolished in the late 1980s, aiming to push 70 percent
of college graduates to find jobs on their own in 1993. The abolishment of job
assignments and the justification of labour dismissal meant that college graduates
had to be self-reliant to find jobs, rather than waiting for job assignments by the
party-state as they did before the late 1980s. Hence, individuals had to learn skills in
order to compete in the labour market. Competition has been getting even more
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intense with the rapid expansion of the number of students in higher education. The
employment rate of college graduates has consistently dropped since 2002 (Xi and
Sun, 2006). Nothing is secured, and individuals no longer have the guidance of the
government or the state.

Secondly, increased pressure on employability over individuals is related to the
increasing stress on developing human capital. Human capital (workforce-adjusted
for average years of schooling) development has gained importance as a driver of
China’s economic growth. Its contribution to GDP grew from around 12.5 percent
from 1999-2008 to 16 percent from 2009-2015, though it was still smaller than an
OECD economy (Wei, Xie, and Zhang, 2017). As such, the value of education has
risen in determining individuals’ opportunities for employment. Income returns on
human capital investment increased both in rural and urban areas (Adamchak, Chen,
and Li, 1999; Zhao, 1997).55 Based on the Chinese Urban Household Surveys, Meng
Xin’s (2012) study shows that returns had risen from 4 percent ‘per year of schooling
in 1988 to as high as 10.2 percent per year of schooling by 2001’.
This, in turn, increases anxiety to invest in education in order to enhance one’s
employability. As mentioned in section 2.1.2 of this chapter, parents intensively
invest in their children’s education hoping that their children can be successful.
However, investment in human capital is ‘speculative’ (Pun and Koo, 2015).
Although individuals incite to constantly undergo the process of self-development to
learn new skills and to improve their own quality, the returns are not guaranteed due
to the speculative nature of human capital investment.

The contradiction between increased human capital and worsening working
conditions is most apparent in the working class. For young labour migrants who
were born in the late 1980s and 1990s, Pun and Koo’s empirical studies (2015) have
strongly demonstrated that despite the fact that younger generations are more
educated than their migrant parents, and work hard on accumulating ‘specifications’,
55

For studies on the returns to human capital investment, see Alan de Brauw and Rozelle Scott, 2008.
‘Reconciling the returns to education in off-farm wage employment in rural china’, Review of
Development Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 57-71. Margaret maurer-Fazio. ‘In Books One Finds a
House of Gold: Education and Labor Market Outcomes in Urban China,’ Journal of Contemporary
China 15 (47), 215-231, 2006.
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they struggled to achieve social mobility due to strict segregation based on the
household registration system, which prohibited them from enjoying urban resident
status and its associated social benefits.

However, such a contradiction of human capital is not limited to the young
generation of labour migrants but also extended to educated young women. While
women have greatly benefited from the expansion of higher education, they are also
more likely to encounter unemployment. The proportion of women in higher
education has increased by 1 percent yearly since 1999. In 2009, women occupied
50.48 percent of the higher educated population, compared with 38.31 percent in
1998; in 2012, the proportion increased to 51.35 percent, and the number of female
graduates outnumbered their male counterparts by more than half a million (0.64
million) (National Bureau Statistic, 1999 and 2013, cited in Li Chunling, 2016). At
the same time, there is a growing number of women pursuing postgraduate degrees.
In 2016, the number of female postgraduates outnumbered their male counterparts
for the first time, making up 50.6 percent of the postgraduate population (Ministry of
Education of PRC, 2016; Meng, 2017). It is necessary to take the issue of skewed sex
ratio at birth into account when comparing gender differences in higher education.
China’s fertility rate dropped from 5.8 children per woman in 1970 to 1.7 by 2013, as
a consequence of the one-child policy (Parkinson, 2015). Thus, although men
outnumbered women by 70 million demographically (Denyer and Gowen, 2018),
there still were more women enrolled in higher education (Li Chunling, 2016).

Paradoxically, increasing the number of female college graduates does not increase
their opportunities in the labour market; instead, it causes the phenomenon of
‘employment discrimination against female college graduates’(nüdaxuesheng jiuye
nan) (ibid.). Educated women experience different forms of discrimination in both
state and private sectors of the labour market. The state sector and civil service jobs
favour male graduates. Women working in these areas have a very low possibility of
being dismissed, and can enjoy long maternity leave that is largely lacking in the
private sector. But women are less likely to move to higher positions in the state
sector because they are regarded as less efficient than men due to their role as
mothers (Li 2016). This also echoes Tong Xin’s findings (2014; see also Lai, et al,
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2017), suggesting that women who are employed in civil service jobs often
encounter the issue of the ‘glass ceiling’, which prevents them from climbing to the
higher ranks.56 A survey of 1000 graduates in Shanghai in 2004 showed that only 8.7
percent of female job applicants for civil servant posts have been employed,
compared to 11.7 percent of male graduates (ibid). In the much more competing
private sector, discrimination against women based on age and care-giving are more
obvious. Moreover, the gender pay gap, which fell slightly to 84.5 percent,
continuously increased, from 85.9 percent in 1995.

In addition to severe employment discrimination against women in the formal sector,
urban educated women are also increasingly dropping out of the workforce and are
paid far less than men. Female participation in the labour force has continuously
fallen since 2000, from 78.2 percent in 2000, to 75.2 percent in 2010, and to 61
percent in 2018 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012; The International Labour
Organisation, 2019). A survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science
in 2013 reveals that around 50 million married women under 33 years-old were not
employed, among whom 9.4 percent held a college degree (cited in Li Chunling,
2016). It also shows that about two-thirds of women in the age group of 18 to 30
years-old were unemployed because they had to shoulder the responsibility of
‘childbearing, child-raising and housework’ (ibid.). Despite decades of economic
progress, China has fallen in a global ranking for gender equality for a decade,
ranked 103 out of 149 countries in 2018 (Lau, 2017; World Economic Forum 2018).
According to the China Labour Market Development Report 2016, women were paid
73.9 percent of what men were paid in 2007, compared with that of 85.9 percent and
84.5 percent in 1995 and 2002, respectively. While women spent 525 ‘work minutes
per day’ at the workplace compared with 481 for men, they still earned less than men
(Lau, 2017; World Economic Forum, 2017). A survey by an online recruiter shows
that Chinese women’s average monthly salary was 6,497 yuan, 78.3 percent of that
of men (Liu and Wang, 2019).
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A Report on female employment in China labour market in 2016 shows that female managers often
had higher educational certificates, but they only accounted for 13.67 per cent of the total number of
the middle and higher managers, and often earned less than their male counterparts. See Lai Desheng
et al. 2017. China Labour Market Development Report 2016: Female Employment in the Process of
Gender Equality.
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Additionally, with the termination of the one-child policy and the initiation of the
universal two-child policy in 2015, concerns of more serious discrimination against
women at the workplace are common among young, educated women. The universal
two-child policy propels every family to have two children, aiming to invert the
demographic pyramid in which there is a decreasing in the working population
relative to the number of aged citizens (Hershatter, 2019). The China Labour Market
Development Report 2016 reveals that 50.98 percent of young, urban females with
two children chose to give up their self-development opportunities for the sake of
family. It concludes that the opening of the universal two-child policy may have a
negative impact on women’s employment because of intensified competition in the
labour market and the individualization of child nurturing.

Given the severe employment discrimination against women in the formal sector,
there is an increasing number of young women entering the informal sector (Li,
2016; Lai et al, 2017). The informalization of labour is another important
characteristic of the urban labour market (Tomba, 2002; Huang 2009; Park and Cai,
2011; Park et al, 2012). Informal employment refers not only to working outside the
formal sector that is unprotected by labour laws and has no benefits or social welfare
but also working informally in the formal sector (ibid.). The official apparatus does
not collect data on the informal sector, but many studies have argued that there has
been a significant rise in informal employment since the mid-1990s (Huang, 2009;
Park and Cai, 2011; Cooke, 2011; Park, et al, 2012).57 The informal sector includes
four different sources: ‘the rural industrialisation and rise of informal townshipvillage enterprises of the 1980s, the large-scale movement of nongmingong [migrant
workers] into informal employment in the cities since the late 1980s, the
unemployment of state and collective enterprise employees and their entrance into
57

For example, according to Philip Huang (2009), in 2006 the informal sector made up 59.4 percent
of the total urban labour force, among which around 200 millions were migrant workers and around
50 million were urban residents. Albert Park and Cai Fang (2011) estimate around 39 per cent of
urban employment is informal. Albert Park, Yaowu Wu, and Yang Du (2012) use four different
criteria and suggest that the share of the urban informal employment ranged from 19.9 to 37.2 per
cent, while Fang Lee Cooke (2011) estimates that informal employment accounts for over 50 per cent
of the total urban workforce. See Albert Park, Yaowu Wu, and Yang Du, 2012, ‘Informal
Employment in Urban China: Measurement and Implications’ ; Fang Lee Cooke, 2011. “Labour
Market Regulation and Informal Employment in China: To What Extent Are Workers Protected?”;
Philip Huang. 2009. ‘China’s Neglected Informal Economy: Reality and Theory’ ; Albert Park and
Cai Fang. 2011. ‘The Informalisation of the Chinese Labor Market’ in From Iron Rice Bowl to
Informalization: Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing China.
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the informal economy from the mid-1990s on, and finally, the rapid rise of informal
private enterprises and of the informal self-employment getihu [petty entrepreneurs]
from the early 1990s on’ (Huang, 2009: 412; see also, Park and Cai, 2011:21).

The expansion of the informal economy has also witnessed an increasing number of
women working in the informal sector. Women, the youth, migrant and unskilled
workers are more likely to be found in the informal sector (Gallagher, Lee, and
Kuruvilla, 2011). Female migrants, who are positioned at the bottom of society,
often enter the informal sector in low-value services in cities, including restaurants,
retail stores, cafes, entertainment, saunas, gyms, and domestic care (Jin Yihong,
2006; Gaetano, 2015). Similar to women from the subordinated class, many educated
young middle-class women also ‘choose’ to work informally. Female college
graduates, potential members of the middle class, are subordinated in the formal
employment system as the result of the marketisation of labour and the naturalised
gender discourse as detailed above and in section 1.3.1 of Chapter 1.

Based on my fieldwork, it is astonishing that almost all of my interviewees are
involved in the informal sector at different levels. Some of them are working as
freelancers, and many are working ‘second jobs’. Working a second job, or
moonlighting, is the most common informal practice. ‘Second job’ seekers are
mainly those workers who work informally in the private sector or work as
individual entrepreneurs without losing their social welfare benefits in state units
(Tomba, 2002; Gallagher, 2005). Such a phenomenon was initially observed in big
cities in the 1990s, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou (Tomba, 2002). While
‘second job’ seekers in the 1990s were mostly observed among those in the state
sector where social welfare benefits could still be guaranteed, the educated, young
middle-class women that I interviewed mostly work in private sectors. They hold
jobs in private enterprises in the formal sector, and at the same time, they have
second jobs on an irregular basis to supplement their incomes. Living costs in the
metropolis are extremely high and the income that my interviewees’ receive from
their formal jobs is never enough, especially to buy a house in cities like Shanghai
without family’s support. It will be discussed in detail in section 2.3 of this chapter.
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In summary, urban labour market reform includes the female labour force,
particularly in the booming tertiary sector, and witnesses the emergence of urban
female professionals, such as female entrepreneurs and technicians. Women account
for over 52 percent of professionals and technicians in post-2000 workplaces
(Hausmann et al 2011). However, despite sharp polarization between women in the
high-end service sector and those in the low-end service sector, women’s working
conditions, in general, are increasingly marked by precarity, flexibility, and
informality. That is, the middle class has gradually slid into working conditions that
their working-class counterparts have experienced for decades. Decades of reforms
have greatly increased labour mobility, flexibility, and insecurity, and smashed the
‘iron rice bowls’ that promised lifelong jobs with housing, medical and education
benefits in the socialist era (Tomba, 2002; Gallagher, 2005). With the elimination of
lifetime employment, the normalisation of short-term contracts both in state and nonstate firms, and the pressures of unemployment, individuals are propelled to
commodify themselves as much as possible to be recognised in a competitive labour
market. Compared with men, women tend to work in more mobile, flexible and
insecure conditions, as they are expected to bear the brunt of reproduction. Workingclass and rural women have been exposed to such conditions since the very
beginning of the reforms; but it is becoming increasingly apparent that educated,
young middle-class women, especially from the lower-middle-class, are now
exposed to a similar fate.

Young middle-class women are particularly favoured in the precarious, flexible and
informal labour regime, and thus embody the contradictory nature of the labour
market reforms. The first is the contradiction between residential ‘immobility’ and
the increased need for labour mobility (ibid.). Many prominent works (Solinger,
1999; Chan, 2001; Pun, 2005; Gallangher, 2005; Lee, 2007; Fan, 2008) have
demonstrated how the household registration system, on the one hand, facilitates the
exploitation of flexible rural labour on a temporary ‘contract’ basis, and on the other
hand, prevents rural migrants from becoming permanent urban residents, which is
tied to many rights and benefits. While the state-sponsored household registration
system maintains young rural migrants as a pool of cheap labour for multinational
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corporations, it also impacts the life choices of the educated, young middle-class
(Tsang, 2013).

There is another contradiction between increasing investments in human capital and
worsening working conditions. As discussed above, increasingly, investment in
human capital does not translate into upward social mobility for the young middle
class, especially for women. Increasing participation in higher education does not
guarantee educated women better job opportunities. There are two main reasons: first
of all, the naturalised gender discourse positions women in the realm of social
reproduction and justifies their subordination in the employment system. Women are
perceived as bearing primary responsibility for childcare and housework, and are
considered by employers as inefficient and incapable of devoting themselves to jobs
as fully as men. On this basis, the abolishment of job assignments and the
justification of labour dismissal in the 1990s, which allowed enterprises to freely
select their employees, disadvantaged women in the workplace; secondly, the
privatization of care responsibilities and social services, which were previously
provided by the state, had a significant impact on urban women's status in the labour
market. The state gradually retreated from its role as welfare provider, forcing
women to be primary caretakers of the family, responsible for the care of children
and the elderly. As such, women are forced into an insubordinate place in the
employment system, focused on precarious and fragmented work. My fieldwork
shows that educated, young women are constantly ‘tiaocao’(job-hopping) to find a
more desirable job, even when they hold advanced degrees from abroad.

The third contradiction lies in the demographic paradoxes. The working-age
population (aged between 16 to 59) of China has been in decline since 2012, and is
set to fall 23% by 2050, which is partly due to the implementation of the one-child
policy (1978-2015) (Wei, Xie, and Zhang, 2017). The number of working age people
dropped from 925 million in 2011 to 911 million in 2015, and is estimated to fall to
700 million by 2050 (Myers, 2016). Meanwhile, the population aged 60 and above is
expected to surge to around 500 million in China (ibid.). As a part of policy to tackle
the challenges of the slowing population growth and the shrinking number of
workforce, the Chinese government abolished the one-child policy and has
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introduced the universal two-child policy since 2015. This paradox places extreme
pressure on women, intensifying already existing contradictions between production
and reproduction. As women are calling to have more children, they also raise
concerns about severe employment problems.58

The marketisation of labour and the privatisation of almost all realms of social
reproduction including education, medical care and housing, force individuals to rely
on themselves rather than on the state. And women, in particular, bear the burden of
the intensified contradiction between production and social reproduction that results
from the growth of marketisation processes beginning in the 1980s. As such, lower
middle-class women find it increasingly hard to find stable work in the labour market
even though they have education certificates, which is more than their female
counterparts from the subordinated classes. The state and the market view the female
labour force as an indispensable part of the labour market and the reproduction of
labour power; yet, instead of pursuing gender-friendly employment policies, the
state-market call for women to work more flexibly to balance the dual role. The
discourse of creativity is the latest example. The discourse of creativity normalizes a
labour regime that features flexibility, precariousness and insecurity in the official
statement, and places educated young women as the ideal subjects in the field of
flexible work. The following section will examine the construction of the creativity
discourse, and the ways that young women integrate into the creative economy.

2.2.

Creativity: A Cultural Policy Review

Thus far, section 2.1 has shown that the middle class has been fetishized as a panacea
for economic, political and social contradictions resulting from decades of reform
(Goodman 2014: 92-94). Although it relies precisely on the flexible exploitation of
cheap labour that has made China the world’s second-largest economy, it is the
middle class that has been staged as the normative figure in the reform era.
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Reports on intensified gender discrimination can easily be found in the media. See for instance,
‘two-child policy delivers new problems for women’ in China Daily, August 10, 2016; ‘China’s twochild policy is having unintended consequences,’ in Economist, July 26, 2018; Qian Yue, ‘China’s
two-child policy needs to come with child-care help’, in The Conversation, March 7, 2018.
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Since the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), the project of upgrading and
transforming the economy through key strategies of creativity and innovation was
explicitly formulated (Butollo, 2014). China’s economic development has slowed
since 2012, with its GDP growth rate decreasing from 10.1 percent in 2011 to 8.1
percent in 2012 and 6.7 percent in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics of China
2016). The economic slowdown, which was termed the ‘new normal’ by President
Xi Jinping, pressures China’s government to rebalance and shift its development
from an export-oriented model to a knowledge and technology-based one (Butollo,
2014). The official statements present creativity and innovation as a one-shot
solution to all economic, cultural and political problems. Upgrading and
transforming to a creative and innovative nation demands a social group with high
human capital that is able to further boost domestic consumption. Against such a
background, the middle class, who are marked by their economic role as consumers
and their high educational capital as discussed in section 2.1.2 of this chapter,
continues to be positioned as a significant historical subject in enabling the
upgrading and transforming processes in this new phase of development.

From a labour perspective, this section will explore how the government strongly
promotes and normalises a new form of work and employment marked by a strong
spirit of self-entrepreneurship, individualisation and flexibility in the emerging
creative economy. The flexible work, which was traditionally undertaken by women
and considered marginal, as examined in chapter 1, becomes a ‘new normal’ in the
labour market. Specifically, the call for creativity and innovation formalises and
institutionalises a labour regime that exploits the educated, young middle class
through flexible and freelance employment, particularly young, educated women
who historically take on flexible and precarious work in the reproductive domain, as
detailed in chapter 1. In other words, young, educated middle-class women are
intended to be a symbol of such a new normative labour regime, since they are
willing to ‘live on thin air’.

Focusing on top-level official policies and statements, this section includes three
parts: the first part will analyse how the creativity cultural policy discourse fetishises
creativity as a magic bullet to solve problems; section 2.2.2., from a labour
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perspective, will explore how the official discourse fetishises creativity as a new
pattern of employment that appears to be egalitarian and aspirational; section 2.2.3.
will provide key findings from an empirical study in Shanghai to explore the actual
work experiences of young, middle-class women in the creative economy.

2.2.1. Constructing the Discourse of Creativity
Pang Laikwan’s work (2012) offers a useful framework for analysing creativity in
China. Pang argues that the creative economy is the most saturated manifestation of
the latest modernity project, and the creative economy in China is also tightly
affected by global conditions. According to Pang (2012: 14), creativity is the most
obvious indicator of modernity currently, which functions as ‘the object of desire and
the symbolic benchmark of progress’. The development of the creative economy in
China and other developing countries is entangled with Western modernity (Pang,
2012: 30). Tracing the conceptualisation of creativity in the Chinese and more
specifically in the Western context, Pang maintains that creativity, mainly
understood in the collective sense in traditional Confucian thinking and the socialist
period in China, is selectively viewed as private ownership with the advent of the
creative economy. Creativity thus is mystified as its meanings are selected and
enclosed to serve the creative economy.
In China’s context, the operation of creativity is a contested conflation of cultural,
economic and political forces. Pang states that the creative economy is conditioned
by the antagonistic logics of culture and economy. The creative economy is
characterised by the increasing exchangeability and reconcilability between the
economic logic and cultural logic, instead of by their binary opposition. As Pang
(2012: 19) states, ‘what we are seeing is not a simple economization of culture, but
its extensive interpenetration’. Culture and economy can be both means and ends for
each other (ibid.). Such seemingly contradictory logics have also conditioned the
development of the creative economy in China. The party-state uses the strategies of
innovation and creativity in an attempt to upgrade itself from a labour intensive
economy to a knowledge-based economy, which indicates a more advanced stage of
modernity. In this vein, culture is oriented by practical knowledge for economic
function (ibid: 41). That is, the creative industry aims to use China’s cultural content
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to encourage cultural consumption. In addition to the economic value, the creative
industry also serves as a political tool to compete with so-called western Culture,
such as Hollywood, and ultimately for supporting cultural nationalism and enhancing
soft power. It is in this regard that Pang demonstrates that creativity in China is not
merely for its economic value, but also for its cultural and political value.

In order to understand the new landscape of work for educated youth under the call
for creativity, it is necessary to briefly review the changing cultural policy that
ignites the cultural economy in China’s context. Since the 2000s China’s government
has placed culture in a prominent status in national policy, which manifests in
emphasizing culture’s economic value and embracing the global discourse of
creative industries (Pang, 2012).59 Culture has been increasingly considered a
significant part of national economic growth and global competition, especially after
China entered the WTO (Wang, 2004; Pang, 2012; Keane, 2016).

Zhang Xiaoming, one of the chief editors of the annual Blue Books on cultural
industries, recognises three stages of CCI development in China. The first stage was
during the period of the 10th Five-Year Plan (2000-2005) when CCI was listed in the
official cultural policy. In 2000, The Proposal of the CCP Central Committee on the
10th Five-Year Plan aimed to ‘improve the policies for cultural industries’ and ‘to
boost cultural industries’. In 2001, then-Premier Zhu Rongji made a proposal to
‘deepen the cultural reform system and improve cultural and economic policies to
promote the development of cultural industries’ in the Report on the Outline of the
10th Five-Year Plan. In the same year, the development of cultural industries was
included in the central document the 10th Five Year Plan for National Economic and
Social Development, which marked the official ratification of the development of
CCI in China (Zhang, 2016).

59

According to Micheal Keane, ‘creative industries’ was not in use on the Chinese mainland until
2005, and ‘cultural industries’ is an official term used in state policy. For the debate on different
usages of the terms ‘cultural industries’ and ‘creative industries’ in China’s context, see Keane,
Michael, Creative Industries in China: Art, Design and Media (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013).
This debate is not the concern of the current research. This research uses ‘cultural industries’,
‘creative industries’, and ‘cultural and creative industries’ interchangeably.
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The second stage is during the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). In 2009, the central
government’s work report for the first time established the goal of ‘actively
developing cultural industries’ (Keane, 2016). With strong support from the
government, CCI expanded rapidly and has played an active role in economic growth
during this time. Recent data have shown that the value of China’s CCI surged from
RMB 344 billion in 2004 to RMB 1105.2 billion in 2010, with an annual growth rate
around 23.6 percent (Zhang, Wang and Zhang 2013: 3). Although official statistics
are always problematic in China, they indicate an emerging culture economy. The
third stage takes place over the course of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). In
2010, the Proposal for the 12th Five-Year Plan called for building CCI into a ‘pillar
industry’ of national economic growth, which requires a contribution to GDP
reaching 5 per cent. The development of CCI is closely linked with the incitement of
consumption as people are encouraged to consume cultural products and services
(Pang, 2012; Kean, 2016).
Under the state’s support, academics also contribute to constructing the discourse of
creativity in China. While in the 1990s academic circles were more critical of the
industrialisation and commercialisation of culture, they have shifted to support the
state-directed project of boosting culture to serve the national economy since the
2000s (Qiu, 2016).60 In 2000, the Chinese National Center for Cultural Studies was
established as an affiliate to the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), whose
research focuses are cultural strategies and policy. In 2004, Li Wuwei, a sociologist
at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences who has powerful political status,
introduced and strongly promoted ‘creative industries’ in China, as he believed that
‘creative industries were an appropriate model for China’s economic and cultural
development’ after his communications with John Howkins and other international
experts (see Keane, 2014: 41-42). Since 2013, the CASS has begun publishing Blue
Books on China’s cultural industries annually. These Blue Books on CCI often
reference the development of CCI in Japan, the UK, Europe and the USA as models,
and are in strong accordance with the governmental discourse of prioritizing the
development of national, provincial and local economies (Qiu, 2016). Cultural
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For this argument, see Qiu Zitong (2016) ‘Doing Chinese Cultural Industries: a Reflection on the
Blue Book Syndrome and Remedy Paradigm’, in Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in
China. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing pp 17-21.
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industries are often associated with terminologies such as ’new economic growth
point’, ‘economic transformation’, and ‘economic development’ in journal articles,
scholarly books and doctoral theses (ibid.).
Since 2014, China’s economic growth rate has slowed down, and the development of
CCI has also entered a new phase of ‘new normal’ as defined by The Blue Book of
Annual Report on Development of China’s Cultural Industries (2015-2016) (Zhang,
Wang and Zhang 2016). The annual growth rate fell to 3.63 percent in 2015, and
increased to 7.5, 10.8 and 8.2 percent in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively (National
Bureau of Statistics 2017, 2018 and 2019); but the growth rate is still lower
compared with that of 23.6 percent on average from 2004 to 2010. Meanwhile,
although the CCI’s contribution to GDP accounts for 4.29 percent in 2017,
increasing from 2.15 percent in 2004, 3.28 percent in 2011 and 3.76 percent in 2014
(Gao 2016:23; National Bureau of Statistics 2018), it did not reach 5 percent of GDP,
which is the yardstick of a pillar industry. Against this background, state policy
shifted from stressing ‘cultural industries’ to ‘culture market’, which, according to
Zhang Xiaoming (2016: 109), ‘shows that cultural industries in China are moving
from the government-led start-up stage to a market-oriented stage’.
At this new stage of ‘new normal’, creativity is a continuous component of official
policy to achieve the transformation of China’s economy into a capital-intensive and
knowledge-intensive one. The plan for upgrading and transforming to a knowledge
economy was initiated in the 12th Five-Year Plan in 2010, and becomes increasingly
apparent in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The stress on creativity is
articulated with its integration with the manufacturing sector. To this end, in 2014,
the State Council issued an important document, entitled ‘The Opinions on
Promoting the Development and Integration of Cultural Creativity, Design Services
with Related Industries’ (guanyu tuijin wenhuachuangyi he shejifuwu yu xiangguan
chanye ronghe fazhan de ruogan yijian). The document sets the objectives by 2020,
calling to
‘enhance the leading role of cultural creativity and design services;
integrate them with related industries; improve the cultural value
added in related industries; cultivate a cohort of high-quality
talents; nurture a group of competitive enterprises; develop
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independent intellectual property, and to establish brands with
international influence. The added-value of cultural creativity and
design services improves its position in cultural industries, and the
surplus-value of relative industries;…promote cultural industries
into a pillar of the national economy’ (The State Council of PRC,
2014; translated by the author).
In general, the past two decades have witnessed the state’s strong embrace of culture
as an industry to implement a new economic logic (Pang, 2012; Keane, 2004). The
legal and policy supports are fundamental in the expansion of such new economic
logics that place culture in a high status (Pang, 2012). With the emergence of the
creative economy over nearly two decades, a new landscape of work and working
opportunities have accordingly emerged. When the young women born in the late
1980s and 1990s who benefited from the expansion of higher education entered the
workplace in the post-2000s, they witnessed the heyday of the creative economy. In
the next section, I will examine how creativity is articulated with labour policy.

2.2.2. Creativity and the Spirit of Entrepreneurship
Creative industry policies have aimed not only to create a new source of economic
growth and a ‘national revival’(minzu fuxing) as examined in the above section but
also to increase job opportunities. The promulgation of the creative economy
requires labour forces. As sociologist Andrew Ross (2009) has argued, the creative
economy is composed of different kinds of workers: those who work in the assembly
line producing chips, and those who conduct ‘fancy’ or ‘cool’ work in the so-called
high-value sector. This research focuses on how the governmental discourse
‘engineers’ the second type of worker, namely middle-class youth, to work in the
creative economy. This section will examine how creativity is ‘put to work’ targeting
the expanding middle-class youth.

Creativity embedded in the spirit of entrepreneurship is fetishized as a solution to all
social and economic contradictions. In September 2014, Premier Li Keqiang first
made the public call for ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’ (dazhong chuanye
wanzhong chuangxin) at the World Economic Forum in Davos, promoting
‘grassroots entrepreneurship’ for national wealth growth. He further elaborated these
key terms on several occasions, such as the World Internet Conference, the
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Executive Meeting of the State Council and the Report on the Work of the
Government. In 2015, the state council issued a document entitled ‘Opinions on
Strongly Promoting Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation’, suggesting that these
keywords were formally included in national policy. In 2017, the state council issued
another document calling to strengthen the implementation of mass entrepreneurship
and innovation. In the following two years, Premier Li continuously stressed the task
of upgrading ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’ (Xinhua 2018; English.gov.cn
2019). All these documents and statements clearly articulate the role of creativity in
this new stage of entrepreneurship. For example, the Opinions read that,
‘The promotion of mass entrepreneurship and innovation is a driver
of development, a means to enrich people, and a policy to achieve
equality and build a strong nation. It is significant in propelling the
adjustment of the economic structure, creating a new development
engine, strengthening a new impetus for development, and leading
an innovation-driven development pathway. Mass entrepreneurship
and innovation is a major measure to stabilize economic growth,
expand employment, incite creativity and innovation of millions of
people, and to improve social vertical mobility and social equality
and justice’ (the State Council of PRC, 2015; translated by author).

Several key points deserve mention here. Firstly, these statements and policies
fetishise creativity as an individualist inner quality that is equally ‘distributed’
among people from different classes and identities. In emphasizing the creativity of
billions of Chinese people, the official discourse suggests that everyone can be
creative. Hence, as stated in the Opinions (2015), anyone, be they a technocrat,
college graduate, migrant worker, veteran, or unemployed can make a living in the
market through self-entrepreneurship by unleashing creativity, just like ‘fish in the
water’. Here, creativity is not only individualised but also democratised as a quality
that everyone can obtain, which echoes Pang’s argument (2012: 5) that ‘this
understanding has conjured a new type of quasi-democracy, which is based not on
political participation but on free access to creativity’. Pang (2012) insightfully
demonstrates that creativity in the creative economy is mystified as an abstract
universal human ability that everyone can access equally and can be cultivated
through education. It is in this sense that creativity is considered a perfect and
unlimited fuel for the creative economy, and thus for the development of capitalism.
Thus, the promotion of mass entrepreneurship based on individualised creativity
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suggests that the government’s policy project shifted from stressing ‘creative
industries– a top-down, closed elitist’ approach– to ‘grassroots actors’(Wang,
2016:45).

Moreover, foregrounding the individualised notion of creativity, the official
discourse romanticises mass entrepreneurship as a way to improve ‘vertical social
mobility’ (shehui zongxiang liudong) and social equality. The term ‘vertical social
mobility’ is frequently used in top leaders’ statements and governmental documents
from 2015 onwards, which, according to China Comment (banyue tan, a magazine
affiliated with The Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China), suggests
that it moves beyond the field of sociology into policy (2015). It is adopted in
response to the calcification of social class divisions and the narrowing upward
social mobility resulting from over four decades of reform. Equality in
entrepreneurship, together with equality in education and employment, is taken as
one of the key measures to improve social mobility in the official reports. Yet, the
concept of equality in entrepreneurship is based on the assumption that creativity is
egalitarian. Because everyone is creative, everyone can participate equally in the
market, as a ‘market player’. As such, systematic inequality once again becomes the
individual’s responsibility with the imperative to unleash creativity for income
generation.
Secondly, according to the official discourse, creativity is ‘engineered’ for job
creation, exposing the paradoxes of labour reform, especially from the 2000s
onwards. The official discourse promulgates mass entrepreneurship and innovation
as crucial measures to improve employment by directing individuals to unleash
creativity to create jobs of their own. On several occasions in 2019, Premier Li
highlighted the significance of stimulating creativity to maintain China’s economic
resilience in the domestic and global sphere (English.gov.cn, 2019a; Xinhua 2019b).
He spoke of the potential to transform hundreds of millions, the majority from rural
areas that were previously defined as ‘low-quality’, into ‘gold mines’ of wealth by
stimulating the creativity of the population (ibid). Thus, the endpoint of unleashing
the creativity of each and every individual is to promote entrepreneurship so as to
expand employment and revitalise China’s economy. Economic growth depends on
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each individual’s ability to economise their inner creative qualities. Everyone is
creative, therefore everyone can be a self-employed entrepreneur. In other words,
creativity with the ethos of self-entrepreneurship is designated to create jobs.

College graduates are listed as a key group that is engineered to be creatively selfemployed by starting-up their own businesses. The government openly encourages
college students to ‘improve their employment through mass entrepreneurship and
innovation’(chuangye daidong jiuye) (Xinhua, 2018a; english.gov.cn 2019b).
Employment for graduates is considered a top priority in the governmental agenda,
which, in the government’s view, concerns ‘China’s social stability’ (Xinhua,
2017b). Since the 2000s the number of college graduates has surged dramatically,
reaching over 8 million in 2018, as a consequence of the expansion of higher
education since 1999. Paradoxically, college graduates, as potential members of the
middle-class, have been reduced more and more to working conditions characterised
by flexibility, precariousness and insecurity, even though migrant workers have been
subject to such conditions of employment since the 1990s. After 2014 when China’s
economic growth began to slow down, the issue of college graduates’ unemployment
gained prominence. Situated in this context, mass entrepreneurship was promulgated
as a means to direct college graduates toward self-employed. For instance, the gov.cn
(2016) covered an interesting story, entitled ‘unemployed college graduate became a
bellwether of the mass entrepreneurial success with Premier’s encouragement’. It
reported that Premier Li encouraged Wang Lei, an unemployed college graduate
living in a low-rent public housing in Ningxia, an autonomous region in north-central
China, to start his own business in 2012. Four years later, when Li re-visited Wang,
Wang became an entrepreneur who started up his own monitor company in a centre
of mass entrepreneurship and innovation in Ningxia. The report set Wang as a
successful exemplar, propelling college graduates to shift their status of
unemployment to self-employment.

As such, the promotion of mass entrepreneurship further pushes individuals to be
self-reliant in the market of labour, in line with the labour reform that began in the
1990s. In the early 1990s, as the job assignment system was abolished, college
graduates had to rely on themselves to search for jobs in the labour market rather
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than ‘waiting for employment’, whereas they were propelled to become creative selfemployed ‘market players’ under the call for entrepreneurship in recent years. Selfemployment is not new. It first appeared in the early 1980s, when only the
underclasses who were not able to find jobs in the formal sector were forced into
self-employment. In this sense, the creative economy, underlined by the spirit of selfentrepreneurship, has taken off with the stimulus of the labour reforms beginning
from the 1990s.

Thirdly, the democratised understanding of creativity does not mean that creativity is
available to each individual; creativity needs to be cultivated through education
(Pang 2012). Education becomes the space where labour reform, with an ethos of
entrepreneurship and individualism, is focused. This is because, as McRobbie (2016)
argues, education is the site ‘where new subjectivities can be addressed by means of
a more strongly business-inflected curriculum’. In 2015, the State Council released a
document, entitled ‘the Opinions on the Implementation of Deepening Education
Reform on Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Higher Education’(guanyu shenhua
gaodeng xuexiao chuangxin chuangye jiaoyu gaige de shishi yijian), to further
promote graduate entrepreneurship in higher education. Since then, many colleges
have added new academic programs on innovation and entrepreneurship to their
curriculums and established new ‘Schools of Innovation and entrepreneurship’(SIEs)
(Wang, 2016). To encourage college students to start up their own business,
preferential policy treatments were offered, including tax reductions, financial
incentives, and a flexible education system allowing students to suspend their studies
to start up their own business (Zhao 2014; Lai, et al, 2015).
With intensified attention on human capital, the subject of ‘high quality talent’ (gao
suzhi rencai) is positioned more prominently in government reports and documents.
Various top-level policies, including the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), ‘the
Opinions on Promoting the Development and Integration of Cultural Creativity,
Design Services with Related Industries’(2014), ‘Made in China 2025’ (2015), ‘Mass
Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ (2014), and ‘Internet Plus’ (2015), stress the
importance of nurturing high-quality talents and skilled workers for national
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economic development. A paragraph from the governmental report in 2016 deserves
a long quote here. It reads that:
‘Ultimately, it is the people who are the inexhaustible source of
power that drives development. A workforce of over 900 million,
of whom over 100 million have received higher education or
are professionally trained: this is our greatest resource and
strength. Obviously, replacing old drivers of growth with new
ones and achieving a shift in development toward greater
reliance on human resources, human capital, and innovation is a
process of painful adjustment. But it is at the same time an
upgrading process with great promise. We just have to get through
this process, and we can, without question, reinvigorate the
economy and ensure its dynamic growth’ (Xinhua, 2016, emphasis
added).

Such a statement is in alignment with the discourse of suzhi, which has prevailed
since the early 1990s in China. As examined in section 2.1.2, suzhi is coded as a
form of embodied human capital inciting individuals to constantly invest in
education. The discourse of suzhi not only transforms human life into a new site of
capital accumulation, it also produces a subjective position in which the middle class,
characterized by education and consumer power, is the normative figure. As the
economic transformation and advancement become national policy beginning with
the 12th Five-Year Plan, the suzhi discourse is also intensified. The State Council in
the document ‘The Plan for Promoting Employment during the 13 Five-Year Plan
Period’(shishanwu qijian cujin jiuye guihua) issued in 2017 stated that ‘the structure
of workers’ suzhi ill-matches the demand of socio-economic development’, and
hence called for ‘improving workers’ suzhi to ‘achieve high-quality employment so
as to provide a strong support for building a xiaokang society’. According to the
Plan, the quality of employment will further improve when the number of highskilled workers reaches 55 million, occupying 32 percent of all skilled workers by
2020. The governmental reports and documents claim that millions of highly
educated labourers represent a ‘gold mine’ that is a tremendous source of wealth
generation for China’s market. In this way, high quality talent is viewed as the
vanguard of China’s advancement and transformation process, and the aspirational
subject for others to follow, which is accorded with a trajectory that can be dated
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back to the emerging discourse of the middle class in the 1990s detailed in section
2.1.1.

The actual effect of mass entrepreneurship and innovation on job creation is
questionable, since, according to the Xinhua News Agency, the success rate for
graduates in first-time start-ups was only 2.4 percent (He, 2017). However, the
government-led discourse of creativity produces a new dispositif, ‘where creativity is
designated by the current modes of biopolitical power, as the site for implementing
job creation and, more significantly labour reform’ (McRobbie, 2016: 38). This
dispositif, as McRobbie demonstrates (2016: 35), functions to supervise ‘novel forms
of job creation’ with the characteristics of precariousness, to coordinate with the
expansion of the middle classes, allowing an increasing number of students entering
higher education and the new middle class to ‘test out the new world of work’
without social security or welfare protections. Although McRobbie’s powerful
arguments pertain to the UK's trajectory, they offer insights into understanding
creativity in China’s context. In China, a similar trajectory can also be detected: the
state has retreated from its role as welfare provider and directed its project of
expanding the middle class through expanding higher education. Against this
background, creativity underlined by the ethos of self-entrepreneurship is deployed
as a force to re-make the expanding middle-class, mostly individuals born in the
1980s and 1990s, toward ‘a new world of work’ where nothing is secured. Moreover,
as McRobbie (2016) points out, the entrepreneurial spirit prevailed so the distinction
between work and life was blurred, producing new subjectivities. The educated
middle-class, as the normative figure, is propelled to market their creativity to be
compatible with the new labour regime.

To briefly conclude, creativity is fetishized in the creative economy as an
individualistic inner quality that can be cultivated through education and be marketed
through entrepreneurship. It engineers young middle class individuals who have
benefited from the higher education expansion that began in the late 1990s to
embrace jobs whose defining features are insecurity, precariousness and flexibility.
Such new forms of work, defined by an ethos of entrepreneurship in the CCI, are
euphemised as a means for everyone to achieve upward social mobility. In this way,
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they gloss over all of the social contradictions resulting from decades of reforms,
and, more importantly, the reduction of the state in providing necessary social
security and welfare protections. Creativity and innovation, to quote from McRobbie
(2016: 45), ‘compensate for and to an extent obscure the shrinking realm of
protections and entitlements’. The young, educated middle classes are pushed to use
their knowledge and skills to adopt temporary work. Thus, as McRobbie (ibid.)
claims, the middle class experiences an inflated status and deflated earning power
simultaneously.
Similar to the UK’s context in which the ‘dark side’ of labour is neglected in
governmental language (Neilsen and Rossiter, 2005; Banks and Hesmondhalgh,
2009; Comunian and Conor 2017), in China the working and labour conditions in
CCI are also omitted from official documents and annual reports, even though the
discourse of creativity is keen to embrace ‘a new world of work’. The Blue Books
and national bureau of statistics rarely provide data on working conditions with
employment and wage information by gender in CCI. My fieldwork in Shanghai
from a gender perspective provides an empirical examination of labour conditions in
the creative economy from a gender perspective.

2.3.

‘Make Work Visible’: An Ethnographic Study in Shanghai

This section uses the case of Shanghai to address the specific conditions of work in
CCI that policy-makers have reluctantly explored. The governmental policy
discourse glamorises creativity as a solution to all ills, and thus glosses over the
actual working practices of creative workers. This section will summarise some
crucial findings drawing from an empirical study of a group of young creative
workers in Shanghai to ‘make work visible in cultural policy’. Specifically, the
following section will centre on key features of young women’s working experience
in CCI in Shanghai.

2.3.1. Locating Creativity in Shanghai: The Charm of Work in CCI for Young
Educated Women
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To gain a deeper understanding of the labour aspect of creativity, I conducted 21 indepth interviews of around two hours. In total, 19 female and two male creative
workers were interviewed, the purpose of which was to analyze whether work lives
are experienced differently between different genders. In addition, I conducted a onemonth participant observation in a coworking-space called ‘naked hub’ in central
Shanghai, and arranged a salon in a co-working space in August 2018, which
attracted around 15 young women to share their work and lives in Shanghai. To build
a full picture of creative worker’s working practices and experiences, this research
began by asking questions about who creative workers are, what kinds of
backgrounds they come from, and what education they have received. To protect the
interviewee’s privacy, they remain anonymous.

The participants were from various occupations, including curator, UI/UX designers,
copywriters, product manager of a technology company, translator, freelancer, and
cultural entrepreneurs, and all were involved in work in the creative economy in
Shanghai for at least one year. The variety of occupational backgrounds to some
extent suggests that CCI has absorbed a whole diverse range of newcomers.
Interestingly, the great majority of the interviewees were not of Shanghai origin.
Only three interviewees were born and raised in Shanghai, and the rest were from
different places, including Liaoning(2), Taiwan (2), Zhejiang (2), Henan(1),
Tianjin(1), Anhui (2), Jiangsu(3), Guangxi (1), Chongqing(2), Canada (1, origin in
Jiangsu), and Fujian (2).
Demographically, the respondents primarily belong to the birth cohort of the ‘post90s’ generation.61 The interviewees were aged from their mid-twenties to early
thirties, with most falling between their mid to late twenties. Except for three
respondents who were born in the mid-1980s, the great majority were born in 1989
(6 people) and the early 1990s (12 people). They were mostly the only children and
were born at a time when the opening and reform policy had been in place for over a
decade. The post-90s generation benefited from the higher education expansion that
began in the late 1990s, and witnessed a surging number of Chinese students

61

Considering that 6 interviewees born in 1989 shared a similar background with those who were
born in the early 1990s, I arrange them in the category of post-90s generation.
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studying abroad (liuxue chao). It is this generation that begins working in the era of
the post-2000s that becomes the first workforce of the creative economy.

In line with existing studies of creative workers (e.g. Gill 2002), the 21 respondents
had astonishingly high educational qualifications: all of them have a university
degree, with nearly 50 percent holding a postgraduate degree. They have degrees
from the humanities and social sciences, including media and communications,
language studies (like Chinese, English, and Italian), literature, art and design,
finance, and sociology, with the exception of two who hold degrees in engineering.
Among those who held a postgraduate degree, all but one obtained their degrees
from abroad, such as the UK, Hong Kong, Italy, France, and Singapore. With the
exception of one who was sponsored by public funding, all funded their studies
abroad by themselves, which suggests that they came from relatively prosperous
middle-class families.

For those who had no postgraduate degree, almost all expressed their intentions to
pursue a higher degree abroad. Three planned to pursue a degree from abroad but
had to save some money as their families could not afford the high tuition. When I
finished my fieldwork in Shanghai in August 2018, two had already begun preparing
materials to apply for postgraduate study in the UK and US, respectively. Over the
course of my fieldwork, it happened quite often that my interviewees approached me
with questions about the experience and requirements of studying outside China,
which probably is because I was viewed as a member of their cohort, being in my
twenties and possessing similar cultural capital.

Although qualifications in megacities like Shanghai have become extremely
demanding since the initiation of the ‘point-based household registration system’
(jifen luohu zhi), it is much easier for non-local interviewees who have a degree
abroad to obtain Shanghai hukou. While the household registration system is
notoriously known for its exclusion of migrant workers from becoming urban
citizens, the point-based household registration system issued in 2014 actually
intensifies such exclusions, making it increasingly difficult for the lower-middleclass to gain hukou in a metropolis such as Beijing or Shanghai. There is a sharp
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difference between those who have a degree abroad and those who do not in terms of
chances of obtaining a Shanghai hukou.

2.3.2. Key findings: Features of Work in CCI
The following pages will offer a broad summary of some of the central findings. The
data collected from Shanghai resonate strongly with many existing accounts, in
particular, those that highlight characteristics and features of working practices in
CCI; however, the features of creative work are in line with the changes brought by
the labour reforms that began in the 1990s.

Precariousness is one prominent feature of creative work, which is most evident in
the widely seen ‘tiaocao’ (job-hopping) among the participants of this research. My
fieldwork shows that the majority of creative workers constantly changed jobs, and
only rarely stayed in the same job for over two years. Among 21 interviewees, only
three ever stayed in the same company for over 3 years, and interestingly they were
all born in the 1980s, including a 37-year old curator named CY who has two small
children, a 35-year old cultural entrepreneur CM who started up her own co-working
space, and a freelancer QYL born in the late 1980s who worked in HR for almost a
decade before beginning freelancing.

For workers in CCI, three years of employment in the same company is a long time
frame. PYL, a UX (user experience) designer from Chongqing who had just quit his
last job when I met him in March 2018, was looking for a new job. I asked him how
long he had stayed in his last job, and he replied ‘oh, it was pretty long. I stayed
there for around 3 years’. I was surprised, asking ‘Three years is long enough
already?’. He said, ‘Yeah, before I left, I was the most senior worker in the design
department. Normally, my colleagues and friends changed their jobs on a yearly
basis.’ The most extreme example that I met was MXF. MXF obtained her bachelor
of media and communication from a well-known university in Shanghai, and after a
gap year, she went to Hong Kong to pursue a postgraduate degree. Before she found
her current job in an advertising boutique in 2017, she had switched three jobs in just
one year. Over the period between April and July 2018 when I left Shanghai and
returned, four of my interviewees had switched jobs.
128

Workers in CCI exemplify the current trend of increasing precariousness that many
youths have experienced, especially among the post-90s urban Chinese. Since 2010,
‘job-hopping’ has become a buzzword for young college graduates, and has been
widely reported in the press. For instance, a report on the employment of college
graduates conducted by MyCOS (2010), a higher education consulting and
management agency, showed that college graduates from the classes of 2006
generally changed their job within the first three years of their career. The report was
widely cited in China’s press in 2010. Prominent news agencies, including Xinhua
news agency and People’s Daily, used the term ‘the three-year itch’ to describe this
phenomenon (see e.g. People’s Daily Online, 2010; Hu, 2010). Four years later, it
seems that the ‘three-year itch’ became the ‘two-year itch’. In 2014, MyCOS’s study
revealed that less than 40 percent of post-1990ers who graduated in 2011 stayed in
their jobs for longer than two years (Pei, 2016).
The post-1990s generation is called the ‘job-hopping’ generation by the popular
media (Xu, 2018). According to China Daily (ibid.), the post-1990ers generally
spend less than a year in their first jobs, in sharp contrast with those born in the
1970s who spent more than four years in their first job and those born in the post1980s who spent about three and a half years in their first job. To quote from Xinhua
(2017a), job-hopping has become the ‘new normal’ for the young generation in
China.

Flexibility is another key feature of work in CCI. It was very common that the
interviewees of this research had ‘bulimic careers’, which refers to intensively busy
working schedules for certain periods (Pratt, 2000; Gill, 2002), and the need to
organise their work across workspace/home and working/non-working time. As work
in CCI is often project-based with tight deadlines, it was almost the norm that
workers had to work for extremely long hours for short periods, widely adopting the
‘996’ work schedule – working from 9 am to 9 pm six days per week, as a normative
work schedule. For example, Yali, a graduate in UI design who obtained her master’s
degree in the UK in 2016, and was employed in a local advertising company at the

129

time of interview in August 2018, could not even squeeze in two hours to have an
interview with me. She texted me complaining that:
‘Sorry I’m not sure if I have two hours next week. I may have to
work for even longer hours next week. I have already worked
overtime for three weekends in a row, and still need to work this
Sunday, but I’ll update you next Tuesday to see if I still have to
take an additional shift ( jiaban). I can’t estimate my workloads
beforehand because my daily workloads depend on my team
leader. I have been working to death recently[jiaban dao
shengwukelian]. Next week is the final week of my current project.
The deadline pushes me over the edge of dying’ (Yali, August 5,
2018).
What’s worse, often, they do not work on only one project at a time. DYY, a product
manager, sometimes had to deal with over a dozen projects at the same time.
However, when there is no project, they suddenly have no work at all. Such a
flexible working pattern was the norm for the interviewees of this research, which
echoes many existing accounts.

Strikingly, flexibility is not only driven by the needs of capitalist accumulation, but
also by the workers themselves, particularly the women. Work in CCI is particularly
attractive for young women who want to escape standard and fixed work patterns in
search of ‘cool’ and ‘pleasurable’ jobs. The female interviewees were mostly from
small cities and towns, and could easily find stable jobs within the system (tizhi nei)
and live comfortable lives in their hometown, where their parents were workers
within the system and had strong local guanxi (network). Their parents also wanted
them to find jobs within the system, such as working as civil servants, teachers, or
workers in local SOEs, which often means stable, secured, and almost life-long
employment. However, young women were not looking for stability at work. In their
eyes, jobs ‘within the system’ are boring and meaningless. They were searching for
working lives that were more fun and meaningful. Consider GXJ, for example, a 34year-old who has a graduate degree in book publishing from China and an MBA
from France. She resigned from a civil service job in the Fujian province after a year,
and went to Shanghai to pursue her career as a screenwriter. GXJ explained her
motivation for giving up the secure and well-paid civil service job that her mother
introduced to her via personal guanxi:
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‘Working in tizhi nei [within the system] was so boring and
meaningless. I went to work at a fixed time, sat at a fixed desk,
literally doing nothing. I’m not exaggerating, but basically, my
everyday job was reading the newspapers and drinking tea. After a
year, I felt like I had become a zombie. I also hated the
environment there. In danwei, the hierarchy was very obvious and
heavy. It’s all about guanxi, and you need to have good guanxi
with your superiors. I hate that. I don’t want to live my life like
that. I’m young, I wanted to find other possibilities’ (GXJ, August
27, 2018).
After resigning the job within the system, GXJ first travelled to Beijing, and then
decided to settle down in Shanghai from 2016 onward. She was employed as a
copywriter in a small-size entertaining firm with only two employees at the time of
the interview. The pay was not sufficient and the working hours were non-standard,
flexible and often long. Nevertheless, GXJ felt that at least she was accumulating
experience and hoped one day she could find a job related to screenwriting.
GXJ was not the only one who rejected the standard and fixed working pattern in
danwei in favor of flexible creative work. DYY, a 26-year-old graduate with a
master’s degree in media and communications from the UK, also resigned from a
secure university job in Chongqing, which her parents had tried very hard to arrange
for her via guanxi, and moved to Shanghai in 2017. After two short internships in
advertising companies, she found a job as a product manager in a well-known video
sharing company in Shanghai where she was working at the time of the interview.
Savina, a 29-year-old who had a postgraduate degree from Italy, gave up the secure
future that her parents had offered within the system in Fujian, and sought more
flexible and cool work in Shanghai. Thus, creative work became a livelihood that
was available or even designated for youth who dream of a lively lifestyle in a
metropolis such as Shanghai.
Flexibility is specifically attractive to married women and working mothers. For
them, a flexible position was a must so that they could work at home. Interestingly,
young women hailed flexibility as a desirable solution to the problem of work-life
balance. In a discussion on the issue work-life balance for women that I attended in
Shanghai in 2018, the participants, overwhelming young, educated professional
women, complained about discrimination against them in the workplace based on the
gendered assumption that women are natural child-bearers and childcare providers,
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and considered flexibility a desirable solution that gave women freedom and
autonomy to balance their work and family lives.

Therefore, as Hardt and Negri (2000), Lorey (2006), and de Peuter (2011) all point
out, flexibilization that is driven from below is actually constructed as emblematic of
self-determination and rejection of the standard work pattern. Young women often
search for greater autonomy and freedom at work, especially of work hours and types
of work. Creative work characterised by flexibility seems to have become an ideal
choice for women in particular. However, contradictorily, as Terranova (2006: 33)
argues, ‘autonomous workers can always turn into precarious workers’. Many young
women working in the creative economy are trapped into the gamble of ‘trial and
errors’. Consider the examples of GXJ, DYY and Savina who rejected the ‘boring’
and standard work routine to embrace the brave new world of creative work as a sign
of self-determination and self-actualisation; while it was precisely the flexible feature
of creative work that directed them to accept the ‘bulimic careers’ that prevail in the
creative economy. As such, job-hopping becomes a way of escaping and resisting the
flexibility and precariousness of work.

The third feature is the prevalence of self-entrepreneurship among the interviewees.
It is interesting that the young women showed a great propensity toward
entrepreneurship, converting their potential and creativity into capital as much as
possible. Indeed, the interviewees of this study repeatedly mention the term
‘chuangye’(entrepreneurship), and the majority are thinking of starting up their own
business, indicating that the governmental promulgation of ‘mass entrepreneurship
and innovation’ since 2014 has become part of the everyday vocabulary. It is not rare
for young women to choose to be cultural entrepreneurs. Consider CM, who
graduated from a prominent university in Shanghai and went on to postgraduate
study in Engineering in Italy, started up a co-working space in a creative hub in 2016
with the financial support of her family. Consider AY, a 26-year old graduate in
Engineering who migrated to Canada around a decade ago. She started a film and
photography studio with two partners of similar age who hold art degrees from the
UK.
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One prominent example of self-entrepreneurship was the widespread second-jobbing
or even multi-jobbing amongst creative workers, which strongly echoes many studies
(e.g. Gill, 2014a and 2014b; Banks and Hesmondhalgh, 2009; McRobbie, 2016).
More than 50 per cent of the interviewees had informal jobs in addition to their
formal contracted job. These informal incomes came from various means.
Interviewees who had higher professional skills, such as UX/UI designers, usually
converted their professional knowledge and skills for more than one employer. That
is, in addition to their contracted job, they used their spare time to work on shortterm projects that were typically procured through their networks, such as friends
and former colleagues. Informal labour is certainly not new and has existed since the
labour reform of the 1990s researched by Tomba (2002).

Strikingly, interviewees also created informal second or more jobs by themselves by
capitalizing on their own skills. including managing yoga houses, e-commerce stores
via WeChat or Taobao, managing one’s own subscription account to attract tipping,
house renting, photography and so on. For example, ZRC, a 26-year old graduate in
art, was a full-time designer in a real estate company, and at the same time owned an
e-store vending rice dumplings made by her mother who had just retired through
WeChat. To better promote the store and maintain better relationships with
customers she also organised a WeChat group, in which she had to do endless
administrative work, such as communicating with her customers, answering
enquiries, and updating the photos of new products available at the store. Another
example is 27-year old PYL, one of the two male interviewees who got his
bachelor’s in industrial design from a university in the Anhui province and moved to
Shanghai around five years ago. He was not satisfied with his salary, which he
claimed was far from enough to buy a small flat and establish a family in Shanghai
(although his salary was actually higher than many creative workers that I
interviewed), thus he was exploring different ways to capitalise his skills to increase
his income. One avenue that he had been pursuing for a year at the time of the
interview was to monetise his self-taught photography skills. He ran a WeChat
subscription account, specifically branding and promoting his photography business.
Regarding the reason why he was trying to capitalise on his leisure hobby, he
explained that,
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‘At the beginning, learning photography for me was just a hobby. I
think it helps to improve my sense of aesthetics so as to upgrade
my skills making me a more competitive designer. It’s beneficial to
my career. But learning photography is very expensive, especially
regarding spending on cameras and lenses. I have invested a lot in
developing this hobby, so why not get some return from it?’ (PYL,
March 14, 2018)

That is, PYL turned himself into a form of capital. All hobbies and skills that he
developed in his leisure time became potential sources of income. Such patter was
widely observed among creative workers. For instance, GXJ, a screenwriter, was
selling hand-made perfume that she had learned to make in France; ZY, a 28-yearold UI designer who was married, sold hand-made crafts and baked goods in her free
time. Considering the examples of GXJ, ZY and PYL, beyond the demands of their
formal contract jobs, they were ‘voluntarily’ devoted to productive activities from
home in their free time. One crucial reason for widespread self-entrepreneurship is
that it is getting increasingly difficult for young middle-class individuals, particularly
from the lower-middle-class, to make a living and stay in Shanghai. Beyond
extremely high costs of living, the point-based household registry system issued in
big cities makes it increasingly demanding to obtain Shanghai citizenship. For
instance, housing, one of the highest expenses, on average costs a quarter of one’s
salary per month. As a consequence, the prevailing entrepreneurship blurs the
distinctions between work and life. In other words, creative workers not only
produce during working hours but also during their free time. The workplace
becomes space like the home, and home becomes a place of production.

The blurring of life and work were most apparent in the cases of cultural
entrepreneurs, taking CM’s story as an example. With the government’s strong
advocacy for ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’ and employment expansion
beginning in 2014, new spaces designed for creative workers, entrepreneurs and
micro-enterprises have sprung up in urban China. The emergence of co-working
spaces was one manifestation of the current cultural and socio-economic
transformation. The co-working space, which first appeared in San Francisco in
2005, designated a change in the labour market based on the values of community,
collaboration, sharing, opening, and accessibility (Gandini, 2015; Ivaldi et al., 2018).
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In China, the first co-working space emerged in Shanghai in 2013, named xinchejian.
Since then, the coworking market has dramatically expanded, with both local and
global brands flooding China, including WeWork, Nakedhub, UrWork, SOHO 3Q
and so forth. In Shanghai and Beijing alone there were over 500 coworking spaces in
2017 (Erdenebileg, 2017).

Against this global and local background, as well as personal working patterns, CM
decided to found a co-working space called MoreSpace in a cultural and creative
cluster in the Huhui district in Shanghai in 2016. Unlike many co-working spaces
that were established by big enterprises with a large amount of capital, CM was on
her own, or in her words, ‘I’m a getihu’. Specifically, she got financial support from
her affluent family, and built the space from nothing into a co-working space. But
similar to other co-working spaces, CM divided MoreSpace into two different zones:
the first storey offered around a dozen segregated small working rooms, two-thirds
of which were rented, and the second storey was a shared open space with a terrace,
available for workers and also for salon and event organising.
As a ‘getihu’, CM had to rely on herself to develop knowledge and skills through
continued trial and error over the course of a two-year chuangye. Interestingly,
although she considered commercial and management skills to be necessary, she
heavily and repeatedly stressed the importance of learning the ‘liberal arts’ (the term
was used by CM) to help her explore feasible business modes. From CM’s
perspective, ‘Liberal art’, at a personal level, was something CM felt was lacking in
the education that she received in China; from a business perspective, it provided
content that could be commercialised. Specifically, how to make the best usage of
the shared open space on the second-storey was one of the biggest problems that she
encountered. The locale was spatial and charged high rent, but lacked enough
human flow, which translated to potential customers. It could barely make ends meet
by depending on occasional sublets to small or micro-enterprises for a few hours.
Therefore, CM tried to shift her business model through organising cultural and artrelated activities and events, to attract newcomers and to make a profit at the same
time. In a word, she tried to capitalize on culture and art. To this end, she organised
various related activities like, music live shows, language learning groups, film
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screenings, cultural salons, print design workshops, second-hand goods exchanges,
study room, and so forth. Targeting creative workers like designers, she also
redecorated the second-storey, transforming it into a more café-like space that was
filled with books of design, art, film, and independent publishing. However, all these
attempts failed. After so much trial and error, she finally could not afford the risk and
costs, and decided to close MoreSpace in November 2018.

The knowledge and skills that CM obtained were not only self-taught, but also first
and foremost relied on her lived experience, which further made life and work
indistinguishable. According to Andre Gorz (2010: 5), there are two forms of
knowledge: one is formal knowledge (connaisance), which ‘bears on formalised
objectivised content which cannot belong to persons’, and the other is experimental
knowledge(savoir), which, in his words,
‘is made up of experiences and practices that have become intuitive
‘facts’ and habits, and intelligence covers the whole range of
capacities that range from judgement and discernment to openness
of mind and the aptitude to assimilate new formal knowledge and
to combine that formal knowledge with experiential knowledge’
(Gorz, 2010:5).

Gorz argues that it is the experimental and vernacular knowledge that post-Fordist
immaterial work sets to absorb and exploit. This form of knowledge, as a part of the
culture of everyday life, cannot be taught, but is acquired in one’s lived experience,
in the activities outside work, such as gaming, shopping, campaigns, arguments,
musical and theatrical activities, etc (2010: 11). Gorz’s arguments strongly echo
CM’s work practices. She acquired knowledge in the terms of business and liberal
arts mainly by communicating with various professionals from related fields, through
collaborations, attending different workshops in Shanghai, and joining art and
design-related exhibitions in Europe. Moreover, it was CM herself that absorbed all
the costs to acquire this knowledge and skills. When she was at Morespace, she
worked; when she had spare time, she participated in short-term workshops on
design, and even went to Europe to attend exhibitions, in order to get inspiration to
develop her business. Therefore, her whole self and life became a potential project to
be capitalised on. Her work practices were barely separate from her life, since the
knowledge and skills of the work were inseparable from her lived experience.
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However, putting her life into her work made it difficult for CM to maintain her
family life. She devoted her whole life to work at the cost of divorce. When asked
how she balanced life and work in the first interview on July 26 2018, she answered
that,
‘For me, work is life, life is work. There is no distinction between
the two. Home for me is just a place to sleep. I’m always here in
MoreSpace, with few rare exceptions. I even rent a flat near
Morespace to reduce commuting time and spend more time here,
even though I have my own house in Shanghai. My husband could
not stand it, and argued with me often…he thought I spent too
much time at work, and not enough time at home. He wanted me to
be a housewife. But for me, work is important. To be independent,
I need to work. We tried to fix our marriage through many
approaches, but we just couldn’t work it out. So we divorced in
2017, a year after I began starting up this space’ (CM, July 26,
2018).
The fourth feature is the individualisation of work in the creative economy. Most
creative workers that participated in this study learned skills by themselves. Taking
UI/UX designers as an example, many of them actually had no professional
background, and most were self-taught with the help of friends and the Internet. For
instance, ZY, who majored in finance, learned about design and software from her
ex-boyfriend in her leisure time; ZRC, a graduate in art, was self-taught through the
Internet; QYL and Jamie, both of whom obtained their degrees in industrial design,
were taught by friends and colleagues. Similar to CM, it is important to point out that
the majority of creative workers stressed the centrality of lived experience, or
vernacular knowledge, in their productive work. Freelancers, such as ZRS, a 28-year
old graduate in English, accumulated writing material through arguing, watching
films and news, performing theatre, communicating with a range of people, etc;
designers got inspiration for their work through collaborating with others and
scanning social media like Instagram, douban and so on.

Moreover, skill-upgrading was perceived to be an individual issue that creative
workers themselves were responsible for. While it is a necessity for creative workers
to continuously update their knowledge and skills, it is the workers themselves that
have to invest in the skill upgrading process. All are personal, and only companies
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would invest to improve workers’ human capital. The individualisation of work was
prominent in CM’s case. With only one short-term intern, CM managed almost
everything by herself. She coped with most immaterial matters, like communicating,
to most material daily trivia. Over the first interview in the second storey of her coworking space, she had to stop multiple times to deal with various issues: opening
the door for new visitors, making coffee for a loyal customer, introducing the space
to visitors who wanted to rent, and dealing with a lighting problem. In her words,
‘I change light bulbs, design and decorate the space, promote the
space through WeChat, organise screening and events to attract
visitors and newcomers, maintain guanxi with my customers and
other entrepreneurs, and decide the business model of the space’
(CM, July 26, 2018).

2.3.3. Blurring Life and Work: The Paradox of Work for Young Middle-Class
Women
Thus far, based on an empirical study in Shanghai, several crucial features of
creative work have been listed, including precariousness, flexibility, project-based,
self-entrepreneurship, and individualisation. It examines the working practices and
conditions that are invisible in the cultural policy discourse, and argues that young,
middle-class women are the experiments of the new labour reform that are disposed
to work without the protection of social welfare. In this section, I will explore the
paradox of creative work for young women living in metropolitan Shanghai.

The most prominent paradox is the blurring of boundaries between life and work. It
is prominent that young, educated urban middle-class women of this study prioritise
work over family life, which strongly resonates with McRobbie’s argument that
young women no longer commit their lives to marriage but to work (2016). As Lisa
Adkins (2012; 2018) clearly demonstrates, the post-Fordist regime functions through
its inclusion of women into waged labour, rather than exclusion. While the
traditional workplace where working hours and place are often fixed is more likely to
disadvantage women as they are considered less productive based on the gendered
assumption that women are natural wives and mothers, creative work, with its
characteristics and features of flexibility, informality, and need for communication
skills, actually attracts and favors young, educated women. The fieldwork in
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Shanghai shows that many young women refused fixed work patterns within the
system, where their parents were usually working, and ‘voluntarily’ embraced
flexible, informal, and entrepreneurial creative work. It is not uncommon that young
women choose to defer marriage and childbearing in order to pursue their careers.
For instance, designer ZY and freelancer WP both of whom had been married for
over 3 years, were hesitant to have children, worrying that it would impact their
careers, although their parents and husbands continuously pushed them. For Jackie, a
single translator in her late twenties who has witnessed the discrimination against
married women in the workplace, considered marriage deferment an important
strategy to avoid such discrimination.

Paradoxically, on the one hand, choosing flexible and precarious work patterns is
perceived as an act of self-determination and self-actualisation; on the other hand, it
is done at the cost of individualising all risks. As Lorey (2015) argues, ‘the paradox
at the heart of this process is that the subject is promised freedom (self-actualisation)
while also being subjugated to the normalisation and privatisation of risk and
uncertainty’. Many young women had emotional and physical pains from work in
their lives. The long working hours and sedentary lifestyle caused different levels of
bodily problems, such as neck and shoulder pain, slipped discs, eating disorders,
diabetes, and obesity. Consider MXF, who was in her early thirties and holds a
postgraduate degree from HK, as an example. Working as a creative director in an
advertising boutique, she was always travelling for business as she needed to be
directly involved in creative content production, supervise the shooting process, and
facilitate communications between customers and directors. According to her, she
was always flying to different places, and could only stay in Shanghai for around 15
days per month on average. Moreover, she had to work overnight frequently, and
sometimes she worked for 20 hours in a row as the shooting schedule was unstable.
She has been working like this for 2 years now. Last year, her menstrual periods
stopped for two months.

In addition to physical pain, they also experienced emotional pains, such as anxiety
and depression. Consider CM, who prioritised her work over her marriage, and still
could not recover from her divorce. For another example, Savina, a 29-year-old
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graduate in Italian who resigned from a creative job in a state-own company and was
employed in a small publishing house, said she cried every night for a whole month
after moving to her new job in May 2018. She worked as a copywriter, whose major
task was to write two or three articles to combine mothering knowledge with
advertising promotions. She had never done something like this and felt the extreme
pressure of beginning from ground zero. She said she was in a deep depression.
Savina’s story will be detailed in section 3.2.2 of chapter 3.

However, all pains and risks are privatised as an individual issue. Reproductive life
is highly individualised and commercialised. It was astonishing to find that the
reproductive life or ‘intimate life’ of young women is largely outsourced to the
market (Hochschild, 2012). Given the fact that women are subjects of imperative
wage labour and that their social protections have been gradually removed, the
reproductive domain has been transformed into ‘a site of entrepreneurial creativity
and inventiveness’ (Adkins, 2018; Taylor, 2016). Take eating as an example.
Because of the long working hours and commuting times, most young women did
not even have time to cook. Hence, it is quite common that young working women
order take-out online almost five days per week, sometimes even seven days per
week. Moreover, one’s mental and bodily problems are also viewed individually and
evaluated under the rationality of the market. Specifically, a response to work-related
body pains and disease is to go to a gym and hire a personal trainer. A response to
mental and emotional issues is to visit a psychologist. Everyone is responsible for
solving her own problems according to her consumer capacity. In other words, since
take-out, gyms, personal training, and consultations are costly, the market can only
solve your problems if you can afford the solutions. Therefore, recourse to the
market to solve the contradictions of production and reproduction intensifies the
exclusions based on those who have sufficient means and those who do not.

In this politics of the expansion of market rationality and the inclusion of women at
the centre of imperative wage labour (Adkin, 2018), young, middle-class women are
becoming increasingly vulnerable in order to make a living in global cities like
Shanghai and Beijing. While living costs, especially housing, in the metropolis are
increasingly expensive, only global cities provide diverse work opportunities that
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include creative work. Besides, the contradiction of increasing investment in human
capital and worsening working conditions detailed in section 2.1.3 of this chapter, is
more acute for the young, middle class. The young women of this study were welleducated, with 50 percent of them holding degrees from abroad, but they were barely
compensated for their educational investments as creative work is often low-paid and
unstable. For young middle-class women, it is not the struggle for survival that
working-class women have long been exposed to, but the struggle to reproduce a
family in Shanghai, the notion of which is often associated with owning housing.
‘Should I stay or should I go’ now becomes a question for many young, middle-class
women, since the megacities introduced the credit-based household registration
system in 2014, which makes it increasingly difficult to obtain hukou in a metropolis
in China. As the metropolis in China have begun the notorious evictions of the socalled ‘low-end population’(diduan renkou), the middle classes have to struggle to
upgrade their skills in order to meet the standards and maintain their status.
However, although the middle class is staged as an aspirational subject, the inflation
of middle-class status has been accompanied by the deflation of earning power,
making it difficult for young, middle class individuals to survive in global cities.

Thus far, this chapter has argued that the discourse of creativity directs young,
middle-class women to adopt a flexible, individualistic, and precarious pattern of
work and life in urban China. In order to make a living in the metropolis, young
women have to put their whole lives into their work, and constantly fashion
themselves and manage their human capital to increase their employability. As such,
the boundaries between home/work and production/reproduction are blurred. When
the boundaries between life and work are dissolved, what kind of labouring subject
takes shape? Chapter 3 will examine the subject formation of young, middle-class
women in urban China, by exploring the interrelations between representation
practices in the dominant culture and the lived experience of young, middle-class
women. While this chapter has summarized key features of working conditions in
CCI, it is equally important to understand how young women view their working
lives. Hence, chapter 3 will pay particular attention to young women’s own voices
and examine their negotiations and resistance to the excessive articulation of work in
their daily life by focusing on two cases.
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3. Life-making in Shanghai: Representation and Subject
Formation of Young, Middle-Class Women
Through analysis of official statements and key research findings summarized from
the ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai, chapter 2 argued that the creativity dispositif
in China’s context sustains a labour regime that directs the young, educated middle
classes to embrace a new pattern of work with limited or no protections. The project
of economic development and transformation through the strategies of creativity and
innovation has continued to place the middle classes – featuring those with high
educational certificates, and economic capacity for consumption – in a hegemonic
position for the past two decades, since the young, educated college graduates are
considered an ideal labour force for driving the new knowledge-based economy.
Chapter 2 asserted that creativity embedded with the ethos of entrepreneurship has
been legitimated in China’s cultural policy since the 2000s, and is romanticized as an
attribute that every educated youth can access to achieve upward social mobility. The
creativity dispositif that incites young, educated youth to embrace the spirit of
entrepreneurship to create jobs of their own, and to adopt a flexible, informal and
precarious pattern of work. Young women, who have been historically expected to
adopt such working patterns as detailed in chapter one, are now the exemplary labour
force of the creative economy. The nature of this work resonates with the question
of Chinese neoliberalism.62

Based on the ethnographic fieldwork of a group of young, educated middle-class
women in Shanghai, chapter 2 summarized several key characteristics of work in
CCI, including the blurred boundaries between work and life, informality,
precariousness, flexibility, and the prevalence of self-entrepreneurship. Hence, the
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fieldwork shows that flexible, informal and precarious patterns of work, which were
previously marginalized in the labour market, and have been historically dominant
among female workers as detailed in chapter 1, are becoming the new paradigm for
young, educated middle-class women in contemporary urban China. Despite the
inflation of middle-class status in the official ideology, the fieldwork reveals that the
call for creativity with the spirit of self-entrepreneurship transfers uncertainty and
risk from employers and states to employees and households. Many young, educated
women have actually experienced the deflation of economic power in the
increasingly flexible, informal and precarious labour market, especially since the
2000s. More significantly, from the fieldwork it is clear that work in the creative
economy attempts to economize every aspect of human life. Specifically, it tries to
extract value from the reproductive domain, such as individuals’ lived experience
and affects which historically have been viewed as unproductive elements of
women’s natural femininity, converted into the market economy. In this climate
young, female workers must invest their whole lives in their work to be viewed as
valuable economic subjects.

Regarding the increasingly blurring boundaries between life and work, the present
chapter further asks: if young, educated middle-class women must dedicate their
whole lives to their work, what kinds of labour subjectivity are produced under
present conditions? This chapter will be divided into two sections to explore the
production of gendered labour subjectivity. The first section will use the analytical
tool of representation to explore the changing role of young, educated middle-class
women in the home and at work in the dominant culture. Representation is crucial in
understanding the subject-positions produced in the hegemonic culture, as it relates
culture to subjectivity and lived experiences of selfhood (Gill, 2008). Three texts
were chosen to explore the interrelations between changing representations in visual
culture and changing subjectivity(-ies) of young middle-class women. Meanwhile, it
is equally important to listen to the voices of young, urban middle-class women with
respect to their position. Therefore, section 3.2 is based on empirical research in
Shanghai to explore the following questions: how and why are young, educated
middle-class women attached to the excessive logic of work? How do they endure if
their lives are consumed by their work? And how do they negotiate or resist in their
daily lives? The second section will first summarize key findings from a salon
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organized by the researcher, in which young, middle-class women shared their
perceptions of the popular representations of them, and gave their own accounts of
perceptions of their work and life experiences; and then, it will zoom in on two cases
to detail young, middle-class women’s love, pains, negotiations and resistance to the
excessive attachment of work in their lived experience.

3.1.

Representing Young, Middle-Class Women in Urban Shanghai

Representation occupies a central place in cultural studies. In his seminal article ‘the
Work of Representation’, Stuart Hall (1997: 16) maintains that representation, which
‘is the production of meaning through language’, connects meaning and language to
culture. The constructionist approach – with the reflective approach and the
intentional approach – has had the most important impact on cultural studies. Hall
focuses on two modes of the constructionist approach: one is a semiotic analysis
associated with Saussure, and the other is a discursive analysis influenced by
Foucault. According to Saussure, meaning is produced in and through language, and
language is understood as a system of signs. Roland Barthes (1972) developed
Saussure’s analysis from the linguistic dimension to the cultural dimension. That is,
to read popular culture as a sort of language in relation to a wider realm of social
ideology. The semiotic approach offers a method for analysing how visual
representations, such as photography, advertising, film, fashion and so forth, convey
meaning. The discursive analysis contributes to shifting the attention from language,
which is applied in a closed and static system by the semiotic approach, and brings
the process of representation to the broader issues of knowledge and power. Foucault
studied discourse as a system of representation. Discourse, according to Foucault,
referred to ‘the production of knowledge through language’ (p.44).

In his later works, Foucault began placing the question of the subject in the centre of
representation. According to Foucault (1982: 212), the word subject has two layers
of meaning: ‘subject to someone else’s control, and tied to his (sic) own identity by
conscience and self-knowledge’. ‘Both meanings suggest a form of power which
subjugates and makes subject to (ibid.).’ What is the subject of and in representation?
Foucault argued that all discourses construct a subject-position. The discourse
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produces the subject, while at the same time producing a place for the subject.
Hence, representation as a signifying practice produces subject-positions that allow
individuals to identify themselves, to become the subject of and to be subjected to its
knowledge/power (ibid: 56).
The following section chooses three texts: the movie Fashionable Red Dress on the
Street (1984), the fashion magazine Elle (1988-1999), and a web drama Women in
Shanghai (2018) – to examine the subject position of young educated middle-class
women in the hegemonic cultural representation. There are several reasons for
choosing the above texts: firstly, the subject of all three are young women situated in
Shanghai, which is the field site of the current research. Secondly, the three different
types of content capture the cultural transformations of three time periods. The 1980s
witnessed the flourishing of the film industry and the return of the Fourth Generation
of filmmakers in China. The Fourth Generation, who were trained in film schools
before or during the cultural revolution, and began their independent directing from
1979 onward, focused mainly on telling the stories of disastrous experiences in
Chinese history, stressing an idealistic view of human nature (Dai, 2006; Yau,
1997).63 The key theme of the Fourth Generation is to criticize the socialist past and
to help legitimize the new policies of ‘reform and opening-up’. In line with this
theme, Fashionable Red Dress (1984) depicts the transitional moment by focusing
on the transformation of young factory women in urban China, and thus it is an ideal
text to examine the changing positioning of young women. In the 1990s, the
development of fashion magazines in China coincided with China’s marketisation
process. Although Elle could only be consumed by a small number of people in the
cities, it prescribed the rules of white-collar beauty, and accompanied the emergence
of middle-class women in China along with an expanding consumerism and the
middle class discourse of the 1990s. As such, an analysis of Elle is helpful in
understanding the emergence of the new middle-class identity in China. The last text
examined is a web drama Women in Shanghai (2018), which was produced with the
boom of Chinese web series since 2014. Web series, whose episodes tend to be short,
have enjoyed great popularity among the young audience. Besides, the paragon of
Women in Shanghai, who is a young female college graduate working and living in
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the creative economy in Shanghai, shares many similarities with the interviewees of
the research. Lastly, an examination of changing representations of young middleclass women from the early stage of the reform era to the present in three different
texts shows the continuities and discontinuities of the positioning of young, middleclass women in urban China. Specifically, an analysis of the three texts will
demonstrate how young, middle-class women in urban localities have gradually
become the normative subject in the hegemonic cultural representation in China
since the 1980s, and examine the kinds of subjectivities that have been constructed
and how they impact the current subject formation.

3.1.1. Fashionable Red Dress on the Street (jieshang liuxing hongqunzi) (1984)
The movie Fashionable Red Dress on the Street (jieshang liuxing hongqunzi, dir. Qi
Xingjia) was adapted from the homonymous play and released in 1984. The movie
was shot in Shanghai against the specific historical context of the 1980s, as discussed
in section 1.3 of chapter 1, when the socialist past, particularly the Cultural
Revolution, was denounced as ‘a decade-long turmoil’ distorting human nature, and
a new ideology was urgently summoned to unleash the force of the market.
Humanism (rendao zhuyi) and the enlightenment (qimeng zhuyi) became the two
crucial agendas among urban intellectuals during the CCP-championed ‘ideological
emancipation’ campaign (Wang Jing, 1996). The construction of a dichotomy
between socialist China and then present China thus defines post-Mao China as
everything that Mao’s China was not. Thus, the Marxist feminist film scholar Dai
Jinhua reflects that the cultural landscape of the 1980s is the foreground in the
project of rewriting history, and of rediscovering and rescuing individuals from the
burden of the history (Dai, 1999; 2000; 2002; 2018). However, the re-discovered
subject, as Dai argues, is inevitably a male.

Against this historical background, a new female figure is depicted in Fashionable
Red Dress. The movie tells the story of a young urban female textile factory worker
who fashions herself from a model worker in a drab working uniform into a modellike urban woman in a fashionable and feminised red dress. The protagonist Tao
Xing’er, who initially devotes her life to her work, is represented as a victim of the
socialist values whose ‘true femininity’ is repressed and distorted under the socialist
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ideology discussed in section 1.2 of chapter one that women’s emancipation is
prominently grounded in their participation in production. Alternatively, the movie
re-portrays what a woman should be in a new era by glorifying Tao Xing’er’s pursuit
of fashion as a restoration of her human nature. In other words, ironically, that
retreating women from work and ‘restoring’ an essentialised femininity becomes a
symbol of ‘emancipating’ women from a repressive historical past.

Such a depiction echoes the popular culture representation of women in the 1980s.
Through a close examination of the fourth generation as well as female writings in
the 1980s,64 Dai demonstrates that the rewriting of women’s identity over the late
1970s and 1980s placed women in an awkward position where they regained their
gendered identity and limited self-expression, and at the same time experienced the
conditions of recession (ibid.). Women were positioned as objects who were the
victims of a disastrous and turbulent socialist past. Thus, as detailed in section 1.3 of
chapter one, the restoration of women’s human nature almost equalled the restoration
of true femininity that was once considered repressed under the slogan of ‘men and
women are the same’ in the socialist era. Following this vein, ‘the play of difference
is highly political’. The play of difference not only becomes a way to break up with
the socialist past and to justify market-oriented reforms, but also legitimates the
essentialised understanding of femininity in constructing female subjectivity, which
is detailed in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1. Differences based on gender, class, age and
rural/urban setting are increasingly visible in post-Mao’s China.
‘The play of difference’ is everywhere throughout the movie Fashionable Red Dress.
Indeed, the movie constructs a new female figure Tao Xing’er using several pairs of
dichotomies, such as red dress/blue work suit, monotonous factory work/ colourful
urban entertainment, old/young, rural/urban, and model worker/model. In
constructing dichotomies, on one hand, the movie narrates history in a binary way,
which justifies the marketized present by representing it with a colourful dress and
urban leisure and denouncing Mao’s China with the associations of a drab working
suit and the seemingly tedious factory; on the other hand, positioning women
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differently in this binary historical narration constructs a new female figure, whose
subjectivity is redefined around her reproductive role and fashionable feminised
look, rather than her participation in social production. That is, the movie devalues
women’s participation in work, especially heavy and manual work, and re-valorises
the essentialized perception of femininity central to defining a ‘true woman’.
Moreover, the emancipated female figure represented in the movie is situated in the
city, which symbolises the modern progress of the post-socialist era.
● ‘Model worker is devalued now! (laomo xianzai diejia le!)’
Questioning the once glorious meaning of ‘model worker’ is the key theme
throughout the movie Fashionable Red Dress. Because it openly criticised the
socialist title ‘model worker’ as a distortion of human nature, the movie, as well as
the homonymous play, stimulated a wave of controversial debates in the 1980s.
Some critics highly praised the movie for representing newly emancipated figures of
the urban landscape in modern China, while some strongly criticised it for its neglect
of Marxist notions of class and class struggle, which were the major themes in the
cultural representations in the socialist era.65 The term model worker (laodong
mofan) is derived from Maoist China, exemplifying ‘(gendered) socialist subjects as
productive labourers for the Chinese public to emulate’(Woronov, 2016). Thus, a
model worker in the socialist era referred to one who sacrificed her life for
production for the state. Women, in particular, were encouraged to postpone
marriage and childbearing for the sake of production, which is mentioned in section
1.2 of chapter 1.
In socialist China being awarded as ‘model worker’ was a great honour, whose
achievements were widely published and circulated in various forms of cultural
representations, such as newspaper, radio and television.66 One typical example was
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the national campaign to elevate the model worker Huang Baomei from Shanghai
No.17 Cotton Textile General, who enthusiastically devotes herself to improve the
efficiency and productivity of the factory and win over the competition. Huang
Baomei’s achievements were adapted for the biographical film Huang Baomei,
which was directed by Xie Jin and produced in Shanghai in 1958.

Fashionable Red Dress employs the classic narrative formula of a model worker who
sacrifices her personal life for the sake of production for the state, which is widely
seen in the socialist cultural representation. Initially, the protagonist Tao Xing’er, a
model worker in the mid-1980s, behaves in a similar way as the model workers of
the socialist era. Like Huang Baomei, Tao works diligently all the time. The movie
begins by displaying lively urban lives in Shanghai: the streets where young women
with colourful dresses are walking, new markets where people go shopping, the park
where some are hanging out, high rises under-construction, a lane full of neighbours,
and so forth. But Tao Xing’er, a 28-year-old young, female model worker, seems to
segregate from the fresh urban life. She first appears in the movie with a white shirt
and blue pants, having just returned to Shanghai from a conference held in another
city. As soon as she arrives, she does not have time to meet with her colleagues, who
are all wearing colourful dresses and come to the station especially to pick her up, or
go back home to get changed; she is instead sent by the shift supervisor of the factory
to attend a textile trade fair. Without taking any days off, Tao returns to work the
next day. She begins working an hour earlier than the scheduled time, and gets off
work much later than others. While her cohorts are exploring newly emerging urban
activities and chatting about the latest fashion and their ideas of love, Tao is
occupied with work (see Figure 1). Tao is profiled as a typical model worker in the
socialist era, whose whole life is for work (for the state).
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Figure 1 Tao Xing'er is working in the factory (Fashionable Red Dress on the Street, 1984)

However, the movie pours new wine into an old bottle. The model worker Tao
Xing’er of Fashionable Red Dress dedicates her life to production, but, unlike in the
socialist period, she is not an aspirational figure in the movie. The movie deflects the
meaning of ‘model worker’ away from its glorious connotation, and creates, to refer
to Roland Barthes (1972), a new myth, suggesting that human nature is distorted
under the name of model worker. Tao not only does not receive respect or admiration
from her young counterparts at the factory but is mocked by them for her dedication
to the work. When the young workers of the factory, an overwhelming majority of
whom are female, are asked to emulate Tao’s hard work, they repeatedly question
and reject the merits of the request. Take one scene, when all workers are dining
together in the canteen inside the factory listening to a live broadcast, as an example.
The radio of the factory is airing the achievements of the model workers of the year,
including Tao Xing’er’s. It uses Tao’s colleague Ah Xiang as a negative example.
She is described as ‘an obtuse provincial girl’, to highlight Tao’s patience in teaching
other workers for the purpose of improving the overall productivity of the factory.
The comparison of ‘a perfect progressive model worker vs a backward ordinary
worker’ is often used in Huang Baomei and many other movies of the socialist
period, especially those produced during the late 1950s and early 1960s, in which
backward workers are finally changed into progressive ones with the help of the
model workers. However, in Fashionable Red Dress the ‘obtuse provincial girl’ Ah
Xiang not only does not show any interest in emulating Tao, but openly and bluntly
expresses her contempt for becoming one. She tells Tao to her face: ‘Don’t be so
proud to be a model worker. Model workers are devalued now (laomo xianzai diejia
le)!’
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In addition to Tao’s cohorts’ undisguised contempt, Tao’s mother also complains
about Tao’s over-devotion to work and her neglect of the family. Tao’s mother is a
housewife who has no name, and only appears three times in the movie: the first time
she is cooking in the kitchen, the second time she is folding clothes near the kitchen,
and the last time she is dining with the family in the house. In all of these scenes,
Tao’s mother is seen inside the house. In the first scene (see Figure 2), when Tao
finally gets an opportunity to return home for the first time, her mother is preparing a
meal and scorning Tao’s father for taking a three-day trip rather than staying home
and sharing in the housework. When Tao’s mother sees Tao, she mocks her,
‘Our model worker is always having meetings and never at home.
Meeting the mayor, and shown in the newspaper. What benefits
have you got? If you are really competent, ask the mayor to give
you a new house! So your younger brother can get married…Look
at you, you’re already 28 years old! You broke up with your
boyfriend when you were sent down to the countryside. When does
your father take care of [your marriage problem]? ’
It is clear that Tao’s mother is not proud of her daughter’s status as ‘model worker’.
Instead, she considers it as an ‘empty’ honour that not only brings no practical or
material benefits for the family, but also obstructs her daughter from establishing a
family. Tao’s mother believes marriage is more important for Tao now, rather than
work. In emphasizing Tao’s age, her mother implies that Tao is no longer young, and
should return home and get married. In her second appearance in the movie, Tao’s
mother is talking to Tao suggesting a marriage mate for her consideration, regardless
of Tao’s reluctance. As such, Tao’s mother, as a mother and a wife, represents the
reproductive roles that Tao as a model worker has been asked to defer in the socialist
era and is now asked to embrace in the era of reform. During the socialist era,
especially the Great Leap Forward, women were expected to defer marriage and
childrearing to enhance the production of the state. That is, women are valued in
terms of their role as workers, which was detailed in section 1.2 of chapter 1. Yet, in
the reform era and the resurgence of the patriarchal Confucian tradition, women were
valued in terms of their maternal roles. Tao’s mother’s remarks strongly resonate
with the re-emerging call for ‘women to return home’ in the 1980s detailed in
section 1.3 of chapter 1.
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Figure 2 Kitchen is the location where Tao’s mother first appears in the movie (Fashionable Red Dress on the
Street, 1984)

Furthermore, the de-mystification of the glory of work in liberating women is
apparent in the movie’s portrayal of the figure of housewife, who is coded with
completely different connotations from that of the cultural representations in the late
1950s and early 1960s. During the heyday of the Great Leap Forward when all social
forces were encouraged to participate in social production for the state, women’s
participation in production was considered a significant symbol of their
emancipation, which was introduced in section 1.2 of chapter 1. The cultural
representation of inciting housewives to join production is a quintessential example
of the ideology that work (for the state) is a means to emancipate women from the
oppression of the family. For instance, in the movie A Riot of Colour Is Always
Spring (Wanzi qianhong zongshi chun, 1958, dir. Shen Fu), a group of housewives is
incited to go out and liberate from the family by participating in collective
production outside the home. Home is represented as a place of oppression, while
work (outside home) is a means to achieve gender liberation for women (Cai, 2016).
The Housewife of a Big Family (da jiating zhufu, dir. Lei Keng) from 1960 shares a
similar theme, in which housewives of the same neighborhood are encouraged to
sacrifice their own private family life and conduct reproductive work collectively for
the big family, namely the state. It is quite interesting that the end of the movie
depicts a moment when a housewife, who is often called Auntie Lin as she is married
to Mr Lin, can finally use her own real name. Auntie Lin is offered an honourable
opportunity to conduct a further study because of her contribution to collective work.
When she is asked her name, she first answers ‘I don’t have a name’. Then,
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hesitating for a moment she said, ‘Call me... Li Er’feng. It has been so long since the
last time I was asked for my own name. No one has called me by my own name
since I married my husband.’ At this symbolic moment, the issue of women’s names
leaps forth through the processes of leaving the home and working outside home.
‘The process of naming is the process of exercising power ’ (Cai, 2016:299). The
story of Li Er’feng indicates that housewives who had been anonymous are
empowered by participating in production for the purpose of socialist construction. A
progressive and liberated housewife of the socialist era is one who leaves home and
works outside.

In contrast to the housewives represented in socialist movies, the housewife of
Fashionable Red Dress is always at home doing housework, and continuously
pushes her daughter to enter into marriage. In an upside-down manner, returning
home to get married is no longer an emblem of backwardness as it was in the
socialist time, but of liberation from the repressive past, which was widely believed
among male and female urban elites in the 1980s to masculinise women and repress
women’s true femininity via stressing sameness.

Replacing production, love and marriage rearticulate as a fundamental part of a
young women’s life. This is most obvious in a conversation between Tao and her exboyfriend Dong, who ends his romantic relationship with Tao during the Down to the
Countryside Movement , and tries to win Tao’s heart back when they are sent back
from the countryside to Shanghai. When Dong takes Tao to a dance hall in the city,
where young men and young women in pairs are holding each other dancing Waltz
to the music under the neon lights. Tao feels uneasy, saying that ‘no this place is not
for me.’ Her ex-boyfriend replies, ‘This is for you. This is for all model workers,
especially those relatively old but unmarried youth, who lost time working instead of
finding love. This event is held regularly for them.’ Love and marriage reappear as a
crucial topic in cultural representations, especially in female writings in the 1980s.67
By distracting Tao from production and encouraging her pursuit of love and
marriage, the movie suggests that she is liberated from the socialist past and restored

67

For a study of female writing in the 1980s, see Dai Jinhua, Shedu zhizhou: xinshiqi zhongguo
nüxing xiezuo yu nüxing wenhua (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007).
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to her human nature. Therefore, it is apparent that the movie opens up a new
potential position for women to resist the statist socialist figure of ‘model worker’ as
discussed in section 1.3.3 of chapter 1.
As such, Fashionable Red Dress re-allocates young women’s social position. It
demystifies the centralisation of work in constructing young women’s subjectivity,
and re-mystifies marriage and the domestic domain as young women’s destiny in the
reform era. In a binary construction of history, the movie turns the meaning of work
upside down, from an emblem of liberation to that of the distortion of human nature.
In this way, it also redefines what a woman, particularly a young woman, should be
in the reform era. The movie ends with Tao Xing’er self-criticism of being an
‘insincere’ model worker. In front of her cohort in a dormitory in the factory, Tao
confesses that ‘…Under the constraint of the honour ‘model worker’, I lost the
sincerity that a human being should have’. Thus, a model worker who devotes
herself to work is no more a figure with an aura that young women should aspire to
emulate. A new role model is emerging in the new time.

● From model worker to model
The movie sets the figure of ‘model’ as a new aspirational subject for young urban
women to emulate in the reforming time, replacing the figure ‘model worker’.
According to the fashion historian Antonia Finnane (2008), model as a profession
was first introduced to China in the 1980s by French designer and businessman
Pierre Cardin who used professional models to display his dresses in a fashion show
in China. Shortly after, local companies began recruiting and training professional
models in big cities in China such as Shanghai and Beijing. ‘Model’ became a
subject that could be seen in the cultural representations in the 1980s, such as in
emerging fashion magazines and in the movies. For instance, the movie Black
Dragonfly (Hei Qingting) directed by Mao Zhifang in 1984 tells a story of a manager
of the Qiushi textile factory liberating from ‘old’ constraints by using young models
to display the dresses produced by the factory so as to promote its sales. Besides,
stories of factory girls and soldiers becoming professional models were not rare
(Finnane, 2008: 264).
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The figure model symbolises the female figure embodiment of ‘true femininity’
expressed mainly through fashion. In other words, a fashionable model became a
standard of what a ‘true woman’ was. Such an association is vividly documented by
Shanghai-based novelist Wang An’yi in her essay Notes on a Fashion Show (Ji Yici
Fuzhuang Biaoyan) published in the 1980s. The essay records a fashion show held in
Shanghai, where a group of women with feminised and colourful dresses walk the
catwalk, just like fashion models, with their husbands and children watching. A long
quote extracted from Wang’s essay is deserved here,
‘They appear to have long forgotten this point. Wearing their
sexless clothing they had forgotten their own sex. Carrying out
their allotted sexless tasks, they obliterated their own sexuality.
They had sexlessly passed their own best years. They seemed,
having concluded the best years a woman has, suddenly to
have remembered that they were women (translated by Antonia
Finnane, 2008, emphasis added).’
Fashionable Red Dress adheres to a similar myth as described by Wang An’yi, that
women’s identity is restored by wearing fashionable and feminised clothing, in spite
of the fact that it is based on an essentialist understanding of femininity as discussed
in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1. The movie suggests that women were androgynous in
the socialist era, exemplified in the figure of model worker, and they are now being
called on to be feminine. Thus, pursuing fashionable and sexy clothing is considered
a woman’s inner nature that is repressed in the drab and sexless working uniform.
Interestingly, it is Ah Xiang who is initially represented as the most backward in the
workplace and then becomes the first to embrace fashion and introduce rare
commodities to other factory girls. She imports fashionable items from Hong Kong,
such as thin stockings, dresses, sunglasses and so forth, for her colleagues, who are
begging and chasing after her in order to get these items.

While young workers are reluctant to learn from the model worker, they show great
enthusiasm for learning fashion from a model. The movie takes around six minutes
to picture a gathering among factory girls in a dormitory of the factory. A model,
who is a friend of a textile worker, is invited to the dormitory to do a fashion show
and to teach style and do fitness (jian mei). While the model is displaying various
long attires with bright colours and diverse styles, young female workers are seated
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together watching her performance with great admiration. After the fashion show,
female workers crowd around the model asking about the latest fashion trends. The
model, seated in the centre, introduces the trendy style and colour of that year, the
year before and the year that follows. Except for performing and teaching fashion,
the model also gives a body-building lesson for these young women. She wears a
tight all-black bodysuit, correcting these women’s deportment. The model said, ‘In
order to make our deportment/carriage beautiful and elegant, we first need to
improve our inner suzhi and cultural quality. This certainly includes doing exercises’.
In this scene, those who pursue beauty and fashion become the role models that
young women are eager to chase after. Work is actually de-centred, in spite of the
fact that the subjects of the movie are working-class women from a textile factory.
Fashion is placed under the spotlight, and becomes a way of ‘re-feminizing’ women.
These factory workers become ‘women’ via adapting a fashionable and feminized
style.

Figure 3 Young women in fashionable dresses walking like models participate in ‘zhanqun’ in the park
(Fashionable Red Dress on the Street, 1984)

The movie chooses ‘zhanqun’, a beauty contest-like activity which was very popular
among young women in big cities such as Shanghai in the 1980s, as the key occasion
where young women fashion themselves and, more importantly, demonstrate and
construct their femininity. While the workplace is depicted by rows of giant waving
machines functioning with loud noises, ‘zhanqun’ in the park is associated with the
joy and pleasure manifested on the faces of young women. For instance, the movie
detailly shows the young female workers’ preparation for their first ‘zhanqun’ in
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close-up. It zooms in on the body parts of the young women to capture the ways that
they decorate themselves: one is wearing eyelashes, one is putting on make-up, one
is applying lipstick, one is perming her hair, one is combing her hair, and one is
donning earrings. During the ‘zhanqun’ (see Figure 3), young women would wear
their finest dresses to the park, and compete with each other to be the most beautiful.
Interestingly, the park as a public space, functions as a location where young women
gather together to display their dresses and beauty.

In the movie, it is via putting the fashionable red dress on and attending the
‘zhanqun’ contest that Tao Xing’er finally transforms herself from an androgynous
model worker into a ‘feminised’ woman (see Figure 4). Tao’s colleagues once
disdain Tao for her prioritisation of work over everything, but embrace and welcome
Tao when she decides to join ‘zhanqun’. In her very first ‘zhanqun’, Tao wears a
sleeveless bright red dress given to her by Ah Xiang, and wears her long hair down
behind her shoulders. When Tao and six other young female workers, who are all in
dresses of different colours and patterns arrive at the park, lots of young people in
fashionable clothing have already gathered. Tao is chosen by her friends to represent
them to ‘zhan’ (compete) with other women. She is shy and embarrassed at the
beginning; but soon she starts walking joyfully and proudly along a path, as if she is
walking on a runway. The movie poetically pictures this moment: soft and cheerful
background music suddenly begins playing, while Tao is walking ahead with her
long hair flowing in the air, her red dress coiling around her feet. The connotations of
the fashionable red dress, which is used as the crucial signifier in the movie, are
indexical and multiply in the movie. Firstly, and most obviously, the working
uniform refers to work, and the fashionable red dress signifies femininity based on
gender difference. Secondly, the movie uses the former to symbolise the socialist
past that is considered to distort human nature, and the latter to refer to the modern
and bright reform present. Thus, the women in the red dress are constructed as the
antithesis of those in the drab working suits, in which the former is represented as
modern and progressive and the latter as backward. As such, Tao Xing’s decision to
put the fashionable red dress on symbolises her transformation from a ‘backward’
model worker to a ‘progressive’ and feminised woman.
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Figure 4 Tao Xing'er (in the middle) are running cheerfully with her workmates after participating in the
'zhanqun' in the park (Fashionable Red Dress on the Street, 1984)

It is interesting that Tao’s successful transformation as a feminised and thus
attractive woman is manifested and confirmed through the male gaze. When Tao is
displaying her femininity, expressed through her appearance, young men from
different corners of the park begin moving toward her, indicating that they are
attracted by her: one is looking at Tao from head to toe to show his approval, one is
smiling at her, one can’t keep his eyes if her, one is whistling with fingers, and some
are playing guitar and cheering for her. On the contrary, the young women are sourfaced, indicating their jealousy. Thus, it is quite obvious that Tao is represented as a
sexual object for the pleasure of the male viewers. As such, the feminist film theorist
Laura Mulvey (1975) argues, such cinematic representation establishes the role of
men as the active-viewer, and women as the passive-object, and thus reinforces the
hierarchical power relations between men and women. Through the male gaze,
heterosexual femininity’s stress on gender difference is normalised. Furthermore, in
the ‘zhanqun’ activity, young women view themselves through the male gaze, and
compete with each other in order to achieve proper femininity based on heterovector. In so doing, a new normative heterosexual femininity defined around the
essentialised accounts of gender difference has taken shape since the 1980s.
Hence, Tao’s self-fashioning is trapped in a contradicted situation. On the one hand,
it seems Tao is liberated from the socialist state subject position featuring gender
sameness. Through embodying heterosexual and competitive-based femininity, she is
no longer an androgynous model worker of the socialist era who has her hair tugged
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into a hygiene white cap and is always in a drab working suit; she is now a progress
woman who is liberated to restore her innate femininity by wearing a fashionable
garment. However, on the other hand, the ‘liberation’ that the movie hails serves to
reinforce the unequal gender relations in which men dominate and women are
dominated. The stress on gender difference, as detailed in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1,
functions to justify discrimination against women in the reform era.
● Problematic femininity
However, normative femininity based on hetero-vector reconstruction is not equally
distributed among all female figures in the movie. Not all women are represented as
embodying the ‘proper’ femininity. The representations of femininity are based
strongly on age and the rural/urban divide. The distinction based on age is apparent
in the different representations of elder women and of the younger women in
Fashionable Red Dress. Only three elder female figures are represented – the shift
supervisor, Tao’s mother, and an elder model worker who only appears for a few
seconds, and they are by no means represented as aspirational figures.

Take the character shift supervisor as an example. The shift supervisor, the eldest
woman who holds the highest position among the young workers in the factory, is
the only one who still adheres to the ‘old’ socialist values stressing production, while
the younger generation of female workers refuses to change themselves into model
workers. She is only shown wearing work uniforms with her body covered, and
never goes out of the factory to be part of the newly emerging ‘liberating’ and fresh
urban leisure life (see Figure 5). Besides, Tao is honoured with the title model
worker because of her achievement in supervising the production of thirty thousand
pieces of flawless cotton cloth. But, actually, one roll of the cloth has a minor defect.
The shift supervisor does not tell the truth to Tao, but manages to cover it and
persists in honouring Tao as a perfect model worker. She continuously asks workers
to learn from Tao despite the fact that all the workers know that Tao’s achievement
is exaggerated. In such a way, the shift supervisor, the elder female figure of the
movie, represents the ‘inappropriate’ past in a new time. In another scene, while Tao
Xing’er is putting on the fashionable red dress, the shift supervisor is the only one
discouraging her. Tao Xing’er asks the shift supervisor’s thoughts about the red dress
and the shift supervisor first responds that ‘it is beautiful’, and then advises that, ‘it’s
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too sexy. Wear it at home when nobody is around.’ A young worker Ge Jia, who
happens to be around, refutes the supervisor immediately, ‘No one will appreciate it
if you wear it at home! I’m just telling the truth. Those who like red dresses are on
the street. Why wear it at home?! You old conservative!’

Figure 5 the shift supervisor is scorning Ah Xiang for dressing too sexy (Fashionable Red Dress on the Street,
1984)

In a word, age has become a marking distinction since the 1980s. The old represents
the conservative socialist past, and the young are the modern and progress present.
The old shift supervisor who has no name in the movie functions as an ambiguous
symbol of the sexless and ‘conservative’ female figure of the socialist past. She is
excluded from the ‘zhanqun’ activity, and symbolises the undesirable, androgynous
and conservative old female body. Thus, desirable heterosexual femininity expressed
via the pursuit of fashionable look can only be embodied in young women.
Beyond the difference marked by the young/old, the representation of ‘proper’
femininity is also very much marked by the urban/rural distinction. Although Ah
Xiang is the owner of the fashionable red dress, she is prevented from embodying
normative femininity because of her countryside origins (see Figure 6). Ah Xiang is
the first one to ‘liberate’ herself from production and introduce fashion to her
cohorts, but is discriminated against by the young workers from Shanghai. She gets
the red dress from a vendor in a free market in Shanghai, and shows off the red dress
to her three colleagues who are from Shanghai in the restroom of the factory.
Receiving no compliments, Ah Xiang is made fun of by the three colleagues. One
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young worker asks Ah Xiang, ‘xiangxiaren (country bumpkin), where did you get
this dress?’ Ah Xiang responds back angrily, ‘You ARE the xiangxiaren. This fabric
is from the United States!’ Another colleague sarcastically replies, ‘xiangxiaren is
cocky now. She is wearing an American dress!’ ‘Don’t call me xiangxiaren anymore.
I’m seriously angry now.’ Ah Xiang says. The three workmates not only do not
apologise, but continue mocking Ah Xiang in Shanghainese, ‘xiangxiaren comes to
Shanghai, and speaks no Shanghainese (xiangxiaren dao shanghai, shanghaihua
jiang bulai).’ Ah Xiang does not want to be disdained, and even prevents her
brother, who is a peasant, from visiting her in the factory in Shanghai.

Figure 6 Ah Xiang shows off the red dress she bought in front of her workmates of Shanghai origin, but is
mocked by them. (Fashionable Red Dress on the Street, 1984)

In contrast, when the urban Shanghai woman Tao Xing’er puts the red dress on, she
receives nothing but positive comments from her young cohorts as well as from other
young cohorts in the park. When Ah Xiang finds out that Tao is secretly trying on
her red dress, Ah Xiang not only does not get angry but enthusiastically helps Tao to
put it on. Ah Xiang highly praises Tao, saying ‘This red dress was custom made for
you!’, and voluntarily gives her red dress to Tao, who later wears it to participate in
the ‘zhanqun’ activity in the park. It is the urban woman Tao, rather than the
provincial woman Ah Xiang, the actual owner of the dress, that represents the young
workers from the factory to win the beauty competition. Hence, the femininity
constructed is clearly normalised within urban young women. No matter how hard
Ah Xiang tries, she, as a rural female body, cannot be recognised as an aspirational
model.
162

● From Work-Life to Urban Leisure Life in the 1980s
Indeed, the movie Fashionable Red Dress highly eulogizes the newly emerged urban
lifestyle in Shanghai, which echoes with a broader context in the 1980s wherein the
reviving urban culture is considered as a space of liberation and civilisation, and the
promise of a brighter and more modernised future (Dai, 1999; 2000: 73). In
Fashionable Red Dress, the city is the place of modernisation. For instance, it
deliberately captures several symbols of modernity: streets full of traffic and walking
youth, an airplane flying overhead, a grand steel bridge, high-rise buildings growing
from the ground, a broad and seemingly endless highway and giant cargos sailing on
the sea. Everything looks strong and powerful through the use of a low-angle shot.

The young urban woman in the fashionable red dress became an emblem of the
developing modern and progressive urban landscape in China in the 1980s. They are
the explorers of the new urban lifestyle brought about by market-oriented opening
and reform. Rather than depicting work-life, the movie vividly represents young
workers’ everyday life in their free time. Within the factory, the dormitory is not
merely a place of rest, but a location where young women experience the new urban
lifestyle. At night, young female workers are seated in front of a TV, watching the
broadcasting of a women’s volleyball game between China and the USA, and
cheering for China. They also watch commercial advertisements and enjoy fashion
shows learning about fashion and fitness in the dormitory.

Outside the factory, new possibilities have emerged. Learning English becomes
popular among young people. On Sunday morning, Ge Jia and Tao Xing’er, who are
competing for an opportunity to go to college, participate in an ‘English
contest’(zhan yingyu) held regularly in a park. Young self-taught English learners
assemble to practise their English and compete with each other in English, which for
Tao ‘is a new thing that emerged because of the building of spiritual civilisation’.
Then, they go for a walk and enjoy the green trees, modern fountains, and naked
female sculptures in the park. Besides, a new consumer market springs up: workers
like Ah Xiang now can shop for dresses imported from Hong Kong in the free
market (ziyou shichang) in the city, where a group of self-employed workers emerge
because of the urban labour reform discussed in section 2.1.3 in chapter 2, and sell
diverse commodities; instead of having meals in the canteen in the factory, workers
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can also dine in a western-style restaurant decorated with a magnificent chandelier
hung from the ceiling, where waiters in red suits with bowties are ready to serve;
they can also have a cup of coffee in a café, and go dancing with their friends in
dance halls. All in all, we get a glimpse of a fresh way of living in the city, and it is
clear that this urban lifestyle is closely linked with consumption.

With the embrace of the market and the burgeoning of the new urban lifestyle,
consumption appears both as a way of life and a way of achieving recognition, even
though the market was still underdeveloped in the 1980s. Ah Xiang’s story is a vivid
example. Ah Xiang is mocked by her colleagues from Shanghai because of her
peasant background, and thus tries to improve her status and obtain respect through
her access to commodities. She lies to other workers that she has a brother in Hong
Kong who can purchase commodities from Hong Kong at a cheaper price for them.
This leads her workmates of Shanghai origin to change their attitudes toward Ah
Xiang, to flatter her and call her ‘sister Ah Xiang’ rather than ‘xiangxiaren’. Yet, in
reality, Ah Xiang buys commodities from the free market and state-owned stores in
Shanghai at the original price, and sells them to her colleagues at a lower price,
pretending that they are imported from Hong Kong. When the truth is exposed at the
end of the movie, the shift supervisor asks Ah Xiang why she did it at the expense of
indebtedness, and Ah Xiang replies with tears, saying ‘Because I’m from the
countryside! Everybody looks down on me, calling me xiangxiaren. But once they
knew that I had a brother in Hong Kong, they came to flatter me. They only stopped
calling me xiangxiaren because I could buy foreign products (yang huo) for them.
For this reason, I was willing and happy to lose some money.’ Ironically, it is
through the access to commodities that Ah Xiang finally surpasses her rural identity
and receives her urban counterparts’ welcome and respect.
The emerging urban landscape indeed fashions young urban women’s everyday life
and practices, but it also brings confusion about what to believe and how to make a
living in cities in the new era. While they fashion themselves to obtain a young,
urban and sexually desirable femininity to fit in the norm of the new time,, they are
seemingly lost at a crossroads. Tao Xing’er is at times wandering the streets of
Shanghai aimlessly alone, sometimes during the day in the pouring rain, sometimes
at night against the neon lights of the city. While the old values of putting one’s life
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to work for the state are diminished, the new values are seemingly directing them to
return to home to be a wife and a mother, just like Tao’s mother. As young
unmarried women in their late twenties, what choices are left for them in Shanghai?

To briefly conclude, Fashionable Red Dress seems to present new possibilities for
subjective positions for women in the 1980s as China tries to bid farewell to its
socialist past and open to the global market. Through a dichotomous narration of
history, the movie denounces the the socialist female figure of ‘model worker’,
which is underlined by women’s participation in production that prevailed in cultural
representations in the socialist era, as a distortion of women’s human nature; and
replaces it with the figure of ‘model’, which is defined as a normative and
aspirational female figure of the reform era based on essentialist accounts of gender
differences. Therefore, to resist the socialist subject position, the movie redefines and
normalises women of the reform period grounded on the valorisation of the attributes
of youth, urbanity, and heterosexual femininity.

Yet, the new possibilities of self-positioning are full of contradictions. On the one
hand, young urban women are offered new possibilities and choices brought by the
market in the city, and find it liberating: they can go to college, learn English, dine in
a café or a posh restaurant, go dancing with males, consume modern goods, and wear
sexy and fashionable red dresses. On the other hand, ‘ liberation was only a
misleading mirage (Brownell, 1998: 37)’. In the end, her future had already been
decided – sooner or later she was going to be asked to return home and enter into
marriage. Specifically, as the participation in work which used to be an indispensable
part of women’s liberation is marginalised, love and marriage are re-articulated as
women’s ultimate goal in the reform era. Tao Xing’er is constantly asked by her
mother to get married, to be what a woman ‘naturally’ should be – a wife and a
mother. The essentialist perception of gender difference that is viewed as a resistance
to the androgynous socialist female subject ‘model worker’ in the 1980s is,
ironically, used to legitimate gendered discriminations against women in the
workplace, and the call for women to return home in the 1990s when market-oriented
reforms were intensified as discussed in section 1.3.2 of chapter 1 and section 2.1.3
of chapter 2.
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What happens when women leave the workplace and return home? Fashionable Red
Dress avoids confronting this question by using a group of young single women as
its protagonists. Tao’s mother, a housewife and a mother of two children, urges Tao
to get married; but at the same time, she suffers from the unequal gender relations at
home in which the wife cooks within the house and the husband works outside. She
is trapped at home performing unpaid housework with no time or opportunities to
explore the new urban life outside. As a single woman in her twenties, Tao still
appears to have freedom of choice, but that choice is rather limited and almost
exclusively refers to choice of a partner in marriage.

Secondly, the normalisation of the model-like female figure constructs and excludes
the other. Underlined by differences based on age and the rural/urban, the movie
valorises the attributes of youth and urbanity as the hegemonic forces. While young
urban women, like Tao Xing’er, are able to obtain the normative heterosexual
femininity, their old and rural counterparts, such as the elder shift supervisor and Ah
Xiang, are excluded from doing so. At the same time, the movie conceals these
differences through representing young women as a monolithic category, in which
the only differences occur between those who are feminised and those who are not.
In the final scene of the movie, a group of women wearing red dresses, all young,
walk side by side and hand in hand, as if they are one. Finally, class is an issue that
the movie deliberately avoids touching upon. It is rather ironic that the working-class
women who were the revolutionary figures in the cultural representation of the
socialist period are continuously represented as the normative subject in the
Fashionable Red Dress, in spite of the dominant ideology of ‘farewell to revolution’
in the 1980s. A group of factory girls of the 1980s are fashioned into urban,
feminised and consumer-like figures, as if they had access to the urban lifestyle and
the economic ability to purchase cutting-edge commodities in the city.

3.1.2. Elle Magazine(1988-1999)

Thus far, the above section demonstrated the emergence of new imaginations of a
possible subjective position for women in urban China in the 1980s. Replacing
‘model’ with the socialist figure of ‘model worker’ as a new aspirational subject of
the reform era, the movie defines women around the essentialized accounts of gender
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difference, and valorizes the gendered attributes of youth and urbanity. In such a
way, it re-allocates women’s social position from social production (outside the
household for the state) to the reproductive roles of mother and wife, which were
considered women’s ‘natural roles’. Thus, it also detaches women from ‘the big
family’—namely the state, and re-attaches them to ‘the small family’. Cities, such as
Shanghai, are depicted as the loci where young, fashionable and sexually attractive
women have freedom to explore the emerging urban lifestyle and choose marriage
partners, even though their future has already been decided—that is, the return to the
small family to fulfil their maternal role.

Grounded in the emergence of the new aspirational female figure in the 1980s, the
following pages will explore the representation of ‘the white-collar beauty’ in the
hegemonic cultural representations in the 1990s through an analysis of the fashion
magazine Elle issued from 1988 to 1999. The emergence and prevalence of the
white-collar beauty in popular culture symbolises the revaluation of women based on
feminisation (Zhong, 1998). With the intensification of market-oriented reforms
beginning in the 1990s, the valorisation of the attributes of youth, urbanity and
heterosexual femininity became increasingly prominent, expressed particularly
through consumerism, which not only completely transformed the urban landscape
but also played a crucial role in shaping the female subjectivity. Meanwhile, despite
the high social polarization and the widening gaps between the classes, a new social
group, the middle class who, though still small in number, became the subject of
popular culture, silencing the larger working class and urban underclasses formed in
the 1990s. As Dai Jinhua puts it, ‘the cultural discourse of the 1990s called for ‘the
creation of a Chinese middle class (2002: 222)’. Fashion magazines then emerged as
one of the most crucial sites of imagining and legitimating this middle-class identity
in China (Zhou, 2000). The fashion magazines almost exclusively represented the
lifestyle of the ‘white-collar beauty’ who embodies the values and lifestyles of the
middle classes. A white-collar beauty is not only young, feminised and of urban
origin as we see in the movie in the 1980s, but more importantly, is from a middleclass background, is educated and has the economic ability of consumption.

● Chinese Version of Elle magazine: Representing White Collar Beauties
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A number of fashion magazines sprung up in China beginning in the early 1980s.
China’s first fashion magazine, Shizhuang (Fashion), was published in Beijing in
1979, and was followed by others such as Liuxing Se (Fashion Colour), Xiandai
Fushi (Contemporary Fashion) and Shanghai Fashion (Shanghai Shizhuang)
(Finnane, 2008). The publishers of these magazines were textile and garment
manufacturing companies, trade companies, or institutions related to the arts of
clothing production. Printed mostly in black and white on coarse paper, the fashion
magazines of the early and mid-1980s also provided sewing patterns so that readers
could produce their own clothes when they could not afford to buy them. Hence, the
fashion magazines in the early reform-era functioned more as guidebooks to
introduce updated information about the clothing industry (such as textile
technology, export standard requirements), and to inform readers about trendy
colours and dressing styles (including fitting, measuring, cutting and ironing) (ibid.).

The Chinese version of Elle (shijie shizhuang zhiyuan) can be distinguished from the
fashion magazines published in the early and mid-1980s in China in many ways.
Firstly, its introduction, as the first of many Chinese versions of international titles,
was tightly linked to the governmental call for ‘connecting with the world’ (yu shijie
jiegui) in the late 1980s. Elle, which was founded in France in 1945, launched its
first international edition in Japan in 1969, and then expanded to the U.S., UK,
Spain, Italy and Hong Kong in the mid-1980s. The Chinese version of Elle was
published in Shanghai in 1988, and was the first international title that received the
Chinese government’s official permission to circulate in China (Sun, et al., 2003).
The Chinese version of Elle was co-published by Hachette Filipacchi Media and
Shanghai Translation Publishing House, as, according to Chinese law, foreign
publishers had to find a local partner in order to publish in China (Cowan, 1988).
Secondly, the introduction of Elle catered to the emergence of consumerism and the
growth of the middle-class market in China in the late 1980s and the early 1990s
(Mei and Dai, 2000). It was a part of a cultural phenomenon that witnessed the
mushrooming of lifestyle magazines in the early 1990s, which covered almost all
walks of life including sports, cars, health and fitness, entertainment, and fashion.
Elle China as a type of lifestyle magazine was the only glossy magazine that could
be seen on the streets of Shanghai in the late 1980s, differentiated from the early
fashion magazines that were printed on coarse paper in black and white. Elle was
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clearly visually-oriented as it used full-sized, colour images of young female models
both from China and abroad to promote international brands. Therefore, as Dai
Jinhua states, the appearance of fashion magazines is a signal of the burgeoning
consumer culture in China, which functioned not only as a way to move beyond the
social crisis in 1989, but also profoundly engaged in the historical process of social
reformation in China (Mei and Dai, 2000: 267).

One of the main reasons for choosing Elle for analysis is that it prescribed what a
white-collar beauty should be, and witnessed its appearance in China along with the
emerging consumerism and the middle class discourse in the 1990s. White-collar
beauty, as a core part of the middle-class imagination in China, initially referred to
female employees in foreign-owned companies who earned high salaries, consumed
high-end products, performed fast-paced work and were smart and elegant in their
presentation in the early 1990s. It has also been used to describe highly educated
workers participating in knowledge work since 2000 (Liu, 2016: 17; Mei and Dai,
2000: 267; Zhou, 2000:141; Meng, 1997: 135). The white-collar beauty is no doubt
the subject of representation in Elle. With few exceptions, feature stories of Elle
from 1988 to 1999 covered almost exclusively young, fashionable and successful
women, including actresses, fashion designers, models, television presenters and
producers, which will be further discussed later.
The ‘white-collar beauty’ emerged simultaneously as the subject represented in Elle
China and the target consumers of Elle. It was priced at 8 yuan per copy in 1988,
when the average urban salary was about 132 yuan per month. Its price kept
climbing to 10 yuan in 1991, and to 16 yuan in 1996. Hence, the highly-priced
magazine excluded most of the population in Chinese cities and was obviously
targeted at the few members of the upper class and the developing middle classes. In
fact, most readers in the late 1980s and early 1990s went to bookstalls on the streets
only to glance over the glossy magazines, and certainly were not able to afford them
(Mei and Dai, 2000: 265; Meng, 1997). In the first six years, Elle had a difficult time
in maintaining itself in China’s market, since most people in cities could not afford
10 yuan just for a magazine, and the international high-end brands advertised in Elle
were even more out of reach (Sun, et al., 2003). Thus, just the act of reading and
purchasing Elle China itself was a symbol of middle-class social status, especially in
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the late 1980s and early 1990s. Besides, Elle not only functioned as a guidebook to
introduce the latest fashion trends, but also to create desires and fantasies about a
middle-class lifestyle, including cooking, travelling, fitness, and interior decorating.
That is, what to wear, what to eat, where to live, and what to do for entertainment are
closely associated with consumption and social status.

Elle provided a cultural space for legitimating the middle class discourse, which was
still a more prescriptive category than a descriptive one in the 1990s. It became a
cultural symbol of the middle class, and created fantasies and aspirations of what the
middle classes should be. Although the middle classes were still developing and
small in number, they had already become the subject of cultural representations in a
clear and certain way in the early 1990s. The representation of ‘white-collar
beauties’ promotes the acceptance of this new identity in China in the 1990s when
the economic restructuring resulted in the lay-offs of a large number of workers. The
visibility of white-collar beauty silenced the invisible working-classes. It is rather
ironic that the disappearance of the working class from cultural representations
happened at the same time as a large number of working-class women were being
marginalised in the society. Therefore, the representation of the white-collar beauty,
as a keyword of cultural studies in China in the 1990s (Dai, 2000: 267), justified the
emerging new rich who benefited from the marketisation, and at the same time
silenced their working-class counterparts.

● New Urban Landscape: Young Middle-Class Women and Consumption
Compared with the 1980s, one crucial change that occurred in the 1990s was the
burgeoning of consumer culture, which completely transformed the urban landscape
in China. The development of consumerism not only helped to stimulate the
domestic economy, but also formed a new urban consumerist subject. This new
subject was constructed via the discourse of the middle class, characterised with the
endowment of high cultural capital and the economic power to consume, detailed in
section 2.1 of chapter 2. The desire for commodities and the power to consume
becomes a means for individuals to locate themselves and their aspirations for a
certain social position, namely the newly possible middle class. The anxiety of
identity thus is transformed into the desire for consumption (Rofel, 2007).
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Elle plays a significant role in shaping this consumeristic urban subject. In Elle,
women, exclusively young and urban, are constructed as desirable consumers, rather
than workers. While in the 1980s the working life of young women was still visible,
it became gradually marginalised as a token of middle-class status in cultural
representations beginning in the 1990s. Replacing work, consumption became
increasingly visible and important in Elle’s representations of young women’s daily
life. The normative heterosexual femininity became a quality that one could acquired
via consumption. Moreover, in the anxiety of being identified as middle class,
individuals were also encouraged to continuously develop themselves in everyday
life. Elle contributed to constructing fantasies and aspirations of this new normative
figure, through the distinct but related mediums of fashion, body, and commodities
(ranging from cosmetics to jewellery, health supplements, high-tech products,
housing and travel).
Elle’s development coincided with the burgeoning consumer culture in urban China
from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. In the 1980s when marketisation in China was
still in the embryonic stage, consumerism emerged, but it did not prevail in most
people’s daily life in the cities. For example, in the movie Fashionable Red Dress as
well as Wang Anyi’s novel Liushi, leisure activities in urban Shanghai mainly
referred to dancing in dancing halls, having coffee in cafes, dining in western
restaurants, and short trips to places near Shanghai. It was during this second stage of
reform and opening in the 1990s, especially after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in
1992, that consumerism prevailed and fundamentally changed the way of life in the
cities. Based on the changes in its content, the development of Elle can be roughly
divided into two stages: the first was from 1988 to 1994, and the second from 1994
to 1999.
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Figure 7 Women’s Summer Dress (Shanghai Fashion, 1984)

During the first stage Elle created the fantasy of life of ‘leisure’ by associating it with
fashionable garments, even though the concept of ‘leisure’ was not that popular
during this period. Young models with different types of garments were pictured
against relevant backgrounds, which implied an atmosphere of leisure and relaxation
rather than production. Compared with fashion magazines of the early reform time,
the functions of garments in Elle were quite different. Take Shanghai Fashion
(shanghai shizhuang), issued in August 1984, as an example. Shanghai Fashion,
which was edited by Shanghai Costume Institute and published by China Light
Industry Press, used young women with feminised looks to display garments from
local companies against monotonous backgrounds, such as the park, tall buildings,
and interior spaces, that could not be identified as any specific location. Moreover,
having no description or identifiable logo, the female garments worn by young
Chinese models were broadly categorised based on function: formal suits, shirts,
summer dresses, pyjamas, sleeveless garments, coats for spring and winter, and
windbreakers (see Figure 7). In sharp contrast, in Elle, attires were associated with
certain styles by the choice of specific backgrounds and the use of detailed
descriptive words and sentences, and the brands of each item were carefully listed.
Specifically, to promote a certain theme of attires, young and sexy models with
matching makeup and hairstyle were placed in relevant environments, posing
accordingly to fit the theme. For example, models wearing jeans were pictured in a
farm surrounded by horses in the Western United States (Elle, Spring 1989); models
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in yellow and green dresses were pictured in a jungle in South America (Elle, Spring
1990); to introduce swimwear, models in swimwear were photographed jumping and
walking on the beach (Elle, Fall 1989). Sometimes Elle directly used the term
‘holiday’ in the title to inform readers what to wear and how to do makeup on
vacation: such as ‘Enjoying White Holidays’ (see Figure 8, Elle, Spring/Summer
1991), ‘Fun Holiday beauty and Makeup’ (Elle, Fall 1990), and ‘Fashion in China:
Holiday Flowers’ (Elle, Spring and Summer 1993).

Figure 8 ‘Enjoying White Holidays’ (Elle, Spring/Summer 1991)

In this way, Elle not merely informs readers what to wear for a certain season as
Shanghai Fashion does, but also guides them on what to wear in accordance with
different occasions and purposes. More importantly, through listing the brands of all
items that models are wearing, readers—as potential consumers, are incited to
constantly fashion their closet by consuming the items displayed in Elle. But, as
mentioned above, the great majority of people at that time had no economic ability to
consume Elle or the brands it promoted. Indeed, due to a lack of consumers and
advertising income, Elle had a difficult time operating in the underdeveloped
domestic market in the first stage from 1988 to 1994. It only published 12 issues
during this period, and almost discontinued its run in China (Sun, et al., 2003).

Despite the unprepared domestic market, what is striking is that the images of
women’s participation in productive activities, especially heavy manual work, were
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completely absent in Elle, which was also true of the initial issues of Shanghai
Fashion in 1983. While Shanghai Fashion had already photographed models in
fashionable attire in non-productive scenes such as parks, Elle further stimulated the
fantasy of recreation by connecting it with fashion. Young slim models in
fashionable dresses, most of whom were foreigners, were represented as consumers
pleasurably enjoying various recreational activities both in China and abroad, which
had no associations with production at all. Even if readers of the early 1980s and
early 1992 could not afford the brands or to travel abroad, they learned from Elle
what they should be wearing for summer camping, a holiday in the jungles of South
America, sports in the city, and so forth.
During the second stage of Elle’s development, consumption dominated the
representation of young women’s everyday life. Leisure was almost equivalent to
consumer activities during this period. One sign of the booming domestic
consumption market was the popularity of Elle in China at this period. From around
1994 on, Elle began making a profit, becoming increasingly popular in China, with
the number of its publications reaching around 400,000 (Sun, et al, 2003). It started
publishing issues every other month in 1994, and then monthly from 1997 onward,
and its price per copy also gradually increased from 8 yuan in 1988, to 12 yuan in
1994, and 16 yuan in 1999. The increasing number of advertisements shown in Elle
was another crucial token of burgeoning consumerism in China. In 1988, Elle only
had two advertisements, both of which were cosmetic products; in 1994, the average
number of advertisements surged to 20 and even reached 30 in some issues. The
types of advertisements also diversified, covering almost every aspect of daily life:
from cosmetic products to drinks (e.g. teabags, alcohol), watches, jewellery, shoes,
bags, interior decorations (such as porcelain), milk powders, health supplements,
fitness clubs, sanitary towels, bras, travel, hotels and so on. Toward the late 1990s,
advertisements of high-tech products became more and more visible, such as body
shavers, cell phones, Walkmans, DVD players, Karaoke machines, home digital
theatres, and juicers. That is, Elle focused the lives of young, middle-class women
mainly on consumption as detailed in section 2.1 of chapter 2.

Though the middle-class lifestyle anticipated in Elle in the late 1980s and early
1990s was still mostly fantasy, it gradually became a reality experienced by some
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groups of urban citizens in their daily life since the mid-1990s. The international
brands that people could only see in Elle in the late 1980s suddenly built stores on
the streets of the big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Elle’s one
interesting change in 1994 was that the addresses and contact numbers of the stores
were added to the bottom of the advertisements to inform readers where to purchase
the brands (e.g. see Figure 9). In Shanghai, Huaihai road and Nanking Road became
the battlefields for international capital, and were gradually occupied by the
department stores (for example, the first Printemps department store, that opened on
Huaihai Road in 1994, made an advertisement on Elle) and international brands,
which changed the urban landscape dramatically. It was also from 1994 onward that
the sewing patterns that had been displayed on the last page of Elle disappeared,
suggesting that readers could purchase clothing advertised from the stores available
in the cities in person instead of making their own. With the expansion of stores of
local and global brands, consumerism gradually became a key facet of urban life in
China. More significantly, the normalisation of consumerism in cultural
representation legitimated the behaviour and way of life of the new rich and middle
classes. Those who ‘got rich first’ were able to consume the commodities in the city
that defined and distinguished their standing in society (Wang Jing, 1996; Dai,
1999). The great majority of have-nots were also greatly influenced by the
aspirational consumer culture, although they could not afford to participate directly
as discussed in section 2.1.2 of chapter 2. Readers, most of whom were young
middle-class women, were incited to become consumers. Lisa Rofel (2007) used the
keyword ‘desire’ to capture the remaking of new subjectivities whose selfrepresentation was associated with consumption and possessive individualism in
post-socialist China.
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Figure 9 left is Louis Vuitton's advertisement in Elle in 1993, the bottom of which only shows one store location,
which is in Beijing; right is Louis Vuitton’s new advertisement in Elle in December 1994, and, as can be seen at
the bottom, another store

Besides, Elle included topics of travel and housing as two regular columns in 1994
and 1997, respectively. Continuous reduction of working hours and the expansion of
holidays were crucial to stimulating people to consume as well as to boosting
China’s domestic consumption. The Chinese government revised Provisions on
Working Hours of Workers and Staff and stipulated that urban workers’ weekly
working hours be reduced to a maximum of 44 hours and six days per week in 1995.
Workers in urban China were allowed to have two days off every other week, annual
vacations and paid holidays (at least four days). As a result, the duration of China’s
circulation holiday increased dramatically from 52 days in 1949 to 104 days in 1997
(Shen, Wang, Ye, et al., 2018). In 1995, work days were further decreased to five
days per week; in 1999, the government reformed the public holiday system, and
introduced the ‘Golden Week’ (the week-long National Day) (ibid.). With the
expansion of holidays, consumption thus further expanded, especially for travel. Elle
included the column ‘travel’ in 1994, introducing resorts, food, and shopping spots
both in tourist cities in China and abroad. Housing, which has been gradually
privatised and commodified since the 1990s, was another key item of consumption
as well as a significant emblem of middle-class social status as discussed in section
2.1.2 of chapter 2. Influenced by the changing market and consumer needs, Elle
accordingly added the column ‘Ideal Living Environment’ from 1997 on,
recommending commodities for interior decor and providing housing design plans.
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Thus, consequently, consumption was embedded into the middle-class lifestyle,
ranging from purchasing housing, shopping for international brands in shopping
malls, eating out in fancy restaurants, bars and teahouses, spending leisure time on
travel and fitness, and so forth.

Figure 10 Elle: the best friend of those who are elegant, fashionable and have fine pingwei’, Elle’s self-promotion
in 1997 (Elle, January 1997).

Furthermore, Elle associated consumption with the term ‘pingwei’ to mark social,
cultural and economic distinctions. From 1997 on, Elle frequently mentions the term
‘pingwei’, which could be roughly translated as ‘taste’ in English. ‘Pinwei’,
according to Song and Lee (2010), is a combination of ‘pin’, which refers to
‘quality’, and ‘wei’ which means position or rank. In an advertisement in 1997, Elle
self-promotes using the slogan ‘Elle: the best friend of those who are elegant,
fashionable and have fine ‘pingwei’ (see Figure 10). Next to the slogan, there is a
young foreign model in a pink suit with full makeup standing and looking straight
ahead. Thus, by promoting itself as having ‘pingwei’, Elle not only distinguishes
itself from other types of magazines, but also underlines that young middle-class
women can obtain ‘pingwei’ through buying and reading Elle. So, what does Elle do
to enhance its ‘pinwei’? In addition to content on the latest fashion, beauty and
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fitness trends, cooking, travel and interior design, it included more pages covering
cultural events since 1997, including the latest books, art exhibitions, movies, and
music. In doing so, according to its editorial of issue January 1999, Elle aimed to
‘help readers to absorb more nutrition for the mind, widen their field of vision, and
enrich their lives (Elle, issue January 1999)’. It, thus, extended consumption from
material commodities to cultural fields. The editorial of the issue from January 1997
states that,
‘As living conditions are improving, more and more Chinese
people now can visit famous tourist resorts, enjoy nice food, and
purchase clothing and cosmetics of good quality. But no matter
how much money you have, there are some qualities that money
cannot buy you, such as pingwei, aesthetic sentiment…’(Elle,
January 1997)
Hence, as Song and Lee argue in their study of men’s lifestyle magazines (2010),
Elle can also be considered, as defined by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, a form of
cultural capital in its objectified state (Bourdieu, 1986: 241). Moreover, pingwei as a
form of cultural capital became a marker of middle class identity that was closely
linked to middle class social positioning. As Bourdieu points out, cultural
consumption, such as books, art exhibitions, and movies, legitimated social
stratification. It became an inner quality defining the middle-class subject, who
anxiously engaged in playing, to utilize Bourdieu’s jargon (1979). They used ‘the
game of distinction’ to separate themselves from both the lower classes as well as the
new rich who were often viewed as poorly-educated (Song and Lee, 2010; Anagnost,
2004). Thus, pinwei is aligned with the discourse of quality (suzhi) discussed in
section 2.1.2 of chapter two, and ‘articulates the boundaries of China’s newly
differentiating social strata’ , ‘producing subject positions necessary for capitalist
accumulation’ (Anagnost, 2004: 199).

● Fashioning the white-collar beauty
Despite the fact that the middle class occupied a very small portion of the population
in the 1990s, ‘the anticipatory stage of middle-class life’ in Elle produced an
aspirational self-entrepreneurial subject in the 1990s, who, as many scholars have
argued (Anagnost, 2008; Rofel, 2007; Ong and Zhang, 2008), was self-reliant and
responsible for his/her own ‘profits and losses’, anxiously managed her/his embodied
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human capital, whose success was measured in commodified expression of social
distinction, and whose self-representation and self-narration were associated with
consumption and possessive individualism.
Indeed, women interviewed by Elle shared many similarities – they were young
(mostly in their twenties and early thirties), good looking (always with full makeup
and fashionable clothing), well-educated, and had successful careers. From 1988 to
1999, Elle China featured almost exclusively stories of successful female elites (only
four males were presented, one entrepreneur, two fashion designers, and a make-up
artist), including four actresses and one singer (e.g. Wu Junmei in issue Fall and
Winter 1988; Chen Chong, in issue Spring and Summer 1992; Gong Li, in issue Fall
and Winter 1992; Liu Xiaoqing, in issue Spring and Summer, 1993; Na Ying, issue
May 1998), four fashion designers (e.g. Lü Lan, in issue four 1989; Chen Shanhua,
in issue Fall 1990; Chen Xiaotao, in issue Spring and Summer 1993; Chen Hong,
December 1994), two fashion models (Xiao Dongmei, February 1995; December
1996), two television presenters and one television producer (e.g. Yue-Sai Kan, in
issue Spring 1989; Ni Ping, in issue June 1996; Xu Gehui, issue August 1999), a
ballerina (e.g. Wang Qifeng, in issue Winter 1989), a female public relations
manager of a hotel (e.g. Gao Lili, in issue Spring 1990), and even a female president
of Tongji University (Wu Qidi, issue May 1999). Via introducing the life stories of
these women, Elle staged them as aspirational subjects for young women: they were
all young, feminised, fashionable and successful. It deserves notice that women
working in the agricultural and industrial sectors were completely invisible in Elle.
The women’s work represented in Elle almost exclusively referred to jobs in the
relatively high-end service sector. For instance, all female interviewees of Elle were
found in the service sector, such as the entertainment industry, fashion, art, design,
media and communications and hospitality which were thought of as more feminised
and hence suitable for women to work in as discussed in section 1.3 of chapter 1 and
section 2.1.3 of chapter 2.
Self-striving and self-development were key themes in Elle’s representation of the
white-collar beauty in the 1990s. Stories often stressed how individual women
achieved their success via their own personal striving (geren fendou). One example
is the coverage of a fashion designer called Lü Lan in an article, entitled ‘Young
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Fashion Designer Lu Lan’s Internal Monologue’, in the summer issue 1989 in Elle.
The article, which was written by Lü Lan herself, detailed her successful
transformation from a former worker in a factory into a fashion designer. Lu initially
worked on a farm in rural Beijing when graduating from high school in 1976, and
then became a worker in a textile factory in her twenties in the late 1970s. Benefiting
from the restoration of the college entrance examination in 1977, she was able to
enroll in college in the late 1970s, and obtained a diploma in fashion design from the
Central Academy of Craft Art. Lü returned to the textile factory after graduation in
1983, and participated in a fashion design competition called ‘China’s Fashion
Culture’ in the same year, winning the second-place award. Lü writes that she works
industriously, and soon becomes a well-known fashion designer in 1985. However,
Lü is not satisfied with what she has achieved, and considers her field of vision too
narrow due to lack of language skills. Inspired by the motto ‘why not the best’ which
Lü quotes from Jimmy Carter the former president of the U.S, she pushes herself to
learn foreign languages so as to understand the latest international fashion trends. So,
she conducts a further study in Beijing Foreign Studies University, and passes all
examinations with distinctions in 1986. After years of striving, Lü finally gains
international recognition and is selected to attend the 1989 Fashion Show of National
Top Fashion Designers.
In Lü Lan’s autobiographical narration, she highlights that her transformation from a
worker in a textile factory to a well-known fashion designer is achieved through two
things: one is her own diligence and self-striving to overcome all difficulties, and the
other is that she never stopped developing and improving herself. More specifically,
over the time span of a decade from the late 1970s to late 1980s, she transformed
herself on her own from a working-class factory girl into an educated middle-class
designer in her early thirties, continuously fashioning herself, especially through
education, including college to learn fashion design and study of a foreign language.
The story indicates that if one relies on herself (kao ziji), and constantly fashions and
develops herself, one can achieve upward social mobility just as Lü Lan did. Hence,
an individual is asked to be responsible for her own loss and profit. For Lü, her selfreliance and self-development finally pay off. The story of self-striving for success,
on the one hand, has slowly become a popular narration of ‘successful people
(chenggong renshi)’; and on the other hand, it has shadowed the increasingly high
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social polarity. This is only one side of the story, but it has become the hegemonic
one widely circulated in China since the 1990s (Dai, 1999; Wang, 2000; Zhang,
2014). As Dai Jinhua (1999: 110) argues, one significant change that happened in the
1990s was that the individualistic dream of pursuing success replaced the collective
dream of national modernisation of the 1980s. Besides, the meanings of selffashioning extend from changing appearance to improving embodied capital. For
Tao Xing’er of the movie Fashionable Red Dress, self-fashioning mainly refers to
transforming her appearance to be more feminised and model-like, while for Lü Lan
it indicates not merely the pursuit of a feminised look but also the anxiety of
improving cultural capital to become a middle-class figure.

Self-fashioning is particularly conducted through what Anagnost (2008) calls the
‘commodified expression of distinction’. Consumption is considered an important
means to obtain a feminised and fashionable look. For instance, Elle organised a
beauty contest sponsored by Evian, a brand of mineral water, to celebrate the coming
of the millennium in 1999 (see Figure 11). It chose five ordinary young women who
wanted to change their appearances to join the transformation challenge, and
published their before and after photos as well as their thoughts on their
transformations. Through comparing the photos of before and after styling, readers
of Elle could vote for the one who they believed had changed most thoroughly and
successfully. The five candidates were young, educated middle class, including an air
hostess, an office worker, a postgraduate student, a college student, and an editor.
While the candidates barely smiled in their photos before the transformation, they
confidently smiled and posed in front of the camera in the photos from after
transformation in which all include sophisticated makeup, stylish hairdos, and
fashionable clothing. They associate the transformations in their appearance with
their ‘inner self’. For example, the air hostess wants to ‘become fashionable and
unleash her inner sexiness through participating in the contest’. Similarly, the office
worker calls it ‘the event that can unveil the most beautiful side of oneself ’. The
beauty contest organised by Elle is very similar to the ‘zhanqun’ activity depicted in
the movie Fashionable Red Dress, especially with respect to encouraging selffashioning by pursuing a feminised appearance. What is more prominent in Elle is
the introduction of market forces. While in the 1980s’ movie women pursuing
fashion is considered a liberation from the androgynous socialist subject position,
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such liberation is ironically absorbed by the market in the 1990s. The before and
after beauty contest suggested that consuming makeup and fashion allows women to
transform themselves into sexy, confident, and pretty subjects. The fact that readers
who vote for the contest are offered a chance of being rewarded with gifts provided
by the beauty brand L’Oréal suggests that readers can also transform themselves, just
like the five candidates, by pursuing and applying beauty products.

Figure 11 ‘’99 Beauty contest’ (Elle, December 1999)

The anxiety of self-fashioning and self-development further intensifies through
accumulating cultural capital, and becomes a significant means of securing middleclass status. A long quote extracted from the editorial of the May 1997 issue reads:
‘Living in modern cities… under the call of developing high
technology and digital infrastructures, our readers are propelled to
keep updating their knowledge, to improve their moral culture, and
to attach importance to self-organisation and creativity in their spare
time. Meanwhile, those who do not want to be left behind, also pay
attention to lifting their quality of life, especially the quality of their
spiritual life, to make a flat life tasteful…Some women aspire to be
the ideal woman, who is not only pretty and intelligent, but also
persists in developing herself through reading.…It is inspiring to see
readers’ own experience and feelings expressed in the letters that
they send to us.…We appreciate those friends who know the art of
living, experience the beauty of life, and nurture elegant hobbies
actively. For this, we hope Elle can be helpful to you (Elle, May
1997; translated by the author).’
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In this way, Elle actually anticipates an exemplary female subject for its readers to
emulate. Such an ideal female subject has a pretty and elegant appearance, fine taste;
and, at the same time, is constantly developing new hobbies and updating her
knowledge in leisure time in order to improve her cultural capital.

More specifically, Elle chose five women to represent such an aspirational female
figure who is ‘pretty, intelligent’ and embodies high cultural capital. In an article
issued in July 1999, five women were interviewed to introduce the ‘elegant hobbies’
they had developed. They are all in their twenties, and all from middle-class
backgrounds, with occupations of doctor, bank clerk, journalist, financial manager,
and teacher. Instead of paying much attention to their work lives, the article
overwhelmingly focuses on how they cultivate and learn fine hobbies and interests in
their spare time, such as tea ceremony, ancient Chinese zither, fabric weaving and
fitness. The article claims that modern women ‘no longer merely move back and
forth between work and housework, but look to cultivating various hobbies and
interests in their lives’. The article uses the title of a book, Having Coffee with
Picasso, to describe the lifestyles of five middle-class women who serve as symbols
of ‘elegant, fashionable and have fine pingwei’.68 Here, a middle-class woman’s
occupation functions only as an indicator of her social status, to differentiate her
from the young working-class women who migrate to cities from rural areas and
work in factories. Elle avoids touching upon issues such as the widening social gap
or discriminations against women in the workplace (e.g. the call for women returning
home that prevailed in the 1990s); instead, it glosses over the social ruptures, and
legitimates the status quo through encouraging young women to learn and develop
their own hobbies to accumulate cultural capital so as to secure their distinctive
middle-class status. Interestingly, the anxiety over self-fashioning of the white-collar
beauties represented in Elle in the 1990s is more out of the need to mark distinction,
rather than for economisation. However, in the web drama Women in Shanghai
(2018, dir. Cheng Liang), it is channelled into the anxiety of increasing
employability, which will be demonstrated later in section 3.1.3 of this chapter.
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At the turn of the twentieth century, Elle depicts an ordinary day in the life of a
white-collar beauty in the city in the December 1999 issue, which deserves a long
quote:
‘Thinking of a scene in our daily life today, we can find something
very interesting. Before heading to work, a white-collar woman
carefully applies lipstick, sprays a little Chanel No.5 perfume
behind her ears, and takes a travel card with her before leaving
home; when in the office, she works with her laptop; when in a
meeting, she takes notes in her memo with a MontBlanc pen; when
at leisure, she wears a pair of shoes from Nike, with Walkman
earphones in her ears. She uses Kodak to capture a wonderful
moment of drinking Coke, and uses Nokia to chat with her lover.
She is a woman of our times: she knows how to prevent breast
cancer and what AIDS is; she is well-educated, and has knowledge
of the Chernobyl disaster; she is a pacifist, and against nuclear
weapons. She can be Li Li, Mary, or Reiko Yamaguchi. These are
the things that we have already gotten used to today, and are icons
marked on the map of our time’ (Elle, issue December 1999;
translated by the author).
In this brief paragraph, six international brands (Chanel No.5, MontBlanc, Nike,
Coke) and several high-tech products (Walkman, laptop, camera, cell-phone) are
listed as daily items that a white-collar, middle class woman consumes and uses at
her work and in her life. Fashion and consumption are crucial to constructing and
articulating the aspirational female subjectivity that serves as a role model for Elle’s
young readers. Yet, having money to acquire commodities is not enough; she has to
obtain embodied cultural capital exemplified in her knowledge of body health and a
cosmopolitan understanding of political and social issues. Therefore, the white-collar
woman represented in Elle is characterised by her power to consume and her
endowment of high cultural capital.

To briefly conclude, middle class status is an economic, social as well as cultural
category. Cultural representations in the 1990s construct an aspirational middle-class
subject who is young, fashionable, well-educated, and has the economic capacity to
consume. In the 1980s, the exemplary female figure shifted from the working class
model worker to a feminised model, and in the 1990s, she became what Woronov
(2016) called a ‘model consumer’ who was an educated member of the middle class
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who had knowledge of consumption. However, such middle-class status is always
contingent in Elle, requiring young women’s constant anxious attention to fashion
their look and develop themselves to improve their ‘pingwei’ or ‘quality’ (suzhi). As
such, everyday life is turned into a constant struggle for betterment. In the anxiety of
being left behind, young women are incited to develop themselves in their spare
time, such as learning a foreign language, and cultivate cultural and artistic hobbies,
in the model of the fashion designer Lü Lan and other middle-class women
interviewed by Elle. However, representation in Elle singularizes the complexity,
and only illustrates a portion of the reality. In Elle, we also witness the changing
meaning of work for young women. As mentioned in chapter one, women’s work
was often associated with the agricultural and industrial sectors in the dominant
cultural representations of the socialist era, while it almost exclusively refers to jobs
in the higher-value added service sector designated for the young, educated urban
women in Elle. Besides, work functions more as a symbol of one’s social status in
the magazine.69 In line with the hegemonic ideology of calling women to return
home, Elle celebrates the commodified expression of classed femininity, and barely
mentions the actual working conditions and practices of young middle-class women
in the city.

3.1.3. Women in Shanghai (shanghai nüzi tujian) (2018)

Since the first decade of the new millennium, the middle classes have found it
increasingly difficult to maintain their social status and achieve upward social
mobility in the megacities in China (Zhang Huiyu, 2014: 13). The state-sponsored
discourse of the middle class anticipated the development of China’s middle class as
a political, economic and cultural solution to the intense social conflicts between the
rich and poor and a tool to drive economic growth, which is detailed in section 2.1 in
chapter 2. The bloc of the middle class is positioned as a normative and aspirational
figure visible in cultural representations, as can be seen from the analyses of Elle in
section 3.1.2 of this chapter. Nevertheless, in contrast to the rosy picture portrayed
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by the government, social media is filled with the anxiety of what film scholar Zhang
Huiyu termed ‘the crisis of the middle class’ since the first decade of the new
millennium. Articles, such as ‘the decline of the middle class’, ‘Will the middle class
become the new poor?’, ‘middle class no more’, and ‘China’s vanishing middle
class’, have been widely circulated on social media in China (Wang, 2018; Xin,
2018; Murong, 2016). The government engineered the project of ‘consumption
upgrade’ (xiaofei shengji), aiming to incite the middle class to spend more so as to
drive economic development; yet, many in the Chinese middle class would rather to
‘downgrade consumption’ (xiaofei jiangji) and have more savings than spending.
Blogger Ma Ning wrote a post entitled ‘This Generation of Young Chinese Should
Brace for the Bitter Days Ahead’ which received over 300,000 views on the social
media platform WeChat in August 2018 suggested young people stop going to
shopping malls and nightclubs, and save time and money investing in upgrading their
skills (Ma, 2018; Yuan, 2018). Given the rising costs, rocketing household debts,
deteriorating employment conditions, difficulty of obtaining a hukou and the
economic slowdown in the metropolis, college graduates and white collar workers
are talking about ‘flee Beijing-Shanghai-Guangzhou’—leaving the three megacities
in China where they once planned to find a niche. Many young people are struggling
to make ends meet in cities like Shanghai, and choose to go back to their second- or
third-tiered hometowns (Li, 2014). Zhang Huiyu (2014) argues that college graduates
born in the 1980s and 1990s, as the potential middle class, find themselves trapped in
the condition that their working-class counterparts have experienced: ‘no avenue to
stay in the city, and no place to return to’.70
Oddly, against this background, women-oriented literature and culture’ (nüxingxiang
wenxue he wenhua) 71 gained great popularity in the mass media, including TV
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series,72 such as Go Lala Go!(dulala shengzhi ji, 2010) The Ode to Joy (huanle
song, 2016), The First Half of My Life (wo de qianbansheng, 2017), and Women in
Beijing (Beijing nüzi tujian, 2018) (Sun and Yang, 2019). Among them, Women in
Shanghai (Shanghai nüzi tujian, dir. Cheng Liang, 2018) is one of the most
noticeable series that offers new interpretations of well-educated middle-class
women in China, and strongly resonated with the lived experience of the
interviewees of this fieldwork.

Women in Shanghai, a local remake of the Japanese TV drama Tokyo Girls (Tokyo
Joshi Zukan, 2016-2017), is a web series streamed on the Youtube-like online
platform Youku in China. The drama revolves around the life of a young, ambitious
woman named Luo Haiyan, originally from a small town in the Anhui province, who
is striving to carve out a career for herself in metropolitan Shanghai after her
graduation. The total 20 episodes span Luo Haiyan’s life from her early twenties to
mid-thirties, vividly portraying her life, career and romances in Shanghai from 2003
to 2018. Capturing a snapshot of Luo’s life in each episode, the show depicts Luo’s
subject transformation from a college graduate of provincial origin to an
entrepreneur who starts up an advertising firm on her own in the glittering
metropolis. The show adopts the narrative of a striving woman who achieves
economic and spiritual independence and freedom in ‘a city full of possibility’ (Sun
and Yang, 2020).

The representation of young middle-class women in Women in Shanghai is very
similar to, and at the same time different from that of Elle. In line with the dominant
popular representations of women since the 1990s, the protagonist Luo Haiyan of
Women in Shanghai is inevitably a young professional middle-class woman who is a
city-dwelling college graduate with a fashionable appearance and fine taste.
However, in sharp contrast to Elle, it is women’s productive role that is placed in the
foreground in Women in Shanghai. The web series uses Luo Haiyan’s striving story
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as a paragon of ‘moxi nüzi’, an expression invented by the web series that refers to
the ambitious young, middle-class women who achieve economic freedom through
self-reliance. The web series underlines that Luo successfully achieves upward social
mobility from the lower-middle-class to ‘the top 10 percent earners of Shanghai’
because of her ambition, independence and constant self-development. Luo Haiyan
not only successfully changes her appearance, but, more significantly, she achieves
economic independence through self-striving, which is viewed as a precondition of
Luo’s freedom to choose a marriage partner in the web drama. It celebrates female
independence and the individualistic pursuit of a career. It is in this sense that the
aspirational narrative of Women in Shanghai provides a ‘new’ interpretation of
young, middle-class women in urban China.
The show stresses the importance of self-reliance and self-striving in Luo Haiyan’s
achievement of economic independence. Work is presented as the fundamental and
primary means of self-reliance. The show begins with Luo’s graduation in 2003
when the expansion of higher education had just begun, resulting in the continued
employment pressure on college graduates detailed in section 2.1.3 of chapter two.
As a graduate with an advertising major from Shanghai University who has no
experience or social connections, it was not easy for her to begin a career in
Shanghai. Luo’s story of job-hunting resonates with many female college graduates:
after graduation, she tried several temporary jobs – including work as an usherette
for a hotel and as an escort for rich men, and all of these jobs are in the low-end
service sector which requires her to convert her femininity and youth into capital.
Luo Haiyan is not satisfied with these jobs: the former not only requires long hours
of work with low pay but it is not a middle-class job; although the latter allows her
to make a quick buck, it relies on using her youth and beauty to please the rich men.
Luo isn’t seeking a low-end service job for the working-class, nor a high-income job
that requires trading her youth to men for capital; she wants a job that bestows
‘middle class’ social status, namely a ‘white-collar’ job.

In order to become a qualified white-collar worker and maintain her status, Luo
Haiyan constantly refashions herself via self-investment. After several unsuccessful
trials, Luo Haiyan finally gets her first formal job in an advertising firm named
bisite. However, Luo Haiyan is not competitive at all. Other newcomers of the
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company are all young, fashionable females with qualified skills as well as social
skills for work. By contrast, Luo is not only not good looking, but also lacks the
necessary skills, such as computer skills, language and the ability to build social
relations with her superiors and colleagues. Through comparison and competition
with others, Luo feels that she is lagging-behind, and needs to increase her
competitiveness via self-investment. The first investment she makes is to learn
English. When joining bisite, Luo is the only one who has no English name; even
though she works very hard, she is outshined by her colleagues and misses many
opportunities for self-presentation because of her inadequate language skills. With
only CNY 1,200 savings in the bank, Luo still decides to register for a VIP course to
learn English which costs CNY 4,999. To make ends meet, Luo only has a budget of
CNY 10 for each meal, and has to eat instant noodles for several months.
Nevertheless, she finds it worthy and believes that her investment will pay off in the
future.
Luo Haiyan’s second investment is in her appearance. Interestingly, Luo’s physical
transformation plays an important role in the depiction of her subjective
transformation from a graduate to a professional. Such a transition takes place in
stages with the help of two ‘instructors’. Luo’s elder sister, an experienced white
collar beauty from a small town, is Luo’s first ‘instructor’. She scorns Luo for
wearing a white T-shirt and carrying a canvas bag for a job interview, and disciplines
Luo that a white collar shirt is necessary to become a ‘white-collar worker’ (bailing).
The elder sister teaches Luo the rules of dress in the workplace, and the ability to
judge one’s positions by the way s/he dresses. Here, shedding the t-shirt and
embracing the white collared shirt signifies Luo Haiyan’s changing social role from a
student to an office worker. Wearing a white-collared shirt alone is far from enough
to be a ‘moxi nüzi’. It is with the guidance of a fashionable woman named Kate from
Shanghai that Luo finally transforms her look into an urban ‘white-collar beauty’. As
Luo’s colleague, friend as well as competitor in the firm, Kate not only speaks fluent
English and has qualified skills at work, she has a pretty and feminine look with
curled long hair, sophisticated make-up and a sweet voice. She is positioned as an
ideal tutor as well as a role model for Luo to imitate in the show. Kate takes Luo to a
hair salon, and guides her on how to style herself. Kate tells Luo that,
189

‘If you want to stay firmly in Shanghai, it is important for you to
have an attractive appearance and elegant style, apart from
proficiency at the job. So, you must not focus only on English
improvement and neglect to dress up. If we women do not take
good care of ourselves, others will not take us seriously. You
should learn how to spend money more wisely to invest in
yourself. Now, to become a sophisticated woman, you need to get
a new hairstyle so that you can shed your old self and put on a new
one.’(Episode 5, Women in Shanghai; translated by the author)

For Kate, different hairstyles represent different personalities and selves. In choosing
a certain hairstyle, Luo also chooses what the self that she wants to model herself to
be. With Kate’s instruction, Luo chooses a bob hairstyle for herself, which,
according to Kate’s explanation, signifies that Luo wants to be a sweet and modern
woman who can handle work and men at the same time (see Figure 12). Kate even
gives Luo a new name, an English name, Harriet.

Figure 12 left is Luo Haiyan(on right) before transformation; right is Luo (on left) after transformation under
Kate's guidance (Women in Shanghai, 2018).

On this account, with improved language skills, a new hairstyle and a new name, Luo
re-fashions and ‘upgrades’ herself from Luo Haiyan to Harriet, namely from a
provincial and unpretentious graduate into a ‘qualified’ white-collar beauty of
Shanghai with a fashionable look and the necessary skills. That is, the investment is
not only a matter of upgrading skills and appearance, but more crucially, is
internalised as Luo’s subjective transformation. Moreover, the investment in look
and skills that Luo desires is inevitably classed. It is Kate, a pretty and skilled urban,
middle-class woman from Shanghai who is presented as a qualified tutor for Luo’s
pursuit of urban, middle-class femininity, rather than Luo’s small town elder sister
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from. However, the goals of self-investment are different. For Kate, who is of
Shanghai origin, her ultimate goals are to ‘get married before she turns 30, own a
wedding dress from Vera Wang, hold her wedding in a French-style hotel, and enjoy
an affluent and carefree life’. Kate’s vision of life strongly echoes the widespread
axiom ‘it is better to marry well than have a successful career’(gandehao buru
jiadehao) that Chinese women have been hearing since the 1980s (Zuo, 2016).
However, for Luo, the chief goal of self-investment is to increase her
competitiveness in the workplace so that she can join the top 10 percent in Shanghai.
She wants to be a ‘top girl’ in the workplace rather than a full-time housewife at
home. Figures like Luo are represented as the paragon of women in Shanghai in the
web drama.

For Luo Haiyan, it is work, rather than love and marriage, that plays a fundamental
role in achieving self-actualisation. The show underscores and orchestrates the
centralisation of work in young, middle-class women’s subjectivity. Specifically, a
modern, young, urban woman post-2010 is represented as someone whose ultimate
goal is to carve out a career by herself in order to gain economic independence that
enables her freedom to choose a partner. Luo’s decade-long working life is entangled
with her love stories in Shanghai. When there is a conflict between love and work,
Luo always prioritizes work over love. Scarlet, Luo’s superior in the firm bisite who
has a successful career and owns a flat in central Shanghai on her own, becomes
another important role model that Luo imitates at the workplace. Scarlet is
represented as ‘nü qiangren’ (a strong woman) in the show. Initially, Luo wants to
give up her job at bisite for her first lover Chen Xiaowei, who is Luo’s competitor
for the job but is defeated by her. Scarlet, with full make-up, a clean long-bob
hairstyle and a smart blazer, instructs Luo that ‘For every single significant choice in
your life, you must not be pulled down by others, even by your beloved.’ Scarlet’s
instruction becomes a key motif of Luo’s life. Luo breaks up with her first two
boyfriends because of her determination to pursue a career in Shanghai. Her first
boyfriend, Chen, is her schoolmate from the Shandong province. Chen blueprints a
life in a small city for Luo, where they could get stable jobs in a bank or state-owned
enterprises, and promises that he would take care of Luo. For Chen, such a life is
more realistic. However, Luo rejects him and the life he promises. Luo chooses to
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stay to pursue her career in Shanghai, even though it means she has to rely
completely on herself.

Luo’s second boyfriend, named Yang Chengyuan, is an English teacher from a
middle-class family in Shanghai. Yang is well-educated, has a stable job, and owns a
property in Shanghai. As mentioned in section 2.1.2 of Chapter 2, homeownership is
crucial to defining middle-class status as well as starting a family in China. In
addition, because of the sharp division between urban and rural citizenship due to the
initiation of the household registration system, Yang’s Shanghai hukou makes him a
far more privileged citizen than a provincial woman like Luo. In other words, Yang
is quite attractive in the marriage market, and thus an ideal husband for Luo.
However, Luo would rather spend time working than securing her relationship. Yang
is unhappy with Luo’s prioritisation of work over their relationship, and tells Luo
that, ‘your work is my biggest rival’. In episode 7, Luo asks Yang to accompany her
to visit a real estate agency so that she can get some inspiration for a project that she
is working on. Luo Haiyan expresses the idea of buying a flat of her own, but is
strongly discouraged by her boyfriend, who tries to discipline her to shift her
ambition from work to family. Yang says to Luo, ‘My mother always says that a
woman’s position, in the end, is in the home. Only in the family can you achieve
your true value’. He further questions Luo’s strong ambition for work, ‘Can
independence give you happiness? Can independence give you a family, a child or a
husband?’. But Luo believes that work is far more important than a husband, and
without a career, a home-oriented woman is only an appendage of her marriage. It is
work, Luo believes, that gives her economic independence and independence.
In the web drama, Luo’s hardwork and drive at the workplace pay off: she begins as
an intern, and soon is promoted to an account manager, and then to managing
director in her late twenties. But even when Luo is assigned a key senior-level role in
the company, she still feels that she does not ‘stand firmly in Shanghai’. She meets a
young and good-looking programmer named Zhang Tianhao at the age of thirty but
still refuses to give up her career for marriage. In episode 14, on a terrace
overlooking the night scenery of Shanghai, Zhang romantically expresses his love
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for Luo, and suggests Luo travel around the world with him for a year. Luo rejects
his offer, and replies,
‘Your idea is too naïve. God knows how many years it took for me
to finally achieve what I have achieved today. The advertising
industry has the fastest pace of change and updating. If I had left
for a year, I would have been replaced by others many times. A
year of travelling gives me nothing, only some photos. For me
now, work is the most important thing.’
Luo’s anxiety over securing her position in the advertising industry does not come
out of nowhere. Work in a creative industry like advertising is constantly updated,
and always favours younger workers as examined in section 2.3 of chapter 2. After
ending her relationship with Zhang, Luo leaves work for a short period for another
boyfriend, a millionaire who signs a contract with Luo asking her to quit her job to
be a full-time housewife. Although she lives an affluent life with the millionaire, Luo
has no work, and is completely dependent on him. Luo realises soon that she does
not want to be a bird in a golden cage, and chooses to re-enter the workplace.
However, when Luo returns to the advertising sector, workers like Luo who were
born in the early 1980s, are considered much less competitive than younger
generations born in the 1990s. She is rejected by many companies, and is replaced by
younger workers born in the post-90s. In a word, in the world of creativity where
‘you are only as good as your last job’, Luo’s work experience and knowledge
accumulated over a decade not only are not considered an advantage, but are viewed
as outdated. The creative world favours younger generations, who not only have the
energy to work long hours but also have the most updated knowledge and are
familiar with popular culture trends. Luo’s anxiety strongly resonates with many
young, middle-class women who were interviewed in the fieldwork, which is
summarized in section 2.3 of chapter 2. Like Luo, they are anxious about being
replaced, which in turn incites these young women to invest more in themselves to
increase their human capital.
Nevertheless, Luo’s prioritisation of career over marriage and family is strongly
criticised by her family and relatives back in her hometown in Anhui. In episode 17,
after years of striving in Shanghai, Luo Haiyan returns to her hometown in her early
thirties for the first time in the web drama. To welcome Luo, her family and relatives
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gather together in a flat that Luo purchased for her parents who then give it to her
younger brother. Luo’s nephew and niece in Anhui consider her a role model,
because Luo is the only one in the big family who left the small town and
successfully pursued a career in cosmopolitan Shanghai. However, in the eyes of
Luo’s mother and aunts, Luo is a ‘failure’ for remaining single in her thirties. They
constantly urge her to find a boyfriend as soon as possible. Over lunch, one of her
aunts says to Luo directly in front of everyone that, ‘next time you return home, you
need to bring a boyfriend back so that your father can have a companion to drink
with’. Another aunt follows immediately, ‘You should hurry up and find a husband!
At your age, if you do not hurry it will only become more difficult to find a husband
in the future’. Her aunts blame her for being too picky. Her first aunt continues,
‘Haiyan is too outstanding, and has too many choices. But don’t be too picky. You
need to hurry up and find a good husband. Otherwise, you will have to settle for
what's left’ . Her third aunt adds that ‘I know you are excellent; but, you need to
hurry and find a husband, and don’t wait until you get too old. As a woman advances
in age, she is devalued! ’ Luo’s mother continues to pressure Luo, saying ‘you
should listen to your aunts. They have been there. What they are saying makes
sense.’ When the lunch is over, Luo tries to help her younger brother clean the table,
but is stopped by her father who thinks Luo’s brother and his wife should do the
clean-up. However, Luo’s mother immediately scorns her husband, saying ‘Let her
do the cleaning. She will get married someday anyway. If she doesn't even know
how to do housework, she won't be able to find a husband’. Although Luo has a
successful career and purchases a property in Shanghai through her own striving, her
family treats her with utter contempt and pity because she is still single in her
thirties. Luo as a woman, in her family’s eyes, no matter how successful she is in her
career, she is a failure at being a woman if she does not marry.

Professional middle-class women, like Luo Haiyan, who are highly educated and not
yet married by their late 20s in megacities in China, have been stigmatised as ‘leftover women’ (shengnü)73 by the mass media in China since the turn of the new
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millennium, including newspapers, magazines and TV shows. The negative media
discourse labels ‘leftover women’ as fickle, materialistic, and unmarriageable due to
their advancing age, which evokes contempt toward these women, and fuels their
anxiety of being ‘devalued’ in the marriage market (Fincher, 2014; Gaetano, 2014;
Ji, 2015; Lü, 2009). In spite of the increasing number of women pursuing higher
education, the resurgence of patriarchal Confucian traditions alongside the marketoriented reformation revalorises women’s role as ‘virtuous wife and good mother’
(Croll 1995; Evans 2010), and problematizes single women as ‘deficient’ or
‘deviant’, an identity that represents failure as a woman and requires justification
(Jin, 2009; So, 2013; Tian, 2013; Gaetano, 2014; Zhang and Sun, 2014; Ji, 2015;
Zhou, 2015). While urban single middle-class women fall into the stigmatised
category of ‘leftover woman’ and are seen to lack femininity, their male counterparts
who are fully engaged in paid employment are often identified positively as ‘golden
bachelors’(huangjin danshen han) in the marriage market (Gaetano, 2014). Thus, the
proliferation of the stigma toward ‘leftover women’ attests to the conventional
gender paradigm wherein a woman's success depends on marriage rather than the
workplace. In line with this gender paradigm, Luo Haiyan’s female relatives and
mother criticise Luo for allowing her work to be an obstacle to marriage.

In this sense, the celebration of women’s prioritisation of paid employment over
marriage in Women in Shanghai is a fresh representation of young professional
women, compared with the derogatory label of ‘leftover women’ prevailing in
popular media. Luo Haiyan chooses commitment to work, which is a means to
economic independence, and refuses to rush into marriage. As a so-called ‘left-over
woman’, she refuses to reconcile. She is less anxious about being ‘unmarriageable’;
instead, she is concerned with increasing her employability. In Women in Shanghai,
women’s economic independence is euphonized not only as a way to resist
conventional gender norms, but also as a way for young, educated women to increase
their choices of partner selection. In addition, it underscores that cosmopolitan
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Shanghai is a place where young, educated women can explore different possibilities
and different ways of living. The characters who pressure Luo to rush into marriage
are all older females from Luo’s hometown. As such, in the web drama Women in
Shanghai the town city is portrayed as a location where ‘traditional’ visions of
gender roles exert pressure on women to return home; in contrast, Shanghai is rosily
pictured as ‘a city full of possibility’ where young women can flee conventional
gender norms by obtaining economic independence.

Figure 13 is one of the official posters of Women in Shanghai, which lists eight men who have romantic relations
with Luo during her striving in Shanghai (douban, 2018, https://movie.douban.com/subject/27185556/). From left
to right, a millionaire, a CEO of a dating company.

Interestingly, it is only when Luo becomes an entrepreneur that she finally decides to
consider marriage. In other words, starting her own enterprise is viewed as a magic
solution to Luo’s decade of conflict between independence and family. In the last
three episodes, after ending her relationship with the millionaire, Luo starts up her
own advertising firm in 2015, during which time the government has begun strongly
promoting the policy of ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’ as well as
‘creativity’ as detailed in section 2.2 of chapter 2. While Luo has constantly
postponed marriage even under heavy pressure from her family, she decides to
accept her boyfriend’s proposal in the final episode after starting-up her own firm.
Here, becoming an entrepreneur has two layers of meanings: firstly, it highlights the
spirit of self-reliance, starting her own firm is represented as a symbol of Luo’s
success in obtaining economic and spiritual independence and freedom in the
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metropolis; secondly, it grants Luo the freedom to keep her career and begin a family
at the same time.
Luo’s changing social status in the metropolis manifests mainly in two ways. One is
her changing consumer behaviours and taste. It is most evident in Luo’s changing
residential locations: as an intern, with the budget of CNY 800, Luo co-habits in a
two-roomed flat in an old and remote area; when she is promoted to account
manager, she moves to a flat where she can see ‘faguo wuton’ (French phoenix trees)
from the terrace, because she is convinced that, ‘only places where one can see
French phoenix trees can be called Shanghai’; then she moves to a fancy flat located
in a typical middle-class gated community, and finally she buys her own property in
Shanghai. Another example is that Luo transforms from a woman who can only
afford a fake Versace bag and eat cup noodles, into one who owns a Cartier bracelet,
dines in Michelin restaurants, drinks wine, plays golf, has high tea in the British
style, visits art galleries, and listens to classical opera. Another indicator of Luo’s
transformation is the different types of men she dates, none of whom are from a
working-class background. Her dates change from her provincial schoolmate, to an
English teacher from Shanghai, an IT programmer, a businessman from Hong Kong,
a young model, a CEO of a dating company, and a millionaire (see Figure 13).

In a word, the web drama offers a fresh representation of young, educated middleclass women, whose subjectivity is prominently placed at the centre of her
engagement in paid employment rather than social reproduction. It rejects the plot of
‘Mr. right must be found’, and celebrates young women’s commitment to work. The
web drama prioritises women’s role as paid worker over their role as mother, which
can be seen in the following elements. Firstly, the protagonist Luo Haiyan constantly
re-fashions herself in order to be viewed as an irreplaceable and competitive worker.
Work functions as a driving force that incites Luo to continuously transform herself
from a provincial graduate to an urban professional and skilled entrepreneur with
fine taste and a fashionable look in Shanghai. She devotes the majority of her time to
investing in her skills and appearance so as to secure her position at work. Even her
leisure time, such as the pub or the golf course, is an opportunity to improve her
English or to maintain networks with her customers. Moreover, in this show, work
signifies not merely an economic income, but more importantly, refers to the
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construction of young, middle-class women’s subjectivity. Specifically, work
becomes a fundamental and indispensable means for young women’s selfactualisation in addition to a means for achieving economic independence.

Secondly, the show underscores the importance of self-reliance and self-striving in
achieving upward social mobility. In a comparison between the different ways of life
chosen by Kate and Luo, Women in Shanghai presents Luo as the paragon of modern
women in post-2000s China, who is driven to obtain economic independence through
work, and refuses to be a full-time housewife. Kate represents the young educated
women who conform to conventional gender roles. She has no ambition for work,
and considers ‘small life’ (xiao rizi) around marriage and family far more important
than the ‘big dream’. Nevertheless, Kate does not live the comfortable and carefree
family life of her dreams. In the web drama, she is always anxious about securing her
husband’s loyalty as she has no career of her own. When she finds out that her
husband is having an affair with his assistant, she realises the importance of having
an independent income. In the final episode, Kate decides to give up being a fulltime housewife, and open up a flower shop. By contrast, Luo, who defers her
marriage in order to carve out a career, believes in economic independence.
Although Luo Haiyan has met different men who express their willingness to take
care of her, she always places work as a precondition of marriage and family. In the
end, because of Luo’s self-reliance and independence, she does not repeat Kate’s
tragedy: she not only opens a start-up, but also gains more freedom in choosing her
partner. While the dominant culture in the 1990s positions figures like Kate, an
educated, middle-class young woman who considers marriage as the ultimate goal of
life, as the aspirational subject, Women in Shanghai places ambitious career women
like Luo as the post-2010 ideal. It is necessary to point out that Women in Shanghai
does not reject the idea of family per se; it suggests that even after having a family
young, middle-class women should maintain a career to guarantee their economic
independence rather than completely relying on their husbands. That is, it reinforces
the anxiety that becoming a housewife is valueless as housework does not provide
any income. Thus, it encourages young women to maintain their positions as paid
employees even when starting a family.
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Besides, Women in Shanghai romanticises and reinforces the hegemonic role of the
urban. Shanghai is viewed as a city full of possibility in the web drama, where even a
young college graduate can enjoy different ways of living, achieve upward social
mobility through self-striving, and reject the conventional gender roles of ‘virtuous
wife and good mother’. Luo’s hometown, on the contrary, is represented as a
conservative and less advanced place where young women have limited choices. In
episode 17 when Luo returns to her hometown, she is not happy at all. She not only
faces the tightened social constraints imposed by conventional gender norms, but
also misses the lifestyle she enjoyed in Shanghai. For instance, Luo is quite
disappointed that the café in her hometown does not serve coffee, which she can
easily have in Shanghai. But in a cosmopolitan city like Shanghai, Luo has so many
‘choices’, in terms of lifestyles, jobs and partners. Moreover, the show suggests that
it is only in the metropolis that a young woman, like Luo Haiyan who begins from
nothing, can become an entrepreneur after a decade of striving.

Thirdly, Women in Shanghai does not represent work as conflicting with women's
reproductive roles as mother and wife; instead, it underlines that work (as a symbol
of economic independence) empowers women's status at home. The category ‘nü
qiangren’ or ‘career women’ has often been marked with stigma referring to women
who are ambitious at work often at the expense of their family and marriage since the
1990s. The derogatory term ‘nü qiangren’ indicates that women’s full engagement in
work is often questioned and seen as a major cause of family conflict, whereas men’s
commitment to work is widely accepted as a social norm (Evans and Li 2007; Zhang
2006; Zhang and Sun, 2014). Because of their outstanding performance in the
workplace, independent women with successful careers are viewed as failing to
fulfil their maternal role as ‘virtuous wife and good mother’. Middle-class, urban
women particularly embody the tension between achievement at home and
achievement in the workplace (Zhang and Sun, 2014). Women in Shanghai presents a
new, positive interpretation of ‘nü qiangren’, who not only have their own
independent careers but also a happy family life.
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Figure 14 left is Scarlet's husband feeding their new born baby in the children's room; right is Scarlet talking
business over her phone in the living room (Women in Shanghai, 2018).

In the web drama, Luo Haiyan and Scarlet are represented as paragons of ‘nü
qiangren’. In the final two episodes, the web drama invites the audience to glimpse
the harmonious marital lives that Scarlet and Luo enjoy. Scarlet marries her former
assistant, who is much younger, and gives birth to twins. They live in a spatial flat
bought by Scarlet, where Scarlet works, and her husband takes responsibility for
child-rearing. When Luo Haiyan visits Scarlet’s flat in episode 19, it is Scarlet’s
husband who opens the door for her. While Scarlet is answering phones for work in
the living room, her husband is feeding and taking care of their newborn twins in the
children’s room (see Figure 14). Home becomes a place where Scarlet works as well
as looks after her twins, and her husband is like her assistant in both work and family
matters. Similarly, in the final episode entitled ‘Free and Independent Soul’, after
having breakfast with her husband in the balcony of her posh flat, Luo, who changes
from pyjamas into a white formal suit with a sophisticated hairdo, is leaving home
for work with a smile on her face; meanwhile, her husband in pyjamas remains at
home, and is smilingly sending Luo out for work. In the final scene, Luo is walking
confidently alone, heading from her home to the Oriental Pearl TV Tower, a
landmark of Shanghai (see Figure 15). Luo Haiyan’s way of life represents the
exemplar of the ‘free and independent soul’, which is also the title of the final
episode. From the examples of Luo and Scarlet, the web drama suggests that ‘nü
qiangren’ can perfectly balance work and family life, without sacrificing either one.
More significantly, in both cases, we see a reversal in gender relations within the
household where women are engaged in paid employment just like men, and men are
staying at home, in sharp contrast to the conventional family model where men are in
charge of the outside productive world and women are in charge of the household
(nan zhu wai, nü zhu nei) detailed in section 1.1 of chapter 1. Thus, the web drama
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indicates that having a career is not only not an obstacle for establishing a happy and
harmonious family life for women, but actually empowers them within the
household.

Figure 15 in the final scene of the final episode entitled 'Free and Independent Soul', Luo in smart suit is walking
toward Shanghai's landmark

Women in Shanghai is a story of inclusion – of how young, educated urban women
are included in the domain of production, becoming wage workers and
entrepreneurs, and of how lower-middle-class women can be included in
cosmopolitan life, competing with men and achieving success in the workplace
through self-striving. Its narrative formula – a striving woman + a city full of
possibility, is not new. It dates back to the 1990s when fashion magazines like Elle
emerged; what is new is that it constructs the core of young women’s subjectivity
around (immaterial) production, instead of stressing their role in the domestic field to
maintain social reproduction. It is necessary to point out that the productive activities
the young women in Women in Shanghai are engaged in are immaterial, involving
mostly affective and cognitive capacities, such as linguistic ability (Lazzarato, 1996).
Production in the web drama is rather different from that of the socialist era, which
mainly refers to heavy manual work. In staging Luo Haiyan as a paragon, Women in
Shanghai emphasises that to be an independent and ambitious wage earner promises
women freedom of economy and partner choice, and at the same time empowers
women to reverse the conventional gender roles within the household. In resonance
with Lisa Adkins’ compelling arguments (2012; 2016; 2018), Women in Shanghai
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suggests that work is no longer an option, but a ‘must’ for young, educated urban
women. It is in this sense that Women in Shanghai provides a new representation of
contemporary young, educated women in post-2010s cosmopolitan China. Echoing
what McRobbie (2007) observes in the affluent West that young women are incited
to become wage-earning subjects in the new sexual contract, Women in Shanghai
defines young women’s success as economic independence on the basis of having a
career.

To sum up section 3.1, through an analyses of three different texts, it is clear that
young middle-class women who are educated, fashionable and situated in urban
areas have gradually become aspirational and normative figures in cultural
representations since the 1980s along with the marketisation process in China, even
though they only account for a small portion of the population. This new normative
figure is located in cosmopolitan cities such as Shanghai, and is constructed as an
entrepreneurial subject, who is consumer oriented and individualistic, and is
responsible for her own losses and profits. She must be self-reliant, and constantly
fashion and invest in herself to feminise her appearance and improve her capital.

At the same time, there are ruptures in the representations of young, educated
middle-class urban women among the three texts. One major discontinuity is the
changing meaning of work for women: in Fashionable Red Dress, work, especially
heavy manual work, is denounced as distorting women’s true human nature, and thus
decentralised in young women’s subjectivity; the marginalisation of such work is
more prominent in the representations of ‘white-collar beauties’ in Elle, which
underlines women’s roles as consumers and as mothers and wives; yet, in Women in
Shanghai, (immaterial) work, especially in the creative economy, plays a
fundamental role in constructing the so-called ‘moxi nüzi’. Work as a symbol of
economic liberation is represented as a crucial means for young educated women to
resist the conventional maternal role of ‘virtuous wife and good mother’, and
improve their status within the household. The evolution in representation of
contemporary young, educated women portrays them as factory girls who become
‘white-collar beauties’, and then ‘top girls’ who are independent, hardworking,
competitive and ambitious at work. In Fashionable Red Dress, work, especially
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industrial work, is marginalised in constructing young women’s subjectivity;
replacing industrial work, in Elle, is work in the high-end service sector, such as
office work, public relations, and design, that is represented as appropriate and
desirable for young middle-class women, even though the work itself is rarely
discussed; in Women in Shanghai, paid work is central to producing the subjectivities
of young, educated urban middle-class women. As we can see from the web drama,
work is represented as being so flexible, risky and precarious that employees have to
invest their entire lives in their work. Luo is a college graduate, and has accumulated
many years of working experience in the advertising industry; yet, she still has to
anxiously improve herself (e.g. learning English, and improving her appearance)
even in her free time and manage her human capital in order to be irreplaceable in
the workplace. The boundaries between life and work further diminish when she
becomes an entrepreneur herself.

While popular culture celebrates an independent and ambitious woman who obtains
economic freedom through self-striving in the metropolis, it undoubtedly
romanticises and conceals the contradictions and unspeakable pains that young,
educated middle-class women endure in their lived experience. In emphasizing the
cruciality of self-striving and self-reliance, the show conceals the broader historical
context wherein it is precisely since the 2000s that young graduates have
encountered increasing difficulties securing middle-class status in megacities, such
as Shanghai. Specifically, young college graduates have been confronted with
multiple problems as discussed in chapter two, including deteriorating working
conditions, the rising cost of living and deflation of earning power in the metropolis,
the introduction of a stricter point-based household registration system, and, for
women in particular, the initiation of the second-child policy. Consequently, the
metropolis, on the one hand, includes young educated women in the fields of
education and the employment labour force, but, on the other hand, it has higher
entry standards, resulting in the increasing difficulty of living and obtaining
citizenship in the megacities.
What is absent in the representations is young middle-class women’s own view of
the excessive attachment to work, and their everyday struggles in negotiating and
resisting this attachment. Decades of reform has resulted in the marketisation of
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almost all aspects of everyday life, including housing, education and health.
Nevertheless, individuals are asked to rely on themselves to resolve these problems.
Women, in particular, embody the contradictions between production and
reproduction. How do young women make a living in the new creative economy in
big cities in China, such as Shanghai? What are their everyday struggles? Those are
the questions that will be further explored in the following pages grounded in
ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai.

3.2.

The Lived Experience of Young, Middle-Class Women in Shanghai

In order to understand how young women perceive the representations of them and
how they position themselves, I invited two of my interviewees to co-organize a
salon called ‘Real Women in Shanghai’ (‘zhenshi shanghai nüzi tujian’). The salon
lasted for 2 hours, and was held in a co-working space owned by CM, one of the
interviewees introduced in section 2.3 of chapter 2, in Shanghai on August 11, 2018.
It aimed to grant young women the opportunity to speak about their own work
experience and lives in Shanghai, through a screening and discussion of the web
drama Women in Shanghai. In the end, the salon attracted around 15 participants (5
of them were interviewees of this research), including 2 males and 13 females, all of
whom were aged between their mid-twenties and early-thirties. The participants, four
from Shanghai and 11 from towns and smaller cities outside Shanghai, were from
diverse sectors, including advertising, NGOs, marketing, language instruction, and so
forth. Interestingly, none of them worked ‘within the system’. I prepared five short
clips extracted from the web drama Women in Shanghai, and several open questions
to invite the participants to share their perceptions and their own lived experience.

The participants could easily identify with the protagonist Luo Haiyan in several
aspects. Firstly, they identified with the demands on Luo to continuously self-fashion
for work. In accord with the very similar transformative process depicted in
Fashionable Red Dress, Elle and Women in Shanghai, the participants felt the
pressure to feminise their own appearances. Yet, the purposes of these feminisation
processes are different: in the Fashionable Red Dress, the feminisation of dress
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among factory workers redefines femininity based on essentialist accounts of gender
difference, and relocates women’s social position away from heavy manual industrial
work; Elle further normalises such an essentialised understanding of heterosexual
femininity, marking it with consumerism and middle-class status; in Women in
Shanghai, the fashioning of appearance is mainly performed for work, in order to be
viewed as proper white-collar workers. Such a perception was shared by the
participants. For instance, one participant who used to work in HR said that she did
not realise that her closet was full of one-piece dresses and high heels until she
resigned from the job. Her reason for purchasing dresses and high heels was to make
herself look more professional. For the participants who worked for foreign owned
companies, the pressure of self-discipline on their appearances and bodies was
widely shared. Some said that their companies would ask them to keep fit or to wear
certain brands to match the image of the firm.
The central place of work in life is another crucial aspect of Luo Haiyan’s experience
that echoed strongly among the participants. Young, educated women, like it or not,
are the subject of and subjected to work-centred life at the same time. On the one
hand, work itself demands their bio-life. Both based on the participants’ responses as
well as the research findings from the fieldwork examined in section 2.3 of chapter 2,
it is evident that young women devote most of their time to work. Similar to Luo’s
experience, the work practices and experience of the participants were marked by
features, which have been discussed in the section 2.3 of chapter 2, including long
work hours, blurring boundaries between life and work regarding to time and space,
the requirement of constant skill-upgrading, the individualistic nature of work, and
so forth. On the other hand, the participants and the interviewees of this research
voluntarily dedicated their lives to work because they considered work as a
mechanism for obtaining ‘independence’ (duli), which strongly echoes a major
theme of the web drama. Female participants of the salon as well as female
interviewees of the fieldwork frequently mentioned the term ‘independence’, and
considered it a crucial part of their subjectivity, which was never heard from the
male interviewees. Although the term ‘independence’ was not clearly defined by
these young women, it is always used in association with another term ‘caiwu ziyou’
(financial independence). Work is regarded not only as a source of income but also
as an emblem of independence and self-actualisation. In this regard, young women
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voluntarily dedicate their lives to work, and fashion themselves in order to be viewed
as qualified workers.

Like Luo Haiyan, the young female participants tended to prioritise their work over
marriage. Echoing the representations and the researching findings of the fieldwork,
young women expressed the view that it is work, rather than marriage, that gave
them a sense of ‘security’ and ‘independence’; marriage, on the contrary, was
perceived to be unstable, insecure, and unreliable. Such a perception of marriage
needs to be understood in a broader context of changing intimate relations in China
since the 1980s. China’s divorce rate increased dramatically from 0.33 in 1979 to
1.59 in 2007, 2.6 in 2013, and 3.2 in 2018 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011;
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2019). Meanwhile, the marriage rate has continuously
declined since 2013, from 9.9 percent in 2013 to 8.3 percent in 2016, 7.7 percent in
2017, and 7.3 percent in 2018, which marked the lowest rate recorded from 2013
onward (Li and Zhang, 2019; Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2019). In 2018 alone, nearly
four million Chinese couples filed for divorce (ibid.). Interestingly, it was reported
that over 70 percent of divorces filed in 2017 were initiated by women (Zhou, 2017;
May, 2018).

Additionally, similar to Luo Haiyan, the young women (including the participants of
the salon and the interviewees of the fieldwork) preferred delaying marriage.
According to the state media, before 2012, the age group of 20 to 24 made up the
largest proportion of those registering for marriage, while since 2013, the largest age
group has gradually shifted to 25-29 year-olds (China Youth Daily, 2018; Li, 2018).
In more developed cities, a higher divorce rate and marriage deferment are more
likely. In Shanghai, for instance, the marriage rate was only 4.4 percent in 2018,
marking the lowest among all provinces (Li and Zhang, 2019). Based on a survey of
single youth in Shanghai in 2018, the average age of women at their first marriage
was postponed to 28.81, compared with 26.51 in 2010 (Chen Sisi, 2019 ). Cai and
Feng argue (2014) that the delay in marriage in urban Shanghai witnessed since the
1980s is characterized by an increasing individualisation in a post-socialist society
where market forces have prevailed in every corner of the society from real estate to
the human body. The reasons for the low marriage rate and delayed marriage are
various. For some participants, it is closely associated with their changing perception
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of work and marriage. In the salon as well as on various occasions during my
fieldwork in Shanghai, I heard from young women that self-development is much
more important than marriage. As mentioned in chapter two, young single women
would delay marriage to pursue a career. Having a career is interlinked with the
notion of independence and self-actualisation, while marriage often means fewer
opportunities at work. However, it does not necessarily mean that all young women
reject marriage. Many were actually searching for true love, but could not find a
suitable partner in the big cities. As life is consigned to work, it is difficult to spare
one’s passion or time building and maintaining a romantic relationship with people
outside one’s work field, particularly in metropolitan Shanghai. This is the major
contradiction that one of my interviewees encountered in Shanghai, which will be
detailed in the case of Koki in section 3.2.1 of this chapter.

The third feature that the participants recognized in the representation was the
unrealistic portrayal of metropolitan Shanghai. When the participants were asked
why they chose to live and work in Shanghai, they all agreed that Shanghai was an
international city ‘full of possibility’. For the participants from outside of Shanghai,
they agreed that Shanghai offered many more working opportunities than their
hometowns in which most jobs could only be found within the system, such as in the
banks, state-owned enterprises, and the government. Some participants from a town
near Shanghai said that Shanghai was attractive because it is relatively equitable
since everyone can compete based on their capacity, which is different from their
hometown where personal guanxi was the decisive element; some thought that
Shanghai as an international city was very convenient in all aspects of life, including
commuting, various entertainment and leisure activities, shopping, art and cultural
events.

While the participants could identify that the representation applied to them, and
could project themselves onto the figure Luo Haiyan, they were also fully aware that
Luo’s success in Shanghai was more an aspiration than a reality. The spirit of selfreliance, which is the fundamental and core characteristic of Luo in determining her
success in obtaining first economic freedom and then freedom to choose a partner, is
contradictorily internalised by the young women. Despite the severe constraints upon
their action, as Walkerdine, Melody and Lucey (2001) argue, the neoliberal subject is
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asked to take full responsibility for their life. On the one hand, the participants
agreed that self-reliance is crucial; on the other hand, they expressed clearly that it is
impossible to rely solely on oneself to obtain what Luo achieves in Shanghai over the
span of fifteen years. The web drama emphasises that it is through self-striving that
Luo obtains economic independence, which grants her freedom of choice,
particularly in terms of romantic life. Yet, what are the symbols of economic
independence for young women? According to the depiction of Luo Haiyan and
Scarlet who are depicted as the paragons of young women in the web drama,
property ownership is an indispensable criterion for obtaining economic
independence in addition to having a job. Indeed, the participants of the research,
especially those from outside Shanghai, aspired to purchase a property in Shanghai.
Such a phenomenon is closely connected with wider social change. A survey
released by the real estate information platform BEIKE (beike zhaofang) in 2019
revealed that the number of Chinese single women purchasing properties is growing.
The survey analysed over 67,000 second-hand housing transactions among 964
homebuyers in 12 major cities in 2018 – including Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen –
and revealed that 46.7 percent of the homeowners were female (aged 18 to 50),
which reached the highest record over the past seven years (news.qq.com, 2019;
Zheng, 2019). The majority of these female buyers were single and were often welleducated millennials from wealthy families. The data reported may be overexaggerated, but it does indicate the changing attitudes of young women on
homeownership, especially considering the custom that men are often the marital
home provider and owners. So why do more and more women aspire to buy a home
of their own? According to the report as well as the participants of the present
research, one important reason for the growing female participation in home
purchasing is that buying a home is viewed as a prerequisite to achieving a sense of
economic security without relying on a partner, which also echoes Fincher’s (2014)
study of home ownership and the phenomenon of ‘leftover women’. In particular, for
those who work and live in big cities to seek out better opportunities,
homeownership, as they said, is considered to provide a strong sense of stability.

Although the participants of the research aspired to own an urban home, they were
fully aware that they could not afford one in Shanghai relying solely on their own
income. According to A Report of Employment of Youth in Shanghai 2019 conducted
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by Shanghai Municipal Human Resources, the Social Security Bureau and the
Communist Youth League of China, the average monthly salary of the working
population aged 16 to 35 was about CNY 7,300 in 2018; yet, the average home price
was over CNY 44,108 per square metre in Shanghai in 2018. By another measure,
the local property in Shanghai is over thirty-eight times that of an average buyer’s
annual income in Shanghai (Numbeo, 2019). While in Women in Shanghai Luo
Haiyan and Scarlet purchase homes on their own in Shanghai, the participants said
that ‘it could only happen on television’. Except for the local Shanghainese and a
few interviewees who had bought their properties with financial help from their
families, the majority of the participants found homeownership in Shanghai ‘severely
unaffordable’.

Becoming an entrepreneur is portrayed as another token of economic independence
in Women in Shanghai. The female interviewees and participants actively embraced
the spirit of entrepreneurship, and tried to convert their skills into capital. The
orchestration of female entrepreneurship is becoming prominent under the call for
‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’. For instance, to celebrate International
Women’s Day, WeWork’s Chinese flagship in Shanghai’s Jing’An district organised
a panel called ‘She Leads’ on March 3rd 2018, which invited five female
entrepreneurs to share their stories of career-making. The five entrepreneurs, who
were young and fashionable, underlined the importance of self-striving in achieving
their success and encouraged the audience, most of whom were young white-collar
women, to start up their own businesses. But self-entrepreneurship also means the
necessity of shouldering potential risks. Starting one’s own business is always risky,
and not everyone could afford the risks. In fact, the two entrepreneurs interviewed in
the research were from very fluent families and heavily relied on the support of their
families. For example, as detailed in section 2.3 of chapter 2, CM bought a home and
opened a co-working space in Shanghai with a huge amount of investment from her
father, who was also a businessman. Without her father’s capital, CM would not
have been able to maintain her business. AY, who had migrated to Canada with her
whole family around a decade ago, and moved to Shanghai in 2017, was also highly
dependent on her parents’ financial help to open a photographic studio in Shanghai
and travel the world without financial constraints.
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Moreover, the participants of the salon believed that their actual working conditions
were only partially visible in the representations. Resonating with Luo Haiyan’s
work experience depicted in Women in Shanghai, the participants did agree that
constant self-development and learning were significant, and shared the anxiety of
being replaced by younger workers at the workplace. Over the span of 15 years, Luo
only changed her job twice, and her last job was to start-up her own advertising
company. Thus, Women in Shanghai suggests that hard work and sacrifice at work
can pay off. However, the participants not only faced more precarious and flexible
working situations, but also had fewer opportunities for advancement. Despite the
fact that around half of the participants and interviewees of the research had higher
educational backgrounds than Luo Haiyan, who holds a bachelor’s degree, many had
to change jobs on a yearly basis. As detailed in section 2.3 of chapter 2, young
workers usually had to work for long hours at relatively low salaries, and had to
jump from one job to another in pursuit of better opportunities. Some young
participants sarcastically referred to themselves as ‘shechu’ – in Japanese Shachiku
and in English wage slaves – to describe their working life. Shechu is a term derived
from Japan in the 1990s, and literally translates as ‘corporate cattle’. As a
combination of kaisha (company) and kachiku (domestic animal), Shachiku refers to
low level office workers who are subservient to their companies and sacrifice their
private time for their companies (Morales, 2010). In recent few years, the term
‘shechu’ has become increasingly popular among young middle-class workers in
urban China. In a discussion on the work experience of young workers in Shanghai
that was held by a group of young people in their late twenties in a self-organised
space on August 26th 2018,74 the attendees, who were educated, white-collar workers
from various sectors, also described themselves as ‘shechu’. The attendees, who
complained about the extremely long work hours, indefinite working times and
blurring boundaries between work and life, felt that they were slaves in spite of the
fact that they worked in bright and new office buildings.
Dedicating one’s life to work is rosily pictured as a prerequisite of obtaining freedom
and independence for young women in the metropolis in the web drama Women in
74

For the poster of this discussion, see:
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA5NDAwMjc4NA==&mid=2649740278&idx=1&sn=a6b39c6
3b412331d38b4618016a00090
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Shanghai; yet, despite the slim hopes of achieving ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’,
living for work actually makes the participants feel that ‘their bodies have been
emptied’ (ganjue shenti bei taokong). ‘Bodies have been emptied’ is one line of
lyrics from a song called, ‘So Far, the Sofa is So Far’, which was composed and
performed by Shanghai’s Rainbow Chamber Choir in 2016. The song was quite
popular and struck a chord in the participants of the research, as it vividly pictures
their feeling of being worn out due to overwork. ‘So Far, the Sofa is So Far’ laments
the overtime working conditions among young workers from the employee’s
perspective, singing the syndromes resulting from long hours of working in its lyrics.
For instance, lyrics lament: ‘it is as if my body has been emptied’, ‘I’m as tired as a
dog’, ‘I haven’t removed my makeup for eighteen days in a row’, and ‘I have
circadian rhythm sleep disorders’. Besides, living to work means that young women
are forced to outsource their reproductive lives based on their economic capacity,
which has been mentioned in section 2.3 of chapter 2, and will be detailed in the
following pages via the examples of Koki and Savina.

All in all, the young women of the salon are fully aware of the realities that are
visible and invisible in the representations. On the one hand, in accord with the
representation, they self-position themselves primarily as wage earners, rather than
mothers and wives. Like the drama Women in Shanghai, they consider economic
independence obtained through work to be an ideal solution to the contradiction
between work and marriage. They tend to outsource their reproductive domain,
paying for services provided by working-class counterparts who conduct housework,
childcaring, and ordering takeout food through online food delivery platforms. On
the other hand, they suffer both emotionally and physically from the unlimited
expansion of production into their reproductive life. To further understand the
contradictions caused by an excessive attachment to work, two cases will be detailed
in the following pages.

3.2.1. Caught in a Bad Romance: The Story of Koki

Koki, born in 1989, is a designer from an affluent middle-class family in Taipei,
Taiwan. Her father is a senior manager at a high-tech company based in Taiwan and
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her mother is a full-time housewife. Since she was very young, Koki has travelled to
many countries with her family, including the United States, Europe, and Japan. She
obtained her bachelor’s degree in industrial design in Taiwan, and her postgraduate
degree in interactive design in the UK in early 2016.

Shanghai is not an unfamiliar city for Koki. She first encountered Shanghai because
her father used to fly between Taipei and Shanghai every month as his company has
a factory in Kunshan, a city in the southeastern Jiangsu province bordering Shanghai.
Following her father, Koki herself worked in Shanghai for a short period before
conducting her postgraduate studies in 2015. But at that time, she viewed Shanghai
simply as a place for making money. In April 2017, after a year working at her
schoolmate’s start-up company in Taipei, she decided to move to Shanghai again.
This time, at the age of 27, Koki looked forward to more than making money. She
wished to settle in Shanghai and establish a family.
Koki has worked for two companies since moving to Shanghai in 2017. She obtained
both jobs through an informal network, instead of sending out a CV to the formal
recruitment market. Her first job in Shanghai was in mobile UI design for a medical
company. The job was introduced to her by a friend from Taiwan, who
enthusiastically invited Koki to work with her in Shanghai while Koki was still in
Taipei. The company was a start-up, and Koki was the only employee who had
knowledge of UI design. Thus, she was fully in charge of building the interface
design of the mobile app from scratch. When I talked with Koki in Shanghai in
August 2017, she had worked there for nearly four months and her working hours
were very long, usually from 10 am to 10 pm. It was also very common for her to
take her work home. But she was excited and passionate about the work at that time,
because she was given full autonomy in design and decision making.
However, less than a year later in December 2017, Koki quit her first job. There were
many reasons for this decision. One was that the job was no longer creative. It had
become tedious and repetitive since after six months of work the design framework
of the app was constructed and she only needed to make minor modifications. In
addition, she felt alone in the company, as her Taiwanese friend who introduced her
to the job suddenly left the company in December 2017. But more importantly, she
212

was not satisfied with the location of the company or the place she lived, which were
around Hongkou and Yangpu districts. The studio flat Koki rented actually was not
bad in terms of commuting and rent: it took approximately thirty minutes by metro
from her home to her workplace, and cost around CNY 2, 700 per month. This was
convenient compared with some interviewees I met, who had to spend forty minutes
to one hour on average commuting,75 and not so pricey for Koki, whose monthly
salary after tax was around CNY 13,000. But Koki did not consider it an ideal
residential location. The studio flat was on the ground floor of a six-story walk-up in
an old residential area, which was built in the 1970s. Surrounded by old
neighbourhoods the studio flat was located in the Yangpu district, which had been a
crucial industrial district in the socialist era. Koki would rarely encounter anyone like
her, namely middle-class white-collar workers, living in the area. The area did not
match her vision of Shanghai: no glamourous shopping malls, fancy restaurants, or
high-rises.
Koki began working at an internet real-estate company with her former colleague’s
introduction in January 2018. She was recruited to the design department, working
with ten other designers – half of whom were female. Although she was still working
as a designer in the second company, she had to adapt to a new work rhythm. Unlike
her first employer, her second employer, a large enterprise with nearly US$6 billion
market value, was located on Nanjing road, the centre of Shanghai. The job not only
demanded her to constantly update her knowledge and flexibly cope with new
projects, but also to spend a lot of time communicating and cooperating with
colleagues from different departments. Koki also had to keep updating her skills. For
example, when she entered the company, she was assigned to do UI design for a
mobile app designated for renters; after a month, she was asked to do a new project
conducting UX design for a new app created for landlords, and in December 2018
when I interviewed her she was assigned to another project to design for an office
automation system. In addition to design jobs, she was also asked to conduct CV
reviews and interviews for recruitments. As the software and design trends were
constantly updated, she also needed to continuously update her knowledge about

75

According to a survey on commuting times in thirty provinces and cities in 2018, Shanghai had the
longest commuting time, which marked 59.56 minutes on average. See
http://sh.sina.com.cn/news/m/2018-10-06/detail-ihkvrhps6447522.shtml.
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them. Although she was soon promoted to senior designer, she was still anxious
about lacking qualified skills, especially language skills.
Koki considered communicating to be the most challenging at work. As a designer,
she needed to co-work with her team members from the same department, to
promote her designs to the product managers and to work with programmers to make
sure that her design could be actualised. Additionally, she needed to fly to Beijing
twice a month to explain and update her project to colleagues there. Particularly
when a new project was just beginning, she had to spend hours and hours in meeting
rooms to explain and defend every detail of her design (e.g. why did she choose a
certain colour? Did the colour match the company’s image? Why is this border wider
than another one? ) to others. In her eyes, communications were far more taxing than
the designing itself. She had to put her emotions and affect into interacting and
negotiating with others. She was tired of this form of communication as it was all
about work and for work rather than a genuine conversation to facilitate an
interpersonal relationship. But communicative ability was an important element in
evaluating a worker’s performance in her firm.
In a word, the job required her to dedicate her whole life to the work. Work is not
more alienated from the workers, but constantly involved in shaping the
subjectivities of the labouring subjects. Koki had to continuously fashion her skills,
be flexible with various projects, and learn to co-work and communicate with
different people based on project, which strongly echoed the research findings in
section 2.3 of chapter 2. She not only had to devote most of her time to work, but
also her emotions and affect. To use Bifo’s parlance (2017), she was ‘the soul at
work’.
For young female workers in particular, appearance is always an indispensable part
of self-fashioning. In a very similar manner to the representation of Luo Haiyan,
when entering the workplace Koki began to feel the anxiety and need for continuous
self-modelling, especially regarding her appearance. The anxiety and the sense of
inadequacy about her femininity were mostly derived from comparisons with her
female colleagues at the firm as well as other young, urban working beauties she
encountered. As her second job highly stressed the importance of cooperation, it also
increased the competition among workers. Koki was confident about her professional
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skills at work, but she was anxious that her appearance was not feminised enough. In
March 2018, I got the chance to have dinner with Koki and her two female
colleagues. Indeed, her colleagues were very thin and had make-up on. One, with
long eyelashes, trendy lipstick and a fashionable hairstyle dyed flax colour, dressed
in an office fashion that resembled that found in fashion magazines and blogs. Koki,
who never wore any make-up when I met her in August 2017, asked her colleagues
to teach her how to apply eyeliner over the dinner. On another occasion in March
2018, I invited her to join an event entitled ‘She Leads’ organised by WeWork (a coworking space company) in central Shanghai, which aimed to celebrate Women’s
Day on March 8th (see figure 16). The event hosted around four female
entrepreneurs to talk about their striving stories, and attracted nearly a hundred
participants, almost all of whom were female. I asked Koki’s thoughts on the event
but she was not interested in the success of the female entrepreneurs; instead, she
fretted that something was missing about her look, and said, ‘I think we are the only
two women here who are not wearing makeup’.

Figure 16 'She Leads' Workshop ( March 6th 2018)

Consumption was the primary means that Koki applied to feminise and fashion
herself. Koki began buying cosmetic products, new dresses, learning dancing, and
going to the gym in order to make herself more like the urban white-collar beauties
she observed at work and on social media. She asked me to accompany her to a
shopping mall to buy some basic beauty products. Having no knowledge of
cosmetics, she did not know what to choose from among diverse cosmetic counters.
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She immediately consulted her friend from Taiwan on WeChat, and decided to buy a
Japanese brand named Shiseido. The shop cost her over CNY 1,000. In April 2018,
we went to an outlet in the Qingpu district, where Koki spent near CNY 2,000 for
one dress and one skirt. Except for new dresses and cosmetic products, she also spent
money on fitness. She joined a well-known gym in May 2018, whose membership
was around CNY 5,000 per year, and personal training was over CNY 300 per hour.
That is, to get a feminised look one needs capital.
However, Koki was constantly in the contradicted process of absorbing, negotiating,
and sometimes resisting the excessive attachment to work as well as the endless
requirement to model herself into a qualified labouring subject. On the one hand, she
was disciplined, and also willing to discipline herself to devote her life to work. This
was primarily because of the high salary the company offered. Excluding bonuses,
her salary after tax increased from around CNY 15,000 per month in April 2018 to
approximately CNY 20,000 after a year of work. Koki, similar to many white-collar
workers, rarely revealed the exact amount she earned. But salary is reflected in
consumer behaviours, such as choice of neighbourhood and the brands purchased.
Like many other interviewees of the fieldwork, Koki changed her accommodations
in accordance with her salary and the locations of her workplace. For instance, in her
first job, she lived in a studio flat in a six-floor walk-up (whose monthly rent was
about CNY 3,000), she was able to ‘upgrade’ her accommodations twice during her
second job. Beginning in April 2018, she co-rented a two-room flat with a man of
her age in a modern gated community developed by the well-known Hong Kongbased property company Shui-On Land, whose monthly rent was near CNY 8,200; a
year later, she moved to another studio flat near the famous boutique consumer
destination, Xintiandi, which is just a five-minute walk away from her company on
Nanjing Road. Besides, her father, a senior manager, was her role model. During our
repeated interviews in January 2018, she retold a conversation she had with her
father. She told her father that the head of her department worked almost every day,
and her father replied, ‘why don’t you do that? You should work harder! You have
nothing to do on the weekends anyway’. When we were chatting in April 2019, when
talk of the ‘996’ work system prevailed in Chinese social media, I asked for her
thoughts on the issue, and she replied that she was ‘selling her life’ (mai ming) to the
company.
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Alternatively, Koki repeatedly expressed a reluctance and refusal to be modelled into
the subject of an urban ‘career woman’ who is always passionate at work, while
carefully maintaining a fashionable and feminised look. She tried many strategies to
escape from work: get off work earlier, work at home when the department head was
away, travel during the weekends, and take vacations annually. On multiple
occasions, she directly stated ‘I really don’t want to work’. When I was doing my
participant observation in a coworking space called naked hub in July 2018 near
Nanjing road, which was a five-minute walk away from her company, Koki
contacted me several times during her work time, asking if I wanted to have
afternoon tea with her. She even visited the naked hub I rented once at 3 pm on a
weekday. During public holidays, she would leave Shanghai. Over the past year
alone, she has returned to Taipei three times and travelled to Singapore, Japan, and
Hong Kong. In her own words, she would stay as far away from her workplace as
possible during the off days.
Beyond complaining about and seeking distance from work, Koki also sometimes
questioned the consumption-oriented feminine beauty ideal that she was subjected to.
Such a notion of femininity, which is evidently classed, is foremost evident in young,
middle-class women’s self-discipline concerning their bodies. For instance, weight
loss was the most discussed topic among Koki’s female colleagues in the firm. Koki
told me that the most popular saying among them was that ‘a woman should not
weigh over a hundred grams’. Her colleagues were always trying to lose weight,
using tactics such as skipping dinner and dieting, even though, as Koki said, none of
them actually weighed over 50 kilograms. Koki herself was influenced by this
phenomenon at her workplace. She weighed around 45 kilograms, but tried several
dieting trends circulated in social media to discipline her own body, including
quitting sugar (though she used to have sweets daily), reducing carbohydrate intake,
and going to the gym every week. This emphasis on body image led her to lament
‘Why is everyone talking about fitness and losing weight? How thin is thin enough? I
can’t stand that everyone in my office is always talking about weight loss!’
The most painful contradiction is between the challenge of building romantic
relationships and the endless demands of work in extracting value from worker’s
biopower. When moving to Shanghai in 2017, Koki was 27-years old, the age at
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which women are often stigmatised as ‘left-over’. Koki became increasingly anxious
about her age as she approached thirty years old. Since she invested most of her time
and emotions into work, her social circle revolved around her job, which made it
difficult to develop romantic relations. Koki once revealed her anxiety over building
a romantic relationship during lunch with a former colleague in March 2018. Her
former colleague asked, ‘don’t you think nowadays young people are all very
anxious? Anxiety is widespread among youth in the cities’. Koki responded, ‘Yes.
My greatest anxiety is the need to find a boyfriend’.
She has worked to expand her social circles in order to become acquainted with more
men since late 2017. She downloaded a popular dating app called Tinder, joined
meet-up groups, went out to pubs, and asked her friends to introduce her to suitable
dates. She did get the chance to meet up with some males. For instance, in early
2018, via Tinder Koki met a man her age, who was also a designer with a degree
from abroad working in Shanghai. They chatted for some rounds on tinder, and then
Koki asked him out. Somehow in April 2018, they decided to co-rent the two-room
flat developed by Shui-on Land mentioned above. This was the first time that Koki
cohabited with a male, which raised her mother’s concern as she believed that it was
inappropriate for a single woman to co-live with an unmarried man. But Koki made
up her mind. Koki tried to build a romantic relationship with the young designer, but
was disappointed. As designers, both of them were subjected to the bulimic pattern
of work mentioned in section 2.3 of chapter 2. When working on projects, they had
to spend most of their time at the workplace, going home only to sleep; when not
working on a project, Koki preferred to spend the whole day at home cooking and
cleaning, but her flatmate preferred to go out to do outdoor activities or enjoy
nightlife in the city. As such, although they lived in the same space, they barely had
the opportunity to communicate with each other. So, Koki moved out as soon as the
one-year lease ended in April 2019.
She tried a number of dating strategies. She joined a so-called language exchange
club for the purpose of making new heterosexual friends as well as improving her
English. The club held meet-up events every Saturday afternoon in a café within a
grand hotel in central Shanghai, aiming to enhance communication between people
who wanted to practice Chinese, Japanese, Korean or English (see Figure 17). I went
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there with Koki on Saturday the July 21 2018. The procedure was as follows: each
participant was first required to pay CNY 45 for an entrance ticket, and then
randomly choose a table to sit and chat with whoever was seated at the table for the
first hour; an hour later, the organiser would ask participants to exchange seats to
meet and talk with different people. Each table normally had approximately two to
four participants. There were nearly 40 participants at the time, around 15 females
and 25 males. While some were from Japan, Korea or English-speaking countries,
most participants were from China.

Figure 17 The café where the language exchanging meetup is usually held (Chinese-Japanese-Korean-English
Language Exchange Meetup, 16-07-2018)

It was more like speed dating than a language exchange meetup. All female
participants applied makeup and were well-dressed, including Koki who usually did
not. For example, one participant at our table was a 25 year old white-collar beauty,
who had a very feminine look: dressed in a lace dress, wearing sophisticated
makeup, and had curled long hair with a trendy Korean wispy bang. As an employee
of a Korean foreign trade company, the young woman said that she joined the club
for two reasons: one was to improve her Korean so that she could get promoted in
the firm, and the other was to meet some new guys. Koki also applied foundation,
eyelashes, and eyeshadow, which she learned from her colleagues, friends and
makeup tutorials available online.
In the second hour, we met a 29 year old young man from Henan province, with
whom Koki chatted several times at the meetup. The man who wore a polo shirt to
highlight his bicep muscles was very talkative. He said that he worked in his father’s
company in Shanghai, and wanted to practice his English through attending the
meetups. He took a lot of time to talk about his future plans: he wanted to migrate to
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the USA before turning 35, and blueprinted various steps for how to actualise his
‘America dream’ within five years. In a word, he tried to present himself as a
confident, ambitious, and promising young man from an affluent, middle-class
family. Koki made a good impression on him, and added his WeChat account after
their second meet-up at the event, hoping that they could interact on occasions
outside of the meetup. However, they never communicated with each other or went
out, even though they befriended on WeChat; they only chatted in the meet-up
group. This was not unusual. According to Koki as well as other participants that I
talked with, participants normally talk with each other during the meetup event
because the format requires it of them. But, once they leave the café, they don’t
usually talk with each other on WeChat or go out in person. It means that it is
difficult to build relationships through participating in this kind of activity.
Koki had considered establishing a family and settling down in Shanghai in April
2018 when she had just moved into her second home that she co-rented with the
designer in a modern gated community. Her vision of a family was foremostly tied to
property ownership. On several different occasions she mentioned her intentions of
buying a flat in Shanghai, especially when her ex-flatmate was present. She
passionately and proudly introduced me to the surroundings and facilities offered by
the community that she co-rented with the designer – high-rises, spatial gyms, two
fancy shopping malls and a Starbucks, and had even investigated the price of a onebedroom flat in that community, which was about six million yuan (over CNY
80,000 per square meter) at the time. Six million was an astronomical figure for
many, even for Koki whose monthly salary was over CNY 20,000. It would take her
300 years to buy a six million flat relying on her entire salary. But with help from the
affluent family that she was so proud of, it was not completely unrealistic. As a
woman from a typical middle-class family, she blueprinted a picture, in which she
and her future husband (who would definitely be middle class like her) would make
the down payment together with the financial support from their families, and they
would work together to pay the rest through a mortgage loan from the bank. Ideal
family life for her was: living in a well-decorated flat they owned in a middle-class
or upper-class gated community, just like the one she rented, where she could spend
qualified time to relax, cook, and clean with and for her husband and children on her
off days.
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Nevertheless, Koki soon dismissed the thought of building a family as well as buying
a property in Shanghai, and never mentioned them again after late 2018. Ironically,
while for many in the middle class the biggest barrier to staying in Shanghai is the
high cost of living, particularly the impossibility of owning a property, for Koki it
has been easier to own a property than to build a romantic relationship in Shanghai.
After two years of unsuccessful dating experiences, she realised that she simply
could not find her future husband in Shanghai, and decided that ‘I’m here to make
money’. Since early 2019, she has begun thinking of leaving Shanghai, and moving
to an English speaking country.

To briefly conclude, Koki represents young, urban middle-class women’s
contradicted position of submission and negotiation with the endless demands of
work. On the one hand, she voluntarily commits her life to work, and identifies work
with the notion of ‘autonomy’, ‘independence’, and ‘self-actualisation’. In addition,
she continuously fashions and disciplines herself in order to be viewed as a qualified
employee who is competitive, calculating, and is constantly investing in selfimprovement, and conforms to consumer-oriented femininity. On the other hand, the
labour subject continuously negotiates and resists the expansive logic of work.
Taking Koki’s example, she attempts various measures to resist the unlimited
demands of economisation for work, and to reclaim her own life. She tries to perform
passively at work or refuse work, such as skipping some working hours. She also
tries to create a boundary between work and life to distance herself from work
through travel and avoiding the workplace on her off days. She refashions herself
into a more feminised figure through consumption, while also questioning the
normalisation of femininity.
As work is expanded beyond working hours and the workplace, extracting and
absorbing value from the biopower of the labouring subject, young, middle-class
women’s daily lives are marked by struggles that are invisible in the representations.
The representations, as discussed in section 3.1 in this chapter, often picture young,
middle-class women as ambitious and cheerful subjects who can confidently master
their life and work, but neglects other kinds of emotions, such as anxiety and
depression, that are caused by the contradiction between establishing a family and
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excessive work. Because work in the creative economy demands not only a worker’s
time but also her interpersonal communications, cooperation, networks, and
emotions, workers normally feel exhausted, or to use one interviewee’s term,
‘hollowed out’ when off work.
With so much passion and love devoted to work, Koki finds herself caught in a bad
romance, which prevents her from building interpersonal relationships outside the
work field. Many interviewees, including Koki, are too tired to pursue
communications or socialisation outside work, and only want to stay and relax at
home. Thus, ironically, as communicative skills and passion are dedicated to work,
little room is left for young women to develop and maintain friendships or romantic
relationships outside the workplace. Over the past two years in Shanghai, the
network and social circle that Koki built revolved around her work. Although she
could make acquaintances through participating in various clubs and groups in her
spare time, she found it difficult to begin and maintain a romantic relationship as
examined above. Koki, like many interviewees, devotes her love and passion to
work; yet, this excessive devotion takes a toll on her life.

3.2.2. ‘You Must Create’: The Story of Savina

The amount of time and emotion that Koki invested in her work far exceeded the
monetary value (expressed through the monthly salary) she received, but she could
anticipate the increases in her income and was able to rely on her salary to maintain
her middle-classed lifestyle in Shanghai (even though she was not able to place much
in savings or to purchase a property on her own). Savina represents a more severe
example of the repercussions of investing too much in work. Savina shares many
similarities with Koki: born in 1990, she is from a rich family in Xiamen, a famous
tourist city in Fujian and she obtained a postgraduate degree in Italy. Despite her
high educational background, she is still not able to make ends meet on her salary
alone, and has to heavily rely on her family to survive in Shanghai. She rejects stable
jobs within the system, and voluntarily embraces a more flexible pattern of work in
the creative economy, which she considers as more cool and promising; but
discovers that it is an illusion to obtain economic independence and upward social
mobility on her own in Shanghai.
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Savina is the only child of a middle-class family, whose parents have blueprinted a
comfortable life for her. As soon as Savina graduated with a degree in Italian in
2012, her father planned to arrange a civil service job within the system in Xiamen
for her. As a senior military officer, he has worked in this system for decades and has
strong guanxi in Xiamen, and it would be effortless for him to get his daughter a civil
service job. Savina’s parents did not expect their daughter to be a successful career
woman. In their eyes, a daughter did not need to be ambitious or too educated. So,
when Savina expressed her intentions to continue postgraduate study in Italy in 2012,
they strongly disagreed. Savina’s parents believed that a degree was qualified enough
to find a stable job in Xiamen, so why bother going to Italy? Besides, studying
abroad meant that they had to separate with their precious only child for a period of
time. All they wanted was for their precious only child to live in Xiamen, have a
comfortable and stable job within the system just like them, marry someone from her
hometown and give birth to a grandchild in her twenties or early thirties which they
could help to take care of. Savina’s parents expected her to be a filial and docile
daughter to their family, and then a wife and mother to her own family. They
expected anything but a career woman.
But it was her parents’ expectation and the stable life that they envisioned for her
that prompted Savina to try and escape. Instead of feeling secure and satisfying,
home became a place of control and stress for her. Staying with her parents at home
meant that her parents would be deeply involved in her life, making decisions about
her career as well as her marriage. This was not the life Savina aspired to. She did
not desire a lifelong job within the system, or a heterosexual marriage and family
values. She wanted to escape from her family and the normative heterosexual
marriage. As Savina said, ‘Stable means boring and tedious’. She wanted to create an
independent life of her own and on her own.

The first attempt Savina made to live independently was persisting in her decision to
study abroad. After several rounds of intensive arguments and quarrels with her
parents, she was finally given permission, and, more importantly, financial support
from her family to study in Italy. She stayed in Italy for four years to complete a
language course and postgraduate study. It was in Italy that she met her girlfriend
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Ellen, who was pursuing a postgraduate degree in engineering at that time. Savina
had never dated a woman before, and Ellen was her first homosexual partner. They
cohabited together in Italy, and chose to hold their relationship back from their
friends and families. Having a homosexual relationship and cohabitating together
was unimaginable for Savina if she had lived with her parents in China. But it was
precisely through relying on her parent’s capital that Savina was able to study in Italy
and create a different life there.

Savina returned to China in mid-2016 because she could not find a proper job in
Italy. When she went back to her hometown at the age of 26 years old, she was
pressured to date men introduced to her by her parents. Savina realised that she had
to have an independent income to establish a life of her own. Hence, she began her
journey of job hunting in China in August 2016. She had no clear idea of what kind
of job she wanted or which city to work in, but she knew very clearly that she did not
want a job within the system in Xiamen, which she considered ‘tedious, meaningless,
and life-wasting’. Savina wanted to work and live in a fancy city, far enough so that
her parents could not directly control her life but not too far away from her
hometown. She was also dreaming of a job in cultural and creative industries, which,
in her imagination, referred to figures like the curator of an art gallery or a book
publisher. She thought that a job in CCI would be ‘cool’ and accorded with her
identity – an educated member of the middle class. Savina found a job advertisement
posted by an editor of Guangxi Normal University Press in douban by chance, which
is a popular social platform for information about film, books, recent events and
activities in cities in China. The well-known publisher, who was looking for an
editor for a project editing a series of children’s books from Italian to Chinese,
offered Savina the job because of her high educational background in Italian. But
Savina rejected it in September 2016, after visiting Guilin, Guangxi, the location of
the job. She was disappointed by how ‘undeveloped’(bu fada) the city was, and the
low income there. In her eyes, Guilin was a remote city, full of chaos and run-down
buildings. This was not the type of city she desired.

In November 2016, Savina decided to move to Shanghai, pursuing her vision of
living in a ‘developed’ international cosmopolis. The first job Savina found in
Shanghai was working as an assistant for a mascot called Kumamon, who is a
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character created by Kumanoto Prefecture in Japan in 2010 for the purpose of
stimulating local tourism. The job was part of a campaign for marketing and
promoting the first franchised character Kumamon themed café and store that opened
in Xintiandi Shanghai in early 2017. The KUMA café invited Kummamon and an
assistant to host events and interact with consumers in the shop. Kumanmon, who
was played by a young woman, communicated with the audience with actions and
facial expressions; Savina, as an assistant, or, in their parlance, ‘jiejie’(literally mean
sister), was responsible for using language to translate and explain Kumamon’s body
language. The job was project-based, lasting for about four months. It did not offer
an ideal salary or any formal job contract; but Savina loved the job. As a fan of
Japanese culture herself, she thought it was cool and fun, and was not bothered by
the low salary or precarious nature of the work.
Savina’s second job was in the creative department in a state-owned enterprise,
lasting for one year. In March 2017 the company, a state-owned subsidiary company
of Shanghai Media Group who recruited Savina for the Kumamon project, employed
Savina as a ‘creator’(chuangyi yuan) in the creative department for her linguistic
ability and high educational qualifications. The SOE was located in The Bridge 8 (8
hao qiao), which is the landmark of creative industrial parks in central Shanghai. The
SOE offered a monthly salary of CNY 4,000 per month after tax, more than half of
which went to cover her monthly rent of CNY 2,300. However, it provided various
hidden subsidies, including travel allowance, a high-temperature subsidy, and gifts
and bonuses for national festivals and so forth. If Savina had not resigned, this could
have been the job of a life-time.

But Savina could not stand the working conditions or workplace environment. One
of Savina’s biggest complaints was how tedious and trivial the work was. She
complained to me in our first interview in late August 2017 as well as on several
other occasions that there was nothing creative in the SOE, even though her job title
was ‘creator’. Each year Savina’s department planned and held various cultural
events in cooperation with governmental departments. For instance, one project was
to plan a blood donation campaign for the Department of Health of the local district.
She had to handle various details: from preparing a PowerPoint to demonstrating the
slogans and schedules of the campaign, to supervise the decoration and installation
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of the venue, and to send out meal tickets to the workers. Another project she
participated in was the Shanghai International Film Festival. Again, she was rarely
involved in the actual activity planning, but had to handle, in her own words, ‘trivial’
things (suoshi). For example, she was responsible for booking tickets for the guests
from abroad who attended the film festival, to pick them up from the airport,
accompany them to the hotel, and serve them in case they need anything. Beyond
that, Savina also complained of the extremely flexible and multitasking nature of the
work. She was often asked to reply to English emails for the department head, who
held a postgraduate degree from Japan. In August 2018, she was suddenly asked to
take charge of financial issues for the company, as the woman who had been
responsible for them was on her maternity leave. In a word, her work was more like
a secretary than a ‘creator’. It did not require a postgraduate degree or experience
studying abroad to conduct such work. She was obviously overqualified.

Besides, Savina was asked to be on call 24 hours when there was a project at hand.
The department head usually used WeChat to send messages and inform her of work
tasks. Whenever she received the messages from her superior, she was expected to
respond right away, even in non-working hours. Otherwise, the superior would ask
her to explain the reason for the belated replies. Because of this, Savina bought a
new phone and created a new WeChat account just for the sake of answering
messages and phone calls from work. What made Savina even more angry and
frustrated was that the superior assigned her tasks in her off-days. In September of
2017, Savina and her three colleagues were asked to work on the weekends for an
exhibition held by the daughter of Savina’s superior’s friend. Savina had to work
overtime for three days in a row for a project that was not part of her formal job. She
was extremely angry about this, and kept asking ‘why do I need to work for the
daughter of my boss’s friend?’.

Furthermore, Savina could not tolerate the work culture in the SOE. Guanxi was
critically important in the office. According to Savina, it was not typical for someone
like her to be hired without any guanxi, because many workers there were employed
through personal guanxi. Taking her department as an example. The creative
department had around six workers, and two of them were relatives of the superiors
in the company. When a new colleague joined the department, the department head
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introduced him to everyone saying ‘this is our new colleague. He’s a nephew of our
manager’. Savina was struck by the way in which the manager introduced someone
by his network connection. As such, Savina said that she always needed to be careful
about whom she talked with and worked with, because she never knew who was a
relative of someone important in the company.
The guanxi-centred workplace made Savina feel that one’s educational certificate
was useless. She complained that many workers in the company did not have high
educational or professional backgrounds. Savina said that ‘the new colleague did not
even have a university degree. He graduated from a vocational school. He was there
only because he is someone’s nephew’. In Savina’s department, only she and the
department head held postgraduate degrees. It made her uncomfortable that one was
recognised by her/his guanxi, rather than educational certificate. Savina’s
dissatisfaction indicates that she felt she was not fully recognised in the company.
Her four-years of study in Italy were not recognised. So she tried to distinguish
herself from other workers who had guanxi by stressing her own high cultural
capital. Paradoxically, in the case of the SOE where she worked, it was precisely her
high educational background that granted her an entrance ticket, even though she had
no guanxi. However, as soon as she joined the company, without guanxi, she was
nobody.

Savina constantly resisted becoming the labouring subject that the workplace
demanded. The workplace required her to adopt a certain way of communicating.
Only on formal occasions would they communicate through emails, otherwise, they
usually exchanged working information through WeChat. No matter where she was
and what time it was, she was expected to respond to the messages immediately.
Moreover, the communications were often, in Savina’s words, ‘indirect’ in the SOE.
Because no one wanted to take responsibility, the major purpose of communication
between different departments and workers was to shirk responsibilities. Things were
often said out of context. Savina complained that she could not decode the actual
meanings of the messages, and thus often made mistakes. Because of this, she was
scorned by her superior several times. As a local SOE, the great majority of the
workers were of Shanghai origin, especially the managers. Thus, except mandarin,
Shanghainese became a kind of ‘official’ language that new employees were
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expected to understand. But Savina expressed strong resistance to learning and
speaking Shanghainese.

In addition to language and communication style, she was disciplined to adopt the
unwritten dress code in the office. Interviewees, who worked in the creative sectors
(such as advertising) in private firms, often expressed and appreciated the freedom
that they had in dressing in the workplace in the creative industries. But in the SOE
where Savina worked, workers were expected to dress in a more formal way. For
example, the female colleagues of the company usually wore attire that conformed to
the norms of smart casual and business casual, such as tailored shorts, suits, blouses
with skirts, wrapped dresses with tights, blazers, tote bags and so forth. In other
words, they often preferred attire that stressed feminine curves and femininity. This
was exactly what Savina rejected. As a self-identified bisexual woman, Savina
repelled the normative dress code that dominated in the workplace. She resisted
wearing dresses, high-heels, and skirts, and insisted on wearing jeans, monochrome
shirts, and a pair of Timberland boots. Savina strongly rejected femininity defined
around the heterosexual norms. She was often mocked by her male colleagues
because of her gender-neutral way of dressing. In our repeated interviews, Savina
expressed her resentment of the sexist jokes that the male colleagues made in the
office.

In a word, Savina struggled to model herself and to be modelled to become a specific
working subject in the creative department of the SOE. The work was not
challenging for Savina in terms of skills required (e.g replying emails in English,
preparing powerpoints, and accounting and reimbursements), but it was
miscellaneous and not ‘cool’ at all as Savina would have liked. She imagined a
creative worker as one who was well-educated and stylish, and could always
encounter something new and exciting; but when she herself became one, she
actually had to spend most of her time dealing with repetitive, boring, and trivial
parts of creative work. But no matter how tedious the work was, it demanded her
time, attention, and emotional labor – in a word, her subjectivity – at work. She
could not indifferently labour with her hands or computers, but had to spend time
communicating and cooperating with her workmates and customers. She was
expected to dress in a more feminised way, learn new things quickly, and understand
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and adopt a certain way of communicating at the workplace. Savina was under
constant demand to become the heterosexual subject demanded and refused to model
herself to become one. She was so uncomfortable and uneasy at the workplace that
she expressed the thought of resigning as early as in late August 2017 when she had
joined the company for just four months. In March 2018, Savina made up her mind
to resign from the SOE.

Savina experienced a short period of depression since April 2018, when her
girlfriend left Shanghai for Spain for a six-month training. Savina’s girlfriend, an
engineer in a foreign own tech company, was Savina’s spiritual support system. They
cohabited together in Shanghai, and, except during work hours, they were always
together – playing games, going out for art exhibitions, concerts and so on. Thus,
when her girlfriend left, Savina was lost suddenly and had no idea of what kinds of
career path she could carve. Unlike her girlfriend who had schoolmates from a
prestigious university in Shanghai, Savina knew no one, except her girlfriend, in
Shanghai. She would go home immediately after work, and barely hang out with her
colleagues. Savina decided to take a two-month gap before hopping to the next job.
She first went on a trip with her girlfriend to Thailand for a week in March, and
returned to her hometown and stayed with her parents for a month in Xiamen. It
needs to be pointed out that the main reason Savina was not so anxious about finding
a job immediately was because she could always count on her family’s financial
assistance. Considering the low salary Savina made and the high cost of housing, she
barely had any savings from the past year of work. As she admitted, her parents
continuously sent money to support her life in Shanghai.

It was not easy for Savina to find a satisfying job. The jobs that she aspired to in the
CCI either required related professional backgrounds or had demanding
requirements. For example, in April 2018 I sent Savina a job advertisement posted
by Shanghai Power Station of Art (PSA), a state-run museum dedicated to
contemporary art in mainland China that was recruiting workers for the cultural and
creative department as well as the curating department. Excluding administrative
jobs, the jobs involving creativity, such as assistant curators and visual
merchandisers, not only required proficiency in English and related educational
backgrounds in publication or arts, but also demanded at least two years of related
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work experience in the field. Savina replied to me, ‘It’s impossible for me to get the
job. They are too demanding.’ As such, Savina found herself having to look for jobs
in a relatively low-value-added sector in the CCI.

Figure 18 Savina’s work desk in a co-working office in Jing An design centre (photo taken by the author, August
2018)

In May 2018, Savina obtained a job in a micro-publishing house, which was her third
job in Shanghai. The publishing company is located in the Jing An Design Centre
(jing’an sheji zhongxin), a three-storey creative hub a few blocks west of Jing An
Temple offering a co-working space for small creative businesses, designers and
freelancers. Including Savina and the owner, the company had three people in total,
working together in a 10 square meter office (see Figure 18). The owner, a woman in
her late thirties, started up the company in 2016, and made a profit through
subcontracting projects relating to publishing and advertising using her own
networks in Shanghai. In early August 2018, I conducted a follow-up interview with
Savina, asking for her thoughts and experiences on the new job. The first thing she
mentioned was the changing workplace. The SOE was a cubicle workplace, while
the publishing house was decorated like a living room displayed in Ikea. I was
invited to visit her office after dinner. The office was separated into three small areas
– one for the boss, one for workers, and one for visitors and customers. The
workspace was cramped but decorated with colourful flowers, bookshelves, bric-abrac, and an orange sofa that gave one a sense of cosiness rather than seriousness.
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But despite the home-like and cosy decor, the workers always felt supervised and
disciplined. Because of the limited space and the transparent glass doors, Savina felt
like she was always being watched. Her desk was right in front of her boss’s, who
could easily see what every worker was doing through the glass door; against her
work desk was another transparent glass door used for the entrance, where everyone
who passed the office could clearly see her iMac desktop. Hence, Savina never felt
‘relaxed’ at work, even though the workplace was decorated in that way; instead, she
always felt the uneasiness and anxiety of doing her job.

Figure 19 A corner of Savina’s workplace where a slogan, reading ‘YOU MUST CREATE’ hangs in the Jing An
Design Centre (photo taken by the author, August 2018)

Savina’s daily work schedules were quite contingent on the project that her boss was
working on. Depending on the projects, Savina had to accordingly learn new things.
This was because the projects were rather risky and unstable. Subjected to the
economic and political environment, these projects could suddenly be terminated.
For example, in September 2018 due to the trade war between China and the USA, a
project that Savina had been working on since May ended abruptly. After months of
long hours of working, she and another colleague suddenly had nothing to do in the
office, and were asked to take two weeks of vacation. When she returned to her
office from a week of travel to Hong Kong in October 2018, she was assigned a
brand new project related to editing and publishing. As such, Savina’s work was
always ‘only as good as her last project’.
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From May to early September 2018, Savina worked as a copywriter promoting a toy
brand from the USA. The project was subcontracted from a maternal and child health
app, which was sponsored by the American toy company. Savina was asked to write
two to four soft-sell advertising articles weekly for the toy brand to post on the app.
Every week, her boss informed Savina the products that needed to be promoted and
their key features. Then Savina would write an article that seemingly shared the
knowledge of child health and nurturing but actually aimed to promote the
commodities of the toy brand. For instance, one week she was asked to promote a
toy with the concept of cognitive development. Savina had to first search for articles,
both popular and academic ones, to learn about cognitive development herself, then
she used a more understandable and approachable language to write an article that
could actually inform the readers about cognitive development, and was at the same
time friendly and subtly promoted a toy product, ‘convincing’ its readers that the toy
was beneficial for the cognitive development of the child. That is, Savina needed to
combine professional knowledge with commercial information to promote the toys.
She needed to carefully balance spreading knowledge and advertising.

Having no experience of copywriting and no knowledge of maternal and child
health, Savina had a difficult time for the first two months. Except for several books
on parenting tips and child development provided by the company, no one taught her
how to write soft sell advertising. At the beginning, it took her a week to write one
article. Savina had worked long hours for five months in order to achieve the goals of
finishing two to four articles a week. She often worked from 9:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.
on weekdays, and sometimes she even went back to work on Saturdays. As such, she
hardly had time or energy for entertaining activities. As she said, ‘if I have my own
time, all I want to do is stay at home and lay down.’ In addition to the long working
hours, Savina also had to adapt to the new working conditions and new ways of
communicating. Working under her boss’ eyes in a 10 square meter office, she
always felt pressured to produce, and to be creative. Indeed, the slogan ‘You must
create’ hung next to her in the office (see Figure 19).

It was a painful process for Savina to adjust to the new work and a new working
environment. Savina never ‘voluntarily’ dedicated her life to her work, but she had
no choice as it was what work demanded. Changing her role from a ‘creator’ in an
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SOE to a copywriter in a start-up, she not only had to spend her time adjusting to the
new role, but also to fashion herself to learn new skills, new ways of communication
and cooperation. The contingent nature of work forced her to be contingent in her
daily life as well. Such contingent working conditions began producing unspeakable
physical and emotional pains. She admitted that she was depressed in the interview
in August 2018. Savina was so depressed that she had cried every night for two
months in a row. Her shoulders and back were hurting because of the long hours
seated in front of the computer. Ironically, the creative workplace, which was
designed to make workers feel more relaxed at work, not only did not change but
concealed the exploitative nature of the work itself. The Jing An Design Centre
where Savina worked had an outdoor terrace on the top floor, and a popular café on
the ground floor; but Savina seldom had time to relax in the terrace or have a cup of
coffee in the café during the working hours, and in her off-hours, she preferred to run
away from the workplace and return to her own home as soon as possible.

Home became a crucial space where Savina could cure herself of the anxieties and
pains experienced in the workplace. Specifically, Savina tried to resist the demands
of putting her whole life into work through re-establishing her life centering on a
family life that she and her girlfriend established in Shanghai. Their first home,
situated in a six-storey building near Shanghai Expo Park, cost them around CNY
4600 per month. According to Savina, the flat was old and dilapidated, and its
stairway was crowded with odds and ends from different residents. Savina’s mother
cried when visiting the place for the first time, saying that ‘this is not a place where
you should live’. After a year of the contract, they moved out to a new community
that more closely matched their middle-class status in November 2017. Their second
home with a monthly rent of CNY 4300 was a two-roomed flat located in a gated
community in suburb Shanghai. It took Savina 3 hours in total to commute between
her home and her workplace in central Jing An. Despite long commuting hours, they
were very satisfied with this new place, especially compared with their first home.
The community was clean and convenient and met their expectations for a ‘middleclass’ living arrangement.

Savina paid much attention to decorating and organising the home. In early January
2018, I was invited to stay with her and her girlfriend at their second home for two
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days, and got the opportunity to have deeper observations and understandings of
their daily life. The flat where they lived was decorated like an Ikea displaying room:
clean, organised and modern. It was full of modern household commodities,
including a Philips air purifier, a humidifier, a vacuum cleaner, a cloth iron, a coffee
maker bought from Italy, and various sized storage boxes from Muji, bedding sets
from Ikea, a set of PS4, and so forth. According to Savina, most of this stuff was
purchased through the online shopping platform taobao. Every corner was carefully
arranged: cables and remotes were stored in white boxes as Savina did not like the
messy look, washing detergent was kept in a white porcelain container, home
fragrance diffusers were displayed in the bathroom as well as the living room. In a
word, one could easily tell that Savina spent lots of time arranging and keeping the
house comfortable and in order. Savina would spend the whole day at home with her
girlfriend and her cat on off-days. They only occasionally went out for an exhibition
or music concert that they were really interested in, as they considered it too tiring to
travel several hours to the centre of the city.

An ordinary off-day for Savina and her partner began and ended at home. They woke
up at around 10 o’clock in the morning, and made some coffee for breakfast. Then
they fed their cat, and cleaned the cat’s litter box. They talked to, and played with the
cat, treating it almost like their child: they bought a condo, a litter box and different
toys for it, and spent more than a thousand a month just on pet food. Savina once
joked that ‘the cat eats better than me’. At lunchtime, like most of the interviewees,
Savina and her girlfriend ordered take-out on food delivery apps. If they prepared
meals themselves, very often, it was Savina who cooked and did the cleaning. After
lunch, they played video games together, their usual form of leisure in non-working
time. They would spend a whole day playing games, such as Persona 5 and many
other games they purchased at the PlayStation store. As huge fans of Hong Kong TV
dramas, they also watched these dramas together while having meals or before going
to bed. When they came to Hong Kong for travel during China’s National Holiday in
October 2018, they were only interested in two things: shopping and visiting
locations featured on the Hong Kong TV series that they loved.

Home was a place where Savina tried to establish a stable family life to resist the
precariousness and contingency of work. Savina herself was by no means aspired to
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sacrifice her own life to ‘lean in’ at the workplace; yet, she had to because the work
itself demanded her time, and her subjectivity. Whether voluntarily or involuntarily,
she had to fashion herself to flexibly adjust to new projects, new working partners,
and a new working environment. Precarious and contingent work practices require
workers to be precarious, flexible, and always ready for employability. Savina was
torn between the expansion of productive logic that extracted value from her
subjectivity and attempts to reclaim her soul and life for herself. She wanted to build
an intimate relationship around the home-centred lifestyle so that she could secure
her escape from the depression at work. She kept everything in the house in order,
and had a strong emotional dependence on her girlfriend. When her partner was
away for a work trip for six months in May 2018, Savina fell into a deep dark hole of
depression as she suddenly found out that only work remained. A stable relationship
was like a shelter where Savina could always return to heal and recover herself from
the pains she experienced at work.

However, just like work, love itself was also contingent. Their romantic relationship
was inevitably affected by their work. During the interview I conducted when they
travelled to Hong Kong in October 2018, Savina’s girlfriend revealed that she was
planning to buy a second-hand one-room flat in the Minhang district in Shanghai. I
asked them if it meant they would finally settle down in Shanghai. Her girlfriend
replied, ‘No. This house is just an investment, which I can make money renting. I’m
still not sure about my current job because the salary is not satisfying. I want to
explore more possibilities. Shanghai is too competitive, and too fast. Maybe I’ll go to
Hangzhou or Shenzhen to find a job someday.’ Savina, who was quietly listening
while her girlfriend was talking, said that this was her first time hearing her
girlfriend’s future plan. I asked Savina what her plan was if her girlfriend left
Shanghai and she replied ‘I don't’ know.’ In addition to the uncertainty about the
future of their work, Savina received increased pressure from her parents to get
married as she was about to turn 30 years old in 2020. Particularly, as the only child
of the family, Savina’s parents wanted her to carry on the family line. She was asked
to go on blind dates arranged by her parents every time she went back to Xiamen.
Savina and her girlfriend did not tell any of their colleagues, friends or families about
their relationship. When their families visited them in Shanghai, they pretended they
were just flatmates. But, as they advanced in age, they were facing mounting
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pressures to establish a normative heterosexual family. What would they do? How
could they maintain their relationship? They had no plan.

To briefly conclude, the similar contradictions caused by the expansive nature of
creative work are evident in Savina’s everyday struggle. Working as a wage earner is
understood as a necessary means for Savina to obtain independence. Having a job
means that she can have an independent income and be less reliant on her parents.
Work allows her to escape from the fixed future blueprinted by her parents, and take
back a certain degree of autonomy over her own life. Yet, at the same time, the
promise of independence comes at the expense of her own time and self in service to
the job. The work, particularly in the creative economy is characterized by
flexibility, precariousness, and individualism, requiring the labouring subject to pour
her soul into productive activities. Savina was by no means as ambitious as Luo
Haiyan, who made every attempt to carve out a career that put her in the top 10
percent elite of Shanghai: she was never willing to learn new skills in her spare time
merely for the sake of increasing her employability. But still, in order to get the job
done she had to dedicate her life to work. Even worse, at least in the case of Savina,
living for work was a necessity, without any guarantee for a promising future or
upward social mobility.

In addition to the dissolving boundaries between work and life, Savina also suffered
from the contingent nature of work. This is evident in the following two dimensions.
First of all, Savina was always in a precarious working condition where she could
only be as good as her last job. Over the time frame between November 2016 and
August 2019, Savina worked at 5 different jobs in Shanghai: one as an assistant for a
short-term project, one as a creator in a SOE, one as a copywriter/editor in a private
micro-publishing house, one as an editor in a small advertising firm owned by an
Italian and a Chinese, and the most recent as a store manager in an Italian bakery.
She has changed jobs every six months on average. And each time she changed jobs
she needed to learn new skills, new forms of communication, and adjust to new
working conditions. Besides, as work demands not only skills but also subjectivities,
Savina has continuously needed to fashion and model herself in accordance with
different work practices.
236

Secondly, as jobs and projects were often unstable and subject to the broader
economic and political environment, Savina had to continuously prepare for the
risks. One example was her job in the publishing house, where she worked on two
different projects. The first project that involved promoting an American toy brand
was terminated after several months because of the intense US-China trade war in
September 2018. The second project was to introduce children’s books produced by
IRH Press, a Japanese publisher which belongs to a controversial religious group
called Happy Science in Japan. Savina was worried about involvement in illegal
publishing activities, as she found out that Happy Science was not legally accepted in
China. She even consulted her friend, a lawyer, about the legal risks of continuing
this project. After consideration, she decided to resign. Her fourth job, where she
worked as a content editor in a small advertising firm, serves as another example.
She worked there for five months, then realised that her two bosses – one an Italian
and the other a Chinese citizen holding a US green card – were involved in various
entanglements and were in a huge amount of debt. So she resigned again. However,
it was Savina who paid the price for taking on these risks.

Furthermore, as examined, the work is not alienated from the worker, but is
constantly shaping the worker’s subjectivity. Taking the example of Savina, to adjust
herself to the contingent, precarious and risky nature of work she herself had to be
contingent and flexible. In this way, the contradictions of dissolving the boundaries
between life and work are accordingly working on and embodied in the labouring
subject. Savina expressed the unbearable demands of dedicating life to work through
emotional illness and body pains. But she was not merely a victim of the ongoing
expansion of work into her private life; she had recourse to negotiate and resist the
overwhelming demands of production.
Relying on her family capital was Savina’s fundamental means of negotiating and
resisting the contingent life. Since the early 1980s individuals have been pushed to
detach from the state, and to rely on herself/himself to make a living in the market as
detailed in section 1.3 of chapter 1 and 2.1.3 of chapter 2; yet, pushing individuals to
be more self-reliant constitutes, drawing on Lisa Adkins (1999), a process of ‘retraditionalization’ wherein individuals re-attach themselves to traditional supports,
such as the family. This is evident in Savina’s experience. It was precise because of
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the support from her affluent family that Savina was able to weather a risky and
precarious lifestyle in Shanghai. She clearly knew that she could always count on her
parents, and hence was able to afford to job-hop five times in three years without
worrying about where her next meal was coming from. She once said in an interview
that, ‘If I couldn’t make it in Shanghai, I could still go back to Xiamen to inherit my
parents’ legacy.’ Savina also relied on her family’s financial help to maintain her
present middle-class lifestyle in Shanghai. Savina’s monthly salary after tax at the
lowest was only CNY4,000 and at the highest was near CNY 10,000, which certainly
was not sufficient to pay off her parent’s investments in her education. Except for
housing, dining and commuting fees, she had various types of fixed spending:
keeping a cat cost a thousand per month for pet food; a gym membership of about
CNY 2,000 per year, a weekly personal training course at CNY 300 per hour,
travelling, and shopping. That is, deducting rent payments between CNY 2,300 to
CNY 3,000 per month, Savina could only just make ends if she relied on her monthly
salary, without being able to maintain her level of consumption. Therefore, Savina’s
ability to shoulder the precariousness and risks of her job choices while maintaining
her middle-class lifestyle was largely dependent on her family.
Savina’s second equally significant recourse was the home that she created with her
girlfriend. As examined above, home was the place where she tried to re-establish
stability to balance the instability and contingency she experienced at work . But
what kind of home did Savina try to establish? Paradoxically, it was both similar to
and different from that of her original family back in Xiamen. It was similar in the
way that she anticipated a stable and middle-class family life like that of her parents.
Savina moved to Shanghai to work independently, aiming to escape the predictable
life her parents had blueprinted for her; but at the same time, when she created her
own life in Shanghai, she imitated the home- and consumption-based lifestyle of
stability and security. A gendered division of labour also existed in the ‘family’
Savina and Ellen created. For instance, Savina did the majority of the housework,
such as cleaning, tidying, organising, cooking et al, while Elle rarely did. In regard to
the differences, as lesbians born in post-1990s, Savina and Ellen both worked as
wage earners, and considered work as an indispensable part of their subjectivity,
whereas Savina’s parents, who were born in the 1960s, followed the family model of
men as wage earners and women as homemakers. Besides, given the fact that
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Savina’s relationship does not fall into the normative heterosexual nuclear family
model, Savina will not be able to ‘institutionalise’, and, thus, ‘stabilise’ her
relationship with Ellen through marriage.

Indeed, in circling herself within a household, Savina was creating a highly
individualised, consumer-oriented and depoliticized lifestyle. In their daily life, they
knew they were ‘different’. They had to refrain from expressing love and affection,
such as kissing or cuddling, in public and in front of their colleagues, friends and
families; they pretended that they were just good friends and flatmates. But it seems
that such daily struggles did not bother them. Although they self-identified as
lesbian, they did not get in touch with any local LGBT communities in Shanghai, and
showed not interest in participating in any cultural or political campaigns or
assemblies related to the rights of LGBT groups. For instance, I shared with them
information about Shanghai Pride (an annual LGBT pride event that takes place in
Shanghai), and screening events on lesbians in Shanghai, but they never participated.
Savina and Ellen encircled themselves within an isolated unit, where their lives
revolved around household consumption and household activities, and were only
concerned for their own well-being. But the present harmonious stable life is pretty
fragile and could be easily disrupted. The future is something they avoided talking
and thinking about. They just wanted to live in the present.

Savina embodied several pairs of contradictions. Firstly, she contradictorily absorbed
the precarious nature of work. On the one hand, she rejected stable work from within
the system, and chose to embrace a more flexible and thus precarious pattern of
work; on the other hand, she was inevitably subjected to and suffered from this
pattern of work, as she was required to put her life and economise her whole self in
order to be considered as a qualified worker. Secondly, the contradiction between
human capital and worsened working conditions is obvious in Savina’s lived
experience. The flexible, precarious and contingent nature of work forces her to hop
from one job to another, and prevents her from carving out one successful career
path. That is, she can only be as good as her last job. She was not able to convert her
high human capital (e.g. a postgraduate degree, and four years of experience in Italy)
into a promising career.
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This relates to the third contradiction between the normative value of pursuing selfreliance and the impossibility of completely achieving it. Savina was able to become
an independent wage earner in Shanghai, but could not rely entirely on her income,
and had to depend on family support. For young women, metropolises, such as
Shanghai, are both inclusive and exclusive: they include young, educated middleclass women as an indispensable part of the workforce, but at the same time leave
them to navigate the precarious and contingent work and life on their own.

Lastly, Savina both refused and longed for a stable family. While she distanced
herself from the normative heterosexual family that her parents established, she tried
to stabilise her romantic relationship with her partner as a bulwark against the
precarious and risky work experience. But her non-normative romantic relationship
is not stable. Considering the broader context of the state’s strong promotion of the
second-child policy, Savina, as the only child of her family, will have to bear
increasing pressures to reproduce a heterosexual family. How will Savina lead her
life and maintain her romantic relationship with her girlfriend in the future? The
answer is not clear. What is clear is that, unlike millions of working class people who
have no access to the city and have no home to return to, Savina – as a highly
educated member of the middle class – at least can still manage her life in
cosmopolitan Shanghai at this moment, even though she has to learn to accept an
unpredictable existence.

To conclude, this chapter aims to explore the production of the labouring subject in
the creative economy. The new aspirational woman is located in the megalopolis,
such as Shanghai: she is not only young, she’s fashionable and has high cultural
capital and economic capacity for consumption, which can be seen in the
representations in the 1980s and 1990s; but, more significant, she is an
entrepreneurial subject, who is expected to be self-reliant, and constantly fashion and
invest in herself to increase her employability. This chapter examines the changing
hegemonic representations of young educated women from the 1980s to the present
and argue that there is a new gender order in China’s new phase of economic
development, which prioritises young, educated women’s role as wage earners over
their role in maintaining the reproductive household. Paid work is placed at the
centre of constructing the subjectivities of young, educated urban middle-class
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women. It deserves notice that the normative work represents changes from the
material production in industrial sectors to immaterial production in the service
sectors, which has been viewed as ‘women’s work’ since the initiation of reform and
opening-up. In Women in Shanghai, the normative and paradigmatic work for young,
educated women features flexibility, precariousness and informality. The cultural
representations of women shift their emphasis from women’s domestic role as
mothers and wives in Fashionable Red Dress on the Street and Elle to their role as
wage earners in Women in Shanghai. Women in Shanghai not only celebrates that
women can be ambitious wage earners just like men, but also encourages young
women to devote their lives to work, which, according to the web drama, would
promise young, educated women better partner choices and better status when they
establish their own families. Moreover, work is associated with the notion of selfactualization and independence. Women in Shanghai romanticizes excessive
attachment to work as a way for young women to achieve independence and lifework balance. Thus, the recent cultural representation constructs a new aspirational
subject-position for young educated women, who are expected to be ambitious
workers.
Yet, the rosy representation of women’s excessive attachment to work conceals the
contradictions on the level of social reproduction and the unspeakable pains that
young, educated middle-class women experienced in their daily life in urban China.
Hence, this chapter shifts its focus to ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai to explore
the lived experience of young, educated women in urban China. The fieldwork
reveals that young, middle-class women contradictorily position themselves. On the
one hand, they conform to the subject-position produced in the hegemonic
representation. In other words, they prioritize their role as workers over their
maternal roles, and consider work crucial in obtaining independence and selfactualization. In order to increase employability, young educated women constantly
fashion themselves, both their appearances and skills, and manage their human
capital. Living for work is considered necessary to be viewed as qualified workers.
On the other hand, young, educated urban women have clear views that exchanging
their lives for work would not guarantee a promising future. It is illusional that they
could rely on themselves to purchase a property in Shanghai or achieve upward
social mobility, especially considering that Shanghai has more demanding rules for
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obtaining its hukou with the introduction of the point-based household registration
system in 2013.

From the cases of Koki and Savina, it is prominent that the love and passion they
invest in work is also detrimental. They are subjected to excessive attachment to
work, but continuously negotiate and resist it. Koki is undoubtedly passionate and
willing to fashion herself for her work and is rewarded with a high salary; yet, at the
same time, she suffers from this excessive passionate attachment to work. One of the
biggest pains she endures is the difficulty of maintaining a romantic relationship and
building a family of her own in Shanghai, in spite of her eagerness to do so. Koki
tries many strategies to resist the expansion of her work into her private life, such as
travelling and performing negatively at work. She also refashions herself into a more
feminised figure through consumption to make herself more qualified; meanwhile,
she questions this normative femininity in the workplace. Savina represents the other
side of the story. She does agree that work is indispensable, but is never willing to
put her whole life into her work. Yet, she has to. She not only has to give her time to
work, but also her soul. Ironically, the reason she ‘chooses’ flexible work in the
creative economy is that she wants to have more autonomy in her work. As a way to
resist, she constantly changes jobs – indeed, she has changed five jobs within three
years – trying to escape from the over-expansion of work into her life. But, the result
is not satisfying. The constant job-hopping prevents her from carving out a stable
career, and, even worse, forces her to start all over again. That is, she has to fashion
herself to fit in the new working environments and learn new skills whenever she
changes jobs. The command that ‘You Must Create’ makes life so difficult for
Savina that she experiences depression. She tries to establish a home-centred
lifestyle, where she reorients her focus on her girlfriend and her cat, to reclaim her
life and escape from the excessive attachment to work.
The resistance strategies that Koki and Savina attempt are inevitably individualistic
and depoliticised, which may alleviate their pains on a personal level to a certain
extent, but cannot completely solve the intrinsic contradictions they experience
between the production and social reproduction. Specifically, the new gender order
positions young educated women primarily as wage earners; yet it does not challenge
the gender norms, as examined in the representations, that young educated women
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are still expected to bear the burden of social reproductive duties, such as
childbearing and domestic labor
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Conclusion: Working for ‘Good Life’ in the time of ‘New Normal’?
President Xi Jinping’s formulation of family values and the ‘Chinese Dream’ has reoriented women’s position in China in recent years. Xi’s campaign to reinforce
traditional family values is explicitly bound up with his concept of the Chinese
Dream, which has two general goals – the material goal of China becoming a
‘moderately well-off society’76 by the 100th anniversary of the CCP in 2020, and the
modernization goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by the 100th
anniversary of the PRC in 2049. Considering family as the basic unit of the nation,
Xi believes that the actualisation of Chinese Dream – namely to build a prosperous
and strong nation and achieve national rejuvenation – hinges on maintaining the
prosperity and harmony of each individual family (Xinhua, 2016a).

That is, the Chinese Dream is built on nationalistic sentiments and practised by
‘moderately well-off members of society’ (Wielander, 2018). Xi states: ‘a family is
the smallest nation, and a nation is made up of tens of thousands of families’
(Xinhua, 2018c). He calls for the 400 million families in China to strive for the
Chinese Dream through ‘integrating their personal family dreams with the Chinese
Dream of national rejuvenation’ (Xinhua, 2018b). The emphasis on the integration of
family with the nation implies the expansion of state power and influence on the
individual family. The family has always been a crucial site of reallocating women’s
position throughout the twentieth century in China, which has been discussed in
chapter 1.
Yet, it was women’s role in the family which Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream integrates.
Xi’s formulation of family values primarily weighs women’s maternal roles as
virtuous wife and good mother in maintaining the well-being of the household.
Calling attention to ‘the family, family education, and family values’ (jiating, jiajiao,
jiafeng), Xi reasserts the importance of enhancing Chinese ‘traditional’ family values
and virtues in caring and educating children and practising filial piety (xiao)
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‘A moderately well-off society’ is where all citizens, rural and urban, enjoy high standards of
living. This includes doubling the 2010 G.D.P. per capita (approaching $10,000 per person) by about
2020 and completing urbanization (roughly one billion people, 70 percent of China’s population) by
about 2030.
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(Xinhua, 2016a). As Hird (2017) points out, this construction of ‘neo-familism’
places ‘parent-child relations and the rise of intergenerational intimacy as focal
points of contemporary Chinese life’. Thus, women are incited to shoulder their
‘unique role’ in the family – namely, to educate children and to take care of the
elderly in the family. In Xi’s description of a perfect model family, a husband is like
the backbone, the material provider, of the family, while a wife functions as a glue to
bind the family together and ‘harmonizes’ the family.

Emphasizing their maternal roles within the family, Xi was keen to promote women
through exemplary female figures. In a conference to honour model families across
the country on December 12, 2016, Xi cited three classic stories. The first one is the
mother of Mencius, who moves her houses three times to provide a good educational
environment for Mencius. The second example is the mother of General Yue Fei,
who educates and encourages Yue to fight for the country. The third one is a mother
who writes on the sand with reeds while teaching her son. On another occasion at the
Spring Festival gathering in 2015, Xi recited the poem ‘youzi yin’ (Song of the
Wanderer), which describes the story of how a loving and ‘kind’ mother stitches a
coat for her journeying son (CCTV.com, 2019). In addition, Xi also uses his own
family as an example to demonstrate the family values he promoted. After the
Eighteenth National Congress of the CCP, Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan are often
seen together publicly at important events. While he represents himself as a filial
son, a husband, a father, and the leader of the nation,77 his wife Peng Liyuan, a folk
singer who gives up her own career for her husband, is presented as a perfect and
virtuous wife and mother who has a fashionable and feminised appearance.
Xi’s speeches deliver the clear message of what a woman is expected to be in today’s
China. Without exception, all the women mentioned above are wives and so-called
‘cimu’ (loving and kind mothers), who devote themselves to nurture and educate
children as well as to conduct care labour for the elderly of the family. In other
words, the women’s role is almost exclusively positioned in the household ‘to create
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A short video, entitled ‘jiaguo tianxia’(family, nation, and the world), is an self-evident example of
Xi’s formulation of family values and the Chinese Dream. See:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsAuVLkyX6g
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and maintain strong ties between the generations’ (Harrell and Santos, 2017). The
cross-generational communication between parents and children and the caring
labour for the elderly are all naturalised as the female domain, which features the
‘feminisation of intimacy’ as discussed by Harriet Evans (2018). Hird has aptly
argued that ‘Xi’s Chinese Dream intertwines nationalism and masculinity through its
models of patriotic manhood and exalted motherhood’. In such a way, Xi’s
formulation of family values marks women as the natural mother and wife to
undertake domestic and care work in the family and to reproduce labour power for
the nation.
The conservative views on women’s roles in the family are resurgent against the
background of the rapidly ageing society and the lack of sufficient working
population in China. By 2050 the UN forecasts that there will be over 300 million
people over 65 of age in China, which is expected to reach 39 per cent of the
population by 2050 (China Power, 2016; Szonyi, 2015). Meanwhile, China’s birth
rate dropped again in 2018, marking the lowest in China since 1961 (Leung, 2019).
The growing ageing population and the decline of birth rate mean the shrinking of
the working-age population capable of providing labour force and home care for the
elderly. This not only threatens national economic growth, which depends on a large
pool of labour supply, but also challenges the government’s ability in strengthening
the social welfare system and providing resources for the needs of the elderly.
Meanwhile, China’s government introduced the two-child policy in 2015, targeting
young women’s wombs and inducing them to reproduce labour power for the
country (Fincher, 2018). The state media echoed the policy with headlines such as
‘Do Not Miss Out Your Best Years for Getting Pregnant’, urging women between
the age of 24 to 29 to give birth to children, and warning the danger of birth defects
if they miss out the best years (health.people.com, 2017; Sina.com, 2019). Young
educated women are the specific target of the latest campaign of the two-child
policy, as the CCP is counting on them to reproduce a new generation of skilled and
knowledge-based labour power (Fincher, 2018).
Meanwhile, the resurgence of conservative views on women’s maternal roles in the
official discourse has intensified the gender-based discriminations against women in
the workplace. Employers penalise female employees if they have children. Reports
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on how young women were dropped off the workplace because they got pregnant for
a second child are widely circulated in Chinese media (Zhu, 2019; Jianjiao buluo,
2018). The Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2018) released in April 2018 revealed that
‘men only’ or ‘men preferred’ is blankly published in a wide range of job
advertisements in both the private and public sectors in China. As section 2.3 of
chapter 2 has shown, women have been gradually marginalised in the formal sector
of employment in China.

Against this background, some scholars maintain that women are pushed back to
home to fulfil their maternal roles (see e.g. Fincher 2018; Hird, 2017).78 Yet, does
that mean they are returning to the ‘old times’ when women who stayed at home
conducted unpaid domestic and caring labour, and were economically dependent on
their husbands? Lisa Adkin’s (2012) analysis on women’s employment after the
financial crisis questions such point of view; rather than returning to old time, she
maintains that the economic recession makes visible ‘the externalization of
production, that is, the folding of the economy into society’ (ibid: 638). Adkins’
argument sheds light on understanding women’s work in urban China today. In
China’s context, while women’s labour has been positioned as a reserve or surplus
population throughout the twentieth century examined in chapter one, it is now a site
of potential and possibility which is at the centre for capital’s valorisation. The
resurgence of the conservative view in underlining women’s maternal roles does not
mean the return of women to home. Women have to work, which is obvious in the
analysis of the web drama Women in Shanghai in section 3.1 of chapter 3; the
question is what kinds of work are available for them.

While the official discourse incites women to be virtuous wives and good mothers in
the family and avoids addressing the intensified discriminations against them in the
formal sector of employment, it at the same time encourages women’s active
participation in ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’. In a press conference held
by the State Council Information Office, Tan Lin, vice-president of the All-China
For instance, in an interview with The Washington Post, Leta Hong Fincher (2018) states that ‘The
direction of the future is that women are supposed to play the role of wife and mother in the home’.
Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hold-in-your-belly--legs-togetherchinese-college-teaches-female-students-to-be-perfect/2018/06/25/c0e1205e-6a21-11e8-bbc5dc9f3634fa0a_story.html
78
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Women's Federation (ACWF), stated that ‘women are a major force of mass
entrepreneurship and innovation, which is often described as “She Power” (ta
liliang) (ChinaNews, 2019)’. Tan mentioned multiple measures taken by the
government to encourage and support female entrepreneurship and innovation. The
first measure is favourable tax policy provided by the ACWF and other
governmental departments to financially support women starting up their own
businesses. The second one is targeting young female college students. Special
service platforms have been established in universities to encourage and support
female college students to set up their enterprises. The last measure is holding
competitions on female entrepreneurship and innovation to ‘stimulate women’s
vitality and potentiality’. 79 In particular, the ACWF underlines that young educated
women are granted more opportunities and have more potentiality in the digital era,
because platform technologies ‘simplify female entrepreneurship choices and lower
the technology threshold’(Xu and Gao, 2019).
Following the state’s advocacy of women and entrepreneurship, the market also
enthusiastically promotes female ‘potentiality’ and entrepreneurship. For example,
Alibaba, the giant e-commerce company in China, has launched its biennial
Conference on Women and Entrepreneurship since 2015 under the governmental call
for ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’. Jack Ma, a co-founder of Alibaba
Group, continuously stressed women’s potentiality and ‘distinct’ advantages in
becoming entrepreneurs and in contributing to economic growth. In the third
conference on Women and Entrepreneurship whose theme is ‘The World She Made’,
Ma stated that, compared with men, women are ‘naturally’ more caring, good at
observing and learning from lived experience, and have stronger communicative
capacity, and thus they will have more opportunities to be successful entrepreneurs
in the future decades, which he called ‘the era of experience economy’ (Alibaba
news, 2019). In a report on female entrepreneurship and employment prepared
jointly by Alibaba group and ACWF, it induces women start-ups to ‘stand on the
digital platforms and tap the best entrepreneurial opportunities’, and to seize the
opportunity to ‘realise their full potential and achieve more progress’ (Xu and Gao,

For example, All China-Women’s Federation even creates an official website documenting the
competitions and forums on female entrepreneurship that they organised:
http://www.women.org.cn/col/col817/index.html
79
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2019). Another report put forth by the Chinese online platform 36Kr and start-up
incubator GirlUP in 2017 shows that female entrepreneurs in China concentrated in
the 21-30 age group and orchestrated for ‘She economy’ (36Kr, 2017).

Here, we see an interesting positioning of women in the current socio-economic
conjuncture in China. The other side of the emphasis on women’s reproductive role
is not returning women home, but to incite women to shift from employment to
entrepreneurship. Without enacting any effective policies in alleviating
discriminations against women in the formal sector of employment or providing
social welfare and protections for women who give birth to more children, the
government advocates women to exploit their potentiality for self-entrepreneurship.
Not only asked to reproduce labour power and conduct care labour within the
household but also to contribute to economic growth, young educated women thus
become the ideal subjects of entrepreneurial reinvention. As examined in chapter 2,
work under CCI is characterised by flexibility, informality, and the prevalence of
self-entrepreneurship, and thus particularly attracts young educated women, who try
to make every effort to lean in at the workplace while maintaining a family at home.
The prevalence of self-entrepreneurship in CCI dissolves the boundaries between
paid and unpaid work, reproduction and production, as well as life and work. Young
women could work at home and take care of their family at the same time. Home is
rewritten now as a site of productivity. It is in this sense that young women’s labour
is no longer positioned at the margin but at the centre of current modes of value
accumulation. While a review of women’s work history throughout the twentieth
century (see chapter 1) shows that women’s labour has constantly been treated as
reserve labour, it is likely that women’s labour is positioned as a site of possibility
and capacity under the current modes of capitalist accumulation in China.

The prevalence of entrepreneurship dissolves the boundaries between life and work,
inflecting all aspects of social life into the field of production. Work becomes an
extension of social life. Chapter 3 has examined how investing life for work is
widely shared among young educated women in urban China. They constantly
update and re-fashion their skills in order to craft their own employability. The
excessive attachment to work is often at the expense of ‘self-exploitation,’ to use
McRobbie’s word (2016). As revealed by the case of Koki and Savina in chapter 3,
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efforts putting life to work, whether ‘voluntarily’ or ‘involuntarily’, have resulted in
various unspeakable pains, including depression and anxiety. Putting life for work
also means the deprivation of time to establish and maintain a romantic relationship,
which is prominent in Koki’s story in section 3.2.1 of chapter 3.

Hence, we see a tendency that young educated women are pushing to not only work
but also live in a status of ‘precarity’. According to Hardt and Negri (2019: 84-87),
precarity can be understood in two senses: one refers to the precarious working
conditions in which workers are forced to work without guarantee and protections;
another sense of precarity, as Judith Butler (2015: 33) writes, ‘designates that
politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social
and economic networks of support more than others, and become differentially
exposed to injury, violence and death’. The concept of precarious life, writes Hardt
and Negri (2019:86), ‘aims to grasp how legal, economic and governmental changes
have increased the insecurity of already subordinated populations – women, trans
people, gay and lesbian populations, people of colour, migrants, the disabled and
others’. That is, precarity is differently distributed among different segments of
society (Lorey, 2015). Thus, it also raises the issues of the hierarchy of protection, of
whom are perceived as other and less worthy of protection (ibid.).
In China’s context, in addition to the working-class population who have long been
exposed to the contingent and insecure modes of living, the recent socio-economic
changes brought by the government make young middle-class women particularly
vulnerable to such precarious life. The official discourse, which integrates women’s
position in the family with the Chinese Dream, induces young educated women to
reproduce a new generation of ‘high quality’ (gao suzhi) labour power to ‘upgrade
and transform’ national production. Yet, it neither provides effective policies to
reduce discriminations against women in the workplace because of their roles of
childbearing and childrearing, nor enhance the social welfare system to relieve the
burden of care work women shouldered in the reproductive domain. Even worse, the
state calls for further marketization of the reproductive domain (see section 2.1 of
chapter 2) and pushes young women to exploit their potentiality to work and live in
precarity and contingency. The recent rise of creativity discourse is a prominent
example. The promulgation of creativity discourse embedded with the ethos of self250

entrepreneurship induces young educated women to work and live with limited
social welfare protections. The precarious and informal pattern of working life,
which used to be marginal in the labour market, now becomes ‘a new normal’ for
young educated women. Similar to what Lorey (2015:2) has observed in the western
context, in China, the state retreats its role as social welfare protector, and now
seemingly ‘proceeds through social insecurity’. Instead of safeguarding an already
relatively subordinated population, the state has increased the insecurity they
experienced.

As such, the official discourse joins forces with the market to orchestrate female
entrepreneurship as a magic solution, in some ‘cruel optimism’, to women’s
embodied contradiction between reproduction and production. The inflection of life
into work not only intensifies the contradictions young women embodied, but also
forces individuals to count on themselves to ‘privatize’ and bear all risks. The
withdrawal of the state’s role as social welfare provider and the continuous
marketisation of the reproductive domain transfers the social risks and
responsibilities of caring to the individual family, especially to women.
Consequently, as Nancy Fraser (2016) points out, the inflection of reproduction into
production further marketizes the social reproduction for those women who can
afford, and privatises for those who cannot.

Indeed, the inflection of social life into work should be understood within a broader
context of China’s path in relation to neoliberalism. Whether or not China can be
usefully characterized by neoliberalism involves a contested and controversial
debate, which is not the main concern of this research.80 Yet, literature from different
stances on neoliberalism in China identifies the significant role of the party-state in
guiding the neoliberalist process. In general, there are two bodies of literature on
China’s neoliberalism (for a recent review, see e.g. Weber, 2018; 2020): One hails
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For this debate, see for example, Ong, A., ‘Neoliberalism as a Mobile Technology’, Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers, 32, 1:3–8, 2007.; Huang, Y. S., Capitalism with Chinese
Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008);
Nonini, D. M., “Is China Becoming Neoliberal?,” Critique of Anthropology, 28, 2:145–176, 2008.;
Liew, L. H., “China’s Engagement with Neo-liberalism: Path Dependency, Geography, and Party
Self- Reinvention,” The Journal of Development Studies, 41, 2:331–352, 2005; Fulong Wu. ‘How
Neoliberal is China’s Reform: the Origin of Change during Transition.’ In Eurasian Geography and
Economics, 2010, 51, No.5, pp.619-631.
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China’s economic success resulting from the implementation of market-driven
reform and opening, but attacks China for the interventionist state in regulating
markets; another body of literature focuses on the social inequalities resulting from
the reform and opening, and criticizes China for the existence of authoritarian rule
(e.g. Ong, 2007; Dirlik, 2012; Pun, 2016a; Pun, 2016b; So and Chu, 2010; Wu,
2010). Both strands of literature recognise that the state still maintains, and even
increases, its control of society in the reform era even though it adapts neoliberalist
policy to a certain extent. The variation of neoliberalism regarding the combination
of state authoritarianism with neoliberal policies in China, or those implemented with
‘Chinese characteristics’, is recognised by many scholars (e.g. Rofel, 2007; Dirlik,
2012; So and Chu, 2010). 81 The party-state was the key agent in shifting the
landscape from class struggle and permanent revolution to one that prioritised
economic development in the late 1970s. As examined in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1,
the party-state initiated several neoliberalist policies to embrace the market and
integrate into global capitalism, which made China known for its role as the ‘world’s
factory’. In a similar vein, the introduction of CCI in early 2000s was also directed
by the state aiming at upgrading and transforming the economy from ‘Made in
China’ to ‘Created in China’, which has been discussed in section 2.1 and 2.2 of
chapter 2.

In this sense, the role of the state is critical in structuring the contradictions that
young middle class women experienced in their everyday life. In the time of new
normalcy when China’s economy has been slowing down, two parallel policies
implemented by the state have resulted in particularly significant impacts on young
middle class women: one is the project of ‘mass entrepreneurship and innovation’,
which incites the young middle class to shift from regular employment to ‘selfemployment’；and the other is the two-child policy, which encourages young
women to reproduce more labour force for the state. Through implementing these
two seemingly contradictory policies, the state is actually implementing a new

For instance, So and Chu (2010) use the paragon ‘state neoliberalism’ to describe the conditions in
which the state has been the dominant agent in enabling the market transition in China. Dirlik et al.,
also refuse to hail the so-called Chinese model, and argue that a ‘Chinese paradigm’ is more a variant
of new authoritarianism associated with the developmental experience of a number of Eastern Asian
States.
81
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normalcy for young middle class women: that is, pushing them to adopt the values of
precarity, informality and insecurity so that they can meet up the dual demands of
production and reproduction. Therefore, young middle class women become the new
ideal subjects of exploitation, whose flexibility is absorbed as a potential form of
value extraction. In this vein, without offering sufficient social protection for young
women, the state is transferring the contradictions and burdens left by four decades
of marketisation to the individual women and asking them to be as self-responsible
as possible.

Interestingly, in the cultural representation analysed in section 3.1 of chapter 3, the
state seems to retreat from the everyday life of young women in Shanghai.
Specifically, the three texts analysed in section 3.1 of chapter 3 portray young
women as self-regulated and autonomous individuals who are free from the
interference of the state and proactive in pursuing their own goals and freedom
granted by the market. In the movie Fashionable Red Dress (1984), it looks as if the
state no longer regulates their work and life. The protagonist Tao Xing’er seems to
throw off the shackles of the values imposed by the state in the socialist era, which
emphasizes women’s role in the field of production, and is free to decide about her
own life in the reform era. Instead of being presented as a repressed subject, she is
now a free individual who can refuse to sacrifice life for work and choose to pursue
femininity and love while enjoying the emergent urban life. Her transformation from
an androgynous factory worker to a fashionable feminised woman is represented as a
self-propelled process without the regulation from the state. Similarly, in the fashion
magazine Elle (1990s), the white-collar beauties ‘voluntarily’ choose to fashion their
appearance in order to obtain urban femininity through consumptions. In a
Foucauldian sense, it seems that the state does not coerce them to do anything; they
make decisions out of their own will. In the web drama Women in Shanghai (2018),
the protagonist Luo Haiyan is also self-motivated to continually upgrade her skills
and appearance in order to increase her employability in the advertising industry in
Shanghai. She actively invests her life into work, and finally becomes a successful
entrepreneur who not only has a career but also a harmonious family. In a word,
from Tao Xing’er to Luo Haiyan, young women are seemingly self-driven to develop
themselves to obtain fashionable appearance and upgrade skills, and the state does
not involve in their decision-making.
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In line with the representation analysed, the young women studied also barely
referred to the role of the state in conditioning their choices, but instead considered
themselves responsible for their own choices. Interviewees believed that they were
exercising ‘autonomy’ by refuting jobs deemed traditionally to be stable within the
system and choosing to embrace entrepreneurship to work more flexibly in CCI. As
shown in section 2.3 of chapter 2, investing life into work and embracing flexibility
are considered ‘natural’ individual choices. Interestingly, while the young women
did not consider the state as intruding into their daily life, they felt direct pressure
from their family instead. For instance, the government did not force them to have
two or more children; but the implementation of the two-child policy is translated
onto the level of individual family. Interviewees who are married tend to face
increasing pressure from their family, who continuously presses them to have
children. However, such pressure from family is not a pure coercion. Young women
also believed that they could acquire better bargaining power if they are
economically independent, as exemplified by the cases of Koki and Savina examined
in chapter 3.

The exercise of autonomy and freedom does not imply the absence of power.
Instead, the state in the Post-socialist era still regulates at a distance through the
expression of self-interest (Hoffman, 2006; Ong and Zhang, 2008). Such
combinations of the neoliberal logic and socialist sovereignty and of individual
choices and state objectives is termed ‘socialism from afar’ by Ong and Zhang
(2008: 10), who suggest that ‘China’s selective embrace of the neoliberal logic as a
strategic calculation for creating self-governing subjects will enrich and strengthen
Chinese authoritarian rule’. In this light, the young women of this research gain
increasing freedom to ‘choose’ to work flexibly in order to pursue their self-interests,
which happen to be regulated and controlled by the state. The practices of choice
‘work through the “autonomization” of social actors, establishing new norms of
behaviour and relations to the self’ (Hoffman, 2006: 554). Through developing the
capacities to make autonomous decisions, young middle class women are modelled
to become the self-enterprising subject, who are asked to be responsible for their own
choices and to bear all risks and loss by themselves.
254

Shaped by the coexistence of self-governing practices and state regulations,
entrepreneurship is normalised as a ‘natural’ daily language in young women’s
everyday life. To be more specific, the call for ‘mass entrepreneurship and
innovation’ engineered by the state normalises flexibility and precarity as a new
employment landscape which further transfers the risks to individuals; but it is
offered as an empowered choice for young middle class women who try to meet the
dual needs of paid work and childcare duties. The naturalization of entrepreneurship
discourse is especially obvious among married interviewees (see section 2.3 of
chapter 2). For instance, the UX designer ZY kept deferring to having her first child
in order to avoid discriminations against women with children at the workplace. But
after deciding to have a child, she automatically viewed working from home as an
optimistic choice to balance the need of work and child caring. Another interviewee
WP, who had given up her formal job as prepared for pregnancy, also sought to run a
start-up so that she could work more flexibly to better combine paid work and
reproductive duties. It is in this sense that the seemingly abstract neoliberal language
is translated into everyday language and mindset. Thus, as argued in chapter 2,
entrepreneurship is ironically implemented as an alternative to young middle class
women who embody the contradictions between production and reproduction. It does
nothing but further deepens the contradicted working and living conditions that
young women faced.

Working for ‘good life’: Dreaming the Chinese Dream

Then, why could young middle-class women accept and endure the flexible and
contingent pattern of working life? The present research suggests that they still
anticipate a better future and hold the hope of future returns, even though such a
future is endlessly deferred. During the interviews, I often asked young women their
thoughts on their future. While they were unsatisfied with their working conditions,
and worried about the uncertainty of the future, they still believed that they could
make it in megacities in China. Such an optimistic view of the future is often
represented through comparisons with their friends or colleagues. For instance, Yali,
one of the interviewees presented in chapter 2, told me that a friend of hers, who, just
like her, was a fresh graduate and had not much professional working experience,
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earned over CNY 20,000 per month. The reason why her friend could receive that
high salary while she could not, she believed, was that her friend knew how to do
self-branding. Hence, she told me that if she could learn more about self-branding
and accumulate more experience, she can also earn that kind of salary. Such
comparison is widely shared among the participants of this research. The common
mindset is that ‘if others can make it, why can’t I?’
The interviewees often linked their expectation of the future with China’s overall
economic condition. On the topic of their individual plan for the future, they mostly
referred to China’s economy, which they believed ‘is developing rapidly (zhongguo
jingji zai gaosu fazhan)’. This suggests that young educated women considered
China as an economically prosperous nation and held the hope that they could
benefit from its economic development, and became the ‘moderate well-off
members’ in urban China. Thus, to a large extent, their imagination of a good life
mainly concerns the material aspect. This is the fundamental force that allows the
young middle class women to endure the worsened working conditions and
continuously improve their human capital. It is in this sense that the ‘Chinese Dream’
is rather compelling. ‘Chinese Dream’ is not merely propaganda that washes over
people; it is not just coercion. Young educated women of this research are convinced
by the ‘Chinese Dream’, insofar as it brings the economic promise of building a
‘moderately well-off society’. In other words, the young educated middle-class
women remain optimistic that they have the resources to actualize their ‘dreams’ of
living a prosperous ‘good life’.
It is through acts of self-interest that the seemingly abstract contents of ‘Chinese
dream’ is substantiated and strengthened. To be more specific, young middle class
women’s prior pursuit of individual prosperity through the practices of choice (of
work over marriage, for instance) helps to actualise the optimizing goals of
governing with targets on the achievement of national prosperity and national
rejuvenation that Xi asserts. Although the interviewees often associated individual
prosperity with the nation’s, they did not express the kind of patriotic attitudes
Hoffman (2006) finds among the group of professionals who combine neoliberal
ideas of self-development with the late-socialist version of patriotism. For these
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young women, the reason for self-development was mainly a vehicle for pursuing
self-interests rather than serving the country.

Intriguingly, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of the Chinese dream Xi
formulated is to achieve national rejuvenation, individual versions of such a dream
are eventually for migrating overseas. While the aspiration for transnational mobility
is widely shared among the interviewees, it is missing in the representation of Luo
Haiyan of the web drama Women in Shanghai. For the young middle class women I
interviewed, their imagination of a prosperous good life to live outside of China,
often in the UK, Australia, U.S, or European countries. Many interviewees expressed
their thoughts of migration to other places in future when they could be well-off
enough. Especially for those who once studied abroad, the desire to settle down in
western countries was strong.

For instance, interviewee Yali, who often compared her working and living
experience in Shanghai with that of London, constantly expressed her yearning for
migration to the UK (See the analysis of Yali’s interview in section 2.3 of chapter 2).
Frequent overtime work made her feel that there was no life in Shanghai outside
work. But London for her was a far more fascinating and inclusive city where she
believed she could dress as she liked and faced less discriminations against women at
the workplace. Everything in the UK was rosily pictured, except that she could not
find a job sponsoring her application for a UK work visa. It seems that Yali believed
that Shanghai was only a temporary site to accumulate working experience and
develop her skills. Her ultimate goal was to find a job in London. Thus, Yali’s
version of ‘Chinese Dream’ is to accumulate experience and upgrade skills in
Shanghai, and then migrate to London.

Similar versions of such a dream are told by other interviewees introduced in chapter
2. Saisai was also thinking of migrating overseas through studying. She thought she
had more freedom and choices other than income growth in countries like the UK,
the US and Australia. WP, who lived an affluent middle-class life in Shanghai, was
also considering moving to Hong Kong. She wanted to study there and give birth to
her first child there in near future. GXJ wanted to migrate to Europe to live a less
stressful lifestyle, just like many of her relatives did.
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Thus, ironically, the charm of ‘Chinese Dream’ is not found in ‘China’ but
‘elsewhere’. To a certain extent, the yearning for migrating overseas indicates that
young middle class women were not fully satisfied with pursuing individual
prosperity as a sole goal of life. Income growth is significant, but they also desire for
more. Indeed, the prioritization of material well-off does not mean that young middle
class women were unaware of other aspects of social life. Sometimes interviewees
would express their dissatisfaction with public issues. In the summer of 2018 when I
was about to finish the fieldwork in Shanghai, a Chinese vaccine maker was found to
produce and sell defective vaccines, which once again angered many netizens and
frayed trust in public health in China. Some young women mentioned the scandal
during the interview, gently criticising the low quality of life. In addition, Chinese
dream not merely creates aspiration that incites young middle class women to work
for, but also generates anxieties. As the prices and costs in housing, education, and
health care escalate, work is becoming more precarious and insecure. It makes the
young women concerned anxious and wonder if they could secure their social
position in Shanghai. Some of them were even thinking of leaving Shanghai and
moving to second or third-tier cities to live and work.

Possibilities of Resistance: Can Young Middle Class be a Force for Social
Change?

When the young middle class women see slimmer chances of achieving individual
prosperity, how long can they endure the worsened working life? As this research
shows, they did try to negotiate and resist the contingent and precarious patterns of
work and life; yet, under the highly individualised cultural and social conditions,
they tend to use individualised and de-politicized ways of resisting discussed in
section 3.2 of chapter 3. One common way they adopted is to prioritise their work
over family and defer marriage and childbearing. They believe that work gives them
a sense of security to confront the precarity of life, whereas marriage and
childbearing disadvantages them in the workplace and deteriorates their lives. Such
point of view is not limited to the participants of this research, but is widely shared
by many young women. In a post entitled ‘The Best Time for Women to Get
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Pregnant is between 22 to 28; When Do You Plan to Get Pregnant?’ published by
China News on weibo, young women flooded in the comment section, and said ‘no’
to pregnancy (China News, 2019). One obvious example is the failure of the twochild policy (Gietel-Basten, 2017). Despite the fact that the government changed its
rules to allow two children, the fertility rates of 2018 fell to the lowest level in more
than five decades in China.

Nevertheless, investing life for work and marriage deferment have not solved and
will not solve the contradictions young women experienced. As mentioned above,
the inflection of life into work turns the social reproductive domain into a site of
productivity. Due to long hours of working, young women mostly outsourced their
reproductive life to the market. One most apparent example is the popularity of
ordering food through online food delivery apps. Having no time or feeling too
exhausted to cook, almost all young women of this research order meals online on a
daily basis. Except for recourse to the market, another way to negotiate and resist the
risky and precarious life is to reattach themselves to the families they grew up in. For
the young single women of this research, they heavily rely on their parents’ financial
support to maintain their life in Shanghai; for those young married women who have
children, they would resort to their parents or husbands’ parents to share the
childrearing and domestic work. That is, individuals have to use their own economic
and social capitals to solve structural problems. Thus, in order to accumulate more
capital, you have to work more; but more work does not guarantee more returns.
Such individualised and privatised culture also gives rise to mental stress, such as
depression and anxiety. The young women tend to internalise their pains as
‘personal’. Interestingly, while effects such as passion, anxiety, and depression are
often articulated, anger is rarely expressed or ‘allowed’ to be expressed by young
women.

Given such contingent and individualised social conditions, how can we find new
possibilities for political struggles? As many have pointed out (e.g. Lorey, 2015;
Hardt and Negri, 2009; Gorz, 2010), it is impossible to completely capitalise the
whole social life and the whole subjectivity. Lorey (2015: 103) aptly argues that
‘modes of subjectivation are not always subsumed into normative political and
economic calls for flexibility, mobility and affective and creative work’. Indeed,
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facing flexibilized and contingent working and living conditions, young women do
not entirely conform to the valorization of social life and modes of subjectivation
into capital. Living and working in contingency does not just mean being exposed to
the insecurity, but at the same time articulates ‘the potentiality of exodus and
constituting’ (Lorey, 2015: 105). As Lorey (ibid.) puts it, the exodus from dominant
relations and from ways of being governed can be a constituent power.

Young women of this research try to deflect from the discourse of putting life to
work through complaining. They do not entirely correspond to unendurable demand
for the whole person to be involved in work, and complain about the long working
hours, the flexibilised and discontinuous working and living conditions. For instance,
in the salon I organised (see section 3.2 of chapter 3), participants from different
sectors of CCI actively talked to each other about their struggles of modelling
themselves for the need of work, and of living a life in Shanghai. The desires for
different forms of living and working condition were explicit through complaining.
Complaints, as Sara Ahmed (2019) poetically writes, ‘is an attempt to address what
is wrong, not to cope with something’. But what way can a complaint be turned into
‘a politicising process’? Or, in Lorey’s words, how can one turn a complaint into ‘the
common exodus’ from dominant relations?
To think of ‘the common exodus’ is to think of the possibilities of resistance. In
China, a broad range of collective resistance are well documented, including
struggles over land appropriation, labour abuse, religion, and environmental
destruction (Dirlik, 2014; Wright, 2019; Yang, 2005). Protests based on the internet
have drawn much attention with the emergence of social media platforms such as
weibo (see e.g. Yang, 2009; Yang, deLisle and Goldstein, 2016). Resistance is
practiced by different social groups, such as workers, peasants, journalists,
feminists, and so forth (Lee and Hsing, 2010). The economic miracle resulted from
reforming and opening over the past decades has come hand in hand with constant
social resistance. Scholars have noted that the market-oriented reforms have shifted
its focus on promising individual prosperity at the expense of political freedom since
the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests (Dirlik, 2014; Wright, 2019). This view
suggests that the political legitimacy of CCP is fundamentally reliant on its economic
development that buys consent and compliance; but once there is an economic
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downturn, popular social unrests are the likely consequence (Lee and Hsing, 2010).
Yet, some scholars (e.g. Lee and Hsing, 2010; Wedeman, 2019) criticise such a static
view for its insufficient recognition of the complicated and contingent nature of
social protests, which, as Lee and Hsing (2010) argue, are not a by-product of
economic slowdown, but have been developing for decades in China.

With the mounting structural contradictions imposed on young middle class women,
can they be one of the rebelling subjects? Resistance can be operated in different
dimensions – in a more organised form placed in a spectrum of ‘protest’, and on a
micro-foundation that is conducted and experienced by individuals. On a micro level,
prioritising work over marriage and complaining about worsened working life can be
understood as a form of resistance against the dictates of the state and the family in
young women’s everyday life. Yet, without collectively challenging and subverting
the dominant culture, such an individual way of resistance would further divide
women into those who have capital and bargain power to ‘choose’ and those who
have not. In this regard, the struggle on the cultural domain is increasingly
significant in creating public space for collective resistance.

When I conducted my fieldwork in Shanghai, the #MeToo campaign has started
gaining momentum on the Chinese Internet since January 2018. I have seen groups
of young feminists, the great majority of whom in their twenties and early thirties,
well educated (at least holding a graduate degree) and working or living in the cities,
actively and passionately discussing publicly in social media on various genderrelated issues, especially sexual harassment in different sectors of society. QYL, one
interviewee of this research who worked as HR for around a decade, gave up her
formal job because she was upset about the gender inequalities in the workplace. She
has started freelancing and created a Shanghai-based project called We and Equality
since 2016. The project organizes screening events, offline discussions, hosts a
reading group, and maintains WeChat groups, aimed for – in her own words –
‘empowering Chinese women and men to choose their lifestyles regardless of
gender.’82 The movies chosen for screening are relevant to gender issues, including
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QYL is very active in promoting herself both online and offline, see for instance:
http://www.feiy.co/organizations/48
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The Vagina Monologue, Miss Representation (2011, dir. Jennifer Newsom), She is
Beautiful When She is Angry (2014, dir. Mary Dore), Still Tomorrow (2016, dir. Jian
Fan), This is Life (sheng men) (2016, dir. Weijun, Chen). The topics for offline
discussions cover a wide range, including women’s working life, sex life, and body
anxieties (e.g. should we wear bra?; consumerism and feminism; gender
discriminations in the workplace). The WeChat group she maintained now has
around 200 members, most of whom are educated middle-class women in their
twenties and early thirties working and living in Shanghai. QYL’s project provides a
space for young women to speak out and share their experience with other women.
Such space is important in providing an opportunity to connect young women
together. Through meeting and talking together, each seemingly individual woman
could realise that her problem is not her own, but collectively shared. As QYL said,
she tried to create a community in which young women can support each other.

Nevertheless, it is not easy to maintain and enlarge such a community. In a
discussion on eating disorders organised by QYL, one participant who has attended
such discussions for multiple times questioned the meaning of participating. She said
that ‘We come here, sit together, and talk with each other; then, we leave separately
and return to our own ‘normal’ work and life. It seems nothing has changed.’ This is
the biggest challenge that such a project or organisation faces. A small scale of
discussion, complaining and sharing is important; yet, how to connect it with the
broader society? Moreover, given the fact that the participants of her project are
highly homogenized – who are almost exclusively young middle-class women, it
also limits its capacity of unfolding a kind of constituting power. Besides, the
tightening of social control in recent years also discourages QYL from expanding
and developing her project. She rigorously controls the total number of participants
of each offline discussion, and seldom directly critiques the government policies. In
spite of that, she has still been harassed by the police several times.

Indeed, the role of the state cannot be avoided when thinking about political
struggles in China. If ever there was such a thing as ‘Chinese characteristics’, it has
to be the distinct and invasive role that the state plays in almost all domains of social
life. To refer to Margaret Thatcher’s oft-quoted remark, ‘there is no such thing as a
society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.’ In China, the
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shrinking of the social is even more noticeable as the state has constantly expanded
its influence and power in every corner of society. Indeed, since 2015, China’s
government has tightened its grip on political activism, and detained over a hundred
of people, including feminist activists, labour activists, human right lawyers, and
NGO organisers (Chang, 2015; Hernández, 2019; Huang, 2017). The state
encourages young women to count on their own to live and work in ‘thin air’; yet, it
shrinks social and cultural spaces for women’s voices. One self-evident example is a
recent report on the different attitudes of China’s government toward two young
women’s campaigning for women’s rights (Yeung, 2019). One woman, who started
up an enterprise providing online sex education platform for adolescents, received
official policy and funding supports from the government, while the other young
women Xiong, a feminist activist, was forced to shut down her NGO Feminist
Voices, a prominent feminist social media account that had launched a campaign
against sexual harassment in China, on International Women’s Day in 2018. The
signal is clear: business is the only possible way for governmental support to resolve
social issues. Given the current political climate, the latest feminist movements in
China are critically important in shaping a new cultural battleground, which launches
feminist voices into the public domain, and brings the discussion to broader
segments of the society. The #MeToo movement has set off a firestorm in China,
spreading to a wide range of sectors, including academia, media, and NGO circles.
Young women from diverse backgrounds stood up and spoke about the issue of
sexual harassment.

The recent #MeToo movement, which is tightly related to the rise of a new wave of
feminist movement since 2012 in China, is particularly crucial in collectively
reclaiming the cultural and social space to resist the state’s representation and
regulation of women. Given the limitations of top-down initiatives, some young
feminists have stood out to launch feminist voices into the public discourse from
2012 on (Lam, 2019). These young feminist activists, who were college graduates
from different family backgrounds, were outspoken and creatively using public
advocacy methods – including performance art, media stunts, and social media – to
draw wider attention to severe gender discriminations. Over the past years, they have
advocated for a wide range of issues, such as domestic violence, employment
injustice against women, and sexual harassment in public spaces. Although the
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government has increasingly tightened its control over the society since 2015, we
still witnessed the rise of the #MeToo movement, which suggests that young middle
class women are a significant and a more visible social force. The severe
discriminations against women at the workplace and the shrinking social spaces
intensify the contradictions young middle-class women embodied. It in turn makes
young women more likely to stand out and speak out.
While the #MeToo movement is a significant ‘cyber’ rebellion against the
monolithic representations of young middle class women, it also raises the concerns
about ways of expanding and extending such struggles to the domain of social
reproduction so as to include more diverse social groups (especially the working
class) to resist the pervasive logic of economy collectively. As Nancy Fraser (2016:
116) argues, social reproduction is not merely about family-work balance, but refers
to reorganise the relation between production and reproduction: ‘for social
arrangements that could enable people of very class, gender, sexuality and colour to
combine social-reproductive activities with safe, interesting and well-remunerated
work’. That is, the struggles in the field of social reproduction can potentially unite
diverse social groups to fight together against the increasing precarious, informal and
insecure working and living conditions.

For the social group of the young middle class, it seems that they are also
increasingly dissatisfied with exploitative working life, which requires them to invest
all of themselves to work. One prominent example is the online protests called
‘996.ICU’ 83 in 2019, which was organised by a group of young middle class
workers in the tech industries. The name ‘996.ICU’ refers to ‘work by 996, sick in
Intensive Care Unit’, which means that if one follows the ‘996’ schedule working for
at least 60 hours per week, one is risking his/her health and may end up landing in
the ICU. In addition to the massive online protests, some tech workers also voiced
out their personal stories online. Li Hongyuan, who had worked at Huawei for 13
years, was arrested and detained for eight months after asking for severance pay from
Huawei (Kuo, 2019). A video game developer, a Netease employee of 5 years,
revealed in a WeChat post in November 2019 that the company NetEase forced him
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See, for example, https://996.icu/#/en_US; https://github.com/996icu/996.ICU
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to resign after he was diagnosed with an untreatable heart disease, and refused to
offer a severance package (Xu, 2019).84 In another WeChat post published in
November 2019, a young woman of post-1990s generation, claimed that she was
diagnosed with leukaemia after working at Miniso for 15 months (Sohu, 2019). She
said that she had worked overtime for more than 1,300 hours within 15 months,
earning only CNY 5,000 to 6000 per month. These stories raised anger among young
middle class professionals. On weibo, users posted the number ‘985, 996, 035, 251,
404’ to refer to workers like Li, who graduated from one of the country’s 985 top
universities, worked from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days per week, fired at the age of 35,
and detained for 251 days. The online anger on the current working conditions
indicates the insecurity of the young middle class, ‘who have never experienced an
economic downturn and have always thought they had more protections than lowpaid migrant workers’ (Yuan, 2019).

However, unlike #MeToo movement which has lasted for some time and mobilised a
relatively large number of young middle class women, the online protests against the
abusive logic of folding life for work is only a flash in the pan. Besides, the online
protests outlined above tend to orient toward improving their self-interests, rather
than struggling for an explicit and collective goal. The struggles for reorganizing the
relation between production and reproduction should include not only the middle
class but also other underprivileged social groups as well. For the working class, they
have already been experiencing the severe crisis of livelihood characterised by
precarity and are less protected by the state (Lee, 2019). We have seen in recent
years that the focus of their struggles tends to shift from recognition to social
reproduction, such as pension, housing, and livelihood (Lee, 2019: 73). For the first
generation of migrant workers who approach retirement age, they have demanded for
protecting their livelihood and retirement (ibid.). Informal workers, including student
interns, construction workers, and service workers (street vendors, domestic workers,
and dispatch workers) who ‘occupy the blurred boundaries between capital and
labor, employed and self-employed’, also struggle against the crisis of livelihood
(ibid.).
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For the game developer’s recounted experience, see
https://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/2019-11-24/doc-iihnzhfz1405328.shtml
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In this light, is it possible to re-invent new ways of working and living based on
struggles formed on multiple fronts? It is not enough to rely on a single group of
social forces alone to address the crisis of social reproduction. It is necessary to
imagine ‘a triple movement’ to forge a new alliance between emancipation and
social protection, and reinvent the current reproduction-production division (Fraser,
2016). Given the current conditions under which subalterns and women – as two
already subordinated social groups – are particularly exposed to living and working
in contingency with limited protection, we may deliberate on how to re-invent a
community based on collective and shared precarious experience, rather than
national identity, to constitute political struggles against the economisation of the
social. One blind spot of the current research is that the young women studied are
mostly from a middle-class background, meaning that they still have resources (such
as family capital) to bear the risky and precarious life. To a certain extent, they could
still maintain their middle-class life in urban China with recourse to their families,
even though they are struggling to achieve upward social mobility. If young middleclass women who have high cultural and social capitals are constantly threatened by
the increased insecurity, what about those women from the lower class and lowermiddle-class background and those who work and live in second-tier cities? The
contradictions resulting from the blurring of life and work are far more prominent for
them. Underpinned by the traditions of combining theory and practice, Cultural
Studies may contribute to providing resources to re-imagine a new possibility for
collective struggles.
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Appendix 1 List of Main Interviewees

1

Nam
e
CY

Ag
e
37

Place of
origin
Shanghai

2

Koki 29

Taipei,
Taiwan

3

ZRC

25

Anhui

4

CZ

27

Jiangsu

5

WP

30

6

Savi
na

28

Origin of
Tianjin;
obtained
Shanghai
hukou
Fujian

7

QY
L

30

Liaoning

8

Yali

25

Guangxi

9

ZRS

28

Anhui

10

Jack
ie

27

Jiangsu

Education
Master in
Journalism &
Communication
s, obtained from
Hong Kong

Formal and
informal jobs
Formal job:
Curator

Informal jobs:
e.g. independent
publishing
Master in
Formal job:
Design, obtained UX designer
from UK
Informal job:
Moonlighting
short-terms
projects
Bachelor in
Formal job:
Stage Design,
UI designer
obtained from
China
Informal job:
Managing an
online store
Bachelor in
Formal job:
Finance,
UI designer
obtained from
China
Master in Media Formal job:
&
Product manager
Communication Informal job:
s, obtained from Running an Airbnb
China
property
Master in
Formal job:
Linguistic
Copywriter
Studies,
obtained from
Italy
BA in Chinese,
Freelancer, founder
obtained from
of a project called
China
We and Equality
MA in Design,
Formal job:
obtained from
UX designer
UK
Bachelor in
Freelancer (make
English,
living through
obtained from
writing, conducting
China
short-term projects)
Master in
Formal job;
English,
Translator
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Marital
status
Married;
have two
small kids

Single

Single

Single

Married;
no
children

In
relationshi
p

In
relationshi
p
Single

Single

Single

obtained from
China

11

ZY

28

Jiangsu

12

PYL
(mal
e)

27

Chongqi
ng

13

30

Liaoning

14

Jami
e
(mal
e)
AY

26

15

CM

35

16

DY
Y

26

17

GY
X

26

origin of
Jiangsu,
migrated
to
Canada
Origin of
Henan;
obtained
Shanghai
hukou
Origin of
Chongqi
ng;
obtained
Shanghai
hukou
Shanghai

18

GXJ

34

Fujian

Informal job:
Moonlighting
short-terms
projects
Bachelor in
Formal job:
Design, obtained UX Designer;
from China
Informal job:
Selling handmade
products
Bachelor in
Formal job:
Design, obtained UX designer
from China
Informal job:
Moonlighting as
photographer
Master in
Formal job:
Design, obtained UI designer
from Singapore
Bachelor in
Engineer,
obtained from
Canada
Master in
Engineer,
obtained from
Italy

Married;
no
children

Single

Single

Entrepreneur, coIn
founder of a
relationshi
photography
p
studio/ Independent
film making
Divorced
Entrepreneur,
founder of a coworking space

MA in Media &
communications
, obtained from
UK

Product Manager

In
relationshi
p

Bachelor in
Chinese,
obtained from
China
MBA, obtained
from France

Senior copywriter

In
relationshi
p

Formal job:
Business developer
for an entertaining
studio

Single

Informal job:
Screenwriting
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19

20

21

MX
F

Sais
ai

31

26

Ann, 29
Wan
g

Shanghai

Master in
Branding,
obtained from
Hong Kong

Origin of
Zhejiang
;
obtained
Shanghai
hukou

Master in
Cultural Policy,
obtained from
UK

Origin of
Taiwan;
migrated
to
Shanghai
with
family

Master in
Cultural Policy,
obtained from
UK
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Formal job:
Account Executive
in an advertising
boutique
Informal job:
Managing a Yoga
store
Formal job:
Social media
manager
Informal job:
Moonlighting
short-term projects
Formal job:
Social media
manager

In
relationshi
p

Single

In
relationshi
p
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